After the news of Gordon’s death, Wolseley advised the government on 21 February that he would not attempt to capture Berber, and that he had recalled the River Column. He had too few troops to defeat the Mahdi at Khartoum, as there were no reinforcements available. Also, he could not receive any more supplies until the Nile waters rose again in late summer.
An autumn campaign was unavoidable. This meant securing the Suakin-Berber route. Wolseley could send his mounted units to Suakin, where they could be supplied with forage until they were needed for the attack on Berber and Khartoum. Wolseley would remain at Korti with his HQ.
By early 1885 a very sizeable Imperial force had converged on the tiny Red Sea port of Suakin. Despite sustaining serious losses in materiel and men, Osman Digna was still a force to be respected. However, by the time of the arrival of the New South Wales Contingent, Gordon (the very reason for this expedition), had been dead for almost three months.
British operations, around Suakin at least, therefore had little military value, although they shored up the political interests of Gladstone’s government in London. Further north along the Nile, Wolseley’s column was undertaking a staged withdrawal, harried all the way by Mahdist forces.
Chapter 5
THE SUAKIN EXPEDITION, 1885
In January 1885 Wolseley gave Graham his operational orders. With his force of 13,000 regular British and Indian Army troops, Graham had three tasks:
• to defeat Osman Digna;
• to seize and occupy the area from Suakin to Berber, thereby protecting the railway being built along that route; and
• to link with Wolseley’s force which was advancing south by land and water to occupy Berber.
Topography
The port of Suakin (known now as Sawákin) was the start of an ancient trade and caravan route to the interior of the Sudan. It was an important rendezvous for slave traders from Sennar and Khartoum. Suakin was the starting point of the desert road to Berber on the Nile, about 450 kilometres distant, which took camels from 12 to 15 days to traverse.
The port was built on a coral island, and had recently been connected to the mainland by a fortified causeway. There were a few large buildings, including a mosque, and several European consuls lived there. The town’s population of about 8000 (mainly Hadendowas) lived on the mainland. They were camel drovers and pastoralists. Only nominally Muslim, they were distinguished by their hairstyle, for which imperial troops dubbed them ‘Fuzzy Wuzzies’.
Stretching westwards, the terrain from the coast is low and flat, then rises gradually towards the mountains. It is interconnected by easy-sloping ravines, and covered by umbrella-shaped spiky Mimosa shrubs up to two metres high. The coastal plains are strewn with huge black boulders. The town itself was described as filthy, and after a health reconnaissance all infantry camps and shore-based medical facilities were sited on nearby sandy ridges, open to the sea breeze.
Suakin had several advantages as an operational base:
• using it as a logistics base, British forces in the area could be better supplied;
• the distance from Suakin to Berber was 450 kilometres, compared with 2655 kilometres along the Nile River from Cairo to Berber;
• health support could be provided by hospital ships anchored off shore; and
• security could be enhanced, as perimeters were swept at night by the searchlights of warships anchored in the harbour.
There were also several places of either strategic or tactical importance locally.
However, the port was an easy target for Osman Digna’s marauding troops. The garrison had lost casualties almost every night for months. It was easy for tribesmen to infiltrate the perimeter at night, bypassing sentries to slit sleeping soldiers’ throats or mutilate them, and generally to unsettle the garrison. Once Graham arrived he ordered that wire barricades be thrown up, ditches dug, earthworks erected, and ships’ searchlights used as part of a defensive posture. This effort was supported by almost 2000 troops rostered for guard duty every night. The strain would soon show on the men.
Underestimating the enemy
“…we tried every device we could think of to put a stop to the sniping [on camps around Suakin], but with poor results. On one occasion a mine was laid on a spot surrounded by a low wall, from behind which the Arabs [sic] frequently took up their position to pepper a searchlight on the walls of the town. This mine was so laid that anyone entering the enclosure must assuredly be blown up, and we thought we had caught them at last, but to everyone’s surprise it was again made use of, and no explosion followed! The next morning a party of Engineers went out to ascertain the cause of the failure, and on approaching the spot the officer in charge halted this men, while he advanced to inspect the wires, the slightest touch of which would explode the mine, but with fatal results, for the next moment there was an explosion, and the poor fellow was blown to atoms. After this accident the ground was carefully examined, and two points were demonstrated. Without doubt men had been there the previous night, and had not only disconnected the wires, but re-connected them before leaving, and this on a pitch black night! ”
Major (later Sir) Norman Stewart
General Hudson’s aide, writing of his service at Suakin in 1885.
Despite these measures, security was lax elsewhere. For example, there was no screening of the everyday civilian traffic through the camps or in and out of Suakin. This provided ample opportunities for Osman Digna’s men to reconnoitre all the military positions around the periphery of the port. This no doubt contributed to the success of enemy raids that occurred almost nightly on British camps there.
