Dad explained what happened to Micaloni and his crew on that day.
That’s where Micaloni got killed, he was in our company, B Company. He went up and his tank got blown up. It was right on the Seves River. These guys should have gotten nothing less than the Silver Star because they didn’t have to die. They were ordered to go and they went. They had to go through that river, the Seves River. The (infantry) colonel gave a direct order for them to take the tank up in there. Captain Galvin (712th B Company commander) didn’t want them to go. Galvin was a big guy, kind of heavyset and boy he could drink some booze. He told Micaloni, “Don’t Go.” Micaloni told him, “I will go Captain.” Galvin was right.
The terrain was not meant for tank warfare – the surrounding swampy fields could not be traversed by tanks and the northern approaches to the ford had been mined. “They hit a tank mine and it blew the tank completely up.” All four of the 712th tank crew, Tullio Micaloni, Frank Krusel, Nicholas Milczakowski, and James Gaither were killed, due to the explosive device containing approximately 400 lbs of TNT.22 We had visited the graves of Micaloni, Krusel, and Milczakowski at Omaha Beach, but I had asked about the other crew member, Gaither, and the fifth member of the tank crew. Gaither was from Alabama, after the war his remains were brought back to the US, at the request of his family.
“The fifth guy was sick. I understand that on the first day of combat he killed sixteen American soldiers. He shot in the woods (thinking them to be Germans). Now that was just hearsay, I don’t know if that was true or not. It was probably true. But he was sick and Micaloni told him to get out. So he got out and they asked somebody to volunteer so an infantryman jumped in. Nobody knows who he was.”
After Micaloni’s tank was lost, “The captain went back to the generals at HQ and told them that area was not a place (the marsh around Seves River) for tanks to fight. All you could hear was the captain (yelling). Nobody else said anything. The general told the captain ‘Ok you run your tanks,’ and he told the infantry colonel, ‘You take care of the infantry.’”
The end of the campaign in Normandy was at hand. Operation Cobra was designed to permit the US Army to breakout of the hedgerow country. It involved a massive bombing of the German defenses around St Lô followed by the Americans moving across the German defenses along the road between St Lô and Périers. Dad said that during the bombardment, they sat on the top of their tank and watched all of bombers dropping their bombs. The sky was dark with all of the planes that were flying on the bombing mission, about 3,000 planes.
Operation Cobra, however was not without mishap. On July 24, the weather was poor and the attack was postponed, some of the bombers however, did not get word of the one day delay in the attack. The pilots proceeded with the bomb run, but due to the poor weather, some of the bombs were dropped upon American GIs instead of the Germans, killing or wounding over 150 Americans. The next day, the attack proceeded again. Once more the weather was not ideal; it was difficult for the bombers to identify the front lines and once again some of the planes inadvertently dropped their bombs on American troops. Friendly fire killed over 150 Americans and wounded over 500 that day. Included in the fatalities was Lieutenant-General Lesley N. McNair, the architect of the Army’s reorganization and tactical doctrine for armored forces. McNair had only just arrived in Europe three days earlier and was positioned on a hill to observe the attack. He was the highest ranking American General killed in World War II.23 McNair is buried in the American Cemetery in Normandy.
As part of the breakout operation, B Company tanks of the 712th were engaged in indirect firing on the town of Périers. Indirect firing was essentially using the 70-mm tank cannon as an artillery piece.
Despite the initial heavy fighting, Périers was liberated by the 359th Regiment of the 90th with the help of D Company of the 712th along with one platoon from B Company. Dad was in that B Company platoon and explains, “I was in the first tank that entered Périers and we proceeded toward the train station. My tank commander, Sgt Warren Willinger, told us that whoever captures the train station in a town is credited with capturing the town. Ours was the first tank at the train station”
Dad and I passed by Henri Levaufre’s home on the way into town. Henri, however, was in the United States attending a reunion of the 90th Infantry Division. We spent the night in the hotel in Périers. Being a Saturday, we attended the vigil Mass in the town’s church, across the street from the hotel.
