The roads offered an opportunity of doing this. From Strasburg the Valley Pike ran slightly east of north to Winchester. From Front Royal the road on which Jackson was advancing stretched almost due north to Winchester. Between these converging highways a crossroad ran from Cedarville seven miles to Middletown, which was five miles north of Strasburg. If the cavalry and part of the army were sent the next morning from Cedarville to Middletown, they might be able to strike a Federal column in motion along the Valley Pike toward Winchester. Meantime the rest of the army could start the advance from Cedarville directly on Winchester. If Banks stayed at Strasburg, the Confederate column from Front Royal could take Winchester. Should Banks decide to strike eastward from Strasburg to Front Royal, then either of the two Confederate columns could be recalled to attack him in rear.14
So Jackson reasoned. Before daybreak on the twenty-fourth he conferred with Ewell and explained the details of their cooperation. To make certain every saber would count, Jackson decided he would place Ewell’s two cavalry regiments under Maryland Steuart. Steuart was directed to strike for Newtown, four miles north of Middletown, on the Valley Pike. Ashby’s cavalry, with Chew’s battery and the fine Parrott-gun section of the Rockbridge Artillery, was to start for Middletown, supported by Taylor’s fast-moving brigade. Ewell, with Trimble’s brigade, the 1st Maryland, and two batteries, was to advance on Winchester by the Front Royal road. The rest of the army, as it came up, was to march in Taylor’s rear for the Valley Pike.
Jackson had not proceeded far with the Middletown column before a courier brought word from Maryland Steuart that all circumstances indicated Banks was preparing to leave Strasburg. Good news that! In whatever direction Banks was moving, it was far better to hit him on the march than in his works at Strasburg. The Confederate column continued on its way. If Jackson spoke at all, it was to give the command that soon was to epitomize his generalship in the minds of his soldiers: “Press on, men; press on!” Ere long there was a series of brushes with Federal cavalry—brief halts, exchanges of fire. It was not a rapid march but it was steady. At length the van came in sight of Middletown—in startled sight. Over the village and as far as vision reached to north and to south was a dust cloud raised by the hurrying feet and horses’ hoofs of Banks’s army. Jackson had reasoned soundly; the enemy was in full retreat down the Valley.15
The artillery was directed to rising ground. Rob Wheat’s Tigers formed behind one of the rough stone walls in which the country abounded. Ashby hurried off cavalry to the right. A sharp order, the bark of the guns, and in a few minutes the Federal wagon train was in chaos. A considerable force of Federal cavalry was seen to the south. Crutchfield advanced his guns within canister range, opened furiously, and scattered the bluecoats in panic. When the artillery could no longer see a target, in rushed the Tigers.
Banks’s column was pierced! His march was interrupted. “Good, good,” Jackson might have said. What next? All that was clear at the moment, amid the slaughter and confusion, was that wagons were disappearing northward as fast as frantic drivers could force their teams down the Valley Pike. They must be captured; was not Jackson the “wagon hunter”? Ashby dashed away. Jackson and his staff sought out the residents of the bewildered village. Since early morning, they said, wagons and infantry had been pouring down the highway. Jackson’s conclusion was clear: Most of the Federal column was probably between Middletown and Winchester, not between Middletown and Strasburg.
