Lincoln's Admiral

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Lincoln's Admiral Page 25

by James P. Duffy


  During the second week of April, Banks crossed the Mississippi from New Orleans and began a campaign against rebel forces there. Accompanying him along the numerous bayous that crisscross that part of Louisiana were four of Farragut’s vessels. Under the command of Lieutenant Commander Augustus P. Cooke, the light gunboats Estrella, Arizona, Calhoun, and Clifton fought their way along Bayou Teche and the Atchafalaya River, all the way to the Red River.

  On the evening of the same day that Porter had completed ferrying Grant’s men across the river so they could begin their march north, lookouts on the Hartford had spotted a steamer coming down the Red River. The alarm was given, and all hands prepared for battle. When the approaching vessel signaled her presence, the men aboard the flagship realized it was the Arizona, and gave a roaring cheer of welcome. A few hours later Estrella arrived with Cooke aboard. Cooke carried a dispatch from General Banks requesting assistance in preventing Confederate forces from reinforcing Alexandria, Louisiana, which Banks intended to capture. The general feared that enemy troops were to be transported to the city from the north by way of the Black River. The following day Farragut sent the Albatross, the Arizona, and the Estrella to close the Black River, which they did.

  After ferrying Grant’s army across the river, Porter would have preferred to return to Vicksburg to participate in the large, victorious campaign that was sure to draw the nation’s attention from the big battles being fought in the East. Instead he was instructed by Welles to move south, relieve Farragut of his command of the river above Port Hudson, and support General Banks’s campaign by sailing up the Red River.

  On May 4, Porter arrived at the mouth of the Red River with several of his gunboats. Two days later, Farragut wrote to Secretary Welles, “Feeling now that my instructions of October 2, 1862, have been carried out by my maintenance of the blockade of Red River … I shall return to New Orleans as soon as practicable, leaving the Hartford and Albatross at the mouth of Red River to await the result of the combined attack upon Alexandria, but with orders to Commodore Palmer to avail himself of the first good opportunity to run down past Port Hudson.”

  On the morning of May 8, Admiral Farragut left his flagship in the hands of Palmer, and boarded a gunboat for the long, roundabout journey up the Red River, through a series of bayous, and finally to his destination, New Orleans. Crew members aboard the Hartford crowded the decks and climbed into the rigging to watch Farragut leave. In a spontaneous demonstration of their affection for the man who had commanded them through so much, they cheered until they were hoarse. There were few dry eyes among those brave sailors, for many wept openly and unashamedly at his departure.

  Farragut’s arrival at New Orleans on May 11 was greeted with great surprise by the population, many of whom had hoped he would be trapped above Port Hudson forever. That day and the following, he wrote long letters to his wife. “You say you think I am getting too ambitious,” he wrote in reply to one of her letters. “You do me great injustices in supposing that I am detained here a day by ambition. I am much more apt to lose than win honors by what I do. My country has a right to my services as long as she wants them. She has done everything for me, and I must do all for her. The worst of it is, that people begin to think I fight for pleasure. I shall go to church tomorrow and try to return suitable thanks for the many blessings that have been bestowed upon me.

  “I hope Port Hudson will soon fall, and that will finish my river work. As soon as Mobile and Galveston are away, I shall apply to be relieved. But it is difficult to get off, as long as the country demands my services.”

  Farragut returned to Port Hudson on May 23, 1863, using the sloop Monongahela as his temporary flagship while the Hartford remmmained above the enemy batteries. He wanted to help make his hope of the town’s fall a reality by keeping up a steady bombardment of the rebel positions. The Union ships engaging in this action, in addition to the Monongahela, were the Richmond, the Essex, the Kineo, the Genesee, and four mortar boats. General Banks arrived the same day and prepared to assault the Confederate fortifications in the mistaken belief they were nearly abandoned. The attack on May 27 failed to capture the Confederate stronghold. With the Confederates completely surrounded by his 14,000 troops, Banks settled down for a siege. By the end of June, the 7,000-man garrison, under Major General Franklin Gardner, was forced to eat mule and horse meat, and some men even resorted to killing and cooking the large rats found near the camps. Farragut’s ships supported the siege by sealing off the river side of the town, and by bombardment of the defenses. Offered an opportunity to surrender, Gardner refused, claiming his duty “requires me to defend this position.”