There were photos on the wall of the hotel taken in Périers during the war. The town had been virtually destroyed by the bombs and artillery shells of the US Army. In 1944, Cpl Albert O. Maranda, was in the 4th Armored Division that participated in Operation Cobra wrote in his diary, “29th July: Raining – moved out at 07:28 hours. Went down St Lô – Périers highway through Périers. All towns and villages in shambles. Périers almost flattened – people streaming back to their former homes if they can find them.”24
After the battle front had moved on, the badly damaged church and the town hall were rebuilt to appear as they did before the destruction. Many of the ancient buildings in France are constructed of stone. Dad said that when these buildings were destroyed during the war, the citizens would reuse the same stones and reassemble the buildings piece by piece like a jigsaw puzzle. When Dad and I attended Mass in the church in Périers, I noticed that the structure itself was reassembled with no apparent visible difference. The statues and other ornamental decorations inside of church were also apparently the originals and reused but they were damaged and scarred. The main crucifix over the altar showed visible breaks and cracks. Henri Levaufre said that the repairs to the church in Périers were not completed until 1960.
At the same time of the breakout and the liberation of Périers, the United States Third Army was being activated under the command of Gen. George S. Patton. The 90th Infantry and the 712th Tank Battalion was transferred to the command of Patton. Under Patton’s command the rapid pace across Europe began. Whereas in June and July, the army was fighting and measuring its advance in yards per day, now the advance was being measured in miles per day. The Battle for Normandy was over, but it was costly.
The 90th had the eighth highest battle casualty rate of all divisions in World War II. The weak leadership of the 90th at this early stage of combat led to it having this high rate; of the roughly 14,200 troops in the Division that landed June 6 and 7, approximately 6,000 were wounded and over 1,000 were KIA. The ineptitude of the 90th’s leaders had an equally devastating effect upon the 712th Tank Battalion; of the KIA casualties suffered during the entire war, 35 percent of the 712th’s KIAs occurred in the month of July 1944.
These dismal casualty statistics almost led to the 90th’s death knell as a Division. On June 9, Gen. Omar Bradley had issued orders to Lieutenant-General Joseph L. Collins to cut off the Cotenin Peninsula at its neck before going to Cherbourg. The 82nd Airborne, the 4th, 9th and 90th Divisions were assigned the task.
For three days the 90th floundered in starting its attack. On the fourth day, Gen. Collins asked that the 90th commander Brig.-Gen. Jay W. MacLelvie be relieved. Shortly before leaving the United States, MacKelvie, the division’s former artilleryman, was promoted to division commander, a job for which he was not adequately trained. His problems in combat were further compounded by too many inept subordinate commanders.
Gen. Omar Bradley wrote about the 90th after the war:
Our choice of the 90th turned out poorly. For three days the division floundered in its starting attack. […]
For the first few days in combat most new divisions suffer a disorder resulting from acute mental shock. Until troops can acclimate themselves to the agony of the wounded and the finality of death, they herd by instinct in fear and confusion. They cannot be driven into attack but must be led, and sometimes coaxed, by their commanders. Within a few days this shock ordinarily wears off, the division overcomes its baptismal panic, and troops respond normally to assured and intelligent command.
