Had this been all, Jackson readily could have dealt with it. Now that Ashby’s influence no longer could be exerted against him, he could have assured support for Robertson had he himself had faith in that officer. There was the barrier. Stonewall seems from an early date to have disliked his new chief of cavalry. Perhaps this was because he was not consulted about the appointment, or because he did not believe Robertson qualified for the command. In either event, Jackson quickly concluded that Robertson lacked vigor in reconnaissance and outpost duty. On August 7 he forwarded a request that he be rid of Robertson and that William E. “Grumble” Jones, 7th Virginia cavalry, be put in command. “That subject,” answered Lee, “is not so easily arranged, and … I fear the judgment passed upon [Robertson] maybe hasty.” With the frankness he always displayed in dealing with Jackson, he continued, “Neither am I sufficiently informed of the qualifications of Col. W. E. Jones … to say whether he is better qualified.” To Mr. Davis, Lee wrote, “Probably Jackson may expect too much…. An undisciplined brigade of Cavl. is no trifling undertaking & requires time to regulate.” There, uncertainly and unpleasantly, the matter had to rest.6
If Jackson could not have his way with the cavalry, he could do his full duty, as he saw it, in disciplining his infantry. He soon observed that he had so many courts-martial under way that he had been compelled to assign all his general officers to that duty. Of all these, the one that involved the largest issue of justice was that of Brigadier General Richard B. Garnett for withdrawing the Stonewall Brigade from the front of action at Kernstown. The accused officer had seen the letter in which Jackson said, “I regard Gen. Garnett as so incompetent a Brigade commander, that, instead of building up a Brigade, a good one, if turned over to him, would actually deteriorate under his command.” As he was satisfied his action at Kernstown had been proper, Garnett was determined to have vindication and, no less, to renew in some capacity his military service in defense of the South. He called for a court to try him, and in due course Lee arranged for one to be held in the field with Jackson’s army.7
On August 5 this court assembled at Ewell’s headquarters near Liberty Mills and began to take testimony. Jackson had drawn with much care broad charges of neglect of duty under seven specifications. The allegation was that Garnett had divided his command at Kernstown, separated himself from his troops, permitted them to become confused, and “given the order to fall back, when he should have encouraged his command to hold its ground.” To all of this Garnett had prepared a detailed answer.
On the stand Jackson gave coldly his story of what he had sought to do at Kernstown and what he believed to be Garnett’s derelictions. Garnett himself cross-examined his former chief. When the examination turned to the tactical details of the advance, Jackson’s memory of the circumstances was completely at variance with Garnett’s. So far were they apart that at three points on his transcript of the testimony Garnett wrote opposite Jackson’s answer, “Lie.” When he opened his defense, he prefaced it with the assertion that, at Kernstown, “Gen’l Jackson did not communicate to me any plan of battle…. I was … entirely ignorant of his schemes and intentions.” He entered denial, in detail, of each specification, and submitted reports, personal letters, and affidavits from his colonels and others who had fought at Kernstown. He cited Jackson’s letter alleging unfitness for command and other complaints of Jackson’s against him. “Such covert attacks,” said Garnett, “are inconsistent with honors and justice, and should arouse grave doubts as to the motives and truthfulness of these secret allegations.”
Before Garnett had finished presenting his case, the spies Jackson had sent to ascertain the position of Pope’s forces returned with their findings. Only a part of the new Army of Virginia, it was reported, had reached Culpeper. Jackson believed that precisely such an opportunity as he had hoped to find now was offered him. Pope apparently had made a mistake. By a swift march Jackson might destroy the Federal van ere the whole army could be concentrated. No time must be lost. The court was suspended. On August 7 the columns were in motion from the camps around Gordonsville.8
The day’s objective was Orange Court House. Thence Jackson intended to drive straight on Culpeper, twenty miles beyond. To reach Orange was an easy matter, because Jed Hotchkiss had chosen roads that scarcely would be under the observation of the enemy. The one trouble, a minor one, concerned Sidney Winder. He was sick, and his surgeon insisted he should not attempt active field command. Winder was willing to obey the surgeon if the march did not involve a battle, but if there was to be a fight he was determined to have a hand in it.
