by Rod Pyle
Fig. 12.1. LOCKUP: The Apollo 11 astronauts can be seen in the window of a specially prepared trailer as they speak to President Nixon and wait out their quarantine after returning from the moon. They were kept isolated for twenty-one days, as were the crews of Apollo 12 and 14. After the latter mission, NASA decided that the risk was minimal and the practice was discontinued. Image from NASA.
It was only later that a journalist pointed out that when the astronauts, bobbing in the ocean after splashdown, opened the hatch to allow the navy divers to toss in the biological-containment suits, a thing could have just strolled out right then and entered the air or the ocean. Oh well, too late. Apparently nothing came back to Earth with them.
But what of Mars? In 1997, the US National Research Council released a study that concluded that the risk to Earth from the kind of extraterrestrial organisms we are likely to encounter on Mars is minimal—a view still held by most. “Contamination of Earth by putative Mars microorganisms is unlikely to pose a risk of significant harmful effects.” But they added, “The risk is not zero, however.”
This was updated by the same group in 2009: “The potential for large-scale pathogenic effects arising from the release of small quantities of pristine Mars samples is still regarded as being very low…extreme environments on Earth have not yet yielded any examples of life-forms that are pathogenic to humans.”
So, in brief, we are unlikely to be transformed into green slime by Martian microbes. And it's a good thing, too, for millions of tons of Martian stuff has already reached Earth. Since the solar system formed, bits of Mars have been knocked off by asteroid collisions and meteoritic impacts, and have made their way to Earth, entering the atmosphere as meteors, with some hitting the planet. It is estimated that at least 10 percent of that total mass is not sterilized by heating. You may recall the famous Alan Hills Martian meteorite of 1994, which was found in Antarctica. Some researchers suspected the Martian rock of containing tiny fossils of living microorganisms (most have since concluded that the microfossils were probably not of biological origin, though the debate continues). This rock was just one of many that have been identified as being of Martian origin, and countless more have fallen over the eons—on Antarctica, on every other continent, and into the oceans. If there are Martian life-forms on Earth, we don't know about them.
As an aside, there is a hypothesis that dates back at least to 1903 called “panspermia,” which theorizes that all life on Earth may have originated on Mars or some other celestial body. There are good reasons to think that this may be true, but no strong evidence has yet been identified.
Later in her NASA interview, Cassie Conley jokingly claims that she spends most of her time at NASA headquarters “answering e-mails,” but her role is a very serious one with that dreadfully serous title. “Planetary Protection Officer” conjures up some compelling images. “It's always interesting to see people's expressions when I introduce myself as the Planetary Protection Officer. Most people think of the characters in Men in Black when they hear this title.” She notes that when she took the job someone at NASA gave her a pair of Ray-Bans just like Will Smith wore in the movie. “That was pretty entertaining,” she added.
Curiosity may indeed have transported germs or contaminants to Mars on its drill bit. If it did, chances are that the radiation hitting the surface of the planet probably did them in, and if not, the action of drilling in the highly toxic soil probably did. In short, chances are that it's harder to be a living microbe or spore on Mars than it is to be a punk-music fan at a Mozart concert. But only time will tell.
Fig. 12.2. DEATH FROM ABOVE? A high-magnification close-up of the Alan Hills Martian meteorite from Antarctica, ALH84001. While the central object does strongly resemble a microscopic worm and caused a sensation in the 1990s, the general conclusion was that it was far too small to have biological origins. Image from NASA.
No good NASA story is complete without a discussion of schedule slips and budget overruns, and MSL's tale is no exception. I do not mean to sound glib here—I merely wish to illustrate the enormous pressures, and frequent financial consequences, of operating in the complex, challenging, and ultimately flawed political and bureaucratic environment within which missions like MSL must proceed.
To begin with, when a mission on the scale of MSL is proposed, it is a bit like going back to 1961 when President Kennedy declared that the United States would land a man on the moon by the end of the decade. At that time, NASA officials were alternately thrilled and horrified (if they were smart, mostly the latter) by Kennedy's announcement. A manned moon mission was close to the heart of many in 1961, but on that schedule? With 1960s technology? At that time, the United States had exactly fifteen minutes of manned spaceflight experience (Alan Shepard's little suborbital hop in the Mercury spacecraft); we did not even know what we did not know. We didn't know how to build big rockets, how to keep people alive in space, if people could live in space, how to land on the moon, what metals to use, what fuels, and so on. Oh, there were ideas—a lot of them—but nothing tested or proven. And this kind of uncertainty is toxic to the engineering mind, at least when you are asking for a commitment to a firm delivery date less than a decade away.
MSL was, in many ways, similar. Of course, much was different—more was known about spaceflight, there would be no people aboard, it was Mars and not the moon, and so on. But there were many unknowns, including how to land this massive machine on a planet a couple hundred million miles away. The MER rovers had not even begun their mission when MSL was being conceived and was seeking official approval. How the heck do you create a cost figure and a delivery date for something with so many unknowns?
