by Dexter Hoyos
the Ebro—180 coastal miles (290 kilometres) to the south—and defeat and
capture Hanno at Cissis near Tarraco. Only then did his superior arrive from
the south. Unless his information-gathering methods were much more ineffi-
cient than his brother’s, it is hard to imagine that Hasdrubal had had no
inkling of the approaching invaders while they moved along the south coast
of Gaul, and that word of their arrival at Emporiae fell on him like a bolt
from the blue. He would know that Hanno’s 11,000 men were bound to be
outnumbered, and he could have joined him from New Carthage in just a few
weeks. It looks as though Hasdrubal had suffered dangerous complacency.7
Nor did he show himself a first-class commander the following year, when
he decided to take on Scipio by sea and land only to have his fleet soundly
beaten at the mouth of the Ebro. The catastrophe seemingly cancelled his
interest in fighting on land as well: another strategic mistake, since Cn. Scipio
was soon joined by his brother with reinforcements. This confirmed the
Roman grip on Spain-beyond-Ebro and exacerbated the danger to the Punic
position across the peninsula. Then, when in early 215 Hasdrubal received
some reinforcements from Africa and again moved north, he was even more
soundly defeated on land, at the battle of Hibera near the Ebro again.
If nothing else, he was proving that he was no master of warfare like his
brother. More important, if Livy is right that he had been under orders from
Carthage to lead an army to Italy, then Italy was saved.8
Hasdrubal suffered—or gave himself—trouble too in his treatment of
Carthage’s Spanish allies and subjects. The Celtiberians, between the Tagus
and the Ebro, were not effectively under Punic control at all and any effect
from Hannibal’s lightning campaign of 220 had worn off; reportedly they or
some of them turned hostile in 217 and distracted Hasdrubal from his
Roman foes for the rest of that year. Nor could he reimpose respect after-
wards, even though from 214 to 212 he had the time to try: they were later on
happy to sign up—if only temporarily—with the Scipios instead. Again, he
so harshly criticized the Spanish captains of the ships captured by Cn. Scipio
at the Ebro in 217 that (according to Livy) they deserted and sparked a rising
among the ‘Tartessians’ in 216 serious enough to delay his advance against
the Scipios; in fact it lasted into 214. Later still, early in 209, Hasdrubal is
found campaigning against the Carpetani, so relations with them too had def-
initely turned negative.
Not all of this need have been his fault. If a general could not rebuke his
underlings for slack performance in combat, his rôle was compromised. The
Carpetani had not relished being crushed by Hannibal in 220 or having a
large force of warriors dragged off in 218 to fight outside Spain (these had
had to be sent home). With the Romans actually in the country, service
abroad no doubt had poor appeal to many other Spaniards too, as Livy attests
at the time of the battle of Hibera. Again, when in 209 the northern Spanish
lords Indibilis and Mandonius, after a decade or more of enthusiastic loyalty,
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I N D E C I S I V E WA R
were provoked into defection by Punic high-handedness, the culprit was not
the governor of Spain but his lieutenant Hasdrubal son of Gisco, who had
gone so far as to seize their womenfolk as hostages.9
Even so, these thorny and at times fractious relations with such a variety of
Spaniards stand in contrast to how the earlier Hasdrubal, in particular, had
handled affairs only a decade before. Nor was it a good sign that in so impor-
tant matter as dealing with Mandonius and Indibilis—who contributed
greatly to the destruction of the Scipio brothers in 211—he could or would
not control a subordinate. As for the Tartessians, if the name in Livy is cor-
rect these had been Hamilcar’s first conquest: a quarter of a century’s Punic
rule plainly had not won them over and, on a reasonable guess, their revolt
now may well have been due to Punic demands for money and men, some-
thing for which the governor again was ultimately responsible.
It is striking too that, with the war intensifying in 217 and 216, Hasdrubal
called for and was sent reinforcements from Africa, first a body of 4,500 and
then an army under one Himilco. In 215 yet another army was sent under the
third Barcid brother Mago: all this even though Spain itself was supposed to
be a reservoir of first-class fighting men. This supports Livy’s notices about
the Celtiberians turning hostile and the Carthaginians having to combat
provincial rebels too. Plainly Hasdrubal’s leadership left something to be
desired.
Given these stresses in Spain, it is risky to trust Appian’s unsupported
claim that Hasdrubal was called back with part of his forces to North Africa
to fight the newly hostile western Numidian king Syphax. Syphax’s enmity
developed in 213 (fostered by the Scipios, who even sent him an army officer
to train his troops) but Appian or his source probably confused Hasdrubal
the Barcid with another Hasdrubal: perhaps the son of Gisco.10
IV
The Roman invasion thus soon began to have damaging impact on the
structure and security of Punic rule in Spain, even if Livy’s account of the
Scipio brothers’ campaigns offers too many suspect Roman victories and
Carthaginian setbacks. As the case of the disgraced ships’ captains and the
Tartessians illustrates, and then later episodes like Hasdrubal’s war in Carpet-
ania, the Roman war shook (predictably enough) the old yet still not very old
Punic hegemony, much of which had been imposed by force or the threat of
force. And as Punic hegemony faltered so did Hasdrubal’s political authority—
to judge from Hasdrubal son of Gisco’s actions and the ensuing bad blood
between him, his nominal boss and the latter’s own brother Mago. This all
flowed from Hasdrubal’s early failure to repel the Roman invasion.
