Joe Cavalieri was a gunner in one of the other tanks positioned near Dad that night. His tank was situated in some brush on the side of the road that ran between Berle and Pommerloch. In the middle of the night the Germans launched a counterattack to regain Berle and Pommerloch with four tanks. As the lead German Mark V Panzer headed along the road, the German commander was standing in the tank’s hatch and apparently did not see Cavalieri’s tank. When the Panzer was about twenty yards from Cavalieri’s tank, the German commander fired a flare to light up the area, but the flare had a short fuse and only lit briefly. The duration of the flare’s light, however, was long enough for the Panzer to become visible in Cavalieri’s sights. When Cavalieri opened up at that point blank range, the Panzer erupted in flames.
Cavalieri’s action thwarted the counterattack, the other three Panzers and accompanying infantry quickly retreated. Unfortunately, the flames from the destroyed German tank illuminated the entire area and all the American positions became visible. Dad said that weapons were firing from all directions that entire night.
About an hour after Cavalieri knocked out the Panzer, two columns of infantry advanced toward the 712th, one column on each side of the road. T/Sgt Dale Albee of D Company opened fire on the advancing soldiers.20 During the firing a voice was heard calling on one side, “Stop firing, for God’s sake stop firing! We’re Americans, we’re GIs returning from a patrol! Please stop firing!”
After the firing had ceased, the voice was heard again, “We’re Germans. We want to give up and be taken as prisoners of war.” Twenty-seven prisoners were taken and an undetermined number of German soldiers had been killed.21 The Journal of D Company reported that throughout the night the area was subjected to artillery and rocket fire.
Dad said, “At night when we couldn’t see what was happening, we would pray for daylight. During the day when the fighting was the fiercest, we would pray for the darkness of night.”
Gen. Patton wrote in his diary for that day’s activities that despite the limited flying weather, all units along the lime attacked as plan. “The 90th Infantry Division, making the main effort, received heavy casualties from artillery and rocket fire just after jump-off, but advanced two kilometers.”22 With the exception of the 90th, the 101st Airborne and Fourth Armored Divisions, all the other units made very limited progress.
With Lt Mesker out with wounds, and Cragg dead, Dad’s platoon was undermanned and was ordered to hold its position. Dad explained, “We had several men wounded and so we couldn’t go any further, so they sent another platoon through us.” The tanks that moved through Dad’s position participated in a dawn attack on Doncols.
From Dad’s vantage point at the edge of the woods, Doncols could be seen in the distance across the open snow covered field. The Germans occupied Doncols and the high area to its rear, including the nearby town of Bahoey (Bohey). The open area between the American line and Doncols was under enemy observation.
An infantryman involved in that action described the night of January 9 and the morning of 10 January.
Between standing guard and strange noises, we didn’t get much sleep. The Captain had patrols out in the snow all night… Often, a patrol would move out to look over the objective, then there would be a skirmish heard in the distance, a few blasts of opposing machine gun fire, and that was it for the patrol.
In the unborn morning of Jan. 10, 1945 we moved through the shattered streets of Berle […] As we passed the last building, the columns to our front were becoming visible […]
As we became visible to ourselves, we also became visible to the German rocket observers. It was horrible that we, without any type of white covering for our clothing, had to make ourselves obvious to the enemy.
The first action to confront us was an enemy machine gun placed to our front during the night. This forced everybody to sprawl out in the snow. It was calculated murder. Once we stopped, the rocket (nebelwerfer) fire began. In flight, these rockets made a sound as ghastly as the sound of the explosion when they hit. We called them ‘screaming meemies’, which is what they gave us when they came in […]
We were bogged down among the trees for a time while we were being redirected towards the town of Doncols. Traversing enemy fire was being sprinkled around and some of it hit us […]
We had to halt our advance toward Doncols, where we wanted to spend the night, but it was not to be that night. We stayed where we were.23
Col. Raymond Bell, the 359th regimental commander, believed the daylight attack that was ordered was a serious mistake. His troops had to attack over an open and barren area near Pommerloch, in bitter cold with unobstructed visibility, moving through deep snow and without flank protection on the northeast side. The German Artillery forward observers were able to look directly down on the 90th from the commanding Grumelscheider Heights. In spite of this situation, the commanders of the III Corps insisted on ordering the attack advising that the crossroads adjacent to Doncols had to be captured as quickly as possible regardless of cost.
