by Dexter Hoyos
bius (3.114.7, 116.6–8): note, though, that Appian has Maharbal command a
cavalry reserve ( Hann. 20.91). The anecdote is disbelieved (e.g.) by Huss (1985)
332 note 281; Seibert, Hann. 198–9; Lazenby (1996) 39; but there are grounds for
believing it in its basic form. Maharbal probably first gave his advice after
Trasimene: Hoyos (2000b).
9 Hannibal expected Romans to offer terms, Livy 22.58.2–9. Lord Montgomery of
Alamein, A History of Warfare (London 1968) 97, comments on his lack of siege
equipment; Seibert, Hann. 201, on his aversion (‘Abneigung’) to sieges—but both
nevertheless hold that he should have marched (Montgomery, ibid. ; Seibert,
198–203, 224, 484; so too Huss (1985) 332–3 and Barceló (1998) 59–60).
Goldsworthy is undecided, (2000) 215–16. That Hannibal was right not to march
is strongly argued by, for instance, Mommsen, HR 2.141; de Sanctis, 3.2.202–3
(Maharbal offering ‘consiglio, più che spavaldo, pazzo’); Hallward (1930) 55
(Hannibal’s ‘deep strategic insight’), cf. 61; Fitton Brown (1959); Hoffmann
(1962) 73–4; Picard (1967) 180–1; Görlitz (1970) 99–100; Lazenby (1978) 85–8,
(1996) passim; Caven (1980) 141; Lancel, Hann. 177–8, cf. 158–9; Shean (1996);
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McKnight (1998) 13—not to mention by the general himself in G. Brizzi, Anni-
bale: Come un’Autobiografia (Milan 1994) 173–4.
10 Masinissa’s capture of Cirta in 203, Livy 30.12.5–10; on its site, OCD 3 333.
Destruction of L. Postumius Albinus’ army in north Italy: Livy 23.24.6–13; Pol.
3.118.7; Frontinus, Strat. 1.6.4; Zon. 9.3.3; Broughton, MRR 1.253. On possible
legiones urbanae in the city: Livy 23.14.2, accepted by Lazenby (1978) 85; not by
Seibert, Hann. 186 note 16, 207 note 130.
11 Fictitious though Maharbal’s comment about speed and surprise may be in
Livy—‘they will learn of my arrival before my approach’ (22.51.2; not in Cato’s
or Coelius’ quoted versions (note 8))—it makes the crucial point: cf. Hoyos
(1983) 177. Fertility of Samnium in central Italy, Pol. 3.90.7; of Campania,
91.1–2; of the territory around Rome, 9.6.9–7.1. Marcellus and Pera: Lazenby
(1978) 90–1, with references. Alarm at Rome in 211: Pol. 9.6.1–3 (‘universal
alarm and fear’, though perhaps an exaggeration); similarly Livy 26.9.6; Appian,
Hann. 39.165–6, 40.173. Possible speed of army to Rome: cf. chapter VIII note
11; also Lazenby, 85. Extent of Rome’s walls reckoned at 11 kilometres (6.6
miles): Starr (1980) 16. Twenty-three slaves crucified in late 217 for plotting ‘in
the Campus Martius’ (just outside the then walls), Livy 22.33.2. Betrayal of Tar-
entum in 213: Pol. 8.24–31; Livy 25.7.10–9.17; Lazenby, 110–12.
12 Mago at Carthage, Livy 22.11.7–12.5. Hannibal had to stay in the south or poten-
tial defectors would be discouraged: thus Caven (1980) 149; Lazenby (1996)
41–2. Booms etc. across the Tiber, Shean (1996) 167, who sees the real bar to a
march on Rome as the massive amount of provisions the Punic army would need
en route (elaborate calculations, Shean, 167–75). But if so, this limitation should
have immobilized it more or less as soon as it left north Italy in spring 217. On
the possibilities for besieging Rome: Seibert, Hann. 200. For swift movement
even over unsuitable terrain, it is worth noting how in 1807 a retreating Spanish
army covered over 300 miles/500 kilometres of trackless mountains during early
winter (1 to 23 November) to reach the city of León, thus averaging 14
miles/22.4 kilometres a day—though it lost half its strength en route (Chandler
(1965/1993) 636–7). Like an ancient army, this one had to move at foot’s pace,
while it also had to transport guns and ammunition.
