The tail of the peacock when it is saturated with abundant light, changes in like fashion its colors as it turns about.
And since these colors are begotten by a certain stroke of light, sure enough you must believe that they cannot be produced without it.
And since the pupil receives into it a kind of blow, when it is said to perceive a white color, and then another, when it perceives black or any other colour, and since it is of no moment with what color the things which you touch are provided, but rather with what sort of shape they are furnished, you are to know that first-beginnings have no need of colors, but give forth sensations of touch varying according to their various shapes.
Moreover since no particular kind of color is assigned to particular shapes and every configuration of first-beginnings can exist in any color, why on a ‘like principle are not the things which are formed out of them in every kind overlaid with colors of every kind? For then it were natural that crows too in flying should often display a white color from whitewings and that swans should come to be black from a black seed, or of any other different color you please.
Again the more minute the parts are into which anything is rent, the more you may perceive the color fade away by little and little and become extinct; as for instance if a piece of purple is torn into small shreds: when it has been plucked into separate threads, the purple, and the scarlet far the most brilliant of colors, are quite effaced;
830 purpura poeniceusque color clarissimus multo,
filatim cum distractum est, disperditur omnis;
noscere ut hinc possis prius omnem efflare colorem
particulas, quam discedant ad semina rerum.
Postremo quoniam non omnia corpora vocem
835 mittere concedis neque odorem, propterea fit
ut non omnibus adtribuas sonitus et odores:
sic oculis quoniam non omnia cernere quimus,
scire licet quaedam tam constare orba colore
quam sine odore ullo quaedam sonituque remota,
840 nec minus haec animum cognoscere posse sagacem
quam quae sunt aliis rebus privata notare.
Sed ne forte putes solo spoliata colore
corpora prima manere, etiam secreta teporis
sunt ac frigoris omnino calidique vaporis,
845 et sonitu sterila et suco ieiuna feruntur,
nec iaciunt ullum proprium de corpore odorem.
sicut amaracini blandum stactaeque liquorem
et nardi florem, nectar qui naribus halat,
cum facere instituas, cum primis quaerere par est,
850 quod licet ac possis reperire, inolentis olivi
naturam, nullam quae mittat naribus auram,
quam minime ut possit mixtos in corpore odores
concoctosque suo contractans perdere viro,
propter eandem rem debent primordia rerum
855 non adhibere suum gignundis rebus odorem
nec sonitum, quoniam nihil ab se mittere possunt,
nec simili ratione saporem denique quemquam
nec frigus neque item calidum tepidumque vaporem,
cetera, quae cum ita sunt tamen ut mortalia constent,
860 molli lenta, fragosa putri, cava corpore raro,
omnia sint a principiis seiuncta necessest,
inmortalia si volumus subiungere rebus
fundamenta, quibus nitatur summa salutis;
ne tibi res redeant ad nihilum funditus omnes.
865 Nunc ea quae sentire videmus cumque necessest
ex insensilibus tamen omnia confiteare
principiis constare. neque id manufesta refutant
nec contra pugnant, in promptu cognita quae sunt,
sed magis ipsa manu ducunt et credere cogunt
870 ex insensilibus, quod dico, animalia gigni.
[831] from which you may infer that the shreds part with all their color before they come back to the seeds of things.
Lastly, since you admit that all bodies do not utter a voice nor emit a smell, for this reason you do not assign sounds and smells to all.
So also since we cannot perceive all things with the eyes, you are to know that some things are as much denuded of color as others are without smell and devoid of sound, and that the keen discerning mind can just as well apprehend these things as it can take note of things which are destitute of other qualities.
But lest haply you suppose that first bodies remain stripped of color alone, they are also wholly devoid of warmth and cold and violent heat, and are judged to be barren of sound and drained of moisture, and emit from their body no scent of their own.
Just as when you set about preparing the balmy liquid of sweet marjoram and myrrh and the flower of spikenard which gives forth to the nostrils a scent like nectar, before all you should seek, so far as you may and can find it, the substance of scentless oil, such as gives out no perfume to the nostrils, that it may as little as possible meddle with and destroy by its own pungency the odors mixed in its body and boiled up with it; for the same reason the first-beginnings of things must not bring to the begetting of things a smell or sound of their own, since they cannot discharge anything from themselves, and for the same reason no taste either nor cold nor any heat moderate or violent, and the like.
For as these things, be they what they may, are still such as to be liable to death, whether pliant with a soft, brittle with a crumbling, or hollow with a porous body, they must all be withdrawn from the first beginnings, if we wish to assign to things imperishable foundations for the whole sum of existence to rest upon: that you may not have things returning altogether to nothing.
To come to another point, whatever things we perceive to have sense, you must yet admit all composed of senseless first-beginnings: manifest tokens which are open to all to apprehend, so far from refuting or contradicting this, do rather themselves take us by the hand and constrain us to believe that, as I say, living things are begotten from senseless things.
quippe videre licet vivos existere vermes
stercore de taetro, putorem cum sibi nacta est
intempestivis ex imbribus umida tellus.
Praeterea cunctas itidem res vertere sese.