  When word that Vicksburg had fallen reached the besieged rebels, Gardner sent a message to Banks asking for confirmation. Provided with the proof he requested, Gardner felt he had done his duty to the best of his ability, and surrendered Port Hudson on July 9, 1863. The Hartford and the Albatross steamed downriver once the Port Hudson batteries had been silenced. Eight days later the merchant steamship Imperial arrived at New Orleans from St. Louis, demonstrating that the mighty river was now truly in the possession of the Federal government.

  On July 10, Undersecretary of the Navy Fox wrote Farragut, “You smashed in the door in an unsurpassed movement and success above [Vicksburg] became a certainty.” A joyful President Lincoln wrote, “The father of waters again goes unvexed to the sea.”

  When Porter arrived at New Orleans on August 1, Farragut turned command of the entire river north of New Orleans over to him and steamed out of the Mississippi River aboard his beloved flagship. He was going home.

  REAR ADMIRAL DAVID Farragut arrived at the Brooklyn Navy Yard, across the East River from New York City, on August 12, 1863. The Hartford, the Brooklyn, and the Richmond were all in dire need of repairs. The flagship, which was the least damaged of the three, had been hit 240 times by enemy shot and shell during her nineteen months of service.

  Virginia and Loyall journeyed from Hastings-on-Hudson to meet Farragut. It was a tearful yet happy reunion for the couple, after so many months of absence and anxiety. The occasion was made even more joyful when Farragut was informed that Loyall had passed the entrance examinations for West Point and had received his appointment to the military academy. He was scheduled to enter on September 1, less than three weeks away.

  Farragut was hailed as a hero everywhere he went. The country was in a better mood than it had been in a long time. A month earlier, a Confederate army under General Robert E. Lee had been badly defeated in a three-day battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, and General George Meade’s successful Union army had chased Lee all the way back into Virginia. As a result of this stunning victory, New Yorkers were especially anxious to welcome home a true hero of the war. The Northern press had been reporting on Farragut’s activities up and down the river for over a year, and many people wanted a glimpse at him.

  Describing Farragut’s campaigns on the Mississippi River, one New York newspaper bestowed the title “American Viking” on him. It said that he had earned a name for himself equal to “the naval commanders of any nation.” A proud Navy Secretary Welles telegraphed a welcome home, and told Farragut he deserved a “respite from the labors and responsibilities which have been imposed upon you and which you have borne so heroically under difficulties and embarrassments which only the Department can know and appreciate.” The secretary said Farragut could report to him whenever he felt like traveling to the nation’s capital.

  Eighty-one of New York City’s leading citizens signed a letter exalting Farragut. In it they exclaimed, “The whole country, but especially this commercial metropolis, owes you a large debt of gratitude.” The Chamber of Commerce called the passing of the lower river forts and the capture of New Orleans “one of the most celebrated victories of any time.”

  A week after Loyall left Hastings for West Point, Farragut reported to Secretary Welles in Washington. Following a dinner party at which the admiral was the guest of honor, Welles wrote in his d
iary, “The more I see and know of Farragut the better I like him. He has the qualities I supposed when he was selected. The ardor and sincerity which struck me during the Mexican War when he wished to take Veracruz, with the unassuming and the unpresuming gentleness of a true hero.”

  Anxious to return to the Gulf and plan his attack on Mobile Bay, Farragut wrote his great friend, Commodore Bell, who remained with the blockading ships off the Texas coast, “I am run to death with the attention of the good people, but I am beginning to give out, as I am not able to bear my honors. I have not been able to have a day at home in a week.”

  The first of Farragut’s warships prepared to sail was the Richmond. The admiral informed Welles that he could steam to the Gulf in her and wait there for the Hartford. However, the secretary asked him to remain in the North until repairs to his own flagship were completed. The names Farragut and Hartford had become synonymous in the minds of the public, and Welles evidently didn’t want one to sail without the other.

