The corpse was borne to Richmond where it lay in state in the Capitol. Then, with a guard of honor to the railroad station and with mourning dignitaries in procession, John Pelham’s body began its long, last journey home to Alabama. “The gallant Pelham,” said Stuart, “—so noble, so true—will be mourned by the nation.” Lee wrote the President: “I mourn the loss of Major Pelham. I had hoped that a long career of usefulness and honor was still before him…. I hope there will be no impropriety in presenting his name to the Senate…” It was as a lieutenant colonel that John Pelham went home.19
3
LONGSTREET TRIES INDEPENDENT COMMAND
Early in January General Lee had thought it probable that if Burnside went into winter quarters on the Rappahannock, part of his army would be transferred south of the James for operations there. A considerable Union force already occupied Suffolk. After reinforcing that command, the Federals might undertake an advance against the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad, which was for the Army of Northern Virginia the sole rail supply line east of the Blue Ridge. Southside Virginia and the corresponding part of North Carolina was, moreover, a country of hogs and corn—an easy country in which to subsist forces and not a difficult one to occupy.
For the remainder of January nothing of any consequence occurred between the James and Cape Fear, though there was vast speculation over the probable objective of the Federal flotilla now believed to be moving down the coast. At length, February 14, Lee’s headquarters heard that Burnside’s old corps, the IX, had taken transports for Hampton Roads. Scouts reported Federal camp gossip that the corps was going to Suffolk. General Lee anticipated it might, but remembered that the corps had done well in North Carolina and he counted among the possibilities a return there.
Regardless of ultimate objective, the presence in Hampton Roads of a corps of veteran reinforcements placed heavy striking power in the hands of an adversary who commanded the deeper waterways. A swift voyage up the James and a surprise expedition against Richmond might be contemplated. Precautions had to be taken. Pickett’s division was started for the Confederate capital. Hood was directed to hold himself in readiness. If these first-line troops were to be sent from the First Corps, Longstreet himself should command them. On February 18 orders were issued accordingly. There was the implication here of an independent command for Old Pete. Several times, during the absence of Lee, he had commanded the Army of Northern Virginia for a few days. It appeared that the taste of power beyond the camps of the First Corps had not been unpleasant to Longstreet. Now, in a new field, he was to have more than a taste.
Longstreet formally was appointed on February 25 commander of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, which extended from Richmond to the Cape Fear River. The department was in reality three—the Department of Richmond, over which Arnold Elzey presided; the Department of Southern Virginia, under Samuel G. French; and the Department of North Carolina, which Harvey Hill reluctantly was taking in charge. The personnel of these departments was not all that could be desired. Officers who had been tried in Virginia and then shunted southward were so numerous that Old Pete must almost have thought he was back in the old Confederate Army of the Potomac as it existed before the coming of Lee.
At Charleston was Beauregard, somewhat repressed perhaps in his Napoleonic ambitions, but otherwise the same as after Manassas. Wilmington on the Cape Fear, with its elaborate defenses, was under command of W. H. C. Whiting, comrade of Centreville days. Harvey Hill, of course, was bound to Longstreet by all the ties of Seven Pines. Shanks Evans, another companion of First and Second Manassas, was at Kinston, North Carolina. Other officers were known to Longstreet from later association. Robert Ransom had gone to North Carolina with his own brigade and John R. Cooke’s. Johnston Pettigrew had been restored to health and assigned a brigade of some 2,500 men in the North State.
