by Dexter Hoyos
ough bibliography of Hannibal’s pass from 1820 to 1993) and Hann. 96–113.
Seibert holds that identification of the pass is impossible and he is probably
right. Less plausible is his theory that the Punic army went in two corps via
two passes, thus explaining—he thinks—why some of Polybius’ and Livy’s
details diverge ((1989) 72–3; FzH 198; Hann. 106). Now neither writer, nor
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any later one, shows any awareness of this division, and in fact Livy’s account
of the whole march largely draws on Polybius. Discrepancies could have
arisen if one or more previous writers had tried to clarify the route from their
own, sometimes faulty, geographical knowledge or guesswork, and if Livy
reflected the guesses (he was interested in the topic himself).
(ii) While Hannibal claimed that he had only 20,000 foot and 6,000 horse
on reaching Italy, some scholars hold that he left another 8,000 out—light-
armed pikemen and Balearic slingers, both mentioned at the Trebia by
Polybius (3.72.7)—to make his victories against huge odds seem still more
glorious: thus Delbrück (1920/1975) 1.361–2; Ridley (1987) 162; Seibert,
FzH 181, 212; Hann. 112. Delbrück, 361, holds that the heavy infantry alone
must have totalled 20,000 on arrival, because otherwise they would have been
too few, after Trebia and Trasimene, to carry out the tasks they did at Cannae.
If so Hannibal really brought 34,000 troops into Italy.
But at the Trebia in December 218 he had about 40,000 men in all, includ-
ing by then 10,000 horse (Pol. 3.72.8–9; Walbank 1.404–5; Lazenby (1978)
56)—and this after ‘all the neighbouring Gauls’ had rallied to him and sup-
plied troops (3.66.7). If he had reached Italy with 34,000 men, then these
new allies can have numbered only about 6,000 and have been mostly cavalry
since his cavalry total had risen by 4,000 (so Delbrück, 361). This is implausi-
ble, and it also contradicts Polybius’ evidence for substantial Gallic infantry at
the Trebia (3.72.8, 74.4 and 11): for one thing Hannibal’s 20,000 infantry in
that battle consisted of Spaniards, Africans and Gauls (72.8). Much more
likely then the general had gained 4,000 horse and 10,000 or so foot, includ-
ing some light-armed, from his new allies.
Even if he left the several hundred-odd Baleares out of his Lacinian
record, he must have counted his own pikemen—themselves Africans and
Spaniards—among the African and Spanish foot (so too Walbank 1.366; cf.
Connolly (1981) 187). Nor did these pikemen likely total 8,000, for of that
total at the Trebia some would be Gauls (cf. Lazenby, 81). In other words his
African and Spanish regular infantry probably numbered more than 12,000.
Moreover, as most of the casualties at Trebia and Trasimene were to fall on
his Gauls, the Africans and Spaniards would not have been too many fewer at
Cannae in 216 (cf. Goldsworthy (2000) 180, 189, 207) though admittedly
some men had died of cold in winter 218–217.
He of course had pikemen at Cannae too (Pol. 3.113.6) but likely enough
many were Gallic again ( contra Goldsworthy, 207; see Lazenby, 81; Connolly,
115, 117–18; Wise (1982) 17 suggests 6,000 were). In rearming his African
troops after Trasimene with his plentiful haul of captured Roman weapons
(3.87.3) he may well have armed the highly trained African pikemen at least,
thus adding them to the regular infantry (on these pikemen’s military quality,
cf. Lazenby, 14–15). Even if not, it is unconvincing to suppose his regular
infantry was only 9,000–10,000 strong at Cannae.
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10 ‘De dignitate atque imperio certare’
(chapter X, note 9)
The original source or sources for Hannibal’s statement to his Roman cap-
tives—Silenus, Sosylus, Fabius or the like—no doubt used Greek terms like
τιµ´η and ’αρχ´η; for a Latin version of ’αρχ´η Hannibal or his interpreter could
have said potestas or maybe dicio. Imperium looks like Livy’s rewording or maybe a recent annalist’s, for by their time it could mean ‘empire’ as well as ‘power’
or ‘command’—not in Hannibal’s day, though (cf. Hoyos [1998] 130). Livy
himself probably had all these senses in mind.