  During his stay in New York, Farragut had occasion to dine with Russian Rear Admiral Lessovski, commander of two fleets, one wintering at New York, the other at San Francisco. The two rear admirals had met years earlier in the Mediterranean and had become friends. When Farragut asked Lessovski why he was anchored at American ports in relative idleness, the Russian explained that he was “under sealed orders, to be broken only in a contingency that has not yet occurred.” He then confided that he was under orders from the Czar to break the seals if the United States became involved in a war with a foreign power during the current rebellion. The implication was clear that the Russian Czar, Alexander II, planned to support the United States actively if it was attacked by either France or England. These two great European powers had more than once demonstrated their support for the Confederacy. Before the fall of New Orleans, it had been widely rumored that Napoleon III was anxious to enter the Civil War on the South’s side in return for Confederate recognition of his hegemony over Mexico. In London, Queen Victoria made little effort to conceal her personal attachment to the Confederate cause.

  In all the hubbub of social and official activities, Farragut never lost sight of his next objective, Mobile Bay. He repeatedly asked Welles and Fox to send ironclads and shallow-draft gunboats to the Gulf area so they would be available for use when he attacked the forts guarding the bay. On learning that several new Monitor-type ironclads had been added to Porter’s river fleet, he asked Fox to send some of them to New Orleans.

  By mid-December, the Hartford was ready to sail, but because there were not enough crewmen available, the departure was delayed. Things dragged on, as they did whenever Washington was involved, even when the nation’s highest-ranking naval officer was trying to get back to the war. What finally lit a fire under the Navy Department was an erroneous intelligence report that Admiral Franklin Buchanan was preparing to burst out of Mobile Bay in what many believed was the most powerful ironclad ram afloat, the Tennessee. After reading this report, Welles immediately ordered the transfer of the required number of seamen from another ship to the Hartford.

  On the afternoon of January 5, 1864, Farragut left New York harbor during a fierce snowstorm. Twelve days later, his flagship dropped anchor in the Gulf, off Pensacola. The “American Viking” was ready for action, and every officer and sailor on blockade duty in the region was glad to have him back.

  Farragut made a brief visit to New Orleans, where rumors that several huge rebel ironclads were preparing to attack the city had infected local Federal officials with “ram fever.” The Hartford then anchored among the ships blockading Mobile Bay, and the admiral immediately began preparations for his long-anticipated attack on the Confederacy’s last important Gulf port.

  Before the war, Mobile, Alabama, had been the second most important port on the Gulf of Mexico, following New Orleans. Located near the northwest corner of Mobile Bay, some thirty miles from the Gulf, the city of Mobile was a center for both rail and river traffic. Two important rivers, the Alabama and the Tombigbee, joined together thirty miles above the city to form the Mobile River. The city was built along the Mobile River’s banks as it emptied into the bay, providing Mobile ready access to the interior. Further supporting Mobile as an important commercial center was the Mobile & Ohio Railroad. The longest railroad in the Confederacy, the M&O ran all the way to Columbus, Kentucky. In addition, Mobile had developed its own manufacturing base, something that was in dangerously short supply in the Confederacy.

  Mobile Bay is a wide and shallow body of water - so shallow that most of the larger ships transporting cargo to and from the city had to anchor in the lower part of the bay. Their cargoes were transferred between city wharves and ships by a fleet of shallow-draft lighters. There were two means of passage for ships entering or leaving Mobile Bay. The first, Grant’s Pass, connected the bay with the Mississippi Sound to the west. This entrance was guarded by an earthwork fort called Fort Powell, located on a small island in the center of the channel. Grant’s Pass was usually not deep enough for large ships but was easily accessible for coastal vessels.

  The main shipping route into Mobile Bay ran through a much larger opening at the bay’s southern end. This channel was bordered on the east by a long finger of land called Mobile Point. At the very edge of Mobile Point stood the strongest of the bay fortifications, Fort Morgan. Three and one-half miles to the west, built on Dauphin Island, stood Fort Gaines. Most of the water between these two forts was too shallow to allow oceangoing ships to pass, except for a quarter-mile-wide channel close to Fort Morgan.