The temptation would be to bid high and build in a slush factor. To a degree, that's what Wernher von Braun did in the Apollo era, and consequently he looked pretty damn good when he delivered the goods mostly on time and on budget. But that was the space race and funds were flowing to NASA like a river. MSL was being proposed in the late 1990s and conditions were not even remotely similar. If JPL were to estimate as high as they would need to in order to ensure on-time delivery of a quality product, some members of Congress would balk. Actually, make that most. Just imagine trying to get a huge dollar number out of a representative who's district was not building any part of your spacecraft, who had no part of the launching or controlling of it, and who is much more concerned about protecting farm subsidies than exploring whatever the heck is on Mars. It would be a nonstarter; and most high-budget planetary-exploration programs have been thus since the end of the Viking days.
So the solution? Bid low, try your best, and then let fate take a hand. Of course, this means cost overruns. Hopefully they are within a reasonable range and will not cause too many officials to turn purple as things move along. And—hopefully—by the time people do get upset, you will be far enough along the road that the project will not get canceled.
With MSL, it turned out to be a close thing.
If you bring up this bit of discussion at a dinner party with some nice NASA folks, you might not get quite the same version that I am presenting. This is greatly simplified and there are a thousand and one nuances I am glossing over. And at the end of the day, NASA officials are highly sensitive to public perception, to the winds blowing one way or another within the legislative and executive branches, and countless other things. They know that they live or die by taxpayer dollars and the goodwill of their elected representatives, and they are not out to fool or mislead anyone. But this is the essence of how things must get done—not just with JPL or NASA, but with any government project of such a large scope. And if you think that this program, which ultimately cost $2.5 billion, is bad, check out military procurement sometime. Depending on how you parse the numbers, the entire MSL program's cost is about the same as the price tag of one or two B-2 stealth bombers, or the bailout of a really small savings and loan a few years back. In that light, it seems pretty mild.
There is another factor here, and t
hat is the tyranny of the launch schedule. Mars is in the proper alignment for a launch attempt once every two years. So if your launch date slips, as MSL's did, you rack up costs as your completed spacecraft components sit and wait, slowly degrading from optimal condition, and people must be paid to continue taking care of business. MSL's launch window slid from 2009 to 2011 for a variety of reasons, and with troubling financial results.
As I said, this is a long and detailed story, and I aim to merely capture the essence of it here. What I do want to impart is an idea of the struggles that NASA and JPL face to acquire and retain funding for major projects, and to stay on schedule while at the same time restraining costs. Despite what you might hear on some AM radio rants, they are, in general, a frugal organization.
The best way to complete this part of our story is probably to look at NASA's own painfully honest assessment of the MSL program. NASA's Office of the Inspector General prepared a report dated June 2011, and, possibly to the surprise of some NASA detractors, it is a candid and sometimes-critical look at why things were slipping in terms of both cost and scheduling. I will include relevant portions and edit out others; if you want to see the entire document, steer your web browser to http://oig.nasa.gov/audits/reports/FY11/IG-11-019.pdf. It's interesting, if agonizingly detailed, reading.
NASA'S MANAGEMENT OF THE
MARS SCIENCE LABORATORY PROJECT
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
REPORT NO. IG-11-019
(ASSIGNMENT NO. A-10-007-00)
OVERVIEW
The Issue
The Mars Science Laboratory (MSL), part of the Science Mission Directorate's Mars Exploration Program (Mars Program), is the most technologically challenging interplanetary rover ever designed. This NASA flagship mission, whose life-cycle costs are currently estimated at approximately $2.5 billion, will employ an array of new technologies to adjust its flight while descending through the Martian atmosphere, including a sky crane touchdown system that will lower the rover on a tether to the Martian surface. Contributing to the complexity of the mission are the Project's innovative entry, descent, and landing system; the size and mass of the rover (four times as heavy as the previous Martian rovers Spirit and Opportunity); the number and interdependence of its 10 science instruments; and a new type of power generating system.
The primary objective of the Mars Program is to determine whether Mars has, or ever had, an environment capable of supporting life. In pursuit of this objective, the MSL rover—known as Curiosity—will assess the biological potential for life at the landing site, characterize the geology of the landing region, investigate planetary processes that influence habitability, and analyze surface radiation. NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is responsible for development and management of the MSL Project.
Due to planetary alignment, the optimal launch window for a mission to Mars occurs every 26 months. MSL was scheduled to launch in a window between September and October 2009. However, in February 2009, because of the late delivery of several critical components and instruments, NASA delayed the launch to a date between October and December 2011.
This delay and the additional resources required to resolve the underlying technical issues increased the Project's development costs by 86 percent, from $969 million to the current $1.8 billion, and its life-cycle costs by 56 percent, from $1.6 billion to the current $2.5 billion. If the Project is delayed to a late 2013 launch window, NASA's costs would further increase, at least by the $570 million that would be required to redesign the mission to account for differences in planetary alignment and the Martian dust storm season. [AUTHOR'S NOTE: All boldface emphases are mine, not in the original report. Also note that the actual launch delay was apparently announced in November 2008, not February 2009. It is not clear why the report gave the later date.]