Bell’s fears proved to be well founded. As soon as the Americans appeared on the open ground, they became ‘sitting ducks’ for the German artillery and mortars. The attack bogged down and Bell’s infantry troops began to suffer heavy casualties. The men dug into snow, and had to take the brunt of the enemy fire.
Bell commented, “A continuation of the attack was clearly suicidal and I could not let that happen to my troops […] I finally was able to extract what was left of the leading companies and I was a very unhappy commander. In fact, I asked General Van Fleet to relieve me, but he refused.”24
The mortars and the artillery that rained down upon the 359th infantry also unmercifully pounded the tanks from B Company, which had also moved into the open field that morning several hundred yards ahead of the infantry. Dad described the fate of the tanks accompanied the 359th in the attack that morning. “When we (B Company) attacked them during the daylight we had four tanks knocked out. That’s when Richard (John R. Williams), David Dickson, Buck Lee were killed. Harvey Fowler was wounded and died of his wounds two days later on January 12, and I believe Dee Johnson was hit and was in them tanks (Dee Johnson also died on January 12).”
Dee Johnson and Dad were in the same tank in Sainte-Suzanne, and, like Dad, he was wounded in Sainte-Suzanne. Lt Otto Krieg was wounded by shrapnel in the foot; eight other B Company tankers were also wounded. All in all there were fourteen casualties from B Company that fateful day.
The Night Attack on Hill 490
General Patton made an unexpected visit to the 90th Division HQ. A junior officer mistakenly told him that the 359th Regiment and the tanks from B Company had achieved its objective – the high ground around the towns of Doncols and Bahoey. Satisfied with this progress report, Patton left the HQ. Other officers quickly realized the mistaken information given to Patton and informed the 90th Commanding Officer, Gen. Van Fleet.
“When he returned to the CP that afternoon, the General (Van Fleet) decided two things: He was not going to misinform General Patton under any circumstances, and the 90th (359th) would seize the objective that night to keep the record straight.”25
In accordance with Gen. Van Fleet’s directive, an unusual plan was developed for an attack on that night of January 10. The Germans knew that the Americans customarily attacked at dawn and rarely engaged in fighting at night. With the weather as cold as it was that day and with deep snow on the ground, the Germans expected even less that the Americans would attack at night, especially after the Americans had been taking such a pounding that day and the day before. As Col. Bell stated, “If there was ever a time to surprise the Germans with a night attack, it was now.”26 After the pummeling the 359th received during the day, planning the night attack for midnight gave everyone enough time to make the necessary preparations.
Lt-Col. Talbott explained the plan of attack by the two battalions.27 “The regimental zone extended down the top of a ridge line with a winding, paved road along the crest [�
�] The plan was to put each battalion in a single file, one on one shoulder and one on the opposite shoulder. The regimental front was two men wide! A couple of hundred yards behind the point men an M-10 self-propelled tank destroyer was to come along…”28 Bringing up the rear of that column were the remaining tanks from B Company of the 712th and other supporting vehicles.
Although the fighting earlier that day and the previous day had decimated B Company, Vutech was able to find enough manpower to fully man the only four Sherman tanks that remained fully operational. Dad was in one of those tanks that participated in that night attack, he described that night.
It was freezing cold, below zero. We never had the right equipment or boots. We were supposed to go to the high ground between Doncols and Bahoey.
I was in a tank and the infantry marched; we had a few tanks and the infantry marched on each side of the road. There had been orders not to smoke or no lights whatsoever and no talking. They (infantry) marched and the tanks were in the center (of the road). We went all the way through the German lines.