  The tip of Mobile Point was first fortified by French troops in 1699. In 1818, on the same spot, the United States Army began construction of a brick fort that was eventually completed in the early 1830s. Named for a Revolutionary War hero, General Daniel Morgan, Fort Morgan had been captured by Alabama state troops sent by Governor Andrew B. Moore on January 4, 1861. Seven days later the delegates to a state convention voted for secession. Fort Gaines fell to the rebel state forces two weeks later, on January 18, 1861. Both forts had been primarily occupied by engineering troops who were strengthening their defenses when the rebels took possession.

  Shortly after his arrival, early in January 1864, Admiral Farragut wrote to both David Porter and Navy Secretary Welles. By then, Porter had been promoted to rear admiral, following the capture of Vicksburg, in which his squadron had played a role. Farragut asked each man to assign him at least two ironclads to use against Mobile. Porter responded that he could not spare any vessels at the time because they were all engaged in river campaigns. Welles said he could not make any of the newly constructed monitors available since they were already committed to the siege of Charleston.

  Like many of the older ship captains, Farragut had disliked the ugly “stinkpots” from their inception. However, he had soon recognized the military value of adding ironclads to his fleet. This was especiiially true when he learned that the Confederate Navy was building a fleet of extra-large and powerful ironclad rams with the stated purpose of attacking his wooden hulled ships blockading Mobile Bay. Such an offensive by well-armed rams could annihilate much of his fleet. It was a dramatic change for the man who, less than a year earlier, had written Undersecretary Fox that the capture of the Indianola by rebel gunboats without the loss of a single life had “astounded me. I never thought much of ironclads, but my opinion of them is declining daily. At any rate, I am willing to do the little fighting left to me, as I told you before, in the wooden ships.”

  On January 20, Farragut transferred his flag temporarily to the double-ended gunboat Octorara, and, in company with the gunboat Itasca, conducted a personal inspection of the defenses around the entrances to Mobile Bay.

  From this close reconnaissance, Farragut developed his final plan of attack. To Welles he wrote, “We must have about two thousand, five hundred men in the rear of each fort, to make regular approaches by land, and to prevent the garrison’s receiving supplies and reinforcments; the fleet to run the batteries
, and fight the flotilla in the bay.” When he learned that the Tennessee was not yet ready for battle, that her reputation had preceded her actual commissioning, he told Welles that if he had only one ironclad in his fleet, “I could destroy their whole force in the bay, and reduce the forts at my leisure, by cooperation with land forces.” The naval force inside the bay was little more than a squadron of river steamers that had been converted to gunboats, some of them too hastily converted for their intended use. The admiral was anxious to get into the bay before the giant ram arrived.

  Farragut closed the ring around Mobile Bay as tightly as possible, while he waited for the arrival of at least two ironclads and a sufficient number of troops to enable him to run the forts and enter the bay. The troops were vital to his plan for two reasons: first, they could launch attacks against the rear of both Fort Morgan and Fort Gaines as his fleet ran past, diverting some of the enemy’s attention and firepower from his vessels; second, it was important to take possession of the forts immediately after his fleet was in Mobile Bay. This strategy would prevent the forts from being reinforced, and his fleet trapped inside the bay.

  During a visit to New Orleans, Farragut learned from General Banks that Major General William Tecumseh Sherman was preparing what would become his famous campaign through Georgia, aimed at capturing Atlanta. Sherman’s plan was to push from Tennessee into Georgia with three Federal armies: the Armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. With this force, numbering more than 100,000 men, he hoped to drive the defending 60,000-man Confederate Army of Tennessee, under General Joseph E. Johnston, into southern Alabama so he could capture Atlanta. Although there was no naval role in this objective, Farragut hoped to aid Sherman by distracting some Confederate forces away from his line of march. He decided he could accomplish this by a minor subterfuge in which he would launch an attack against one of the smaller forts at Mobile Bay and perhaps fool the enemy into thinking he was preparing to enter the bay and capture Mobile itself. If the ploy was successful, the Confederate troops in and around Mobile, rather than being reduced in number to supply men and material to General Joseph E. Johnston’s Army of Tennessee, would be forced to remain where they were. The more rebel soldiers Farragut could keep at Mobile, the fewer would be sent against Sherman.

 

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