11 Independent Roman corps operating in Italy
(chapter XI, note 3)
Hanno’s and Hannibal’s victories over such forces in 213 and 212 are one or
both rejected by Kahrstedt (1913) 265–6, and Briscoe (1989) 54 note 52.
Seibert, Hann. 288, accepts the earlier but (294 note 33) rejects the later; both
are accepted by de Sanctis, 3.2. 264, 383, by Huss (1985) 359 note 184, 365,
by Lazenby (1978) 102, 113, and by Kukofka (1990) 76–7 with modifications.
Appian, Hann. 9.37, 11.45–7, confuses the defeat of C. Centenius’ ‘army’
after Trasimene in 217—in reality Centenius led the consul Servilius’ cav-
alry—with the disaster of M. Centenius Paenula the ex-centurion (perhaps
appointed a praefectus) in Lucania in 212; but this is hardly a warrant for disbe-
lieving the Paenula incident which Livy reports.
Irregulars in 209 forced to surrender: Livy 27.16.9. Some had been
brought over from Sicily by Valerius Laevinus and combined with Bruttian
deserters for operations in Bruttium. Livy 27.12.4–6 avoids naming any com-
mander; cf. chapter X note 13. Note too another independently operating
force in 208, a column of Roman troops marching on their own from Taren-
tum towards Locri when ambushed at Petelia by Hannibal (27.26.4–6).
12 Debated aspects of the Italian campaign of 207
(chapter XII, notes 12–13)
Though Livy seemingly makes Hannibal move from the territory of Larinum
in east-central Italy to the Sallentine peninsula, ‘agri Larinatis’ in his text may
be a copyist’s mistake for ‘agri Tarentini’ (27.40.10, where most MSS actually
offer ‘laritanis’, ‘laritani’ or ‘lartiani’): thus Huss (1985) 392. Certainly the gen-
eral is soon after reported departing ‘ex agro Tarentino’ (40.12). But Livy fails
to explain why Hannibal should be marching into the heel of Italy at all—for
forage? Or is ‘in Sallentinos’ an error for some other and more northerly des-
tination (e.g. ‘Salapitanos’)?
Whether the rest of the reported marching and fighting could have fitted
between mid-March, when the consuls entered office and joined their armies,
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and mid-June when Nero left Apulia for the north, is hard to decide but looks
a little dubious (the battle of the Metaurus was fought on 22 June by the
Roman calendar, according to Ovid, Fasti 6.769–70. Cf. Walbank 2.270–1,
answering de Sanctis’ scepticism (3.2.560–1); cf. Derow (1976) 280–1; Seib-
ert, FzH 244–5).
Seibert ( Hann. 382–4) sees Canusium as Hannibal’s intended junction-point
and the brothers as having conflicting views (‘Meinungsverschiedenheiten’),
while also supposing (385) that Hasdrubal had got in touch with Hannibal as
soon as he reached Italy. He rightly notes (383–4) that a junction in Umbria
implied moving against Rome. But it need not follow that this meant giving up
the Punic-held south, for Hannibal had garrisons in key cities.
At the battle of the Metaurus, Seibert ( Hann. 389, 391) judges Nero’s deci-
sive tactical manoeuvre as fiction from a Nero-friendly tradition—a very
early one if so, since Polybius reports it—which copied Hannibal’s decisive
cavalry manoeuvre at Cannae. Instead he credits the other consul Livius with
working around Hasdrubal’s flank to strike the decisive blow. But not only is
this an arbitrary treatment of Polybius’ evidence as well as Livy’s; it virtually
implies that Nero’s presence was unnecessary, for until he made his manoeu-
vre his troops played no part in the battle. (Nor, it may be added, is Nero’s
infantry manoeuvre very similar to Hannibal’s cavalry coup at Cannae.) Why
not infer then that his famous march and reinforcement of Livius were
invented too? Seibert also denies Nero’s decisive rôle in urging a battle and
assigns the decision to Livius (386–7, 391)—even though before Nero’s
arrival the latter was avoiding combat and gave his unexpectedly arriving col-
league a decidedly ‘frostige Begrüßung’ (386).
