Handoub 16 April 1885
‘After a couple of days spell we started for a place called Tamai expecting to have a great battle, before the march we had our water bottles filled, but by the time we were halfway there the water was rather scarce in our bottles and the heat was very great, so we had to march all the afternoon with very little water, by five o’clock we arrived at a camping ground and stayed here for the night. Early next morning we started for Tamai and very soon heard the bullets whizzing about our heads. We marched right through the Arabs’ camp which they left and fled into the hills. The front line of the square opened volley fire on them and cannons fired a few shells in amongst them killing a great many each time. It did not last long. Two were wounded in my company and a few in the others. After which we marched back and had dinner and started for the Zareba which was half way back. We arrived there about 6 pm and camped for the night. In the morning we started off for Suakin, arriving there fully tired after our first real battle.’
Extract of a letter from Private Walter Martin, D Company
Osman Digna was still a threat, and his forces continued to harass British units, although regular reconnaissance patrols minimised their effects. British intelligence at this time also became aware of an enemy force under an important local sheikh and lieutenant of Osman Digna, Mohammed Adam Sardun. It was his tribesmen who had launched the attack on McNeill’s Zareba. Now they were gathering in the Abent Valley near the village of T’Hakul to harass Graham’s lines of communication.
The British response was simple: destroy this force by a combined attack from Suakin and Otao. Graham’s last offensive was therefore a raid on T’Hakul on 6 April. This village and its well harboured a force of about 1000 men under Mohammed Adam. They not only were responsible for harrying the railway, but also kept local tribes in awe of Osman Digna.
Graham’s force of only 1500 men achieved complete surprise, capturing more than 2000 animals and a few prisoners, but almost all the enemy force fled intact. This skirmish shows that Graham’s tactics were evolving, and that he could take the battle to an otherwise mobile enemy force. By then, however, the end of the campaign was in sight.
Mohammed Adam’s stronghold was situated almost 30 kilometres due west of Suakin and 16 south of Otao. After a series of successful engagements between 6 and 7 May, the Mahdists were effectively scattered and their main camp destroyed. A number of local tribes then sought peace.
Return of friendly locals to Suakin, note the fort, one of several around Suakin. Contemporary sketch. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume V, Cassell, London, 1885, p. 77.
With the immediate area around Tamai ‘pacified’, Graham turned his attention to the railway line to the northeast. Consequently, garrisons and zarebas in the southwest were withdrawn or stripped of supplies.
Intelligence from patrols to the south around Hashin indicated that any enemy attack in force was unlikely. The arrival of 500 camels from India had enabled Graham to give at least part of his force some much-wanted mobility, so on 16 April he ordered the formation of a new unit, the Composite Camel Corps.
This unit consisted of five companies formed by Guardsmen and 50 men from the New South Wales infantry, the Royal Marine Light Infantry, the Royal Engineers, the Berkshire and East Surrey Regiments, the Shropshire Light Infantry, and 100 Egyptian soldiers. Each camel carried two riders. This was a new experience for the Australians, not to be repeated until the Imperial Camel Corps was formed in 1916. The unit’s first deployment took place on 23 April, when a detachment was sent to Tambuk to reconnoitre the land west of there around Es Sibil.
The camp at Tambuk. Note the defensive perimeter made of mimosa.
THE COMPOSITE CAMEL CORPS
Within the Suakin expeditionary force, a formation designed specially to defend the railway workers and material came into being. This was the Composite Camel Corps, and like that in Wolseley’s Desert Column, it was composed of British and Egyptian troops, but Australian troops also served in it. The brigade-sized Corps of five companies came into being on 16 April, and consisted of 518 imperial troops. It was a sound response to the rigours of the climate, and prefigured the Imperial Camel Corps of the First World War.
Before leaving England, Graham had the foresight to order 500 camels from India to supply troops in desert conditions. The first of these animals did not arrive at Suakin until 6 April. The army had a large logistics footprint. For every 1000 troops moving anywhere though the desert, over 1800 kilograms of foodstuff per day were required. Two camels could carry about 720 kilograms at most, but they could move almost silently, which was an important tactical consideration, and they could cover about 11 kilometres a day over most types of ground.
As there were not enough troops to be spared from the infantry, only some 400 imperial officers and men and 100 Egyptian labourers were employed for service with the Corps, the remainder of the camels being used to carry infantry on the ‘ride and tie’ system, in which the New South Wales Contingent and the Grenadier Guards were specially trained. Each camel carried two men. However, lack of experience in this type of warfare, particularly in the provision of forage, and inadequate veterinary care and poor animal handling, almost cancelled out any tactical advantage that this force might have offered.
The British government soon decided to evacuate all its forces from the Sudan. The reason? Russian troops had appeared suddenly in Afghanistan. On 9 April Gladstone announced the incursion in Parliament, and called out all army reservists in Britain.
Graham shared in the disappointment and frustration of his men, and advised Wolseley that Osman Digna and his forces should be found and destroyed. The operational tempo was disrupted on 2 May by Wolseley’s arrival in Suakin to make his own appreciation as to whether to maintain a garrison there or withdraw.