Wh
ere possible we made an effort to relieve the severity of that shock by conditioning each new unit in a ‘quiet’ sector before committing it to attack. But when the 90th came ashore on the heels of the 4th Division across Utah Beach, there was no ‘quiet’ sectors. We had no choice but to fling it into an attack that would have tested the mettle of veterans. But this sudden immersion was not confined to the 90th alone. Other equally green divisions entered the line under even more appalling conditions and most of them weathered the ordeal with distinction. Almost from the moment of its starting attack, however, the 90th became a ‘problem’ division. So exasperating was its performance that at one point the First Army Staff gave up and recommended that we break it up for replacements.25
Maj.-Gen. Eugene M. Landrum, Gen. Collins’ deputy at VII Corps, was chosen to replace MacKelvie, and cautioned to clean house throughout his new command. However, after three more weeks of poor performance by the 90th staff resulting in two companies surrendering to the enemy and a battalion position falling. Landrum had not made enough changes. The division’s morale had been shaken and whatever confidence it had was gone. Landrum had not supplied the needed spark and was relieved from command of the 90th, although Gen. Bradley’s staff strongly suggested that the division be cannibalized for replacements, Bradley was not convinced that the division could not be rescued by an outstanding commander.
With the Third Army about to be activated, Bradley decided to keep the division intact rather than cannibalize it for replacements as suggested. He transferred it to units that would soon comprise the Third Army that would be under the command of Gen. George S. Patton Jr.
Every war seems to have one or two generals whose names are indelibly associated with that conflict throughout history. Patton is one such general of World War II. He was not without his supporters and critics during and after the war but the successes of the Third Army under his command are indisputable and assure his place in military history.
Eisenhower said of Patton, “He was one of those men born to be a soldier, an ideal combat leader whose gallantry and dramatic personality inspired all he commanded to great deeds of valor. His presence gave me the certainty that the boldest plan would be even more daringly executed. It is no exaggeration to say that Patton’s name struck terror at the hearts of the enemy.”26
George Patton is largely known by my generation as a result of the 1970 movie, Patton. Surprisingly, George C. Scott’s portrayal of the man, his public persona and the events that helped create it, is regarded as being highly accurate.
Patton’s flashy uniforms, his polished helmet, and ivory-handled pistols resulted in some of his contemporary American and British generals considering him a showman. Patton’s public image was for the most part, by design, of his own making to boost morale among his troops and the American public. Other generals of WWII era portrayed themselves as “just an ordinary Joe”. Patton deliberately chose another style – he was not trying to be perceived as “democratic general” or “a man of the people”. He wanted his image to be one of a hard charging, aggressive general with a desire to win, but at a minimum cost in American lives. The opening seen of the movie Patton, where George C. Scott appears on a stage before a group of troops is an accurate portrayal of both the appearance and words of the speeches George Patton made to the troops in England in the spring of 1944. Much of the dialogue in the movie faithfully drew on the actual words of Patton.
Beneath the flashy and brash exterior, however, Patton was a thoughtful, intelligent and professional soldier. He was on the forefront of progressive leadership style which distinguished him from other Allied generals. In both strategy and leadership methods, Patton abandoned some of the old military ways and employed a new style. Patton abandoned the old command methods of the US Army – close supervision of subordinates and written specific orders, instead issuing detailed orders he preferred in “mission command”: “Never tell people how to do things, tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their own ingenuity.”
Patton utilized military intelligence to his advantage. The Germans encrypted their military messages with an Enigma machine, a keyboard device for enciphering and deciphering their messages; they believed the Allies were incapable of intercepting and deciphering their secret messages and orders. But in 1940 the British had recovered an Enigma machine from a sunken submarine and soon began intercepting most of Germany’s top-secret messages. To preserve the secret that the cipher had been broken, Allied intelligence derived from enigma signals were a special security Ultra Secret Source, and referred to as ULTRA.
Instead of engaging in frontal attacks on an enemy’s main defense, resulting in a large attrition of manpower, Patton believed in maneuver warfare. Patton’s idea was to keep the enemy off balance – keeping his troops moving while the enemy’s troops were in disorder. “My men don’t dig foxholes. I don’t want them to. Foxholes only slow up an offensive. Keep moving. And don’t give the enemy time to dig one, either.”
Patton used the military intelligence of ULTRA in formulating his tactical battle plans, picking the enemy’s weakest points and then planning rapid attacks resulting in the fewest American casualties, whereas the Allied generals tended to determine the objective and then consult with military intelligence to assess the attack plan.