13 Livy 22.51.4.
X H A N N I B A L ’ S I T A L I A N L E AG U E
1 Defections: Pol. 3.118.1–4; Livy 22.61.10–12 (both lists cover several years’
worth, cf. Walbank, 1.448); Lazenby (1978) 89–90; Huss (1985) 335–6; Seibert,
Hann. 203–4, 212–15. Mago sent south, Livy 23.1.4, 11.7. On the Samnite defec-
tions, E. T. Salmon, Samnium and the Samnites (Cambridge 1967) 298–9; on the
Campanian, Frederiksen (1984) 238–41. On Hannibal’s hopes in 217 for Capua’s
defection cf. chapter IX note 6. Links with Romans: Livy 23.2.6, 4.7 (Pacuvius
Calavius’ with Ap. Claudius Pulcher and M. Livius Salinator), 25.18.4–5 (Badii
family’s guest-friendship with Quinctii Crispini). Vibius Virrius, Livy 23.6.1–2;
on the defection of Capua cf. Ungern-Sternberg (1975) chapter II.
2 Hannibal’s treaty with Capua, Livy 23.7.1–2 (‘more like pro-Carthaginian non-
belligerency than a genuine fighting alliance’, Salmon (see note 1), 298); arrest of
Decius Magius, 23.10.3–13 (Magius escaped to Alexandria). Atella, Calatia (and
the obscure Sabatini): 26.33.12, 34.6, 34.11; Salmon, 298 note 4; Frederiksen
(1984) 36, 242–3. Capua seen as ‘an indispensable source of provisions and
industrial wealth’ for Hannibal: Frederiksen, 241. For what it is worth, note that
artisans (‘fabri’) serving the Punic garrison at Locri were paid: Livy 29.6.4.
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3 Defection of Locri, Livy 23.30.8, 24.1.2–13 (with pact, 24.1.13; cf. Schmitt, SVA
3.245; Kukofka (1990) 16 note 29). Treaty with Tarentum: Pol. 8.25.1–2; Livy
25.8.8; Schmitt, SVA no. 531. Samnites’ complaints, Livy 23.42 (especially 42.11).
Bruttians and Lucanians defeated, 24.14–16. Bruttians at Tarentum in 209,
27.15.9; Appian, Hann. 49.212.
4 Livy 24.2.8 (‘[ut] senatus Romanis faveret, plebs ad Poenos rem traheret’); cf.
23.14.7, and Plutarch, Marcellus 10.1 (pro-Hannibal commons at Nola). Locri:
Livy 23.30.8 (quoted), 24.1.5–8 (fuller details), 29.6.5. Arpi, 24.47.6–10; Etruria,
e.g. 27.24.2–5 (Arretium), 29.36.10–12, 30.26.12 (investigation ‘de coniura-
tionibus principum’). See Harris (1971) 142–3; Ungern-Sternberg (1975) 63–76
(defecting to Hannibal ‘fast durchweg von Angehörigen der führenden Schicht
ins Werk gesetzt wurde’, 69); Lazenby (1978) 88; Kukofka (1990) 154–7. Hanni-
bal as democrat: Groag (1929) 112 note 1; Picard (1967) 135–6 (cf. (1968));
Brisson (1973) 154–5, 206 (‘il favorisait de toutes ses forces tout ce qu’il y avait de
démocratique dans l’Italie romaine’), 212–13, 233, 235; Huss (1985) 347; contrast
Nicolet (1978) 2.612, 617–18 (Barcid democratic inclinations at home, but in
Italy Hannibal did not push democracy).
5 Hannibal and Tarentum in 214, Livy 24.13.1–5; its defection, Pol. 8.24–31; Livy
25.7.10–10.10. Date: Walbank 2.5; Lazenby (1978) 110. Metapontum and Thurii,
25.15.5–17; Heraclea, Appian, Hann. 35.149.
