[425] Then again, if room and space which we call void did not exist, bodies could not be placed anywhere nor move about at all to any side; as we have demonstrated to you a little before.
Moreover there is nothing which you can affirm to be at once separate from all body and quite distinct from void, which would so to say count as the discovery of a third nature.
For whatever shall exist, this of itself must be something or other.
Now if it shall admit of touch in however slight and small a measure, it will, be it with a large or be it with a little addition, provided it do exist, increase the amount of body and join the sum.
But if it shall be intangible and unable to hinder any thing from passing through it on any side, this you are to know will be that which we call empty void.
Again whatever shall exist by itself, will either do something or will itself suffer by the action of other things, or will be of such a nature as things are able to exist and go on in.
But no thing can do and suffer without body, nor aught furnish room except void and vacancy.
Therefore beside void and bodies no third nature taken by itself can be left in the number of things, either such as to fall at any time under the ken of our senses or such as any one can grasp by the reason of his mind.
For whatever things are named, you will either find to be properties linked to these two things or you will see to be accidents of these things.
That is a property which can in no case be disjoined and separated without utter destruction accompanying the severance, such as the weight of a stone, the heat of fire, the fluidity of water.
Slavery on the other hand, poverty and riches, liberty war concord and all other things which may come and go while the nature of the thing remains unharmed, these we are wont, as it is right we should, to call accidents.
Time also exists not by itself, but simply from the things which happen the sense apprehends what has been done in time past, as well as what is present and what is to follow after.
And we must admit that no one feels time by itself abstracted from the motion and calm rest of things.
So when they say that the daughter of Tyndarus was ravished and the Trojan nations were subdued in war, we must mind that they do not force us to admit that these things are by themselves, since those generations of men, of whom these things were accidents, time now gone by has irrevocably swept away.
namque aliud terris, aliud regionibus ipsis
470 eventum dici poterit quod cumque erit actum.
denique materies si rerum nulla fuisset
nec locus ac spatium, res in quo quaeque geruntur,
numquam Tyndaridis forma conflatus amore
ignis Alexandri Phrygio sub pectore gliscens
475 clara accendisset saevi certamina belli
nec clam durateus Troiianis Pergama partu
inflammasset equos nocturno Graiiugenarum;
perspicere ut possis res gestas funditus omnis
non ita uti corpus per se constare neque esse
480 nec ratione cluere eadem qua constet inane,
sed magis ut merito possis eventa vocare
corporis atque loci, res in quo quaeque gerantur.
Corpora sunt porro partim primordia rerum,
partim concilio quae constant principiorum.
485 sed quae sunt rerum primordia, nulla potest vis
stinguere; nam solido vincunt ea corpore demum.
etsi difficile esse videtur credere quicquam
in rebus solido reperiri corpore posse.
transit enim fulmen caeli per saepta domorum
490 clamor ut ac voces, ferrum candescit in igni
dissiliuntque fero ferventi saxa vapore;
cum labefactatus rigor auri solvitur aestu,
tum glacies aeris flamma devicta liquescit;
permanat calor argentum penetraleque frigus,
495 quando utrumque manu retinentes pocula rite
sensimus infuso lympharum rore superne.
usque adeo in rebus solidi nihil esse videtur.
sed quia vera tamen ratio naturaque rerum
cogit, ades, paucis dum versibus expediamus
500 esse ea quae solido atque aeterno corpore constent,
semina quae rerum primordiaque esse docemus,
unde omnis rerum nunc constet summa creata.
Principio quoniam duplex natura duarum
dissimilis rerum longe constare repertast,
505 corporis atque loci, res in quo quaeque geruntur,
esse utramque sibi per se puramque necessest.
nam qua cumque vacat spatium, quod inane vocamus,
corpus ea non est; qua porro cumque tenet se
corpus, ea vacuum nequaquam constat inane.
510 sunt igitur solida ac sine inani corpora prima.
[468] For whatever shall have been done may be termed an accident in one case of the Teucran people, in another of the countries simply.
Yes for if there had been no matter of things and no room and space in which things severally go on, never had the fire, kindled by love of the beauty of Tyndarus’ daughter, blazed beneath the Phrygian breast of Alexander and lighted up the famous struggles of cruel war, nor had the timber horse unknown to the Trojans wrapt Pergama in flames by its night-issuing brood of sons of the Greeks; so that you may clearly perceive that all actions from first to last exist not by themselves and are not by themselves in the way that body is, nor are terms of the same kind as void is, but are rather of such a kind that you may fairly call them accidents of body and of the room in which they severally go on.
Bodies again are partly first-beginnings of things, partly those which are formed of a union of first beginnings.
But those which are first-beginnings of things no force can quench: they are sure to have the better by their solid body.
Although it seems difficult to believe that aught can be found among things with a solid body.