Lt John H. Cochran Jr., in the 3rd Battalion of the 359th, described that night:
Colonel Smith said something like this: “I have been ordered to be on that hill to our front at daylight, and I damn well don’t intend to be there by myself.”
Since resistance had been so dogged and fierce during the day, we believed our end was at hand. How could anyone survive this night? We would be marching to our certain destruction!
[…]
We moved out in the prescribed plan. What happened to the Germans we never found out. As we moved through their positions we could hear them talking on either side of the road. I don’t know if they knew we were moving through them and didn’t fire, mistook us for another German unit, or plain let their guard down and didn’t see us. The road turned out to be a boundary line between their units, and that is always a weak point.29
Cochran continued:
It was difficult to believe what was happening. Were we so bold or were the Germans in shock? We kept moving, waiting for the inevitable to happen. These were the ones that had stopped us in the afternoon and inflicted severe casualties on us. They were now sitting on each side of the road and not firing a shot. I must say that our attack was one of audacity, to say the least.
Just at daylight both battalions were on their objectives. On the top of the hill, where Col. Smith “Didn’t intend to be by himself.” He not only had a lot of company, his tanks and TDs were in firing position.30
Upon reaching the top, all of the American troops had been spread out along the top of the ridge, Dad explained that two of the four tanks and some infantry were positioned in one area and the other tanks and TDs were situated elsewhere.
After we made the night march and we got to the high ground. We outposted a village, it wasn’t really a village, it was two or three houses. In the morning all hell broke loose. The Germans counterattacked us. That was one morning I was scared. We only had eight infantry men and two tanks. We (were supposed to have) one company of infantry (approximately 180 men) but the company of infantry were all wounded or killed (in the attack the day before) except eight men and we were holding a little circle, a little hilltop like. One tank was around the corner to catch the road coming up. Five German tanks were coming up that road and we knocked out the first German tank coming down here, they were trying to get us. It was daylight, just as day was breaking here comes marching over the hill about a battalion of soldiers, almost a thousand German soldiers. We felt we were gone then. We wouldn’t of given a nickel for our lives. So what he (my tank commander) did was we called back for artillery fire. He said to hold until they got close enough to us. So they held up until they (the Germans) were about from here to those trees, that’s about 200 feet, then we called for the artillery fire. Then the artillery fire came in and it burst at about the height of those trees and we started firing on them and we never had a shot fired back. I don’t know if we killed every one of them or if they wouldn’t fire back because they knew they would be killed, or if some of them stayed there until night came and got up. We never went and looked.
Whether the artillery shells used were equipped with the radar detonation device, that had been demonstrated to Patton in mid-December, or whether they were ordinary time delayed shells did not matter to Dad or the other troops around him, they were all grateful that the artillery was effective.
Lt Cochran’s account of the destruction inflicted upon the Germans on the morning of January 11, is similar.
(We had) heavy machine gun in position with the rifle companies, where both tanks and TDs were. The Germans attempted to pull out, and when they did we opened up with all we had available. We inflicted many casualties and caused much damage to equipment. Some of it was horse drawn. The horses never pulled equipment again. It did not take long to render this large unit completely ineffective.31
As D Company was bringing ammo and supplies to the high ground where the tanks of B Company were situated, C Company tanks along with other elements of the 90th were attacking Doncols and Sonlez from the base of the hill. The attack on Doncols happened with such speed that an entire enemy command post was captured.
During a period of two hours that day during the German counterattack, the tanks of B Company were credited with knocking out thirteen enemy tanks and thirteen self-propelled guns.32
Capt. Colby, further commenting on the taking of Hill 490, stated, “It is impossible to estimate what the cost in US soldiers would have been to gain this same ground in daylight action, but it would certainly have been awful.”33
Patton wrote again in his diary on January 11, “I believe today ends the Bastogne operation. From now on it is simply a question of driving a defeated enemy.”34
Calling the capture of Hill 490 a great victory in the Ardennes, Toland stated, “The Battle of Bastogne was abruptly over.”35
German prisoners captured during the battle were some of the same that had faced the 90th and the 712th at the Falaise Gap but had escaped. Because of their encounter with the 90th and the 712th then, documents captured after the battle at Hill 490 revealed the utmost respect accorded the 90th by the Germans.