It was now 4 o’clock. The distance to Winchester was thirteen miles. For Banks’s army with all its trains to reach the hills that protected the town, seven or eight hours would be required. Jackson’s old brigade, under the vigilant eye of Winder, was placed in advance. Jackson, riding ahead, was as taciturn as ever, but inwardly he was confident and exultant. “From the attack at Front Royal up to the present moment,” he said later, “every opposition had been borne down, and there was reason to believe, if Banks reached Winchester, it would be without a train, if not without an army.”16
As Jackson approached Newtown, four miles north of Middletown and nine miles south of Winchester, the sound of a minor artillery duel was heard. He found Colonel Crutchfield, chief of artillery, with Poague’s battery and in flaming rage. He had no troops and no cavalry to serve as support. Instead, the Tigers and Ashby’s cavalry were plundering Federal wagons. Jackson was outraged at the looting and still more at the delay in the pursuit, but as he was far ahead of his infantry and the other batteries there was nothing he could do until the Federal guns were silenced by Poague or were withdrawn. It was nearly night when the Federal battery ceased its fire. Jackson ordered the pursuit resumed. He believed that Banks would seek to rally on the hills southwest of Winchester, and regardless of hunger and weariness he determined to press on through the night in order to wrest that dominating position from the Federals before they could get a firm grip on it.17
A hideous march it proved to be. At least one veteran would pronounce it the worst he experienced during the entire war. Past Newtown the head of the column ran into an ambuscade. Again at Bartonsville and still again at Kernstown they were delayed by skillful resistance. The tactics of this night fighting Jackson left to Sidney Winder, who handled his men with a skill that accorded with his rising reputation. Down almost every stone wall, now, a line of disputing fire would dance through the darkness. Then the Federals would stumble away to the next field. Agonizingly for men and mounts benumbed, the persecuting minutes dragged out.
About 1 o’clock Colonel Fulkerson came up to Jackson. “General,” he said, “if I may be permitted to make a suggestion, I think the troops had better be rested for an hour or so…. Unless they are rested, I shall be able to present but a thin line tomorrow.” Jackson reflected and then answered steadily: “Colonel, I yield to no man in sympathy for the gallant men under my command; but I am obliged to sweat them tonight, that I may save their blood tomorrow. The line of hills southwest of Winchester must not be occupied by the enemy’s artillery. My own must be there and in position by daylight. You shall, however, have two hours’ rest.”
The column halted. Thousands slumped in their tracks and fell asleep on the road.18
3
A VICTORY ENDS AT A MANSE
Jackson kept watch and, at 4 o’clock on the morning of May 25, passed word down the column for the men to be aroused and started toward Winchester. He had sent Stapleton Crutchfield across country to the Front Royal-Winchester road, and had every reason to believe Ewell would be on his right when he formed for battle. Brief instructions Jackson gave Ashby, who disappeared quickly to the left. The weather was favorable. If the column were closed and the cavalry at hand, there was promise of victory that Sabbath morning.19
The Federals might have been pushed so hard that they had not halted on the high ridge which shielded Winchester on the south and southwest. Beyond that elevation there was a second, but it was commanded in part by the heights nearer the Confederates. Soon a report came back from the companies in advance that the Federals had a skirmish line, but apparently no more, on the nearer ridge. Soon Jackson saw for himself the shadowy figures against the high horizon. The sight must have revived him. Although he had not slept for twenty-four hours, he was lithe with energy.
Winder, dapper and alert, arrived and asked for orders. Jackson gave them in five words—“You must occupy that hill.” Winder touched his horse and was off. Jackson rode back to Carpenter’s battery and pointed out a position which he told the captain to take as soon as the infantry had cleared the ridge. Already the skirmishers were quarreling in front. From the right, also, there was the sound of fire, a welcome indication that Ewell was in position.20
Jackson did not have to wait long. The moment the 2nd and 27th Virginia began to mount the ridge he rode after them. By the time the Federal skirmishers had withdrawn in the face of the advancing line, Jackson was on the crest. Bullets screamed past him from a Union line 400 yards in front, on the ridge near the town. Federal artillery was plas
tering the position. Jackson paid no heed to the fire. At Jackson’s side Colonel John A. Campbell received an ugly wound. Colonel Andrew J. Grigsby of the 27th had the sleeve of his coat cut by a bullet. The general seemed to wear magic armor. Not a bullet touched him or his garments.
