Bowie and Menchaca brought Crockett and his companions into the town and took him first to Don Erasmo Seguín's home, though thereafter he found quarters near the Plaza de Armas.55 Naturally the garrison hailed the unexpected arrival of this genuine American legend, even, if he only came with a handful of men instead of the army they needed. simply for the sake of morale his arrival proved a boon. Before long Neill summoned the garrison and the citizens joined the party in the Plaza de Las Yslas, and Crockett stood atop a packing box to make the inevitable speech. He told yet again the now-dusty “go to hell” quip and many other “jolly anecdotes,” as Dr. John Sutherland recalled from what he heard. In the end Crockett turned serious. “Me and my Tennessee boys, have come to Help Texas as privates,” he said, “and will try to do our duty.”56
In fact Crockett was no more than a private, a situation that some no doubt thought inappropriate to say the least. While the so-called Tennessee Mounted Volunteers with whom he rode naturally looked to him as their leader during their journey, the fact remained that they were not an officially organized unit. Indeed, at least one in the party had actually enlisted in another company after they left Nacogdoches, and so Neill was now at liberty to assign them within his command as he wished, and put Crokett and the others in the company of Capt. William Patton—no relation to Crockett's nephew of the same name.
Yet if Crockett did not hold actual rank, everyone recognized his symbolic importance. Green Jameson reported his arrival to Henry Smith, and Bowie introduced Crockett to his brother-in-law, Horace Alsbury.57 And on February 10 the officers put together an impromptu fandango in his honor, inviting the ladies of the town to attend a dance that went on into the early hours of the next day. At I A.M., while the party still reveled to the fiddle and guitar, Bowie walked over to his friend Menchaca, whom he saw reading a letter. He gave it to Bowie, and while he read, Travis approached. When Bowie handed over the letter, Travis playfully complained that he had no time for reading, for he was just then dancing with the most lovely lady in San Antonio. Bowie suggested that the letter was important enough for Travis to forgo the dance, and when Travis took it he read it aloud, translating the Spanish for Crockett and others. Benavides, scouting near Camargo, nearly 200 miles south on the Rio Grande, sent confirmation that Santa Anna himself had his army at Presidio de Rio Grande, ready to advance. In two weeks the Mexicans could travel the 140 miles to San Antonio, and perhaps sooner. Benavides's dispatch was already four days old, which meant they might have only ten days. But there was nothing to be done then. “Let us dance to-night”, said Travis, “and to-morrow we will make provisions for our defense.”58
While Crockett served in the ranks, and Bowie held no real portfolio as yet, Travis had command concerns to consider even before the word arrived of the Mexican's coming. He needed to get to know the other officers, though he knew Green Jameson, at least, since he once acted for a creditor to collect a debt from him.59 Then after Forsyth and the rest of the legion arrived on February 5, he had to spend some time—and some of his own money—providing them with fodder for the animals and a little cash for the men.60 Naturally he had to be concerned about what was happening back in San Felipe, for that would govern what he was to do here, and how long he must stay. On January 31 the council finally learned of Houston's request to have the Alamo blown up and the place evacuated, and immediately sent an express off to Béxar to countermand it, though Bowie and Neill clearly never regarded it as a direct order in the first place.61 When that rider arrived, possibly the same day as Travis, Buck knew that now he was to stay here for awhile unless he followed through on his threat to resign.
