The Federals on Marye’s Heights—that stirred instantly the combativeness of Jube Early’s soul! By God, he would not retreat without a fight. He galloped to the Telegraph Road to rally any troops that might be making off. Down the road, toward the rear, were rushing Pendleton’s reserve batteries. “Halt! Halt!”—with added words, perhaps, not found in the manual of arms. Furiously Early galloped on until he came upon Barksdale. The Mississippian was untouched by panic. Twice, he said, the bluecoats had been beaten back from the stone wall at the foot of Marye’s Heights. In a few minutes more the Union line had advanced irresistibly, and his men who held the road under the wall had been overwhelmed. Some field pieces of the Washington Artillery and of Parker’s battery had been captured.
Early found the Washington Artillery angry and humiliated at the loss of some of their famous weapons. One of the defenders broke out wrathfully, “I reckon now the people of the Southern Confederacy are satisfied that Barksdale’s brigade and the Washington Artillery can’t whip the whole damned Yankee army!” Barksdale himself did not put it that strongly. “Our center has been pierced, that’s all,” he said; “we will be all right in a little while.”
Quickly Early and Barksdale formed a line along the plateau in rear of Lee’s Hill. They fell back at intervals until, at Cox’s house, on defensible ground, Early determined to make a stand. He drew Smith and Hoke back to the new line. Gordon and Hays found their place in this new order of battle. By 3:00 P.M., though his strong position overlooking the Rappahannock had been snatched from him, Early could say that he had his force in hand, ready to fight, and that the infantry losses had not been excessive. Artillery commands had not been so fortunate. The guns taken from the Washington Artillery proved to be six. Parker’s battery lost two.19
If the balance of the morning’s account was slightly, though no more than that, to the credit of Early, he had that afternoon remarkable good fortune, which he had not anticipated and, for that matter, did not deserve. Three and a quarter miles above Fredericksburg, Cadmus Wilcox had been stationed with his Alabama brigade. Banks’ Ford, of much strategical importance, was his post. His instructions were to hold the position at all costs if it was assailed. In the event it was not, he was to detach a guard to watch the crossing and with the remainder of his brigade march via the Plank Road toward Chancellorsville. Since his fine conduct at Second Manassas, Wilcox had been denied a conspicuous part in operations. He had wished to leave the Army of Northern Virginia in the belief that he would have better prospects elsewhere. Lee had declined to permit this, but efforts to procure a major general’s commission for Wilcox had been futile. Was he now merely to watch a ford while his division and his army won another victory that would bring praise and promotion to those who led their men wisely?
The whole of the war brought few instances to demonstrate more dramatically that vigilance often makes great the small opportunity. On the morning of May 3, Cadmus Marcellus Wilcox was—as soldiers always should be—early astir. He observed with critical eye everything he saw of the enemy across the river. As there was not the slightest sign of any attempted crossing at Banks’ Ford, all the circumstances, Wilcox later explained, “induced me to believe that much of the force at Banks’ Ford had been sent to Chancellorsville.” He directed that fifty men, with two pieces of artillery, be detached to watch the ford and that the remainder of the command proceed toward Chancellorsville in the manner contemplated by orders.20
This plan was interrupted by the Federal assault on Marye’s Heights, and Wilcox positioned his brigade to cooperate with Harry Hays. Soon a courier from Barksdale brought Wilcox news of the lost fight on Marye’s Heights and the suggestion that Wilcox, like Hays, proceed to the new line Early was forming on the Telegraph Road. The suggestion was both polite and permissible, but as Wilcox ranked Barksdale, he had no obligation to follow the plan of the gentleman from Mississippi. Wilcox deter mined to follow his own judgment in the application of his orders from army headquarters. In doing so, he made the finest of his several wise decisions on this, his greatest day. His nearest avenue for the execution of his contingent orders to join Lee was the Plank Road; down that same road it seemed reasonable to assume that the enemy, whose heavy lines were in plain sight, would be certain to advance. He said afterward, “I felt it a duty to delay the enemy as much as possible….”