“It is imperative (said one directive) that steps be taken to ascertain whether or not the American 90th Infantry has been committed. Special attention must be given to the numbers 357, 358, 359 […] Prisoners identified with these numbers will immediately be taken to the Regimental G-3.”36 The Division that had almost been disbanded in Normandy was now one of the most feared and respected by the German Army.
On January 13, B Company moved back to the town of Surree (southwest of Doncols) for maintenance. The Company also used this maintenance period to whitewash the tanks for winter warfare.
By January 15, some of the towns people of Doncols were returning to rebuild their lives. That same day, the Battalion received fifteen new replacements, all of which were assigned to B Company because of the heavy losses sustained on January 10. B Company resumed the assault on the bulge and moved to the town of Wardin, Belgium (located between Doncols and Bastogne). With the main thrust of the Third Army’s attack being toward Houffalize, B Company supporting the flank reached the town of Longvilly, Belgium on January 21.
When other units of the Third Army met at Houffalize with forces of the First Army moving down from the north, the attack shifted eastward toward the German border. B Company having reached the town of Longvilly on January 21, moved next to Boxhorn, Luxembourg on the 24 and Troine on the 26. On January 27, B Company was in Troisvierges, Luxembourg. By the end of January, all of the territory that the Germans had captured in the Battle of the Bulge had been regained; the Battle of the Bulge was over.37
CHAPTER 11
The Siegfried Line and Into Germany
Fixed fortifications are monuments to man’s stupidity. When mountain ranges and oceans can be overcome, anything built by man can be overcome.
General George S. Patton Jr.
&
nbsp; The Siegfried Line was a ribbon of concrete obstacles, called dragon’s teeth, along the western German border. Stephen Ambrose provided this description:
They (dragon’s teeth) rested on a concrete mat between ten and thirty meters wide, sunk a meter or two into the ground (to prevent any attempt to tunnel underneath them and place explosive charges). On top of the mat were the teeth themselves, truncated pyramids of reinforced concrete about a meter in height in the front row, to two meters high in the back. They were staggered and spaced in such a manner that a tank could not drive through. Interspersed among the teeth were minefields, barbed wire, and pillboxes that were virtually impenetrable by artillery and set in such a way as to give the Germans crossing fire across the entire front. […] behind the first row of pillboxes and dragon’s teeth, there was a second, and often times a third, sometimes a fourth.1
From Troisvierges, B Company advanced to Habschied, Germany and the Siegfried Line. Dad related what happened as his tank approached Germany.
The Germans had tank traps, what they called dragon teeth, to keep tanks from running (over) them. So it was winter time and it started to get to be spring, and we looked out and you could barely see them. All of a sudden it looked like soldiers (Germans) coming through, it looked like a whole army coming through there. We called back and we waited, we never got any closer and finally around the middle of the day the sun came out strong enough and it was the dragon teeth, the tank traps. The snow was on it, and they were grey and from a distance it looked like men standing there.
Dragon’s teeth.
Siegfried Line. (90th photograph)
The town of Habschied, Germany was captured on February 6. On February 15, Lt Vutech was officially promoted to Captain; his rank was now commensurate with his duties. Dad was now in a tank commanded by Sgt Charles F. Schmidt. Schmidt landed with the 712th in Normandy and was the most decorated soldier in the battalion and one of the most decorated combat soldiers of World War II, receiving nineteen decorations for valor and heroism.2 Two of his decorations were awarded personally by Gen. Eisenhower and Gen. Patton. During the course of the war, Schmidt was captured by the Germans three times and managed to escape each time.
A Tank Gunner's Story: Gunner Gruntz of the 712th Tank Battalion Page 19