6 The ‘clouds gathering in the west’, Pol. 5.104.10 (Agelaus of Naupactus), cf.
Gruen (1984) 1.322–5; Seibert, FzH 15 note 57. Treaty between Philip V and
Hannibal: Pol. 7.9; Livy 23.33.9–34.2 (a libellous version); Schmitt, SVA
3.247–50 no. 528. Gelo of Syracuse’s attitude: Livy 23.30.10–12; Marino (1988)
31–4. Syracusan demands about Sicily: Pol. 7.4.1–7, 5.4–7; Livy 24.6.7–8.
Hieronymus’ dealings with Hannibal and Carthage: Pol. 7.2, 7.4; Livy 24.6.1–9;
Schmitt, 3.251–2 no. 529. Hannibal’s agent Hannibal: Pol. 7.2.3, terming him ‘tri-
erarch’; Livy 24.6.2 (‘a young nobleman’, perhaps misreading Polybius).
Lenschau, RE 7.2,351, suggests he may have been the Hannibal nicknamed
Monomachus of Pol. 9.24.5 (on whom see above, chapters VII note 2, VIII note
18) which is possible enough (despite Walbank, 2.32; Brizzi (1984) 15 note 20).
Monomachus was a friend of the general, and a trusted lieutenant if he could
perpetrate atrocities yet stay unpunished: and the position of trierarch was held
by trusted friends or kinsmen (like Hasdrubal under Hamilcar in Spain; cf. Wal-
bank, 1.109, 153).
7Hannibal to his Roman PoWs, Livy 22.58.2–3 (‘non internecivum sibi esse cum
Romanis bellum; de dignitate atque imperio certare’), cf. Hoyos (1983) 176, 180
note 9. Carthalo ‘nobilis Carthaginiensis’, 22.58.7–9, probably the same as the
skilful cavalry general in 217 (22.15.8). De Sanctis supposes Carthalo’s mission a
fiction (3.2.216 note 33—describing it wrongly as ‘d’offrir pace’); so too Seibert,
Hann. 203, on the grounds that Hannibal was waiting on the Romans to make the
overtures (but that was precisely Carthalo’s brief) and that sending Carthalo was
incompatible with his personal sense of honour (a subjective verdict). Inciden-
tally, the Carthaginians and other Hellenistic states continued to obey the dictum
that crushing defeats required peace. After three in North Africa in 203–202 the
Carthaginians capitulated; after one major battle, Cynoscephalae in 197, so did
Philip V of Macedon; likewise his son Perseus in 168 after losing his army at
Pydna. Antiochus III of Syria came to terms after a defeat in Greece in 191 and a
major battle in Asia in 189.
8 Hannibal’s promises, Pol. 7.9.12 and 15. Discussions of the treaty are many: e.g.
G. Egelhaaf, ‘Analekten zur Geschichte des zweiten punischen Krieges’,
HZ 53/NF 17 (1885) 456–61; and (1922) 13–16; Groag (1929) 80–90, 132–5;
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E. Bickerman, AJP 73 (1952) 1–23; A. J. Chroust, Classica et Medievalia 15 (1954)
60–107; Picard (1967) 26–35; Walbank, 2.42–56; Eucken (1968) 62–71; M. Barré,
The God-List in the Treaty between Hannibal and Philip V of Macedonia (Baltimore and
London 1983); Huss (1985) 341–3; R. M. Errington, CAH 2 8.96–8; Seibert,
Hann. 240–6; Lancel, Hann. 192–4. Seibert, FzH 271–2 gives a lengthy bibliography going back to 1885. Treaty bound Carthaginian state: Hoyos (1994) 254–5
and note 13. For Illyrian events in 216, e.g. Lazenby (1978) 158–9.
9 ‘For honour and power’ (‘de dignitate atque imperio’, note 7 above): cf. Appendix
§10. That Hannibal did not envisage the destruction of the Roman state or city,
but instead the reduction of Roman power, was early stressed by G. Egelhaaf
( HZ (1885) 456–65, and (1922) 13–16, 39–40), Kromayer ((1909/1974) 247–50)
and de Sanctis (3.2.11–12); doubted by Groag ((1929) 80–95); reaffirmed with
modifications by Hoffmann ((1957/1974) 40–3, 56–9), Nicolet ((1978) 619–20),
Huss ((1985) 343), Seibert ( Hann. 63–5), Lazenby ((1996) 42–6), and Barceló
((1998) 65–6).