Livy claims that Nero’s return to Apulia was swifter (‘citatiore agmine’)
than the outward one—it began the night after the battle and took six days
(27.50.1), while the battle itself was fought the day after he joined Livius
(27.46.5 and 11). If the Metaurus was fought on 22 June, this would date
Nero’s expedition—500 miles (800 kilometres) of marching plus a major
battle—from about 12/13 June to 28/29 June, a clear impossibility. De Sanc-
tis (3.2.556) suggests Nero and his cavalry took six days to return while the
infantry took longer, for he holds (553) that Hannibal moved towards Lar-
inum now, not at the start of the year—giving Nero only some 190 miles
(300 kilometres) thither from Livius’ army—but on this see Lazenby (1978)
185. Three to four weeks’ absence is a safer estimate.
Seibert’s efforts ( Hann. 385 note 36) to shield Hannibal from blame for not
noticing Nero’s absence (‘angesichts der kriegerischen Praxis völlig normal’)
or, if he did notice it, for not taking advantage of it, are hardly persuasive.
And if Nero knew that his absence would be ‘völlig ungefährlich’ for the
Romans because Hannibal would not stir, this puts the latter’s military sag-
acity by 207 in just as poor a light.
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13 The peace talks in 203 and P. Ryl. 3. 491
(chapter XIV, note 12)
P. Ryl. 491, published in 1938 (Roberts (1938)) and generally seen as pro-
Carthaginian in tone, does not mention an attack on Scipio’s envoys, but it is
too fragmentary for disproof and its supposed bias is quite unprovable
(Hoyos (2001a)). Just as likely if not more so, it could be a précis of a pro-
Roman account, maybe even Fabius Pictor’s. Whatever its background, it
does not impugn Polybius’ account.
Plutarch meanwhile has a story of Scipio telling the Carthaginians that,
because they had recalled Hannibal, he would not continue the armistice
‘even if they wished it’ unless they paid a further 5,000 talents ( Moralia
196C–D); but this tale is not plausible. Having brought Hannibal home the
Carthaginians would scarcely be interested in paying to continue the
armistice; and Eutropius (3.22) has Scipio prescribe a similar penalty when
Hannibal himself supposedly asks for peace before Zama. So at best
Plutarch’s story is a glimmer of a more pro-Punic and anti-Scipio tradition:
thus de Sanctis, 3.2.533 note 161, and Huss (1985) 414 note 90; while Mantel
(1991) 121–2 sees it as a distorted annalistic item.
14 The ‘quaestor’ at Carthage in 195
(chapter XVI, note 3)
That ‘quaestor’ means rb ( rab) and head of finance is argued most fully by
Huss (1979), but the case is not completely certain. Finance officials are
attested— mhsbm, ‘the accountables’—but, it seems, no rab of the mhsbm
(Sznycer (1978) 585; cf. Huss (1985) 465) even though rab means simply
‘chief ’ and is also used with other offices, e.g. rab kohanim, ‘chief of priests’
(Huss, 543). Livy’s Latin, of course, may mean not ‘ the quaestor’ (the usual
supposition) but, just as likely, ‘ a quaestor’ and so may refer to one unco-
operative member of ‘the accountables’. True, Gades in 205 had two sufetes
and one ‘quaestor’, all of whom Mago murdered for disloyalty (Livy 28.37.2);
but Gades, a town much smaller than Carthage, may well have had only one
mhsb. In any case Latin writers are not consistent in naming Punic magistra-
cies, so a ‘quaestor’ recorded at one city does not inevitably prove one at
another; for inconsistencies compare Livy calling Hannibal in 196 ‘praetor’
(33.46.2) but writing of ‘sufetes’ in 193 (34.61.15), while Justin terms him
‘consul’ at the time of his flight (31.2.6); and on Nepos’ confusions see chap-
ter XV note 7.