By February 11 affairs started to change rapidly, and dramatically. The garrison still backed Governor Smith in his battle with the council, though now it was charging him with giving orders to Travis after it had unlawfully tried to remove him from office.62“Politics are all straight here,” Jameson wrote to Smith that day, “and every man in the Army your friend.” Unfortunately, some of those volunteers intended to start leaving on February 12, disenchanted from lack of pay and clothing and even provisions for the past two months. Recent additions brought their force up to 150 as of that day, but it would nor last if the men began going home. Even worse, Neill left now, responding to an urgent message of illness in his family. He would be back in three weeks, he said, though the garrison urged him not to leave. At his departure he put Travis in command.63
Suddenly Travis went from near humiliation at the paltriness of his legion to command of Béxar, and from that moment on he dropped all pressure to be relieved. As next ranking officer in the service, he naturally assumed command on Neill's departure, but almost immediately he felt himself cast in a delicate situation. The only men by regulations subject to him as an officer were those who had enlisted under the December 1835 acts of the council creating the regular and volunteer services. Yet perhaps half of the garrison or more were men simply remaining from the old informal volunteer companies that besieged Béxar, men who remained solely out of desire rather than legal obligation. They had stayed with Neill, no doubt, because he was a known quantity, having been with them most of the time for months now. Travis was new, however, and in the pleadings of some of the volunteers for Neill to stay, he interpreted their dissatisfaction at his being the colonel's replacement. He could show them his commission, which he had brought with him, as evidence of his right to command, but that would hardly matter to these men.64 Moreover, Travis took command by Neill's request—though military procedure of course dictated that as next in seniority of rank he would do so anyhow—and he feared that the volunteer portion of the garrison might not accept him unless some positive order came from Smith or Houston for him to command.65
It was a delicate situation, and it soon became even more so. While one company said they would accept him as their commander, two others made it clear that they objected to his commanding them because he was a regular, while they had served from the previous October in an army that had popularly elected its commander—first Austin, then Burleson. They had a point, frustrating though it was, and Travis took the only reasonable expedient available at the moment. He told them that they could elect their own commander, and Travis and their choice would share the command in Béxar. Any other option risked a confrontation that would see scores of the men simply leave, with Travis powerless to stop them short of arrest. At least if they chose their own commander, they would be appeased, and might stay on until the mess in San Felipe was cleared and some genuine direction could come from Smith. Houston was no good to Travis in this situation either, for he had given up on his Goliad mission and was now off on a near-pointless trip to see the Indian tribes to conclude treaties to keep them out of the war.66
So there would be an election. There were only two obvious candidates. Some of the volunteers wanted Crockett to accept the post. After all, he was “Colonel” Crockett, and he had war experience, which most of them no doubt had heard greatly exaggerated versions of in recent years. When they approached him, however, he refused. “I have come to assist Travis as a high Private,” he said.67 He made a wide choice, whether he knew it or not, because there were undercurrents here he knew nothing about. Then, too, having tried to conceal his elevation above private during the Creek War, he may well have thought it unseemly for him to accept any form of rank now. Moreover, a somewhat larger proportion of the volunteers preferred Bowie, and it was obvious from the first that he would be elected. He may even have politicked among the men for the position. Certainly he had their confidence as a fighter. When the ballots were cast, Bowie was “Colonel” Bowie once more, though of the four companies of volunteers present, possibly only tow actually voted. Clearly this was no mandate. 68Though Travis's solution to the problem seemed reasonable, it quickly foundered on problems inherent in the arrangement, exacerbated by Bowie's behavior. No one was completely in charge. Bowie would not obey Travis, and Travis certainly would not yield to Bowie, and so the garrison divided i
nto somewhat unfriendly camps. On February 12 Adjt. J.J. Baugh saw that Bowie, “availing himself of his popularity among the volunteers seemd anxious to arrogate to himself the entire control.” By the next day the situation had become intolerable, precipitated mainly by Bowie unfortunately choosing his election as an event worth celebrating with a two-day drunk. When he saw some of the citizens trying to leave the town with their belongings on their carts in fear of the advancing Mexican army, he forcibly detained them.