10 Virrius’ assurances, Livy 23.6.1–3; Hannibal’s, 23.10.2. Bruttians attack Petelia
and Croton, 23.20.4–10, 30.1–7; 24.2.2–3.15; Locri, 24.2.1. On other resurfacing
antagonisms cf. J.-M. David, The Roman Conquest of Italy (tr. A. Nevill, Oxford
1996 (from French edn 1994)) 58–9; cf. Seibert, Hann. 224, 253, 484, 543.
11 Annexation: Seibert makes a similar deduction ( FzH 159–61; Hann. 64–5). Citi-
zenship promised to soldiers: Ennius, Annales 234–5, ed. Skutsch; Livy 21.45.6;
cf. chapter VI note 7. Italy claimed as gain of war: Pol. 3.111.9; Livy 23.33.11
(treaty), 23.5.13 (Varro), cf. 24.6.8; Zon. 9.4.2. Promises before Ticinus: Livy
21.45.5–8, a programme too carefully itemized to look like mere Roman inven-
tion; it could go back to Silenus or Sosylus even if Livy, or a predecessor like
Coelius, chose to put it in at a dramatic rather than historically suitable moment
(but the rite Livy imagines accompanying Hannibal’s promises is a borrowed
Roman one: cf. 1.24.7–9 and R. M. Ogilvie, A Commentary on Livy Books 1–5
(Oxford 1965) 70–1, 112). Barceló’s view that Hannibal meant to enforce simply
‘das Prinzip des Gleichgewichts der Mächte’ ((1998) 65–6) is over-simple.
12 Reinforcements via southern Gaul: thus Seibert (1989); FzH 183, 193–4; Hann.
110, 222. Picard sees southern Gaul as virtually annexed by Hannibal in 218
((1967) 163–7), but rather than reinforcements by that route he infers later Brut-
tian and Lucanian recruits (198). So had others, e.g. de Sanctis, 3.2.213–14; Gsell,
HAAN 2.339; Groag (1929) 100 note 3 (on p. 102). Bomilcar’s corps: Livy
23.13.7, 41.10, 43.6; the figure for the funds sent over is missing (13.7) but was
probably ‘500’ (cf. Conway and Walters’ comment (Oxford text) on the passage).
Another 1,000 talents were voted later (23.32.5) though not sent. Reinforcements
diverted to Spain, 32.5–6; forces to Sardinia, 32.12; Mago sent to Spain for fresh
troops, 13.8. The elephants mentioned once with Hannibal in Campania in 215
(Livy 23.18.6) are probably later annalists’ anticipation of the corps that later
arrived with Bomilcar (de Sanctis, 3.2.227 note 52; Peddie (1997) 110, 215, 222,
supposes the Carthaginians might have sent some in 216). Despite writing on ‘gli
eserciti annibalici’, Barreca (1983–4) has nothing on the army after Cannae, nor
has Peddie’s discussion, 101–4; contrast Wise (1982) 12, 22–3.
13 Northern and southern Punic armies: Seibert, Hann. 211–15. Not heard of after
211: Kukofka (1990) 83. Garrisons: at Capua, Livy 23.7.5, 25.15.3, and 26.5.6,
6.3, 12.10–11, 14.7; Appian, Hann. 36.153–4; Livy 24.47.2 (Arpi), 26.38.11 and
Val. Max. 3.8 ext. 1 (Salapia); 27.1.1–2 (Marmoreae and Meles in Samnium),
25.11.8; 27.15.9–12, 15.18, 16.5 (Tarentum), 29.6.5–7.10 (Locri). Still other Punic
garrisons are mentioned at Tisia in Bruttium (Appian, Hann. 44.188–90), among
the Hirpini and Lucanians (Livy 27.15.2) and at Metapontum (27.16.12, 42.16).