875 vertunt se fluvii in frondes et pabula laeta
in pecudes, vertunt pecudes in corpora nostra
naturam, et nostro de corpore saepe ferarum
augescunt vires et corpora pennipotentum.
ergo omnes natura cibos in corpora viva
880 vertit et hinc sensus animantum procreat omnes,
non alia longe ratione atque arida ligna
explicat in flammas et in ignis omnia versat.
iamne vides igitur magni primordia rerum
referre in quali sint ordine quaeque locata
885 et commixta quibus dent motus accipiantque?
Tum porro, quid id est, animum quod percutit, ipsum,
quod movet et varios sensus expromere cogit,
ex insensilibus ne credas sensile gigni?
ni mirum lapides et ligna et terra quod una
890 mixta tamen nequeunt vitalem reddere sensum.
illud in his igitur rebus meminisse decebit,
non ex omnibus omnino, quaecumque creant res
sensilia, extemplo me gigni dicere sensus,
sed magni referre ea primum quantula constent,
895 sensile quae faciunt, et qua sint praedita forma,
motibus ordinibus posituris denique quae sint.
quarum nil rerum in lignis glaebisque videmus;
et tamen haec, cum sunt quasi putrefacta per imbres,
vermiculos pariunt, quia corpora materiai
900 antiquis ex ordinibus permota nova re
conciliantur ita ut debent animalia gigni.
Deinde ex sensilibus qui sensile posse creari
constituunt, porro ex aliis sentire sueti
* * *
mollia cum faciunt; nam sensus iungitur omnis
visceribus nervis venis, quae cumque videmus
mollia mortali
consistere corpore creta.
sed tamen esto iam posse haec aeterna manere;
nempe tamen debent aut sensum partis habere
aut similis totis animalibus esse putari.
910 at nequeant per se partes sentire necesse est:
[871] We may see in fact living worms spring out of stinking dung, when the soaked earth has gotten putridity after excessive rains; and all things besides change in the same way: rivers leaves and glad pastures change into cattle, cattle change their substance into our bodies, and often out of these the powers of wild beasts and the bodies of the strong of wing are increased.
Therefore nature changes all foods into living bodies and engenders out of them all the senses of living creatures, much in the same way as she dissolves dry woods into flames and converts all things into fires.
Now do you see that it is of great moment in what sort of arrangement the first-beginnings of things are severally placed and with what others they are mixed up, when they impart and receive motions? Then again what is that which strikes your mind, affects that mind and constrains it to give utterance to many different thoughts, to save you from believing that the sensible is begotten out of senseless things? Sure enough it is because stones and wood and earth however mixed together are yet unable to produce vital sense.
This therefore it will be well to remember herein, that I do not assert that the sensible and sensations are forthwith begotten out of all elements without exception which produce things; but that it is of great moment first how minute the particles are which make up the sensible thing and then what shape they possess and what in short they are in their motions arrangements and positions.
None of which conditions we find in woods and clods; and yet even these when they have so to speak become rotten through the rains bring forth worms, because bodies of matter driven from their ancient arrangements by a new condition are combined in the manner needed for the begetting of living creatures.
Next they who hold that the sensible can be produced out of sensible elements, accustomed thus to derive their own sense from elements [which are sensible] in their turn, [do thus render their own seeds mortal,] when they make them soft; for all sense is bound up with flesh, sinews and veins; which in everything ye see to be soft and formed of a mortal body.
But even suppose that these things can remain eternal: they must yet I presume either have the sense of some part or else be deemed to possess a sense similar to the entire living creatures.
namque animus sensus membrorum respuit omnis,
nec manus a nobis potis est secreta neque ulla
corporis omnino sensum pars sola tenere.
linquitur ut totis animantibus adsimulentur,
915 vitali ut possint consentire undique sensu.
qui poterunt igitur rerum primordia dici
et leti vitare vias, animalia cum sint,
atque animalia sint mortalibus una eademque?
quod tamen ut possint, at coetu concilioque
920 nil facient praeter volgum turbamque animantum,
scilicet ut nequeant homines armenta feraeque
inter sese ullam rem gignere conveniundo.
sic itidem quae sentimus sentire necessest.
quod si forte suum dimittunt corpore sensum
925 atque alium capiunt, quid opus fuit adtribui id quod
detrahitur? tum praeterea, quod fudimus ante,
quatinus in pullos animalis vertier ova
cernimus alituum vermisque effervere terra,
intempestivos quam putor cepit ob imbris,
930 scire licet gigni posse ex non sensibus sensus.
Quod si forte aliquis dicet, dum taxat oriri
posse ex non sensu sensus mutabilitate,
aut aliquo tamquam partu quod proditur extra,
huic satis illud erit planum facere atque probare,
935 non fieri partum nisi concilio ante coacto,
nec quicquam commutari sine conciliatu.
Principio nequeunt ullius corporis esse
sensus ante ipsam genitam naturam animantis,
ni mirum quia materies disiecta tenetur
940 aere fluminibus terris terraque creatis,
nec congressa modo vitalis convenientes
contulit inter se motus, quibus omnituentes
accensi sensus animantem quamque tuentur.