Poague’s two Parrott guns unlimbered squarely on the crest to challenge the Federal batteries in their front. Carpenter’s battery came up. Federal infantry took shelter behind a stone wall to the left and directed a vigorous fire against the Confederate gunners, but the iron hail from the artillery was bringing down more men. Jackson would not endure this. War meant killing, but not of his own men needlessly. He wheeled his horse and went back down the hill. Three things must be done at once: Additional guns must be placed on the ridge to silence the Federal guns; second, ample infantry supports must be at hand; third, the Confederate left must be extended to drive off the infantry and guns enfilading Poague.21
To the first of these movements the vigilant Winder already was attending, with Cutshaw’s and the rest of Poague’s battery, and of the third he spoke to Jackson: The enemy must be attacked from the left. “Very well,” answered Jackson, “I will send you up Taylor.” His watch gave the time as a little after 6 o’clock. An early fight was at a difficult stage. Poague’s battery was being overwhelmed. Carpenter was getting all he could stand. The infantry west of the Valley Pike was idle, unable to advance over the crest of the ridge. On the right, Ewell had opened at 5:40 but, as yet, seemed to be making no progress. If victory was to be won quickly, Taylor must get beyond the enemy’s right and turn it. Jackson spurred toward Taylor’s oncoming brigade. They had been told not to cheer, but as he rushed by, the battle light flaming in his eyes, they took off their hats. He removed his cap in acknowledgment, but not a word did he say. To Taylor one gesture and one sentence covered orders. Jackson pointed to the ridge on the left: “You must carry it.”22
He rode with Taylor under a fire that now was quickening. It was in vain that Taylor insisted the commanding general of the army should not expose himself. Jackson paid no heed whatever. As some men fell, the Louisianians began to duck. “What the hell are you dodging for?” Taylor yelled. “If there is any more of it, you will be halted under this fire for an hour!” Taylor remembered afterward that a look of “reproachful surprise” came over Jackson’s face. “He placed his hand on my shoulder, said in a gentle voice, ‘I am afraid you are a wicked fellow,’ turned, and rode back to the pike.”23
Everywhere as he spurred on Jackson directed all the regiments to be ready to charge when Taylor advanced. Apparently he did not attempt to send word to Ewell to share in this movement, but that officer was maneuvering. He had taken a line of advance suggested by General Trimble and was moving around to the Federal left precisely as Taylor was to the right. The outlook was brightening. In half an hour, at most, Taylor would charge. Then the test would come! To be ready for it, Jackson headed his horse back up the hill where he had been when the Federal artillery opened. This time he did not mount the crest but stopped where he could peer over the brow of the hill.
Battle of Winchester, May 25, 1862.
The Louisiana Tigers under the daring Rob Wheat slipped around to a point almost directly opposite where the Federals had been firing on Poague. The regiments of the Louisiana Brigade formed in a long line to the south of Wheat. Then, about 7:30 o’clock, there was staged such a spectacle as the Army of the Valley never had witnessed before: “The enemy poured grape and musketry into Taylor’s line as soon as it came in sight. General Taylor rode in front of his brigade, drawn sword in hand, turning in his saddle to see that his line was up. They marched up the hill in perfect order, not firing a shot! About halfway to the Yankees Taylor, in a loud and commanding voice …, gave the order: ‘Charge!’” Jackson could restrain himself no longer. “Forward, after the enemy!” he cried, and bounded in full pursuit over the crest of the hill.24
The whole Confederate army seemed now to be pouring over the ridge and into the streets of Winchester—Ewell from the right and, from the center, the First and Second brigades of Jackson. Taylor’s men were in front of them all. Jackson was among them. “Order forward the whole line,” he shouted, “the battle’s won”; and soon, as Taylor’s men swept on, he cried, “Very good! Now let’s holler!” His cap was off and in his hand; he cheered as wildly as any private. When an officer remonstrated with him, he disdained answer and commanded: “Go back and tell the whole army to press forward to the Potomac!”
Near the outskirts of the town he met Taylor. Without a word he reached over from his saddle, silently wrung the younger officer’s hand, and hurried on. He found that the enemy had kept good formation for the first few hundred yards of withdrawal, but in the streets of the rejoicing city the Union columns had been broken and the regiments confused. As the Federal units crowded the approaches to the northern roads the rout had begun. When Jackson and his shouting infantry reached the open country, before them to the horizon the enemy seemed to be spread in hopeless disorder.