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Passing comment in Livy: 27.43.11. Lazenby (1996) 45, like Livy 26.38.1–2, is
over-pessimistic about Hannibal’s capacity to garrison places, though it is obvi-
ously true the general could never hope—or need—to garrison everything. Punic
army at the Calor, 24.14.1, 15.2 (most of the cavalry were Numidians and Maure-
tanians). Bruttian levies in 207, 27.42.16; cf. 27.12.5 for Bruttian deserters in 209.
Polybius (11.19.4) includes Italians in his generalized list of the nationalities rep-
resented in Hannibal’s army from 218 to 203.
14 Italian troops in Hannibal’s army: cf. Appian, Hann. 59.247 (stressing their high
quality). Recalcitrant Italian troops massacred in 203: Livy 30.30.6; Diod. 27.9;
Appian 59.247–9; below, chapter XIV §III. Veterans at Zama: Pol. 15.11.2 (Han-
nibal’s speech, 11.6–12), 12.7; Livy 30.33.5, 35.9; cf. Appian, Lib. 40.170 (terming
them entirely Italian). For Kahrstedt (1913) 561, they were some 15,000 sur-
vivors from 218 an
d Bomilcar’s reinforcement, plus ‘ein paar Tausend’ Italians;
for de Sanctis, 3.2.531, a mixture of invasion-veterans and Italian recruits; Picard
(1967) 198, 204; Wise (1982) 22–3. Hallward (1930) 104, estimates 8,000 sur-
vivors of the original army and 7,000 Italians; Connolly (1981) 203–4, 4,000-odd
of the original African troops; similarly G. T. Griffiths, The Mercenaries of the Hel-
lenistic World (London 1935) 229–33. For Brisson (1973) 293, Hannibal took to
Africa only ‘les vétérans des premières années de campagne’.
15 Bomilcar’s reinforcements: note 12. Punic army sent to Sicily, Livy 24.35.1–3; cf.
Thiel (1946) 79–80. On the war in Spain see for instance Lazenby (1978) chapter
V. Hannibal’s control of Punic war-effort, Pol. 9.22.1–6. Mottones: Walbank,
2.150 with references; Lazenby (1978) 119, 172, 292 note 44; Seibert, Hann. 317
note 95.
16 Hasdrubal the Bald: Livy 23.32.11, 34.16–17, 40.6–41.1. Himilco in Sicily:
24.35.3–36.10, 39.10; 25.26.3–14. Hanno: 26.40.3–11. Hasdrubal son of Gisco:
chapter XI §III.
17Mago’s report to the senate at Carthage: Livy 23.11.7
–13.8 (‘a small extra effort’,
13.6), cf. Seibert, Hann. 215–16. Hannibal and supporters at Carthage: chapter
VII §I. On dealings with Syracuse see note 6 above; Hoffmann (1961/1974) 351
also stresses Hannibal’s initiative. Letter of Hannibal to Carthage: Livy
24.35.4–5. Epicydes and Hanno: 25.40.5–13 and 41.3–7; 26.40.11. Mottones:
Pol. 9.22.4; Livy 25.40; 26.40.3–8; 27.5.6–7; SEG 585 no. 32; de Sanctis, 3.2.299
note 170; Walbank, 2.150. Hanno as anti-Barcid: Hoffmann, 356; Huss (1985)
369 note 266.
18 Hasdrubal ordered to march to Italy: Livy 23.27.9–10, 28.1–8, 29.16–17; Oros.
4.16.13. Romans worried: Pol. 3.97.4. Date of battle of the Ebro: de Sanctis,
3.2.235 note 71. Seibert, Hann. 220–2, views the marching orders as a Roman fic-
tion to glorify the Scipios’ victory.
19 Fresh army from Spain envisaged: previous note. On the encirclement strategy
cf. Hallward (1930) 60–1. Sardinian rebellion, Livy 23.32.10–17, 40.1–41.7;
Dyson (1985) 251–4.
20 Pro-Carthaginian versus pro-Roman factions: Ungern-Sternberg (1975) 65–70;
Kukofka (1990) 154–6. Arpi: Livy 24.45.1, 47.4–8. Salapia: Livy 26.38.1–11; Val.