Two days later Wolseley informed the Secretary of State for War that he had decided not to continue with the railway, and advised the withdrawal of most of the force, including the New South Wales Contingent, leaving the Indians and one British battalion as a garrison force.
It was poor timing. Despite a growing local trend among several tribes to oppose the Mahdi, the British government ordered its own forces to withdraw from the Sudan. The Grenadier Guards left Otao, then Suakin on 15 May, followed by the Scots and Coldstream Guards the next day. The New South Wales Contingent and the remaining elements of the Guards Brigade embarked on 17 May, the same day as Graham. Two days later Wolseley left Suakin for Cairo and, after handing command to Sir Frederick Stephenson, returned to London on 27 June. A few weeks later, on 10 July, the death of the Mahdi was reported.
Despite the victory at Tamai the Mahdi, and his followers after his death, seemed undeterred in their continuing opposition to the Egyptian government and British forces. From a psychological perspective the enemy had one great advantage. According to an old prophesy the coming of the Mahdi would be marked by a 40-year struggle with the unbelievers. The Mahdists therefore had time on their side, and could counter the short-term effects of defeat by looking to a brighter future.
Chapter 6
THE RAILWAY
Graham had been ordered to begin the construction of a railway line to the town of Berber, almost 340 kilometres west of Suakin, following the traditional caravan route across the desert. The railway was to be built through Hadendowa lands to support a combined advance from the north to capture Khartoum. It was to be laid as far as Ariab, 160 waterless kilometres short of Berber.
All necessary plant and materials were then to be assembled at Ariab, so that once Berber was captured the line could be completed. By this means the final stage of Wolseley’s advance on Khartoum could be supported by supplies from Suakin.
The primary mission of the New South Wales Contingent was to guard the surveyors, engineers, and construction workers on the railway project from enemy snipers and attacks. The actual construction work was carried out by a combination of Royal Engineers, British and
Indian contract labour, and locally employed workers.
Disembarking material for the railway at Suakin. Contemporary sketch. Source: The Graphic, 18 April 1885.
Apart from the security issue construction was relatively easy, for no bridges had to be built, and there were no steep gradients. Engineers had estimated that to lay the required 386 kilometres of track from Suakin to Berber would take about six months, assuming no delays. Given the resourcefulness of the Mahdi and Osman Digna, this estimate was wildly optimistic, particularly as Berber was still in enemy hands.
There was some confusion in London as to what gauge the track should be. Before the contract was let with the British engineering contractor Lucas & Aird, it had been suggested that the gauge be one metre. This was the usual gauge in India, and initially there was a good reason to use it in the Sudan. There was a large pool of experienced railway construction workers in India who were used to working with this gauge, and they would be less affected by Sudan’s heat. Lucas & Aird secured the contract only when it was realised that there were no excess stocks of construction material and rolling stock in India.
When he received his instructions for planned operations around Suakin on 20 February, Graham was informed that the contract had been let to construct a 4 foot, 8.5 inch (143.5 centimetres) standard gauge single track railway line from Suakin to Berber and an 18 inch (45.7 centimetres) gauge single track line around Suakin itself, to supply all plant and workers.
For its part, the War Office was responsible for keeping the ground surveyed for the track secure and protecting the railway company’s workers. Once the line was completed the contractor would receive a two percent commission (up to £20,000). The railway workers would be paid by the government and provisioned and clothed by the War Office.
The split army/civilian control over construction did not help. The army preferred to use its own engineers, or at least having the contractors’ work overseen by engineer officers. Another sore point with the army was that once in Suakin, British railway workers (mostly unskilled men) would be paid twelve times the daily rate of an infantry private, in addition to receiving free accommodation and rations.
There were delays in Suakin due to poor stores supervision and the delivery of different sizes of rails, bolts and nuts, often mixed together. Much of the material that arrived in the Sudan was sub-standard, probably as the result of profiteering in Britain. The 750 workers who arrived were also too few in number. The contractor had assumed a large supply of unemployed local ‘coolie’ labour would be available, but most of the local men were either already working for the army, or belonged to tribes aligned to Osman Digna.
Members of the Naval Brigade manning an escort wagon at the terminus in Suakin.
Laying the Suakin-Berber railway Contemporary sketch. Source: John Grant, Cassell’s History of the War in the Soudan, Volume IV, Cassell, London, 1885, p.161.
The 10th Railway Company, RE was in the process of expansion for active service when it landed at Suakin on 7 April. Under its commander, Major W.F Rathbone, it was responsible for survey work and marking out the rail bed. A party was detailed to survey and stake out the proposed railway line, while the remainder of the company worked on the 18 inch gauge railway system around the town. Some of the company subsequently worked on extending the railway line from Quarantine Island in Suakin harbour to Handoub and Otao, which it reached on 30 April. During this time 32 kilometres of track were completed at the rate of three kilometres a day.
Construction began on 13 March, after which progress was subject to enemy activity and the various other tasks Graham committed his units to undertake. His troops, mainly Guards detachments and New South Wales infantrymen, were responsible for guarding the line as it was pushed out from Suakin. Construction was supported by:
10th Railway Company, RE;
17th Field Company, RE; and
24th Field Company, RE.