‘The Arabs were also the original “terrors-by-night”. During this time we worked on the Suakin-Berber railway, guard duties at night became rather an ordeal. The natives lurked in the enveloping darkness, ready, and more than willing, to pounce on an unwary sentry with a specially selected spear. In this midnight stalking they used great stealth and patience. One procedure was first steal some grease from the railway construction job, smear their bodies all over, then roll in the sand like a milkman’s horse. Thus camouflaged, they used to lie flat on their faces and commence a tortuously slow slither-crawl towards our camp. Usually the stalker would cut a small bush, push it forward to arm’s length, then inch by inch, slither up to it. The operation would then be repeated. It was necessary for a sentry to note the exact position of every bush in his area. Any that moved - or appeared to move – were fired at without challenge. Morning inspections sometimes revealed the wisdom of this action.’
Private Tom Gunning (NSW Contingent)
One of the redoubts on Suakin’s defensive perimeter.
Climate
Disregard for the harsh conditions, the heat, and the lack of water, had been behind several local British military disasters. One evening in May the New South Wales Contingent’s surgeon, Williams, recorded the temperature inside a tent ward as 40.4 degrees Celsius at 2300.
Oases and deep wells were few and far between, and usually poisoned by the enemy, or in hostile country. Watering large numbers of animals posed significant logistical challenges for any force. The Indian force alone had 1973 mules, 150 bullocks, 4500 camels, including 500 riding camels, and 150 ponies.
Graham’s instructions and return to Suakin
Graham had seen action at Tokar and El Teb and around Suakin the previous year. He was appointed to command another, larger, Suakin Force on 20 February 1885. The War Office gave Graham his orders on 20 February 1885. They were to be executed in two phases.
Phase One:
• take command of the force at Suakin;
• destroy Osman Digna before the onset of the hot season; and
• occupy all Hadendowa territory lying near the Suakin to Berber camel and rail route.
Phase Two:
• support the construction of the railway;
• hold and retain Tokar and Sinkat;
• ensure the rail line was pushed towards Berber at least as far as Tambuk Wells; and
• occupy and hold Ariab to cover the advance along the Berber line, and make every effort to clear the wells and increase the water supply there.
Proposed railway route between Suakin and Berber. A contemporary sketch. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume V, Cassell, London, 1885, p.153.
Logistics
The first task of Graham’s chief of staff, Major General Sir George Greaves, was to ensure a supply of potable water. He arranged for four ships, fitted out by the Royal Navy and equipped with steam-operated water condensers, to be moored at piers around the harbour. This gave all troops access to uncontaminated drinking water. This measure alone largely explains why the incidence of sickness was relatively low during this campaign. By the end of March these condensers had been supplemented with other equipment to produce 213,666 litres of potable water a day. Daily demand was 209,120 litres.
THE WATER RATION:
Litres per day
British troops
9.0
Local labourers
4.5
Hospital patients
27.0
Other consumables included:
Tonnes per day
Rations for European troops
20.3
Rations for native troops
10.1
Forage (compressed hay from England for horses, camel forage from Egypt and India)
11.7
Fuel
12.2
Medical comforts and supplies
3.0
Railway materials
5.0
Ganges Hospital Ship, off Suakin. Image Courtesy of National Army Museum (UK).
This made a total of 10,160 tonnes for the two months’ supply Greaves had been ordered to maintain. Corned tinned beef was issued initially, but because it caused so much thirst, fresh beef was purchased from the Ukraine and imported, as were fresh vegetables. Bread was baked daily in Suakin and transported to outlying posts. As the railway line progressed, water was carried on rail wagons, while camels carrying water in 57 litre tins continued to support the bulk of the deployed force.
Unusually for a field campaign of this type, and in contrast to Wolseley’s advance on Cairo in 1882, medical support was more than adequate. Hospital accommodation was based on a casualty estimate over three months of 12 percent for the troops and three percent for labourers. The New South Wales Contingent’s Surgeon Major William Williams commented that:
… the point that struck me was the complete manner in which every detail was thought of and carried out, for no sooner would the halt be sounded, and the camp ground allotted, than the camels carrying the tents were unloaded, the tents pitched, stretchers laid out in regular order as beds inside, the mules, carrying the medical and surgical panniers and filters, were relieved of their burdens, and every article placed in its own recognised position, ready for immediate use.
There were three fully staffed hospital ships, the Ganges, Bulimba and Czarewitch. The first two were converted liners. Patients arrived alongside by steam launch, and seriously wounded or ill personnel were hoisted aboard using a swing cot (see page 102). All three ships were well equipped, and had a good nurse to patient ratio.
There were four experienced female nurses on the Ganges, which was fitted out for 28 officers and 170 other ranks, and staffed by a Principal Medical Officer (PMO), six medical officers, one warrant officer, five non-commissioned officers, 50 other ranks and four female nurses. The Czarewitch had 125 beds for troops. The Australians had access to both Ganges and Bulimba.