Wilcox drew his line parallel to the Plank Road on the best near-by ground he could find, held off the enemy for a time, then side-slipped to his right to see what the Federals would do. They seemed to be puzzled and hesitant. From this he felt confident that if he had to retire along the Plank Road, “ample time could be given for re-enforcements to reach us from Chancellorsville; and … should the enemy pursue, he could be attacked in rear by General Early, re-enforced by Generals Hays and Barksdale.” That seemed irrefragable logic after the event. At the time, it represented risk as well as daring—a combination that must be balanced on the beam of judgment.21
Wilcox moved over to the Plank Road, threw his command squarely across the line of the enemy’s advance, and boldly offered shell for shell. He did not suffer unduly from the attacks of a cautious adversary; but he must have been pleased, in the early afternoon, to learn that three brigades from McLaws’s division were on their way to reinforce the Alabamians. Wilcox did not know it at the time, but reinforcements for him and for Early had cost Lee dearly. In the hour of victory that morning, while Anderson’s men were mingling with Stuart’s at Chancellorsville, Lee had received word that Early had been driven from the heights of Fredericksburg. Further pursuit of Hooker had to be deferred that day. By no other course was Lee able to detach sufficient troops to deal with the Federals who were marching against his rear.
After the arrival of McLaws’s men, the work of the afternoon was simple for Wilcox. Federal commanders at about 5:15 threw their regiments against the Confederate position at Salem Church. The repulse by the four waiting brigades was bloody. Wilcox then took the initiative and, with the support of Paul Semmes’s Georgians, drove the column of attack back upon strong reserves. Darkness ended the action. Wilcox could tell himself without vainglory that he had protected the rear of Lee and had made it possible for Early to reconcentrate scattered forces. Daring and devotion had their reward. Cadmus Wilcox that day gave military history an example far outliving his time of the manner in which one brigade, courageously led, can change the course of a battle and retrieve a lost day.22
Early owed more to Wilcox than he acknowledged then or thereafter, but as senior officer of the sector nearest Fredericksburg, he received, on the evening of May 3, Lee’s instructions. Lee’s dispatch was an expression of regret at the loss of Fredericksburg and an appeal for Early to unite with McLaws in an attack: “I think you ought to be more than a match for the enemy.” At the same time, a dispatch from McLaws inquired naively what Early proposed. The Georgian was in term of service the oldest major general with the army, and the Virginian the most recently appointed; but that circumstance neither deterred McLaws from asking for suggestions, nor led Old Jube to hesitate in giving them.
Early determined to recover the high ground at Fredericksburg in the morning. When this was accomplished, he would have secured himself against an attack from the direction of the town and separated the Federals there from the units on the Plank Road. He believed he could deliver successfully this first stroke with part of his forces, and with the remainder extend their left to unite with McLaws’s right. It would be easy, after that, for Early and McLaws to close in and overwhelm the brigades cut off on the Plank Road. It was a practical operation, Early thought, provided McLaws would cooperate heartily. McLaws forwarded the outlined plan of action to Lee, who thought the plan good but had some doubt whether it was practicable. Lee realized that McLaws’s active aid was necessary, and he particularly enjoined that officer to press the Federals “so as to prevent their concentrating on General Early.”23
Nothing in Early’s action indicated any misgiving. He
was self-reliant, if not self-confident, and was not oppressed by his responsibility. Old Jube was growing as a soldier. McLaws’s mental approach to the battle is more difficult to ascertain. If he was apprehensive, it was on three counts: First, he did not feel that he knew the ground of probable action. He undoubtedly was troubled, also, because he thought the enemy was in superior force. Third, he had been much impressed by the Federal bombardment on the afternoon of the third, when the enemy batteries “were admirably served and played over the whole ground.” It is possible, in addition, that McLaws missed Longstreet and felt overwhelmed by his responsibility, but of this there is no positive evidence. Uneasy he was, and unconvinced that he should or could carry the burden of the fighting the next day. That seems to have been his state of mind.24
Daylight on May 4 found Early’s entire division astir. The general himself intended to march with John B. Gordon’s brigade, which he had selected to recover the heights and cut off the Federals from the town. Snowden Andrews was to follow with his battalion of artillery. Smiths and Barksdale’s brigades would be in support. When Early had all these troops ready to advance, he rode off to show Hoke and Hays where to take position on the right of McLaws. Hurrying back to the Telegraph Road where he had left Gordon’s brigade, Early found that the Georgians were not there. Neither were Andrews’s guns. A moment’s inquiry elicited the disconcerting fact that instead of waiting for Early to direct him, Gordon already was moving toward Lee’s Hill, with Andrews following.