He sent Lieutenant McHenry Howard to report his condition to Jackson and to inquire whither the army was moving and whether Jackson expected an action. The lieutenant did not like the idea of putting such questions to the taciturn Jackson and said so, but Winder was insistent. Howard found Jackson in his headquarters tent and reported Winder’s illness, and then rushed on: “But he sent me to ask you if there will be a battle, and if so, when and he would be up, and which way the army is going.” He spoke it all in a mouthful and expected to be met with a sharp retort. Instead, Jackson reflected for some moments and then indulged in a diffident smile at young Howard’s manifest confusion. “Say to General Winder I am truly sorry he is sick”—a pause and then: “that there will be a battle, but not tomorrow, and I hope he will be up; tell him the army will march to Barnett’s Ford, and he can learn its further direction there.” Gratefully Howard hurried away and reported to Winder, who resolved to follow the column.9
At Orange Court House, during the night, Jackson issued orders for the three divisions to march at dawn. Ewell was to lead; Hill was to follow; Jackson’s own division, under Winder, was to close the rear. Then, with these orders delivered, Jackson changed the plan, deciding to send Ewell by a parallel route and reunite with the other divisions at Barnett’s Ford. Of this change of plan A. P. Hill was not informed. At the appointed hour, on the morning of the eighth, he had his leading brigade near the street in Orange up which he expected Ewell to move. Shortly after sunrise troops began to pass. Hill assumed they were Ewell’s men. A brigade or more had tramped northward before he learned that the troops were of Jackson’s division.
What was Hill to do? All his choices were poor, and he concluded it would be best to keep the Light Division where it was until all of Jackson’s men had passed. After a time, up rode Jackson. Why, he asked Hill, was his command not on the march? Hill explained, perhaps too briefly, that he was waiting for Jackson’s division to pass. Jackson looked down the street, saw a halted column of his men, and tersely told a staff officer to order it to move on. Then he turned his horse and rode off. When Hill finally got the Light Division into the road, the progress of his column was halting. He rode ahead to Barnett’s Ford to ascertain the reason, and found part of Jackson’s division waiting on Ewell’s troops, whose route converged at that point. Thereupon Hill sent word to Jackson that the march was delayed. No response came. Finally he was told to return to Orange Court House and encamp there.10
A feeble, farcical performance the advance had been! On a day when sound strategy demanded maximum speed, Jackson’s “foot cavalry” had crawled. Ewell’s leading division had been able to do no more than eight miles. What had gone awry? Excessively hot weather was in a measure responsible, but the prime reason was a combination of poor planning, bad staff work, and unnecessary reticence on Jackson’s part. Worst of all was his failure to notify A. P. Hill of the change in orders, or to acquaint him with even the essentials of the general plan. Lee’s admonition to Jackson to advise with Hill had violated something deep, something almost instinctive in Stonewall. Caution, distrust, jealousy, inborn reticence—whatever it was, cost Jackson a day’s march by his largest division.
For the failure of the advance Jackson blamed himself, but he blamed Hill for not preceding Jackson’s division from Orange. He did not arrest the commander of the Light Division, but he became doubtful of Hill’s ability to conduct a ma
rch. Seeds were sown that August day for animosities that might have a grim harvest.
2
JACKSON FUMBLES AT CEDAR MOUNTAIN
After the wretched march of August 8, Jackson began the next morning a movement that was related almost as vitally to the grand strategy of the changing campaign in Virginia as his advance on Front Royal had been to a somewhat analogous situation in May. Then, as now, McClellan was in front of Richmond; a column was waiting at Fredericksburg; in northern Virginia a third force was afield. The first difference was in the balance among these hostile armies. In the Valley campaign McClellan threatened Richmond; in August he was passive at Harrison’s Landing. The force at Fredericksburg under McDowell had been powerful; in August the strength of the troops on the Rappahannock was not believed to be large. In contrast, Pope had many more troops around Culpeper than had been credited to Banks at Strasburg fifteen weeks previously.