Williams referred to both moveable and stationary hospitals at Suakin, both types being under canvas (double roofed and walled India issue E.P. [European Privates] tents). Each tent could accommodate 18 patients in the field, or eight men if they were used in a stationary hospital. The field hospitals had been issued with the latest type of stretchers. All British and Australian officers and men deployed to this campaign were given lessons in first aid.
There was a hutted general hospital at Suakin, of 300 beds. In addition, an auxiliary hospital was set up on Quarantine Harbour near Suakin, Male orderlies from the British Army Medical Staff Corps (formed in 1884) nursed soldiers in the field. As well as those on the hospital ships, there were female nurses in the hutted general hospital. These women were sent by the National Aid Society.
The army maintained an ice works, and all hospitals in the area had a daily allowance of 50 kilograms. Water filters were standard, as were quantities of alcohol such as port, champagne and brandy, which were regarded as stimulants or part of a sick diet.
Little has changed in army procedure for casualty admission since the last century. Williams wrote that:
[w]hen a patient was admitted into one of these field hospitals, his arms and accoutrements were taken by an arms-caretaker; he was placed in bed and his regimental number, rank, name and regiment at once placed over his bed. He was then seen by the medical officer on duty, by whom his case was duly entered on the case board, with notes to all medical directions, also for diet and stimulants, with the hours for the administration of the same, clearly laid down, so that in the event of a sudden change in the surgeon or orderly in charge, the case could be at once taken on by the new comer, without any waste of time or unnecessary inquiries.
Not surprisingly most trauma cases were knife and gunshot wounds, usually to the bone of arms and legs. From March 1885 up to eight soldiers, usually suffering from typhoid, were being admitted daily to hospital. At that time it was not unusual for mortality rates from disease to reach 30 percent or more during military operations. The prevailing illnesses were bowel diseases: typhoid, dysentery and diarrhoea. Heat stroke also claimed several victims. The military could and did exploit advances in medical science, such as the use of chloroform and antiseptic techniques. Soldiers who could not be returned to the field were sent to a hospital at Suez or invalided home.
Deputy Surgeon General Oliver Barnett, the PMO, had a staff of 45 medical officers and 478 men of the Army Medical Staff Corps. An environmental health officer was attached to Graham’s headquarters staff. In addition to access to the three hospital ships, Barnett had the following units under his command:
British
• two camel bearer companies;
• four mobile field hospitals (100 beds each);
• one stationary field hospital (200 beds); and
• one base hospital (300 beds).
Total - 900 beds, or ten percent of the deployed force.
New South Wales
• one Ambulance Corps of three officers, two pharmacists, two NCOs and 24 bearers and nine wagons.
Indian
For the Indian Brigade (3250 strong), there were 13 doctors in a base hospital and two field hospitals, giving a total hospital capacity of 488 beds, 15 percent of the force:
• two mobile field hospitals (100 beds each); and
• one base hospital (288 beds).
Deployed Forces
• No. 3 Field Hospital was attached to the Cavalry Brigade;
• No. 1 Field Hospital was attached to McNeill’s Brigade;
• No. 2 Field Hospital was located at Suakin;
• a section of a field hospital (50 beds) was at Handoub; and
• No. 4 Field Hospital operated in two sections, one in each of the Guards battalions (sick personnel were transported from Handoub to Suakin by rail).
The British Army Veterinary Department (formed in 1881) deployed nine veterinary officers and a number of other ranks. They set up two horse depots and one for sick camels. This campaign was the first in which the British army used new pattern machine-made horse shoes and nails. This meant a consid
erable logistics saving in not having to transport heavy forges, together with the fuel and stores needed to run them.
The Arrival of the New South Wales Contingent
The Iberia dropped anchor off Suakin on Sunday 29 March, and the Australasian followed three days later with the artillery aboard.
Embarking wounded on the Ganges. Contemporary sketch. Source: The Graphic, 23 May 1885.
MAJOR WILLIAM WILLIAMS
Major William Williams, an enthusiastic and innovative 29-year old Sydney surgeon, commanded the New South Wales Contingent’s medical team of 37. He went on to make a name for himself in the Anglo-Boer War, through innovations based on his experiences and observations in the Sudan. He founded the Australian Army Medical Corps, and was appointed the first Director General of Medical Services in the 1st Australian Imperial Force in 1915.
Like several other doctors in the New South Wales Contingent, Usher Glanville had seen previous military service (in his case in the Ashanti wars 1873-1874). In addition to a second doctor and a clerk, there were two non-commissioned officers, two dispensers, 24 trained stretcher-bearers, five drivers and a trumpeter. Their equipment included five ambulance wagons (each of which could carry seven wounded, sitting or lying), two pharmacy and surgical wagons, two wagons for tents, a water cart and saddler for 24 horses.
Major William Williams. Image courtesy, Mitchell Library, Sydney.
THE NSW CONTINGENT CONSISTED OF:
Sudan 1885 Page 9