For the lightning of heaven passes through the walls of houses, as well as noise and voices; iron grows red-hot in the fire and stones burn with fierce heat and burst asunder the hardness of gold is broken up and dissolved by heat; the ice of brass melts vanquished by the flame; warmth and piercing cold ooze through silver, since we have felt both, as we held cups with the hand in due fashion and the water was poured down into them.
So universally there is found to be nothing solid in things.
But yet because true reason and the nature of things constrains, attend until we make clear in a few verses that there are such things as consist of solid and everlasting body, which we teach are seeds of things and first-beginnings, out of which the whole sum of things which now exists has been produced.
First of all then since there has been found to exist a two-fold and widely dissimilar nature of two things, that is to say of body and of place in which things severally go on, each of the two must exist for and by itself and quite unmixed.
For wherever there is empty space which we call void, there body is not; wherever again body maintains itself, there empty void no wise exists.
First bodies therefore are solid and without void.
Praeterea quoniam genitis in rebus inanest,
materiem circum solidam constare necessest;
nec res ulla potest vera ratione probari
corpore inane suo celare atque intus habere,
515 si non, quod cohibet, solidum constare relinquas.
id porro nihil esse potest nisi materiai
concilium, quod inane queat rerum cohibere.
materies igitur, solido quae corpore constat,
esse aeterna potest, cum cetera dissoluantur.
520 Tum porro si nil esset quod inane vocaret,
omne foret solidum; nisi contra corpora certa
essent quae loca complerent quae cumque tenerent
omne quod est spatium, vacuum constaret inane.
alternis igitur ni mirum corpus inani
525 distinctum, quoniam nec plenum navite
r extat
nec porro vacuum; sunt ergo corpora certa,
quae spatium pleno possint distinguere inane.
haec neque dissolui plagis extrinsecus icta
possunt nec porro penitus penetrata retexi
530 nec ratione queunt alia temptata labare;
id quod iam supra tibi paulo ostendimus ante.
nam neque conlidi sine inani posse videtur
quicquam nec frangi nec findi in bina secando
nec capere umorem neque item manabile frigus
535 nec penetralem ignem, quibus omnia conficiuntur.
et quo quaeque magis cohibet res intus inane,
tam magis his rebus penitus temptata labascit.
ergo si solida ac sine inani corpora prima
sunt ita uti docui, sint haec aeterna necessest.
540 Praeterea nisi materies aeterna fuisset,
antehac ad nihilum penitus res quaeque redissent
de nihiloque renata forent quae cumque videmus.
at quoniam supra docui nil posse creari
de nihilo neque quod genitumst ad nil revocari,
545 esse inmortali primordia corpore debent,
dissolui quo quaeque supremo tempore possint,
materies ut subpeditet rebus reparandis.
sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate
nec ratione queunt alia servata per aevom
550 ex infinito iam tempore res reparare.
denique si nullam finem natura parasset
frangendis rebus, iam corpora materiai
usque redacta forent aevo frangente priore,
ut nihil ex illis a certo tempore posset
555 conceptum summum aetatis pervadere finem.
[511] Again since there is void in things begotten, solid matter must exist about this void, and no thing can be proved by true reason to conceal in its body and have within it void, unless you choose to allow that that which holds it in is solid.
Again that can be nothing but a union of matter which can keep in the void of things.
Matter therefore, which consists of a solid body, may be everlasting, though all things else are dissolved.
Moreover, if there were no empty void, the universe would be solid; unless on the other hand there were certain bodies to fill up whatever places they occupied, the existing universe would be empty and void space.
Therefore sure enough body and void are marked off in alternate layers, since the universe is neither of a perfect fulness nor a perfect void.
There are therefore certain bodies which can vary void space with full.
These can neither be broken in pieces by the stroke of blows from without nor have their texture undone by aught piercing to their core nor give way before any other kind of assault; as we have proved to you a little before.
For without void nothing seems to admit of being crushed in or broken up or split in two by cutting, or of taking in wet or permeating cold or penetrating fire, by which all things are destroyed.
And the more anything contains within it of void, the more thoroughly it gives way to the assault of these things.
Therefore if first bodies are as I have shown solid and without void, they must be everlasting.
Again unless matter had been eternal, all things before this would have utterly returned to nothing and whatever things we see would have been born anew from nothing.
But since I have proved above that nothing can be produced from nothing, and that what is begotten cannot be called to nothing, first-beginnings must be of an imperishable body, into which all things can be dissolved at their last hour, that there may be a supply of matter for the reproduction of things.
Therefore first-beginnings are of solid singleness, and in no other way can they have been preserved through ages during infinite time past in order to reproduce things.
Again if nature had set no limit to the breaking of things, by this time the bodies of matter would have been so far reduced by the breaking of past “ages that nothing could within a fixed time be conceived out of them and reach its utmost growth of being.
