by Dexter Hoyos
their close kin.
Whether or not it was a monarchy in its beginnings, virtually on its first
appearance in the historical record the Punic state is reported as falling under
the control of a rebellious general, Malchus—a name that seems a Latin ver-
sion of Phoenician milk, ‘king.’ In rather more detail the same source, Justin,
then tells of the rule of Malchus’ successor Mago, another general, and
Mago’s descendants after him. One of his sons was the half-Syracusan
Hamilcar of 480, whom Herodotus terms ‘king’, so these rulers belong to the
sixth century and after. They were seen by at least some foreigners as royal:
Diodorus describes two of the dynasty as kings ‘according to the laws’. Just
what this title really meant is not clear, but its implication is plainly that the
Magonids dominated the affairs of city and empire. It may be that by now the
kingship had become elective, though held for life and remaining in the
hands of one family.
The Magonids’ known activities were military, and it was military defeat
abroad that finally broke the dynasty’s dominance at home some time in the
early fourth century. For the same reason the tribunal of the Hundred and
Four was created, to control future over-mighty generals. Yet not every ambi-
tious Carthaginian was deterred from hopes of Magonid-style domination.
Later in the century the most eminent citizen was one Hanno—styled the
Great like his namesake a century later—who, after holding high military
command in Sicily, was accused of plotting to make himself master of the
state and was put to death with many of his kinsmen and supporters. His
family remained powerful even so, providing other notable generals (none of
them very successful) against the Greeks until Agathocles’ time. But in 308,
just after Agathocles’ invasion failed, one of them conspired to make himself
master of the city by a military coup. In an episode vividly recorded by
Diodorus, Bomilcar’s attempt was thwarted and he was executed on the
cross. This was the end of the Hannonid ascendancy.17
These later efforts at dominating the state may have been partly encour-
aged by the examples of successful autocracy that Punic aristocrats could see
across the water, not just in Greece (like Jason of Pherae in the 370s and of
course the Macedonian kings) but equally in Sicily—above all the triumphant
four-decade rule of Dionysius the Elder at Syracuse, later too that of Agath-
ocles. Autocrats and kings were now in the ascendant in much of the Greek
world. Their glamour and power might well incite men of wealth, status and
following at Carthage, who in any case had the recent memory of Magonid
dominance as a spur. But such moves failed against resistance from the bulk
of the city élite. These had earlier grown strong enough to limit and then
32
C A RT H AG E
discard entrenched Magonid supremacy. They had refined the complex
republican institutions that reinforced oligarchic control and attracted Aris-
totle’s approval. They now showed they could cope effectively with the
ambitions of even so eminent a figure as the conspirator Hanno and so
unscrupulous a general as Bomilcar. We can infer that whatever these men’s
resources in funds and followers, they did not outweigh those of the other
grandees united against them.
In the more than sixty years since Bomilcar’s failure the oligarchic republic
suffered no more pressure from over-mighty citizens, or at any rate none is
reported. Leading men and lesser ones no doubt competed or co-operated to
win office and influence at different levels. Each would have his group of
friends and followers, possibly also more formally recognized clients or social
dependants. To judge by the past cases of Magonids and Hannonids, and the
coming one of Hamilcar and his family, such allegiances were very often
hereditary—though it would be rash to suppose that they bound everyone,
grandees and ordinary voters alike, in unloosable fetters or for unchanging
generations. But how competition and co-operation worked, how changeable
or stable the political groupings were, how much based on family allegiances
and how much on policy issues—not to mention what family groups existed,
where each came from and what it took for a family to rise into, or fall from,
prominence—all these issues remain, once again, largely unknown.
It seems likely that the war with the Romans brought about a fair degree of
solidarity in the ruling élite. Some defeated generals might be crucified, but
even in the darkest days of Regulus’ invasion no bickerings among Punic
leaders are heard of, and no hints of treachery or unrest. Competition for
office, all the same, surely continued; and, after a decade and a half of fight-
ing, views on how to wage the war could well start to diverge. The rundown
of effort after the victories of 249, accompanied by the removal of both the
victorious commanders in favour of Hamilcar Barca, may signal a change in
political fortunes for rival groups: Hanno and his allies—Hamilcar conceiv-
ably among them—now winning pre-eminence over whoever had enjoyed it
earlier. We have already seen that Hanno’s group apparently then kept its pre-
eminence until the war ended.
But this was not to last much longer. The loss of the war in Sicily more
than counterbalanced the gains in Africa, and brought on a crisis that perma-
nently shifted the structure of Punic politics.