Then he fomented trouble with his old friend Judge Erasmo Seguín, when he ordered a convicted tejano thief to be released from jail, even though both Bowie and Travis had sat on the jury that convicted him. Seguín sent him back to the calabozo, but when Bowie learned of that he lost his temper and furiously confronted the judge. When Seguín refused to back down, Bowie sent for troops and ostentatiously paraded them in the main square in what Baugh called “a tumultuously and disorderly manner, Bowie himself, and many of his men, being drunk—which has been the case ever since he has been in Command.” Then Bowie ordered the release of a private from Travis's company of regulars, a man convicted of mutiny, and issued a general order that all prisoners were to be released and assigned to labor details instead.69 That provoked Travis to go to Seguín himself in protest, and then to write to Governor Smith in exasperation, supported in part by a statement from Crockett.70
Travis actually sent his protest about Bowie to his old law partner Nibbs, to be handed to Smith, for fear that in being addressed directly to the beleaguered governor it might instead fall into the hands of the council, doing potentially considerable harm. “My situation is truly awkward & delicate,” he complained. “I do not solicit the command of this Post,” he said. Indeed, now he would be happy to yield it to any other artillery officer Smith could send, but he begged for some definite orders. Bowie had “been roaring drunk all the time,” and “turning every ;thing topsy turvey.” Travis only remained because honor required him to obey his orders, but he warned Smith that “I am unwilling to be responsible for the drunken irregularities of any man.” He implored Smith to send more regulars as soon as possible. Otherwise Bowie and his volunteers might run roughshod indefinitely over his two companies of regulars, the legion and the artillery company.71 Travis may have been disposed to be rather more intolerant of Bowie's behavior thanks to his own views on drinking. If he drank at all it was only moderately, while his prominence in the Claiborne Temperance Society several years earlier may have meant that he abstained altogether. But whether Travis was a teetotaler or not did not matter. Bowie's behavior was abominable.
Just what impelled Bowie so to misbehave is unclear. Maybe the celebration simply got out of hand. Then, too, he may have been on a long-term binge going back to his drunk in San Felipe in November. Perhaps already he did not feel well, not his usual robust self, and used the liquor to deaden his senses. Maybe he just felt like getting drunk. Whatever the reason, his timing could not have been worse, for his drunkenness encouraged it in the other volunteers. Some men even sold their rifles to get money for liquor, and Samuel Bastian maintained, perhaps not entirely hyperbolically, that “most of the garrison sere drunk,” adding that “there was a bitter feeling between the partisans of Travis and Bowie, the latter being the choice of the rougher party in the garrison.”72 The situation actually created sufficient animosity between the two factions in the command that Travis did the only sensible thing. He ordered the regulars to accompany him, and they left the town to camp a few miles southwest on the Medina to escape what Baugh called “this disgraceful business.” Otherwise there seemed to be the very real risk of violent clashes between the factions.73 But then as quickly as it arose, the problem seemed to evaporate, and that was probably due to Bowie. “It is well known that he sometimes drank too much,” recalled William W. Fontaine, who was one of the little children at Montville with Charles Travis. “But it is not so generally known how quickly he hastened to make the amende bonorable, so soon as he came from under the influence of liquor.” On February 14 Bowie sobered and apparently sent for or went to see Travis, and gave an apology, for immediately Travis and his command returned to San Antonio, and all signs of friction between the two disappeared for good.74 It may have helped that both were Freemasons, and Bowie quickly made his apologies to Erasmo Seguín, too.75 They agreed to share a joint command of the post, Travis over the regulars and Bowie over the volunteers. It was perhaps the best that could be done under the circumstances, and while Travis probably maintained some private resentment at Bowie's uprising, publicly the two gave all appearances of having put the sad episode behind them.
It helped that the Mexicans distracted the attention of everyone away from such lesser matters. The day after Neill left, even while dealing with the Bowie embroglio, Travis received more intelligence that now put the enemy strength on the Rio Grande at 2,000 commanded by Gen. Joaquín Ramírez Y Sesma, with another 2,500 at Saltillo personally led by Santa Anna, who reputedly issued a declaration of vengeance against Texas, promising extermination. Travis saw the obvious, that the roads from Saltillo, Laredo, and Presidio de Río Grande all led to San Antonio first. “This being the Frontier Post nearest the Rio Grande, will be the first to be attacked,” he wrote to Smith this day. “We are illy prepared for their reception.” With only now about 150 men—and those “in a very disorganized state” thanks to the Bowie uprising—he could offer no effective resistance.