The Scipios’ main achievements were to bar him from Italy and weaken
Punic control in Spain. Just how they did it is hard to follow, since Livy’s
details of marches, sieges and battles all over southern Spain are too often
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I N D E C I S I V E WA R
questionable—for instance a claimed advance to the Castulo region in 217
after Cn. Scipio’s naval victory, and a sweeping campaign all over the Baetis
valley supposedly in 214. Advancing to the Castulo region makes no strategic
sense in 217, and according to Polybius the Ebro was first crossed by both
brothers together, later that year. Other reports of fighting in 215 and 214
have aroused doubts too, and only Livy’s account of the brothers’ destruc-
tion in 211 has been generally accepted (even then, his date of 212 has to be
corrected).11
Scepticism may go to excess. Even the impact of the battle of Hibera in
215 is occasionally but needlessly doubted, and the brothers’ rescue in late
217 of the Carthaginians’ Spanish hostages from Saguntum—thanks to a
resourceful Spanish chief who tricked the city’s Punic commandant i
nto
sending them away—is circumstantially reported by Polybius as well as Livy
and can be believed. Even the account of their southern Spanish campaign in
(supposedly) 214 offers some plausible-sounding topographical details—for
instance Castrum Altum, identified as the site of Hamilcar’s death, Castulo as
the hometown of Hannibal’s wife, and Iliturgi nearby—and Appian reports
the pair wintering around Castulo. Very likely Livy’s source misdated this
campaign from 212, for he adds that the Scipios re-established the surviving
Saguntines in their town and that this was seven years after Hannibal had
taken it. Besides, Appian has the brothers campaign successfully in the south
in 212 before wintering there. Probably they had sought to break the stale-
mate of 214–213 with an ambitious drive into the Punic–Spanish heartland.12
But after initial successes their momentum faltered. Instead, in 211 Has-
drubal and his confrères scored stunning successes. First P. and then
Cn. Scipio and their separated armies were overwhelmed—Hasdrubal’s first
and, as it proved, only major victory over Romans—with the sterling aid of
the northerner Indibilis and the Numidian prince Masinissa. Yet Hasdrubal’s
limitations as general and governor now saved the enemy from total annihila-
tion. The remnants of the Scipios’ forces were able to retreat all the way
north, cross the Ebro and regroup; even if Hasdrubal eventually marched
northwards in pursuit, as Livy and others claim with decorative fictions about
Roman victories, quite plainly the surviving Roman troops were not dis-
lodged from Spain-beyond-Ebro. More than that, reinforcements arrived
from Italy: first under C. Claudius Nero and then more in 210 with his
replacement P. Scipio, son and youthful namesake of the late proconsul.13
One reason for Punic inattention may have been that the enemy no longer
seemed a threat; another, mentioned earlier, was that Hasdrubal and his lieu-
tenants—his brother Mago, and Hasdrubal son of Gisco—quarrelled
furiously after victory and each went his own way. These were hardly ade-
quate excuses. Both reveal a surprising level of miscalculation and
irresponsibility. Worse still, they fatally compromised Punic and Barcid for-
tunes in Spain.
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X I I
T H E D E F E AT O F H A S D RU BA L
I
The Second Punic War most plainly reached stalemate in 211. In Spain, Has-
drubal destroyed the Romans’ invasion of the south and killed the Scipio
brothers. In Italy, Capua surrendered to the consuls Claudius and Fulvius,
and Campania fell out of Hannibal’s orbit. Syracuse had already been taken
by Marcellus; Macedon was no threat to the Romans or help to Hannibal.
The Romans maintained 21 legions and 100 or more warships. Stalemate
dragged on in 210: Hannibal won at Second Herdonea and effectively at
Numistro, but neither was decisive and the strategic reality stayed the same.
The Romans might not be able to crush him, but he could no longer threaten
them, or even safeguard all his remaining allies from them. Hasdrubal in
Spain let the Roman forces keep their coastal footing beyond the Ebro,
though they had no strength for wider ventures. Observers of the war might
well suppose that it would drag on for a very long time, even a quarter-
century like its predecessor.
What impact this had at Carthage can only be estimated, but by 210 the
war must have stopped looking hopeful. Hannibal no longer won smashing
victories; Hasdrubal failed to follow up his defeat of the Scipios. Finances
must have been under pressure: there can have been little benefit any more
from captives or booty, though a raid on Sardinia in 210 garnered some. At
the same time costs were surely higher than ever: troops had to be levied and
fitted out in North Africa for expeditions overseas, some to Spain, others to
Sardinia and Sicily; funds had to be sent too.