Along with varied excellencies, some of the best of these new lieutenants of Longstreet had more than their share of temperamental peculiarities. Doubtless because of his health Harvey Hill was in his most nervous, critical mood. He had more separate responsibility than he cared to assume, and he had permitted his prejudices to sour him. In an extraordinary address to his command he urged his infantry to “cut down to 6 feet by 2 the dimensions of the farms which these [Northern] plunderers propose to appropriate.” To artillerists he said: “It is glorious to lose guns by fighting them to the last; it is disgraceful to save them by retiring early from the fight.” Hill opened the sluices of his favorite prejudice—that against the cavalry—by announcing that any troopers “who permit themselves to be surprised deserve to die.”20
It developed that Harvey Hill’s particular sarcasms were directed against “the wonderfully inefficient” cavalry brigade of Beverly Robertson, the same Robertson who had provoked Jackson the previous August. One of Longstreet’s first letters to the adjutant general, after assuming command, was an effort to have Robertson superseded. On the Blackwater was Roger A. Pryor, and for a short time the ex-editor was retained, but he soon was in a fair way of being deprived of his brigade by the same expedient used earlier—transferring his troops to other stations or to different commands. Longstreet managed this as suavely as if he had been Lee himself, and soon Pryor once more was a brigadier without a soldier. As for Chase Whiting, some of his peculiarities doubtless were familiar to Longstreet, but as departmental commander he had yet to learn of the endless apprehension, the persistence, and the prolixity of Whiting as a correspondent. Nor could Longstreet be expected to know at the outset the depth of Whiting’s ambition to be an independent commander.
The last of the ranking commanders in the sprawling department was one of whom Longstreet knew little. Samuel G. French was a West Pointer who served thirteen years in the regular army after graduation in 1843. In 1861, though a New Jersey man, he unhesitatingly threw in his lot with the Confederacy. In command of the Department of Southern Virginia, he had directed operations all the way from Drewry’s Bluff on the James River to the Cape Fear. Personally French was sociable and blessed with more than a spark of humor. As an “old army man” he knew thoroughly his duties and his rights, and was of a disposition to maintain his rights while discharging his duties.
These were a few of the men with whom and through whom Longstreet had to work. In ability they were about of the average of the army. Temperamentally, they may have been somewhat more difficult than the average. That probability ought to be remembered in weighing the events that followed as a first test of Longstreet in separate command.
Was “separate” to be synonymous with independent, in the sense that Longstreet no longer was under Lee’s orders? Longstreet himself does not appear to have been quite sure during March. In so far as acts explained equivocations, he proceeded to order offensive operations without reference to Lee. Two days after assuming command, he suggested to D. H. Hill an enterprise which was to open Longstreet’s eyes concerning some of his subordinates.
In North Carolina the Federals had been occupying New Bern on the Neuse River, using it as an excellent base from which to raid inland. In December 1862 the Federals under General J. G. Foster had made exactly such a raid against Goldsborough. In the face of slow and clumsy defense by some of Gustavus Smith’s troops, Foster had burned the important railroad bridge over the Neuse. A repetition of this Longstreet sought to prevent by the direct and soldierly expedient of nipping off New Bern. That done, he could hope to forage extensively in a district long closed to the Confederate commissaries.21
He proposed vigorously that Hill take the offensive against New Bern. For the attack Longstreet reasoned that he could spare one long-range Whitworth field gun, and Whiting could send up another of these rifles from the Wilmington defenses. Of troops, Longstreet estimated that Hill would have 14,000 or 15,000 men, provided 4,000 from Whiting’s command cooperated. It was over this proviso that Longstreet’s calculations went astray. His letter on the subject had on Whiting as exciting an effect as if it had been warning
that the entire Federal navy was concentrating for an attack on Wilmington. “So far from considering myself able to spare troops from here,” Whiting explained, he had applied for another brigade to be sent him immediately. Concerning the Whitworth gun he was unyielding.
It was in the face of Whiting’s manifest reluctance to cooperate that the expedition against New Bern was prepared. Hill as usual was weighted down by his responsibility and discouraged by his failure to get a brigade from Whiting. His attack scarcely deserved to be called anything more than a reconnaissance in force. No exaggeration appeared in the report of General Foster: “The whole affair, meant to be effective and strong, was ineffective and weak.” Said Hill, “The spirit manifested by Whiting has spoiled everything…. If I am to be cut down to two brigades I will not submit to the swindle.” Longstreet was philosophical in dealing with the failure, and with Hills bitter report: “I presume that this was not intended as an official communication and have not forwarded it. I hope that you will send up another account of your trip.”22
Complications now developed rapidly. From Hampton Roads to the Savannah every Confederate garrison was on the lookout for Federal ironclads and for the appearance of the troops that had left the Army of the Potomac. Where was the blow to fall? Lee thought the major offensive was apt to be on the Rappahannock, and instructed Longstreet to keep Hood and Pickett close enough to the railroad for their quick return. At the time of the raid on Kelly’s Ford he ordered the two divisions to rejoin, but canceled these instructions as soon as he discovered that the movement was of no importance. Longstreet, for his part, explained that he could not keep two divisions ready to move back to the Rappahannock and, at the same time, collect from eastern North Carolina the large supplies of salt fish and meat known to be there.