Early did not delay to ask why this had been done. If Gordon launched the attack prematurely, it must be supported. Let Smith and Barksdale proceed to join Gordon with the least possible delay! Fortune laughed—as Fortune rarely does—at a misunderstanding of orders. Gordon had an unopposed march to an invaluable objective. He found that Lee’s Hill was not occupied by the enemy—nor was Marye’s Heights. Early, arriving quickly, gave Gordon the support of Smith and ordered Barksdale to resume the familiar position under the heights and, if possible, reoccupy Fredericksburg. The Mississippian reported seeing in Fredericksburg what appeared to be a heavy force, and Early had to content himself with ordering him to maintain position and keep the Federals from advancing.25
If Early’s eyes, all the while, had been on the ridge, his ears had been straining for the sound of McLaws’s guns. No echo had rolled down Hazel Run; no message had come. Had the plan for a joint attack gone awry? Was McLaws waiting on Early? He hurried off a staff officer, Lieutenant A. L. Pitzer, to explain his situation to McLaws. The Georgian was to be informed that Hoke and Hays were in position on the left and ready to cooperate with McLaws. As soon as these troops and McLaws’s own engaged the enemy, Early would throw in Gordon and Smith against the Federal left.
McLaws received in some puzzlement the report that Pitzer brought. The terrain confused McLaws; the strength of the enemy in his front made him doubtful of success. He was willing to help Early, but should not Early open the attack? Moreover, Lee had sent word that Dick Anderson was marching from Chancellorsville to reinforce the troops around Salem Church. Was it not prudent to wait until Anderson arrived and then strike with a stronger force? So reasoning, McLaws bade Pitzer take back this message to Early: The advance would not be made until Anderson was in position; then three guns fired in rapid succession would signal the general attack.
About 11:00 A.M. Anderson arrived in the vicinity of Salem Church, but before McLaws could decide where to put his troops, the commanding general reached the ground and assumed direction of affairs. This was a deliberate and not a chance appearance of Lee. Preferably, if he could have mustered the men, he would have struck Hooker’s main army that day north of Chancellorsville. Instead he came personally to deal with the Federals on the Plank Road because he seems to have felt that McLaws was proceeding with too much caution and deliberation. Lee began, with manifest if unusual impatience, to get into position Anderson’s brigades.26
Even under the eyes of “Marse Robert” himself, progress was slow. Tired men did not show their old alacrity. At length, in the afternoon, Lee rode out and met Early. Apparently the commanding general had concluded that he could expect little of McLaws, and that the attack must be committed to the other divisions. He sent this message: McLaws was to occupy the enemy in his front and, after Early and Anderson opened the attack, was to throw in Kershaw and Wofford. It was close to 6 o’clock when McLaws received word that Anderson and Early were about ready to attack.
In a few minutes all along the line was heard the signal of three guns fired in swift succession. On the right, Gordon started ahead; Hoke and Hays immediately were set in motion by Early; on the left of Hoke, Anderson ordered forward Wright’s Georgians; beyond them, Posey’s orders were to advance. Gordon encountered scant opposition at first; Hays, Hoke, and Wright started magnificently out. Old Jube’s pulse beat up and his sharp eyes shone more brightly than ever. The onset was thrilling, the next stage was expectancy, the third was suspense. After that, gallantry did not suffice. Nothing went well. Hays’s lines of advance converged with Hoke’s; the two brigades mingled and between them some mistaken fire tragically was exchanged. When Hoke fell with a shattered arm, none of his colonels knew under what orders the brigade was acting. Just as Early reached the Plank Road, the two brigades fell back to it. Neither Wright nor Posey crossed the Plank Road, according to Early, until nightfall.
Final Confederate disposition at Salem Church, about 6:00 P.M., May 4.