Again, by these middle years of the war large and therefore expensive
Punic fleets existed. As many as 155 warships operated under Bomilcar’s
command outside Syracuse in 212 and later that year 130 sailed to Sicily and
Tarentum. True, most other Punic fleets recorded were half this size or less,
but they still cost money and no fleet achieved great success. Nor did the
Carthaginians even manage to ward off repeated Roman raids on their coasts
yearly from 217 to 215 (though in the first two they did inflict some losses
when the Romans landed) or fresh attacks from 211 on, which according to
Livy inflicted much damage.1
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T H E D E F E AT O F H A S D RU BA L
If these unpromising conditions weakened Barcid political dominance at
Carthage, it would be no surprise. Hardly anything is known of domestic
alignments in these years but it is not plausible that Hannibal and his sup-
porters continued to dominate affairs as easily as before. Other figures, with
their own interests, had to be taken into account—Hasdrubal son of Gisco
being the most notable.
As we saw earlier, he (not Hannibal’s brother) was probably the general
sent against the western Numidian king Syphax in 213. He then went to
Spain, probably late in 213 or at the start of 212, as a lieutenant of his Barcid
namesake, and no doubt as an ally of the Barcids: he would hardly have been
sent otherwise. On the other hand, as already noted, he was plainly an
independent-minded officer whom the Barcid Hasdrubal found hard to dis-
cipline. He must already have held both seniority and prestige, for after
Hasdrubal left for Italy in 208 the son of Gisco and not the Barcid brother
Mago took over the Spanish command. Livy describes him in Spain as the
most distinguished Punic general apart from the Barcids, and in North Africa
later as ‘the first man in the state by far’.
By 205, in fact, Hasdrubal son of Gisco probably commanded a backing at
Carthage equal to the Barcids’. Besides Livy’s description of his eminence the
poet Silius, borrowing this or using other information, describes him frankly
as the man in charge there. Again, when he commanded in North Africa
from 205, he had no known Barcid lieutenants (notwithstanding an officer
named Hanno son of Hamilcar) and acted very much as his own man. Then
in 204 he was to win the newly reconciled Syphax, who by then had made
himself master of all Numidia, as husband for his daughter, the famous and
accomplished Sophoniba.
Rather than being a follower or protégé of the Barcid group, Hasdrubal
looks very much like a high-ranking Carthaginian aristocrat—no less high
than Hanno the Great, for example—with his own following and resources.
Originally no doubt he had allied with the Barcids for patriotic and personal
reasons, but even as early as 211 he had begun to assert his independence. If
he could be the prime figure at Carthage after losing Spain, his political posi-
tion must have been remarkably strong; it would no doubt have been
stronger without his unfortunate talent for incurring defeat at Scipio’s hands.
A good deal of his support probably came from men who had hitherto
> backed the Barcids but were growing disenchanted with the war’s progress.
The war-effort outside Italy had always had to be left to the local comman-
ders for practical reasons, even if Hannibal remained the final authority, and
when the Romans invaded Punic North Africa it was hardly possible for him
in Italy to try to direct the defence of the homeland. Hasdrubal son of Gisco,
resilient and energetic despite his setbacks, was the obvious one to take
charge. He thus became the local man of destiny—briefly. It was his misfor-
tune that, after helping the Barcids to destroy the Scipio brothers in Spain in
211, all his tireless energy never won him another victory over the Romans.
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T H E D E F E AT O F H A S D RU BA L
Nothing suggests that he and the Barcids were at loggerheads, even if he
was not part of their faction. As just noted, they collaborated in Spain. In
Africa, after Scipio the younger destroyed his and Syphax’s armies in their
camps in 203, he and the Barcid faction together were to rally the Carthagini-
ans to a new effort, including the recall of Hannibal from Italy. True,
according to Appian even when Hannibal returned Hasdrubal continued to
operate on his own until he met an untimely death: but quite apart from the
fact that independent operations do not prove antagonism, Appian’s details
of the war in North Africa need to be treated very cautiously, as we shall see.2
Another hint to a weakening of Barcid dominance at home is the rise in
political power of the ‘order of judges’: probably meaning, as we saw earlier,
the tribunal of One Hundred and Four. By 196 the ‘judges’ were, Livy
reports, the dominant element in the republic—and an arrogant and corrupt
element at that. Of course they had always been important (and doubtless
arrogant and corrupt too), but this had not prevented the Barcids from con-
trolling Punic affairs since Hamilcar’s time. Many members of the Hundred
and Four by 211 owed their position to Barcid support; some surely were
kinsmen or close allies of Hannibal; and many other ‘judges’ had no doubt
found advantage in being aligned with the Barcids. But Barcid dominance
relied on success and its profits and prestige, all of them declining assets after
210.
As the war went on, the bulk of the Hundred and Four—all of them sena-