Increasingly the stores of that region were assuming importance in many minds. To aid in getting the herring and much-needed bacon, Longstreet and Hill were considering plans for demonstrations against Suffolk, against Washington, North Carolina, and against New Bern once more. At the least, it was reasoned, the Federals could be held at the threatened points while the Confederate commissaries scoured the country, which for a year they had not been able to enter. Major Raphael Moses, Longstreet’s corps commissary, learned of the dangerous depletion of the reserve rations of the troops in Virginia at the same time he ascertained there were tons of bacon and unreckoned barrels of fish in the counties east of the Chowan River. He laid these facts before his chief. In forwarding Moses’s report to General Lee, Longstreet wrote: “We can occupy that country and draw the supplies out with another division of my old corps, but I do not think it would be prudent to attempt such a move with a less force.”23
While this and other possibilities were being considered, preparations were made for the investment of Washington, North Carolina, the western gate to a region from which the Confederacy was drawing no supplies. Whiting most reluctantly sent Ransom’s brigade from Wilmington. To add further strength to the expedition, Longstreet lent Hill the brigade of Kemper and continued the loan of Garnett’s brigade. Of the capture of Washington Longstreet cherished small hope, but he believed its investment would pin down the Federals to such an extent that his agents would be unhampered in purchasing provisions in the region north of the town. The “siege of Washington,” as it was styled by the Federals, was begun on March 30 and was regarded by Hill one day as promising and the next as futile.24
Longstreet had more than the fluctuating moods of Hill to puzzle him. Should he attempt to drive the Federals from Suffolk? Had he force enough to invest the town? Could he at least occupy the Federals by a protracted feint while he brought out supplies from the district to the east and southeast? Longstreet argued these questions in correspondence with Lee. That Longstreet was coming to regard himself as a strategist who without abashment could dissent from the opinions of his chief, the exchange of opinions plainly shows. Beyond that, if one is looking for a lieutenant who considered himself the superior of his chief and was anxious to advance his campaign at the expense of the main army, one can interpret Longstreet’s language to confirm that view. With equal show of logic, one may read Longstreet’s dispatches as the frank expression of a plain-spoken and somewhat cautious man anxious to have adequate force for his mission, but was not insubordinate or unreasonable.25
Lee felt there was no military justification for making further detachment from the Army of Northern Virginia. For the rest, he was willing to trust Longstreet’s judgment of what could be effected in front of Suffolk. If Longstreet was too heavily committed when Hooker attacked, Lee was willing to retreat from the Rappahannock to the North Anna. Longstreet, for his part, remained doubtful of the results that could be obtained at Suffolk without a larger force than he had. Lee could defend the Rappahannock, Longstreet boldly maintained, with Jackson’s troops and safely could detach to Southside Virginia the remaining two divisions of the First Corps.
At length Longstreet decided the provisions of eastern North Carolina were worth the risks of a heavy demonstration against Suffolk. The advance was to be in the department of Major General French. Longstreet would be compelled to use French’s division, but he was not disposed to employ French’s services. Micah Jenkins had been transferred to French’s division, where he was senior officer, after French himself, and Old Pete probably felt that the South Carolinian could handle French’s troops better than their regular commander could. “The next thing I knew”—French is speaking—“[Longstreet] … put his command in motion and took from me a division and a number of batteries, and was on his way to Suffolk without informing me in anyway of his designs, or of his wishes.”