In light of the importance of the MSL Project to NASA's Mars Program, the Office of Inspector General conducted an audit to examine whether the Agency has effectively managed the Project to accomplish mission objectives while meeting revised cost and schedule projections. See Appendix A for details of the audit's scope and methodology.
Results
We found that the MSL Project has overcome the key technical issues that were the primary causes of the 2-year launch delay. Additionally, as of March 2011 all critical components and instruments have been installed on the rover. Project managers expected to complete integration of equipment by May 2011 and ship MSL to Kennedy for flight preparation by June 2011.
However, of the ten issues Project managers identified as contributing to the launch delay, as of March 2011 three remained unresolved: contamination of rock and soil samples collected by the Sample Acquisition/Sample Processing and Handling (SA/SPaH) subsystem and development of flight software and the fault protection systems. The resolution of these and other issues that may arise during final integration is likely to strain the already limited margin managers built into the Project's schedule to allow for unanticipated delays. Moreover, since November 2009 this schedule margin has been decreasing at a rate greater than planned.
In addition, approximately 1,200 reports of problems and failures observed by Project personnel remained open as of February 2011. If these reports are not resolved prior to launch, there is a possibility that an unknown risk could materialize and negatively affect mission success.
Finally, since the 2009 decision to delay launch, the Project has received three budget increases, most recently an infusion of $71 million in December 2010. However, in our judgment because Project managers did not adequately consider historical cost trends when estimating the amount required to complete development, we believe the Project may require additional funds to meet the 2011 scheduled launch date.
[…]
As early as May 2009, MSL's Standing Review Board expressed concern about delays in development of flight software and fault protection systems and we are concerned that their development remains incomplete. As of March 2011, the majority of the software needed for launch, cruise, entry, descent, and landing was developed. However, the software was not expected to be delivered until May 2011 and Project managers stated that work on software required to operate the rover on Mars would be completed after launch. In addition, as of March 2011, 13 of the 16 necessary fault protection related tasks had been completed and the remaining 3 were in progress.
Because of technical issues related to these three and other items, Project managers must complete nearly three times the number of critical tasks than originally planned in the few months remaining until launch. As shown in Table 1, Project managers had planned to have all critical tasks (except for Kennedy Space Center operations) completed by April 2011. However, when they revised the schedule in November 2010, that date slipped by 3 months to July 2011. Furthermore, the February 2011 revision shows that seven critical tasks have been further delayed. Coupled with the decreasing schedule margin described below, we are concerned that management may be pressured to reduce mission capabilities in order to avoid another 2-year delay and the at least $570 million in associated costs.
Accelerated Schedule Margin Decrease. To allow for unanticipated delays, NASA routinely builds a margin of extra time into project development schedules. We found that for MSL this schedule margin has eroded at a rate slightly greater than planned and that as of February 2011 only 60 margin days remained (see Figure 4).
When the launch was rescheduled in 2009, Project managers programmed 185 margin days into the development schedule. However, since November 2009 the Project has been consuming margin days more quickly than managers expected as a result of the number and complexity of technical issues needing to be resolved. Although managers expressed confidence that the remaining schedule margin would be adequate to address the risks having potential schedule impact that they have identified, the rate of schedule margin decrease concerns us because the inherent complexity of the MSL Project increases the likelihood that additional issues will arise in final testing and integration.
[…]
[Now comes the part where the report criticizes specific areas, of which I have included only a few:]
Project Management Did Not Effectively Assess or Prioritize the Risks Identified by the P/FR Process. Problem/Failure Reports (P/FRs) are generated when individuals working on a project observe a departure from design, performance, testing, or other requirements that affects equipment function or could compromise mission objectives. P/FRs may range from minor issues with negligible effects to potential “red flag” issues with significant or major effects, up to and including a loss of mission.
[…]
Project Funding May Be Inadequate. The Project achieved several important technological successes over the past 2 years, including delivery and acceptance of the actuators (motors that allow the rover and instruments to move), avionics, radar system, and most of the rover's instruments. However, Project managers did not accurately assess the risks associated with developing and integrating the MSL instruments and did not accurately estimate the resources required to address these risks. Consequently, the cost of completing development and the Project's life-cycle costs have increased.
In August 2006, NASA estimated the life-cycle cost for MSL as $1.6 billion. After launch was rescheduled for 2011, Project managers developed a new schedule and cost baseline for the Project, adding $400 million to complete development. Estimated life—cycle costs for the Project increased to $2.3 billion in fiscal year (FY) 2010 and to $2.4 billion in FY 2011. In November 2010, the Project requested an additional $71 million, which brought the total life-cycle cost estimate to the current estimate of approximately $2.5 billion. The extra money was obtained by reprogramming funds in the FY 2010 Mars Program budget, identifying additional funds from the Planetary Science Division in FY 2011, and addressing the balance in the FY 2012 budget request.