33
I I I
T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
I
Not only had the Carthaginians lost the war and their possessions in Sicily;
they soon found themselves in danger of losing everything at home too. The
20,000 soldiers evacuated from Sicily—mercenaries from all round the west-
ern Mediterranean and conscripts from among the subject Libyans of Punic
North Africa itself—had plenty of grievances, especially over their unpaid
arrears (the size of which lost nothing in the telling). They were suspicious,
unruly and armed.
They found a republic both too impoverished to pay them and too mal-
adroit to fob them off successfully with promises or part-payments. Gisco’s
careful efforts to prevent them from uniting into one body were discontin-
ued. The men were vexed by being sent inland to the distant city of Sicca and
soon marched back to Tunes near Carthage. Then insistent official haggling
over the payments combined with agitation among the men to cause an
explosion, and their resort to arms gave a signal to the oppressed Libyans. All
at once, the lands around Carthage and her fellow-Phoenician cities Utica
and Hippou Acra erupted in revolt.
Utica and Hippou Acra, on the coast to Carthage’s north, were laid under
siege. A rebel corps blockaded Carthage from Tunes a few miles away, cutting
access to the city at the western end of the isthmus. Coins and Polybius’
account show that the rebels obtained good sources of funds and presented
themselves to some extent as a conscious political force—‘the Libyans’, and
perhaps also ‘the army’—opposing their oppressors.
charge of Libya. He was now given command against the rebels. It is reason-
able to infer that the muddle and (in the soldiers’ eyes) the bad faith of the
Carthaginians’ dealings with the returned veterans was his and his faction’s
doing. That there may have been sound financial reasons for haggling is not
much of a defence.1
Another mistake, or so the troops saw it, was not to make Hamilcar and
Gisco the negotiators from the start. Gisco had finally been sent to them and
34
T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
almost succeeded in reaching an agreement, but feelings ran so high by
then—especially among the Libyan troops—that talks broke down. Hamilcar
did not put in an appearance at all, partly no doubt because he knew of the
troops’ irritation with him. Gisco, who had repeated his chief ’s promises
when evacuating them, they arrested when the talks broke down—and he
later suffered a hideous fate at their hands. Had Hamilcar been with him,
Punic and not only Punic history would have progressed very differently.
But Barca probably had a further reason for not involving himself in the
talks. His enemies (it seems) launched a prosecution against him, alleging
misconduct during his Sicilian command.
This is an inference from Appian, the only writer to mention a prosecu-
tion. He has it happen after the war in Africa ended, thus during 237; but
chronology is very much against so late a date. Besides, by then Hamilcar was
the saviour of his country. Lodging charges in 237 based on Sicilian events of
the 240s would have been a fairly predictable waste of effort. Hamilcar’s
rather inglorious return in 241 and immediate disappearance from the public
scene offer a more convincing context. Appian often gets details in this era
confused (for instance, the terms of the original and the revised peace-terms
of 241, and the course of postwar relations between Carthage and Rome), so
a mistake in chronology may well be another.2
Prosecution for wartime misconduct or theft of public funds (Appian has
both, in different works) suggests a case before the tribunal of One Hundred
and Four. Notoriously a guilty verdict could mean crucifixion or else a flight
into exile. But Hamilcar won the support of ‘the leading men’, writes
Appian—or his term may even mean ‘the men in power’—and the case
failed. Who the enemies were is not stated, and of Hamilcar’s rescuers the
only one named is Hasdrubal, who then or later became his son-in-law.
Appian adds that this young man was ‘the most popular’ of the ex-general’s
supporters. Enemies then or later claimed a homosexual relationship origi-
nally existed between the two men, but there is no evidence in support.
Hasdrubal is usually thought to have allied himself with Hamilcar only
after the war with the mercenaries and Libyans. But this depends on combin-
ing Appian’s date for the prosecution with Diodorus’ report (which clearly
comes from a better-informed, or at least better-organized, source) that, after
the war, Hamilcar founded a villainously democratic party and thus gained
wealth and power. Yet not only is Appian’s dating probably wrong but
Diodorus does not mention Hasdrubal amid these later events at all. Hamil-
car by 237 was popular on his own account. If he needed a popular ally or
allies, it would have been in the postwar months of 241.