Another and a confusing strategic difference there was. Major General A. E. Burnside, in command of a small army on the coast of North Carolina, had left that area and taken transport to Fort Monroe. Was he to reinforce McClellan, or to strengthen Pope? If he was to join Pope, what would be his line of advance? Suppose he ascended the Rappahannock and debarked at Fredericksburg: Would he move vigorously against the Virginia Central Railroad? Did the Federals hope such a movement would force Jackson to retreat so that Pope would have a clear road to Gordonsville? Was that, in turn, preliminary to a junction by Pope with McClellan in front of Richmond? If Burnside did not move against the Virginia Central, would he march westward from Fredericksburg to join Pope on the Rapidan in an effort to overwhelm Jackson?
All these possibilities had been debated anxiously in Richmond, but without sufficient information to shape an answer. On August 5, Jeb Stuart, sent to make a reconnaissance in force toward Fredericksburg, reported that he had located two brigades of Federal infantry. The enemy, Stuart thought, was preparing an advance on the railroad that linked Jackson with Richmond. John S. Mosby, returning from Fort Monroe as an exchanged prisoner of war, reported that Burnside, according to gossip at the post, had been ordered to Fredericksburg. This information was suggestive but not conclusive. At the moment Lee could not send further reinforcements to Jackson. McClellan’s strength was so superior that he could not weaken the force defending Richmond. Jackson therefore had started his march northward from Gordonsville in the hope of engaging Pope before the full Army of Virginia could concentrate; but he did not know what flanking operation he might encounter, or what move might be made against the railway on which he depended.11
The underlying strategy and tactical dispositions of the Federals were being influenced by circumstances which no opposing general could have divined. Pope’s mission had been outlined on June 26. He was to cover Washington, control the Shenandoah Valley, and “so operate upon the enemy’s lines of communications in the direction of Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off … a considerable force of the enemy from Richmond….” Before Pope could undertake this, McClellan’s retreat to the James had been made. In growing doubt that Pope and McClellan could work together, Mr. Lincoln now brought Major General Henry W. Halleck from the western theater to coordinate operations in Virginia, giving him the title of general-in-chief. Pope meanwhile undertook a succession of cavalry raids on the Virginia Central until Jackson reached Gordonsville and secured the railway against anything short of a general offensive. After a fortnight of hesitation, Halleck ordered McClellan on August 3 to abandon operations on the James River and to move his army by water to Aquia Creek, near Fredericksburg. Thence, it was reasoned, he could defend Washington and later participate in a new overland campaign. Burnside had already been ordered to Aquia, which he reached on the third.
This change of underlying strategy had not modified greatly the mission of General Pope. As previously, he was to demonstrate against the Confederate lines of communication in the hope of compelling Lee to detach to guard those lines; thus McClellan’s prospects of an untroubled departure from the James River would be increased. Pope specifically was required to hold the line of the Rappahannock and maintain contact with Burnside on his left. Although the news of Jackson’s forward movement on August 8 led Pope to canvass the possibility that his adversary had seized the initiative, he decided that Jackson more probably was undertaking a reconnaissance in force. As the hot day of Jackson’s slow march burned on, Pope’s principal doubt was whether the advance of the Confederates would be on Madison Court House or on Culpeper.12
At dawn on the ninth, Pope was satisfied that the attack, if delivered, would be on his right. His dispositions were made accordingly. On a wide front was his cavalry, supported, on Cedar Run, by Crawford’s brigade of Banks’s II Corps. The remainder of Banks’s corps was five miles south of Culpeper, or about three miles in rear of Crawford. Ricketts’s division of McDowell’s III Corps was three miles behind Banks. Sigel’s I Corps, formerly the command of John C. Fremont, had not yet reached Culpeper. In spite of instructions from General Halleck to be “very cautious” until more troops reached the line of the Rappahannock, Pope decided to advance the remainder of Banks’s II Corps to the position occupied by Crawford’s brigade; orders to that effect were sent at 9:45 A.M.13