Writing in the sure expectation that Smith would circulate or even publish his letter, the politician, publicist, and revolutionary in him went on to speak for the public eye. Only raising a large force of militia—and quickly—would save them, he said. The forces at Goliad and Copano, which never got to Matamoros, should be sent to Béxar immediately for a concentration against the foe. Turn back Santa Anna here, and they might end the war. “For Gods sake, and the sake of our Country, send us reinforcements,” he cried. He called for an end to the factional strife that crippled the provisional government and left his post isolated and ignored. “We hope that our Countrymen will open their eyes to the present danger,” he went on. “I fear it is useless to waste arguments upon them.—The thunder of the Enemy's Cannon and the pollution of their wives and daughters—The Cries of their Famished Children, and the Smoke of their burning dwellings, will only arouse them.” It was almost as if he were writing headlines for his newspaper, resorting even to the lurid imagery of interracial rape to arouse Texian manhood.
He said that he was determined to hold his post “as long as there is a man left because we consider death preferable to disgrace, which would be the result of giving up a Post which has been so dearly won.” Travis may well have been criticizing Houston's desire to abandon and destroy the place, and when Houston saw the letter he may have taken it in just the same fashion. “Yet should we receive no reinforcements, I am determined to defend it to the last, and should Bejar fall, your friend will be buried beneath its ruins.”76 Travis wisely spent two dollars on writing paper that same day, knowing from now on until he received relief, he would be fighting his war with words as well as weapons.77
At least Travis knew that Neill's scouts had burned the bridge over the Rio Grande at Laredo, and that would delay the Mexicans a little.78 Knowing that several men of the garrison were out looking at land, Travis sent riders to collect and hurry them back to Béxar.79 Using his own legion and mounted men informally commanded by Capt. Juan Seguín, Travis maintained a constant stream of patrols and scouts to monitor the roads leading to the Rio Grande. His old friend Deaf Smith proved particularly useful, and so at least Travis could hope not to be taken by surprise. On February 13 he received and encouraging letter from Smith promising aid and soon, and despite the stormy weather read it to the assembled garrison to boost their morale. Their cheers for Smith encouraged Travis, and even better now was the help the people of San Antonio gave.80
Bowie's cooperative attitude made a great difference. Starting on February 14 they signed most of their orders an
d letters jointly, and now Buck saw the positive side of Big Jim. Bowie's contacts in the tejano community helped to bring forth provisions. Neill had negotiated a five-hundred-peso loan from the city council that was long spent, and now both Travis and Bowie used their personal credit to purchase goods for the garrison, but that was nearly exhausted. The local vendors would not extend much more credit, and the two pleaded with Smith to send them a substantial sum to continue their work. They had only a few days' provisions left, and scarcely a dollar in their purses. “It is useless to talk of keeping up the garrison any longer without money,” they protested, “as we believe that unless we receive some shortly the men will all leave.”81
Day after day they struggled on. By now Bowie and the volunteers seem to have been staying in the Alamo compound, while Travis and his command lodged in town. It was a time of rumors and routine, one day a spurious story coming in of a Comanche plan to send two hundred or more warriors to massacre the garrison and pillage the town, and the next Travis sending Deaf Smith to San Felipe with the latest report on the condition of the post.82 Surveying his arsenal, Travis found a total now of twenty-one cannon of varying descriptions, some of them old and virtually useless. Most were already emplaced at the Alamo, and now he and Bowie put the men to work getting the rest that were serviceable put in position. Their only ammunition would be the powder and projectiles captured when Cós surrendered in December, and the quality of some of that appeared questionable. At the same time, he and Bowie put some of the other men to work digging ditches outside the walls of the Alamo complex, in the event that the Texians would need to man them for skirmishing.83
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