Work on the railway was temporarily halted on 22 March so that all available resources could be focused on countering Osman Digna and his forces. An advanced zareba was to be set up on the road to Handoub to cover the railhead, which was to be pushed on as fast as possible, and a blockhouse and zareba were to be established at Handoub itself, eight kilometres further west, while covering parties were to protect the head of the rail line as it advanced. This meant more convoys for the transport of water and supplies.
By 7 April Lyon-Fremantle, leading a mixed force of Coldstream Guards, New South Wales men, engineers and a 2.5 inch RML mountain/screw gun, established the first post. Later, the New South Wales infantry, together with the Coldstream Guards, advanced to Handoub over sand and shingle. There a zareba was established near an old well, while other wells were dug out. Graham arrived at the Handoub camp on 12 April, and reviewed elements of the New South Wales artillery, before withdrawing to Suakin with the transport camels.
RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION
The railway construction crew at Quarantine Island, Suakin, 1885. Construction of the line was supervised by the Suakin Berber Railway Corps under the control of the 10th Railway Company, RE, which cleared the roadbed for the track to a width of 90 metres.
Source: http://railwaysofraj.blogspot.com.au/2010/01/davids-back-again.html.
Extracts from letters written by Private George Tuckey from the Sudan to his parents in Sydney.
Handoub, 11 April 1885
‘We arrived at Suakin last Sunday week and I have had hardly a minute to spare since then … At any rate I can tell you I was at the taking of Tamai and I have also been under fire on 2 other occasions but I can’t see much danger in it. The natives seem completely cowed … I have not had my arms off for the last 10 days … There is a great deal of talk here about England going to war with Russia and of the likelihood of our being ordered to India … I am very well in health but I am awfully homesick.’
Otao, 25 April 1885
‘We arrived here from Handoub yesterday at 1 o’clock after a very hot morning’s march. When we arrived I was tired out but I had to work hard all the afternoon at making a Zareba round our encampment. After that I had to go on outlying picket all night and on guard all day today so you can see I am having a picnic of it.
There is a lot of talk here about leaving and I think we will not be here much longer but where we are going nobody knows. We have been asked to volunteer for Afghanistan … I don’t like the officers. They are right enough on Moore Park [Sydney], but when they come to active service they are like a lot of old women. They give us double trouble through their foolish blunders.’
Suakin, 5 May 1885
‘We camped at Otao until the first of May when we marched as far as Handoub where we camped that night. The next morning we came by rail to Suakin and here we are now expecting to be sent on a 4 or 5 days expedition against the Arabs [sic] round Tamai and a neighbouring town … We hear from every authority that we are to leave here by the 15th of the month and that we are all go to London.’
He adds the usual comment about the view of the world from the Army’s rank and file.
‘I can’t think of anything else to tell you in fact it seems useless as you know more of what we have done and what we are going ‘To do than I do myself’.
On 13 April a reconnaissance was made along the route from Handoub to Otao, ten kilometres further out, where two working wells were found. Based on this reconnaissance report of good water supplies at Otao, the village was chosen as the next ‘station’ for the railway. The Scots Guards remained at Handoub while the Australians and the Coldstream Guards advanced to Otao where they arrived on 16 April, and built a zareba near an old well.
On the 16th the Scots Guards, two guns, a cavalry squadron, and some engineers established a camp at Otao. Two days later a column composed of New South Wales infantry, mounted infantry and some guns took part in a coordinated advance from Handoub and Otao to the village of Deberet, and met with little resistance. Then, on the 19th the Scots Guards with two guns and an engineer co
mpany were sent to Tambuk, almost ten kilometres beyond Otao, to occupy the wells there.
The transport camels were sent back to Suakin under escort, and work continued on the railway in extreme conditions. Once Otao was occupied on 16 April by the Scots Guards and the cavalry squadron, the New South Wales artillery battery deployed from Suakin to assist the Royal Marine Light Infantry and the 28th Bombay Native Infantry in defensive duties at Handoub (the railway reached there by 23 April).
On the morning of 24 April the NSW infantry returned to Otao from Deberet, joining the Coldstream Guards holding Otao, while Lyon-Fremantle took a small force (Scots Guards) from Handoub and occupied Tambuk, eight kilometres west of Otao. At Otao and Tambuk both camps (which included New South Wales troops) were fired on over two days and the telegraph cut. There were no casualties. Otao, only 32 kilometres from Suakin, was the furthest the railway line reached.
Redoubt of NSW infantry at Handoub. The Graphic, 16 May 1885.
The enemy retaliated on the night of 26 April by attacking Otao, burning sleepers, and cutting the telegraph line. Up to this time almost 30 kilometres of line had been laid from Suakin at a cost of over £850,000. In London the government was beginning to weigh up the financial costs incurred so far in the overall campaign.
With each kilometre of track laid, the British government progressively lost interest. The enterprise was both costly and increasingly pointless, given that the Madhi was consolidating his successes and gaining popularity. However various elements of New South Wales infantry did see service along parts of the line, including at Handoub, where a fortified zareba was defended by over 2400 men of Lyon-Fremantle’s force.
Sudan 1885 Page 12