Immediately French concluded that the reason for Longstreet’s secrecy was a desire to transfer the division to Micah Jenkins. Was he to acquiesce quietly and remain behind in Petersburg? Not Sam French! He had too much zeal for the cause and knew too well his rights to let himself be supplanted in this fashion. “The next day,” he wrote, “I … rode to Suffolk and took command of my own troops….” That was all there was to it. Samuel G. French, major general, blandly presented his compliments and awaited the orders of the lieutenant general.
Longstreet showed no impatience when French rode up and reported in front of Suffolk, but he determined to use French otherwise than with infantry. Knowing French’s reputation as an artillerist, Old Pete issued orders for all the artillery with the forces on the Blackwater to report to General French. French, in turn, promptly reassigned most of the batteries to the chiefs of artillery of Pickett’s and Hood’s divisions. To French the whole incident appeared as an effort on Longstreet’s part to get rid of him as division commander by assigning him artillery duties he was entirely justified in evading. He was suave in this; Longstreet was not awkward. Both proceeded so skillfully that many officers of less experience did not know what was afoot.26
Out of French’s anomalous position developed a sensation that might have been termed a scandal. As the Confederate lines were drawn facing Suffolk, on the left stood Fort Huger, an open work that had been constructed in 1861 to protect Suffolk. Opposite it was the channel used by the Federal gunboats that patrolled the Nansemond. Fieldpieces in Fort Huger might close the river to the gunboats, and Longstreet accordingly directed French to put a heavy battery here. French sent in five of Stribling’s guns—two 24-pounder brass howitzers and three 12-pounder Napoleons—and decided to put in pits at the rear of the fort’s two 32-pounders.
For infantry support French appointed part of Colonel J.K. Connally’s 55th North Carolina. General E. M. Law, commanding one of Hood’s brigades downstream, sent into the fort as support two companies of the 44th Alabama, approximately fifty men. These troops, Law understood, were to be relieved by some of Connally’s regiment. French understood, apparently, that it was Law who was to garrison the fort and that Connally’s sole duty was to guard the two 32-pounders at the rear of the fort and serve as general reserve.
As always may happen when responsi
bility is not fixed, there came a surprise. About 6 o’clock on the evening of April 19, some 270 Federals landed above the fort. They encountered no opposition in getting a foothold. Neither Connally nor Law had picketed the riverbank at that point, because each thought the other would or had. With a rush the Federals broke into the fort and forced its surrender. Five guns, 7 officers, and 130 soldiers were captured and carried across the river.27
The “capture of Stribling’s battery,” as the affair was styled in the Confederate army, created a tremendous stir. French in his report blamed the garrison of the fort for negligence, and in his diary expressed himself “tired of volunteering against gunboats.” He resolved to confine himself to the immediate command of his own division and to “take no more interest in Hood’s line.” Longstreet was altogether moderate in his judgment. There seemed to have been “a general lack of vigilance and prompt attention to duties,” he said.“… This lesson, it is hoped, will be of service to us all.”28
George Pickett was giving Longstreet trouble of an entirely different sort. The gentleman with the perfumed ringlets was desperately in love with LaSalle Corbell. That interesting romance would have been exclusively his affair had not “the charming Sally,” as he styled her, lived in the very county where Pickett’s lines were now drawn. The miles from his headquarters to her home at Chuckatuck were not too long to deter a lover on a good horse; but double that distance between the end of one day’s duty and the labors of another was a heavy strain on man and mount. Longstreet would deny Pickett nothing that a chief honorably could grant a lieutenant and, again and again, he gave assent for Pickett to rush to Chuckatuck to make his avowals. At length Longstreet must have sworn that for so many days he would not authorize Pickett to leave camp. The gallant lover did not despair. He pleaded with Moxley Sorrel, the corps A.A.G., to give him authority to go. No, Sorrel insisted, he must go to the lieutenant general. “But he is tired of it, and will refuse …,” said Pickett. “I swear, Sorrel, I’ll be back before anything can happen in the morning.” Sorrel stood his ground, and wrote afterward, “Pickett went all the same, nothing could hold him back from that pursuit…. I don’t think his division benefited by such carpet-knight doings in the field.”29
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