As for McLaws, his report was a chronicle of confusion: “Alexander opened his batteries, and Generals Kershaw and Wofford advanced to the front through a dense woods. Night now came rapidly on, and nothing could be observed of our operations.” Commanders scarcely knew where they were or what they were expected to do. Amid this confusion came the sound of troops moving across the pontoon bridge above Banks’ Ford, a tremendous clatter as if giants were beating the long roll on the pontoons. Protected by night, all the Federals in the vicinity of Banks’ Ford got safely off.
As a considerable force still was believed to be in Fredericksburg, Early was ordered back there during the night with two of his brigades to strengthen Barksdale. Early predicted that the enemy would quit the right bank of the Rappahannock before morning, and fact bore him out. By daylight on May 5 the whole force of the Unions General Sedgwick, from Fredericksburg to Banks’ Ford, had the river between him and the Confederates.27
Of these events Stonewall Jackson heard with a pleasure he was physically strong enough to express. “Good, good,” he would say at the recountal of some gallant deed, and with glistening eye he warmly would praise some officer to whom, had he been present on the field, he might have given at most a glance of approval. Late on the evening of May 3 had come a message from army headquarters: Lee sent word that the military situation demanded the removal of Jackson to a place less exposed. Dr. McGuire was instructed to turn over all other duties to the senior surgeon, and was himself to attend the general and remain with him. As the commanding general left to the patient the choice of a nearby haven, Jackson promptly said that if it was agreeable to the family, he would go to Fairfield, the home near Guiney’s of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Coleman Chandler, who had shown him many courtesies. Whether the journey should be made the next day was left to be determined by Jackson’s condition, which hourly seemed better.28
Jackson slept well and, in the judgment of his surgeons, he now could look forward to normal convalescence. Dr. McGuire told him the orders of General Lee could be executed without excessive risk. The weather on the fourth was favorable, a fair and pleasant morning. Preparations to take the road already were being made. In Jackson’s mind, that road to recovery did not end at Guiney’s. From it, when his wounds began to heal, he would go to a pleasant village, such as Ashland, conveniently near Richmond but free of the bustle and excitement of the capital. Finally, he would complete his recovery at Lexington, in the home he had not seen for more than two years. Then, in the mercy of God, with one hand he would smite the invade
r more heavily than ever he had with two!29
At length the ambulance was ready. On the flooring a mattress had been placed. His young chief of artillery, Stapleton Crutchfield, again was to accompany him as a fellow patient. Jed Hotchkiss was to choose the route and clear the road; Smith and Lacy were to remain at the general’s side; Dr. McGuire was to direct everything. The safest road was one of the shortest—by way of Todd’s Tavern to Spotsylvania Court House and thence southward and eastward to the R.F. & P. at Guiney’s. It would be an all-day journey.
Before long they overtook lightly wounded men walking toward the railroad. These Second Corps veterans shouted friendly messages to the wounded man. Over and over, soldiers cried out that they wished they could have been wounded instead of their general. Rough teamsters they encountered stood bareheaded and in tears as the ambulance passed. When word spread that Old Jack was coming, residents came out to welcome the general and to offer him the few delicacies they had—their bread, their milk, a little butter, a handful of eggs. At Spotsylvania Court House refugees and residents crowded sympathetically around the ambulance.
The journey was rendered less tedious by conversation in which Jackson shared freely. When he was asked for his opinion of Hooker’s plan of campaign, Jackson did not hesitate: “It was, in the main, a good conception, sir; an excellent plan. But he should not have sent away his cavalry; that was his great blunder. It was that which enabled me to turn him….” In answer to tactful questions, Jackson confided that he had hoped to press forward on the night of May 2 and seize a position between Hooker and United States Ford, where the Federals would have been compelled to attack him. He spoke in unclouded memory of the attack on Hookers right, and in glowing words of those officers who had most distinguished themselves. First in his praise was Robert Rodes. He expressed high admiration for the man who had directed the advance of Harvey Hill’s old division. Rodes, said Jackson, should be promoted; promotion for valor, especially promotion on the field, was the greatest possible incentive to gallantry on the part of others.
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