It was futile for Jackson to attempt swift, organized pursuit with his scattered infantry; but the situation was the traditional one for cavalry to sweep forward with pistol and saber. Jackson looked about for his squadrons. None was in sight. Ashby had gone off to the left, beyond Taylor’s flank, and nothing had been seen of him after that time. Maryland Steuart had the 2nd and 6th Virginia cavalry on E well’s right—where was Steuart now? “Never,” cried Jackson as he looked vainly about him, “was there such a chance for cavalry! Oh, that my cavalry were in place!” If the troopers were not at hand, it was suggested to Jackson, advance the artillery and have the infantry follow in support. “Yes,” said the general tersely, “go back and order up the nearest batteries you find!”25
Soon the artillery was advanced to the front, though it was plain the exhausted horses scarcely could drag the guns. Behind them staggered some of the infantry, like sick men fired to strength by some wild delirium. Jackson seemed oblivious to their plight. “Order every battery and every brigade forward to the Potomac,” he cried hoarsely, and himself spurred on. It did not matter that the Potomac at Williamsport was full thirty-six miles from Winchester, and at Harper’s Ferry twenty-five. The enemy was routed and must be pursued. He sent Lieutenant Sandie Pendleton back to find Maryland Steuart and order him instantly to the front. Meantime, the infantry and the artillery must keep on! They did their utmost, but men and horses were failing fast. By the time the foremost battery reached Stephenson’s Depot, five miles north of Winchester, the guns were without infantry support. Reluctantly Jackson had to call a halt.26
An hour later Steuart came thundering up with his two regiments and went after the vanished foe. The reason for Steuart’s delay, Sandie Pendleton reported indignantly, was that the cavalryman showed himself a stickler: He was under Ewell; orders to him must come through the division commander; regulations were regulations, channels were channels. Pendleton had to ride two miles farther to the headquarters of Ewell, who “seemed surprised that General Steuart had not gone immediately on receipt of the order.”
Once in pursuit Steuart pressed vigorously, but the two hours that had been lost in bringing him up had sufficed for the enemy to get beyond the range of effective pursuit. Ashby was powerless to follow the Federals. When asked by Jackson why he had not reached the front sooner, Ashby explained that he had swept around to the right to cut off the Federals who moved in that direction. Jackson was not satisfied with Steuart’s performance or Ashby’s explanation, but there was nothing he could do. The battle was over. He gave his exhausted troops such rest as they could find, and himself rode back to Winchester. He rewarded himself with the luxury of a visit to the manse where Mrs. Jackson had spent the winter. On Monday, in gratitude for a victory on the Sabbath, he directed that religious services be held for the entire army.27
That day Steuart found that the enemy had evacuated Martinsburg, eight miles from the Potomac, and captured there many military stores. From Marti
nsburg the advance went almost to Williamsport on the river, destroying a bridge of the B. & O. Railroad. On the twenty-eighth the infantry moved to Charlestown, and on the twenty-ninth made a demonstration against Harper’s Ferry. The enemy had been driven to and not merely toward the Potomac, but after the blood-stirring events at Front Royal, Middletown, and Winchester, the advance to the river was an anticlimax. Jackson’s army had taken an estimated 3,030 prisoners, wounded and unwounded, 9,300 small arms, 2 field guns, many wagons, and rich commissary supplies. The captures of quartermasters’ stores were valued for the thrifty Jackson at $125,185, “besides an immense amount destroyed.” Confederate casualties in the entire operation had been 68 killed, 329 wounded, and 3 missing, a total of 400.28
This was done by Jackson in three days of fighting, but the strategical results went far beyond the impairment of a Federal corps, misstyled an army. On May 28, Jeb Stuart reported to General Johnston that the advance of McDowell’s army, which had been marching southward from Fredericksburg, had turned back to that city. Both for the withdrawal of McDowell and for the resultant improvement in the prospects of holding Richmond, the credit belonged primarily to Jackson and his men.
In Washington on the twenty-fourth, when Jackson had been pursuing Banks from Middletown, Secretary Stanton had telegraphed McDowell to suspend his advance on Richmond and to send 20,000 of his men to the Shenandoah Valley. In western Virginia General Frémont was told to advance immediately to Harrisonburg in order to relieve the pressure on Banks. It was a mission more readily ordered than fulfilled. On the twenty-sixth President Lincoln was questioning whether the troops left with McDowell—less than half the original force of 40,000—should not be recalled to the defense of Washington.
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