When Patton began to review the units that would be under his command, one of the first orders of business for the 90th was to fill the vacancy at the top position. When Patton was given a long list of possible replacements, he caught sight of two names on the list: Raymond S. McLain and Theodore Roosevelt Jr.
Patton is quoted as stating, “I recalled, however, in thinking of Roosevelt that Eisenhower and I had once agreed in Sicily that Ted’s easy indifference to discipline would probably limit him to a single star. ‘The men worship Ted,’ I had explained to Ike, ‘but he’s too softhearted to take a division – too much like one of the boys.’ But it was not a disciplinarian the 90th needed now. It called for a man with vitality and courage, a man who could pick up the division singlehandedly and give it confidence in itself. If anyone fitted that description, Ted Roosevelt was his name. With a thick-skinned disciplinarian as his second in command, Ted would have the 90th brawling with the Germans in a couple of weeks.”27
Patton telephoned Eisenhower at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) on July 13 to recommend Roosevelt for the job. But it was about midnight and Eisenhower had gone to bed. Patton told Gen. Bedell Smith of his choice. Smith said that he would pass it by Eisenhower in the morning. It was Eisenhower’s decision to forward the recommendation to Washington for Roosevelt’s promotion.
Patton relating the incident stated:
Bedell called back early the next morning. I had not yet gone to breakfast. “I’ve got the answer for you on Roosevelt. Ike said O.K. It’s the right thing to do.”
“It’s too late, Bedell,” I answered, “Ted died of a heart attack at midnight last night.” The news had been telephoned me from the 4th Division where Ted had been assigned as a spare brigadier. The coronary attack had come unexpectedly and without warning; Ted died as no one could have believed he would, in the quiet of his tent.28
General Roosevelt is buried in the Normandy Cemetery above Omaha Beach.
As a result of Roosevelt’s death, Patton had to make another choice for a replacement for the 90th. On July 30, Patton chose, Brig.-Gen. Raymond S. McLain who had served with him in Sicily. He informed Bradley of his choice. “As the discussion ended Bradley said: ‘George, you haven’t commented on any of these officers. This Division is going to belong to you; you had better speak up.’ Patton replied, ‘Hell, damn it, I told you McLain and that is what I meant.’ McLain got the 90th. He had earned Patton’s trust and that was good enough.”29
McLain would take over the reins of the 90th as the Battle for Normandy was coming to an end and the Battle of Northern France beginning. McLain was told to replace any subordinate officer he wanted. Within two days McLain ha
d a list of sixteen officers he deemed unsatisfactory in his command. They were quickly transferred out of the 90th.
CHAPTER 6
The Breakout
Death in battle is a function of time. The longer troops remain under fire, the more men get killed. Therefore, everything must be done to speed up movement.
General George S. Patton Jr.
Give George a headline, and he’s good for thirty miles was Omar Bradley’s assessment of Patton’s motivation for his rapid advance. After slugging it out for seven weeks in the hedgerows, Eisenhower appreciated every mile gained by Patton’s forces.
The month of August, 1944 has been chronicled as one of the most remarkable periods in military history.1 The month began with the ultimate success of the D-Day invasion still in doubt. More than any other campaign of the war, it sealed the fate of the Axis powers. The coming of age of the American army as an outstanding military organization, the unprecedented movement of Allied forces, and the Allied military strategy in Western Europe during this month had a major impact on the outcome of the war. It tipped the scales between victory and defeat.
The US Third Army’s rapid progress across France during the month of August began immediately after Patton assumed command. In the fifty-one days from June 6 to July 27, the US Army had progressed a mere 25 miles inland, the distance between Utah Beach and Périers. In contrast the distant from Périers to Avranches is approximately 34 miles and the Army traversed that territory within two days.
A Tank Gunner's Story: Gunner Gruntz of the 712th Tank Battalion Page 10