15Hannibal, Cyrene and Siwa (chapter XVII, note 4)
Along with holding that Hannibal visited Cyrene in 193, Seibert ( Hann. 514
and on his Map 10) supposes that he travelled inland to the oracle of Zeus
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Amon at the oasis of Siwa, for later he believed in a prophecy of Amon
about his place of burial (Pausanias 8.11.1; Appian, Syr. 11.44; Tzetzes, Chili-
ades 1.801–22). Of course he would not have had leisure to go to Siwa during
his flight in 195. But Appian and Tzetzes pretty clearly imply that Hannibal
had been sent the prophecy, perhaps after submitting a written query. No
actual visit to the oasis should be supposed.
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814/813
Timaeus’ date for the foundation of Carthage
753
Traditional date of Rome’s foundation
from 550s?
Malchus, Mago and descendants dominant at
Carthage
509
Traditional date of Roman kings’ expulsion, and of
first Roman–Punic treaty
348
Likely date of second Roman–Punic treaty
310
Agathocles of Syracuse invades Punic Africa
308
Military coup by Bomilcar foiled
307Agathocles abandons his forces in Africa and returns
to Sicily
279
Roman–Punic pact against Pyrrhus
about 275
Hiero (later king) becomes leader of Syracuse (dies
215)
264
Clash over Messana and outbreak of First Punic War
256–255
Romans invade Africa; victories and defeat of Regulus
249
Punic naval victories off Drepana and Cape Pachynus
247Hamilcar Barca appointed general in Sicily; birth of
Hannibal
247–244
Hamilcar on Mt Heircte
244–242
Hamilcar at Mt Eryx
241
Battle of the Aegates islands; peace with Romans
Outbreak of the Mercenaries’ War
238/237 (winter)
End of Mercenaries’ War; Hamilcar again elected
general and dominant in Punic affairs
237 (March?)
Romans seize Sardinia, declare war on Carthage;
Carthaginians cede Sardinia and pay money
(April?)
Hamilcar’s expedition to Spain
237–228
Hamilcar’s expansion in Spain
231
Alleged Roman embassy to Hamilcar
229 (end) or
Death of Hamilcar at ‘Castrum Altum’; Hasdrubal
228 (start)
elected general
233
T I M E - L I N E
228 or 227Hasdrubal visits Carthage
227/226
Foundation of New Carthage; Roman interest
aroused
225 (spring)
Ebro-accord between Hasdrubal and the Romans; prob-
able date of first Saguntine–Roman diplomatic links
225–222
Romans defeat Gallic invasion of Italy, and subdue
Cisalpine Gaul
221
Hasdrubal assassinated; Hannibal elected general;
subdues Olcades
220
Campaign in central and northern Spain; Vaccaei and
Carpetani defeated
(autumn)
Roman envoys see Hannibal at New Carthage
219 (prob. Apr./May– Hannibal besieges Saguntum
Dec.)
218
Romans declare war at Carthage
(June–Nov.?)
Hannibal’s expedition to Italy
Cn. Scipio operates in north-eastern Spain
(Nov.–Dec.)
Battles of the Ticinus and the Trebia
217Hannibal enters Etruria; crossing of the Arno
marshes
(June)
Battle of Lake Trasimene; Hannibal marches to
Apulia; Fabius Maximus dictator at Rome;
operations in Campania
Victories of the Scipio brothers in Spain
216 (Aug.)
Battle of Cannae
215
Defections to Hannibal begin in Campania and
southern Italy; further operations in Campania;
treaty with Philip V of Macedon
Hasdrubal in Spain defeated at Hibera
Hiero of Syracuse succeeded by his grandson
Hieronymus
214
Hannibal’s operations in Campania and Apulia;
Hanno defeated at river Calor
Hieronymus assassinated; Hippocrates and Epicydes
ally Syracuse with Carthaginians
213
Arpi in Apulia defects to the Romans; Marcellus
besieges Syracuse
212
Tarentum defects to Hannibal; likewise Metapontum,
Thurii and Locri; first battle of Herdonea