Praeterea quamvis animantem grandior ictus,
945 quam patitur natura, repente adfligit et omnis
corporis atque animi pergit confundere sensus.
dissoluuntur enim positurae principiorum
et penitus motus vitales inpediuntur,
donec materies omnis concussa per artus
950 vitalis animae nodos a corpore solvit
dispersamque foras per caulas eiecit omnis;
[910] But the parts cannot possibly have sense by themselves alone; for all sense of the different members has reference to something else; nor can the hand when severed from us nor any other part of the body whatever by itself maintain sensation.
It remains to assume that they resemble the entire living creatures.
In this case it is necessary that they should feel the things which we feel in the same way as we do, in order that they may be able in all points to work in concert with the vital sense.
How then can they be called first-beginnings of things and shun the paths of death, seeing that they are living things, and that living things are one and the same with mortal things?
Nay, granting they could do this, yet by their meeting and union they will make nothing but a jumble and medley of living things; just you are to know as men cattle and wild beasts would be unable to beget any other thing by all their mixing with one another.
But if haply they lose from their body their own sense and adopt another, what use was it to assign what is again withdrawn? Moreover, the instance to which we had before recourse, inasmuch as we see the eggs of fowls change into living chicks and worms burst forth, when putridity has seized on the earth after excessive rains, you are to know that sensations can be begotten out of no-sensations.
But if haply any one shall say that sense so far may arise from no-sensation by a process of change, or because it is brought forth by a kind of birth, it will be enough to make plain and to prove to him that no birth takes place until a union of elements has first been effected, and that nothing changes without their having been united.
Above all senses cannot exist in any body before the nature of the living thing itself has been begotten because sure enough the matter remains scattered about in air, rivers, earth, and things produced from earth, and has not met together and combined in appropriate fashion the vital motions by which the all-discerning senses are kindled into action in each living thing.
Again a blow more severe than its nature can endure, prostrates at once any living thing and goes on to stun all the senses of body and mind.
For the positions of the first-beginnings are broken up and the vital motions entirely stopped, until the matter, disordered by the shock through the whole frame, unties from the body the vital fastenings of the soul and scatters it abroad and forces it out through all the pores.
nam quid praeterea facere ictum posse reamur
oblatum, nisi discutere ac dissolvere quaeque?
fit quoque uti soleant minus oblato acriter ictu
955 reliqui motus vitalis vincere saepe,
vincere et ingentis plagae sedare tumultus
inque suos quicquid rursus revocare meatus
et quasi iam leti dominantem in corpore motum
discutere ac paene amissos accendere sensus;
960 nam qua re potius leti iam limine ab ipso
ad vitam possint conlecta mente reverti,
quam quo decursum prope iam siet ire et abire?
Praeterea, quoniam dolor est, ubi materiai
corpora vi quadam per viscera viva per artus
965 sollicitata suis trepidant in sedibus intus,
inque locum quando remig
rant, fit blanda voluptas,
scire licet nullo primordia posse dolore
temptari nullamque voluptatem capere ex se;
quandoquidem non sunt ex ullis principiorum
970 corporibus, quorum motus novitate laborent
aut aliquem fructum capiant dulcedinis almae.
haut igitur debent esse ullo praedita sensu.
Denique uti possint sentire animalia quaeque,
principiis si iam est sensus tribuendus eorum,
975 quid, genus humanum propritim de quibus auctumst?
scilicet et risu tremulo concussa cachinnant
et lacrimis spargunt rorantibus ora genasque
multaque de rerum mixtura dicere callent
et sibi proporro quae sint primordia quaerunt;
980 quando quidem totis mortalibus adsimulata
ipsa quoque ex aliis debent constare elementis,
inde alia ex aliis, nusquam consistere ut ausis;
quippe sequar, quod cumque loqui ridereque dices
et sapere, ex aliis eadem haec facientibus ut sit.
985 quod si delira haec furiosaque cernimus esse
et ridere potest non ex ridentibus auctus,
et sapere et doctis rationem reddere dictis
non ex seminibus sapientibus atque disertis,
qui minus esse queant ea quae sentire videmus
990 seminibus permixta carentibus undique sensu?
[950] For what more can we suppose the infliction of a blow can do, than shake from their place and break up the union of the several elements?
Often too when the blow is inflicted with less violence, the remaining vital motions are wont to prevail, ay, prevail and still the huge disorders caused by the blow and recall each part into its proper channels and shake off the motion of death now reigning as it were paramount in the body and kindle afresh the almost lost senses.
For in what other way should the thing be able to gather together its powers of mind and come back to life from the very threshold of death, rather than pass on to the goal to which it had almost run and so pass away? Again since there is pain when the bodies of matter are disordered by any force throughout the living flesh and frame ,and quake in their seats within, and as when they travel back into their place, a soothing pleasure ensues, you am to know that first-beginnings can be assailed by no pain and can derive no pleasure from themselves; since they are not formed of any bodies of first-beginnings, so as to be distressed by any novelty in their motion or derive from it any fruit of fostering delight; and therefore they must not be possessed of any sense.
Delphi Complete Works of Lucretius Page 87