In the early morning of August 9, Jackson knew only that the Federal cavalry were in his front and that infantry of unknown strength were behind the horsemen. Gloomily he wrote Lee: “I am not making much progress…. I fear that the expedition will, in consequence of my tardy movements, be productive of but little good.” Still in the belief that no more than the advanced units of Pope’s army had reached Culpeper, he determined to press on toward that town. With Robertson’s cavalry in advance, Ewell moved northward from Barnett’s Ford on the Rapidan.14
The lead brigade was that of Jubal Early, “Old Jube.” It was the first time Early had shared in a new operation since that bloody charge of May 5 outside Williamsburg. He was full of fight and was to show, ere the day was done, that he had disciplined well the old brigade of the invalided Arnold Elzey. Behind him tramped the rest of Ewell’s division and next, three brigades of Jackson’s old division. Winder was little better than on the seventh, but insisted on taking the field. Pale and manifestly weak though he was, he soon abandoned his ambulance and rode to the head of the column. Powell Hill, smarting under the black look that Old Jack had given him the previous day, had begun his march before daylight and soon closed the rear brigades of Winder. Whatever the price, Hill was determined that the division which had fired the first shots of the Battle of Gaines’ Mill should not be backward in any action the Army of the Valley might undertake.15
Twenty-four thousand men crossed the Robertson River in the sunshine of what promised to be a blistering day. Of the heat Jackson scarcely seemed conscious, but to the vulnerability of his train of 1,200 wagons he was sensitive. The troopers under Robertson seemed too inactive, and he halted the trains and left the brigades of Gregg and Lawton to guard them. This arranged, the column pressed its march, but still not to Jackson’s satisfaction. Persistently he urged Robertson to locate the enemy; as persistently Robertson complained that his men were straggling. In a situation that called for the eyes of Ashby, the army was half-blinded.16
Ahead the roads constituted a capital “Y.” To the northwest the route led to Madison Court House, to the northeast, the highway to Culpeper. The main features of the terrain were woods in the angle of the “Y,” low ridges and cleared land to the right of the easterly highway, the low shoulders of Cedar Mountain (known also as Slaughter’s Mountain) to the east and southeast, and forests to the westward. About midmorning, on a long cleared ridge to the northeast, Union cavalry could be seen. Early’s guns opened on the troopers, and they withdrew. As they did so, an answering salvo came across the ridge from their rear. Enemy guns in support! Was there infantry behind the ridge also? Word was sent back to the commanding general, and Early, with skirmishers deployed, moved up the road to the “Y” and halted
. He perceived at once that the Federals did not intend to give ground.17
Jackson by this time reached the front and rode to the house where Dick Ewell was waiting for orders. Jackson laid out his map; he and Ewell bent over it. The topographical fact which fairly smote them in the face was that the ridges of Cedar Mountain covered the Confederate right and commanded the Union left, and on that Jackson based his plan of action. Ewell was to take two brigades over the shoulder of the mountain and turn the Federal left flank; Early was to advance up the Culpeper Road; Winder was to support Early and to extend his left in such a fashion that it could sweep around the Federal right. For pressing the attack on the center and left, the Stonewall Brigade was to be in immediate reserve. A. P. Hill’s division would constitute the general reserve.
Confidently, almost indolently, while he awaited the deployment of his infantry, Jackson stretched out on the porch for a rest. Ewell followed his example. Jackson probably acquainted Winder as well as Ewell with his plan, but he did not tell the other subordinates any more than they had to know. Ewell was not so reserved with Early. Old Jube was informed of all Ewell’s division was to undertake, and that he would be supported by three brigades of Winder, who would notify him when the troops were at hand.18
At 2 o’clock Early was told Winder was less than three-quarters of a mile in rear and ready to advance. Quietly and unobserved, Early led his troops into the open ground east of the road. With his skirmishers deployed, he climbed the ridge to the northeast. The moment they showed themselves over the crest, three Union batteries opened from the left front. Early, feeling they were needlessly exposed, quickly recalled his regiments to the south slope. He was ready now for the attack he had been told to deliver. He sent back a request for Winder to move up promptly, and as he waited he studied the terrain closely.
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