For we see that anything is more quickly destroyed than again renewed;
nam quidvis citius dissolvi posse videmus
quam rursus refici; qua propter longa diei
infinita aetas ante acti temporis omnis
quod fregisset adhuc disturbans dissoluensque,
560 numquam relicuo reparari tempore posset.
at nunc ni mirum frangendi reddita finis
certa manet, quoniam refici rem quamque videmus
et finita simul generatim tempora rebus
stare, quibus possint aevi contingere florem.
565 Huc accedit uti, solidissima materiai
corpora cum constant, possint tamen omnia reddi,
mollia quae fiunt, aer aqua terra vapores,
quo pacto fiant et qua vi quaeque gerantur,
admixtum quoniam semel est in rebus inane.
570 at contra si mollia sint primordia rerum,
unde queant validi silices ferrumque creari,
non poterit ratio reddi; nam funditus omnis
principio fundamenti natura carebit.
sunt igitur solida pollentia simplicitate,
575 quorum condenso magis omnia conciliatu
artari possunt validasque ostendere viris.
porro si nullast frangendis reddita finis
corporibus, tamen ex aeterno tempore quaeque
nunc etiam superare necessest corpora rebus,
580 quae non dum clueant ullo temptata periclo.
at quoniam fragili natura praedita constant,
discrepat aeternum tempus potuisse manere
innumerabilibus plagis vexata per aevom.
Denique iam quoniam generatim reddita finis
585 crescendi rebus constat vitamque tenendi,
et quid quaeque queant per foedera naturai,
quid porro nequeant, sancitum quando quidem extat,
nec commutatur quicquam, quin omnia constant
usque adeo, variae volucres ut in ordine cunctae
590 ostendant maculas generalis corpore inesse,
inmutabilis materiae quoque corpus habere
debent ni mirum; nam si primordia rerum
commutari aliqua possent ratione revicta,
incertum quoque iam constet quid possit oriri,
595 quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique
qua nam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens,
nec totiens possent generatim saecla referre
naturam mores victum motusque parentum.
Tum porro quoniam est extremum quodque cacumen
600 corporis illius, quod nostri cernere sensus
iam nequeunt, id ni mirum sine partibus extat
[557] and therefore that which the long, the infinite duration of all bygone time had broken up demolished and destroyed, could never be reproduced in all remaining time.
But now sure enough a fixed limit to their breaking has been set, since we see each thing renewed, and at the same time definite periods fixed for things each after its kind to reach the flower of their age.
Moreover while the bodies of matter are most solid, it may yet be explained in what way all things which are formed soft, as air water earth fires, are so formed and by what force they severally go on, since once for all there is void mixed up in things.
But on the other hand if the first-beginnings of things be soft, it cannot be explained out of what enduring basalt and iron can be produced; for their whole nature will utterly lack a first foundation to begin with.
First-beginnings therefore are strong in solid singleness, and by a denser combination of these all things can be closely packed and exhibit enduring strength.
Again if no limit has been set to the breaking of bodies, nevertheless the several bodies which go to things must survive from eternity up to the present time, not yet assailed by any danger.
But since they are possessed of a frail nature, it is not consistent w
ith this that they could have continued through eternity harassed through ages by countless blows.
Again too since a limit of growing and sustaining life has been assigned to things each after its kind, and since by the laws of nature it stands decreed what they can each do and what they cannot do, and since nothing is changed, but all things are so constant that the different birds all in succession exhibit in their body the distinctive marks of their kind, they must sure enough have a body of unchangeable matter also.
For if the first-beginnings of things could in any way be vanquished and changed, it would then be uncertain too what could and what could not rise into being, in short on what principle each thing has its powers defined, its deep-set boundary mark; nor could the generations reproduce so often each after its kind the nature habits, way of life and motions of the parents.
Then again since there is ever a bounding point [to bodies, which appears to us to be a least, there ought in the same way to be a bounding point the least conceivable to that first body] which already is beyond what our senses can perceive: that point sure enough is without parts and consists of a least nature and never has existed apart by itself and will not be able in future so to exist, since it is in itself a part of that other;
et minima constat natura nec fuit umquam
per se secretum neque post hac esse valebit,
alterius quoniamst ipsum pars primaque et una,
605 inde aliae atque aliae similes ex ordine partes
agmine condenso naturam corporis explent;
quae quoniam per se nequeunt constare, necessest
haerere unde queant nulla ratione revelli.
sunt igitur solida primordia simplicitate,
610 quae minimis stipata cohaerent partibus arte.
non ex illorum conventu conciliata,
sed magis aeterna pollentia simplicitate,
unde neque avelli quicquam neque deminui iam
concedit natura reservans semina rebus.
615 Praeterea nisi erit minimum, parvissima quaeque
corpora constabunt ex partibus infinitis,
quippe ubi dimidiae partis pars semper habebit
dimidiam partem nec res praefiniet ulla.
ergo rerum inter summam minimamque quod escit,
620 nil erit ut distet; nam quamvis funditus omnis
summa sit infinita, tamen, parvissima quae sunt,
ex infinitis constabunt partibus aeque.
Delphi Complete Works of Lucretius Page 78