Another such ally may be suggested: Hanno the Great, the commanding
political and (at home) military figure of the day. Although his poor negotiat-
ing skills helped to provoke the mercenaries into rebellion, his repute was
still high—for he was promptly given the command against the rebels. Had
Hanno been one, presumably a leading one, of the enemies behind the
35
T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
prosecution, Appian’s phrase for Hamilcar’s rescuers is harder to account for
and so is Hamilcar’s escape from danger. What then about Hasdrubal’s su-
perior popularity, if that is what Appian implies? It could be a touch of
exaggeration, allowing the author to introduce the future second leader of the
Barcid dynasty at a dramatic point.3
If not an ally of Hamilcar’s over the trial, Hanno probably stayed neutral at
least. Whether he owed a favour to the ex-general, or simply thought the
attack on him mischievous, or felt that now was not the time to destroy a tal-
ented commander whom the state might soon need (the great rebellion was
surely looming or had already broken out), we do not know. But it would be a
mistake to assume that the two were already divided by bitter rivalry.
II
Hanno had done very well fighting Numidians and taxing the Libyans, but he
was a good deal less successful against the veterans. His level of incompe-
tence is no doubt overstressed in Polybius’ account, which draws on a
strongly pro-Hamilcar tradition. Even so things soon reached a point, proba-
bly early in 240, where Hanno’s efforts had been stymied and he may even
have been cut off from Carthage, on the far side of Utica and, if so, danger-
ously positioned between the rebels besieging that town and those
beleaguering Hippou Acra to the north. The Carthaginians decided to
appoint a second general as well. Hamilcar Barca was the choice.
Hamilcar was not given Hanno’s army but commanded a second one,
which the Carthaginians had been gathering (like Hanno’s) from mercenaries,
rebel deserters and citizens. He himself may well have been responsible for
putting it together. The alternative—Hamilcar, though out of judicial danger,
staying in retirement while some other person recruited and trained the force,
then stepping forward to take command—seems less likely. As the other top
general of Carthage he was the obvious man for the task of raising and then
leading a second army. Its original aim may have been to confront the rebels
at Tunes who had cut Carthage off from the rest of the country (though not
from access by sea) but, if so, Hanno’s predicament changed this: Hamilcar
broke out towards Utica.
Two generals in the field together for a major campaign was not a novelty.
Even three had operated jointly on occasion. At times too, one general seems
to have held the superior authority: in 250 and 249 Adherbal apparently had
overall authority while others, including Carthalo, were his deputies. This
seems not to have happened now. At first Hanno operated on his own and
Hamilcar does not seem to have had the power to give him orders. When the
rebels murdered Gisco and his fellow-prisoners, the authorities at Carthage
urged each general to take action; they did not urge one to do so and leave it
to him to direct the other. Hamilcar did then ‘call Hanno to him’ so as to
unite the two armies, but this was probably a request or suggestion. For when
36
T H E R E VO LT O F A F R I C A
the two did join forces only to quarrel bitterly, the only solution that the
authorities in Carthage could devise was to let their two armies decide who
should stay in command
and who should retire.
Later on, with Hanno holding a command once again, it took a delegation
of senators to persuade the two to bury their antagonism in the national
interest. It looks, then, as though the two men were originally equals in com-
mand. This, plus the fact that their quarrel seemingly took the Carthaginians
by surprise—hence the desperate and unprecedented solution of letting the
troops decide—also adds some support to the view that the two men, up to
then, had been political allies or at least had co-operated politically.4
III
Once appointed general, Hamilcar won some quick successes. He raised the
siege of Utica—and probably gave back to Hanno his strategic freedom of
movement—by a victory on the bank of the river Bagradas nearby, then
reconquered parts of the Libyan hinterland. This endangered rebel supplies
and reinforcements, so forces from Tunes set out after him, led by two of the
original ringleaders of the revolt, Spendius the Campanian and Autaritus the
Gaul. This reaction may have been one of Hamilcar’s hopes in marching
inland: as well as recovering subject territory and harassing supply-routes to
the enemy, he was dividing rebel forces, which could make them easier to
destroy. If Polybius is correct that 70,000 Libyan recruits had joined the
20,000 veterans—or even if he exaggerates—thinning such forces offered
the Carthaginians the only hope of conquering them.5
Very luckily for the Carthaginians, they had the Romans on their side. They
nearly did not. When the revolt broke out, the Carthaginians still had enough
naval strength to begin intercepting traders from Italy (probably from other
lands too) who supplied goods to the rebels, and the haul of Italians and
Romans had reached more than 500 when a stiff protest arrived from Rome
probably in spring or early summer 240. Hanno, Hamilcar and the other
Carthaginian leaders recognized that to antagonize their ex-enemies would
be the last word in folly. The offenders were set free, no doubt with apologies
as fulsome as could be penned.
The soundness of this response was soon proved. The Romans in turn
released 2,700 remaining Punic prisoners of war ransom-free (the Cartha-
ginians had not the money to ransom them), banned Italians from doing
business with the rebels, and complied with other requests—for instance, so