Harrisons report produced an immediate change in the dispositions of the army. In order to keep the enemy at maximum distance from the lines of supply, A. P. Hill was directed to move his corps east of the mountains. Longstreet was to follow. Pickett’s division should be left on guard at Chambersburg. On the thirtieth Hood and McLaws moved to Greenwood, where they remained for the night. Lee established his headquarters near Longstreet’s. An English military observer wrote in his diary that June 30: “The relations between Lee and Longstreet are quite touching—they are almost always together…. I believe these two generals to be as little ambitious and as thoroughly unselfish as any men in the world.”17
There was no difference between them as they approached the crisis of their cause. No difference there was, but—to repeat a fact soon to make history—each misunderstood the other’s view of the course they were to follow: In Longstreet’s mind, Lee was committed morally to a tactical defensive, which was Longstreet’s own conception and, to his way of thinking, an essential of Confederate success. Lee never had intended to commit himself to that tactical policy and he did not know that Longstreet considered him so pledged.
3
THE PRICE OF 125 WAGONS
Different far from Longstreet’s state of mind and different no less from Ewells was that in which Jeb Stuart looked forward to a second invasion of the North. Ewell entered Pennsylvania with reputation much heightened, Stuart with fame impaired. Longstreet was resolved to justify a tactical theory, Stuart to vindicate his name as a leader. The slurs on Jeb in the press stung. The Richmond Sentinel, which spoke with some authority on military affairs, had cried: “Vigilance, vigilance, more vigilance, is the lesson taught us by the Brandy surprise…. Let all learn from it, from the major general down to the picket.” It was said openly in the city that “Stuart’s headquarters had been fired into before the enemy’s presence was known,” and that Stuart had been outgeneralled. The indignant whisper was that the surprise had occurred because Stuart and his officers were “rollicking, frolicking and running after girls.” Surveying all this, the Richmond Whig concluded an editorial defense of the Beau Sabreur, “We shall be surprised if the gallant Stuart does not, before many days, make the enemy repent sorely the temerity that led them to undertake as bold and insulting a feat [as the advance on Brandy].”18
Stuart read, raged, and doubtless resolved that the Whig’s prediction should be fulfilled. First must come opportunity. His immediate duty, though difficult, was the unspectacular one of screening Hill and Longstreet while they were moving toward the Potomac. He had to keep the enemy east of the Blue Ridge so that the northward march of the Confederate infantry down the Shenandoah Valley would not be interrupted. Clashes were frequent and furious though they usually were on a small scale. The bluecoated troopers under Alfred Pleasonton, David Gregg, and John Buford demonstrated that the vigor of the attack at Brandy Station was not accidental. They now were an experienced, confident, and well-led corps, scarcely resembling in anything but uniform the clumsy horsemen over whom Stuart’s men had ridden in 1862. The day of easy Confederate cavalry triumphs was gone. All Stuart’s men possessed of courage, resourcefulness, and endurance they needed in these fights around Aldie, Middleburg, and Upperville.
Stuart, fighting defensively, planned offensively. Now that all the infantry were west of the Blue Ridge, he reasoned that it would be possible to leave one or two brigades of cavalry to defend the gaps and with the remaining three to descend on the enemy and harass Hooker in any advance the Federals might make to parallel Lee’s own. If Hooker crossed the Potomac, Stuart could do the same thing or could rejoin the army on its advance into Pennsylvania. This expedition could be started as soon as the Union cavalry withdrew from their inquisitive and persistent daily attacks.19
Jeb suggested such an operation to Lee and gained approval of the general idea. Longstreet, also, was favorable. The one basic stipulation made by Lee was that as soon as Stuart found that the Federals were moving into Maryland, the Confederate cavalry, too, must pass the Potomac and must cover the flank of the advancing Southern infantry. By the night of June 21 this much of the plan was accepted. On the twenty-second the Federals did not return to contest the roads to the mountain gaps. The country between Aldie and the Blue Ridge was secure; the task of screening the infantry was nearing completion.
That evening a courier brought Stuart a note from Longstreet, who enclosed a letter from the commanding general. Lee expressed concern lest the retirement of the Federal cavalry might mean that Hooker was stealing a march on the Confederate army and might get into Maryland before it did. Then Stuart read, “If you find that he is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General Ewell’s right….” Longstreet’s covering note approved, if Stuart thought the cavalry could make the move successfully. The prospect, Longstreet went on, was that Stuart would be less apt to disclose the Confederate plan to the enemy if the cavalry crossed the Potomac in rear of the Federals. It would be well, the commander of the First Corps concluded, if Stuart delayed the start until certain he could move northward into Maryland in rear of the Unionists.20
A gracious Providence scarcely could have shaped opportunity more to Stuart’s wishes! On the morning of June 23, Jeb had his scouts search for the enemy. Reports were encouraging. Major John S. Mosby, the boldest and most responsible of partisan rangers, wrote that the enemy was inactive east of the Blue Ridge and was encamped over so wide an area that Stuart could push his way between two of the corps. All this information Stuart promptly forwarded to Lee. The intelligence developed a possible contingency not covered by orders: Mosby thought the Federal infantry had been stationary for almost a week. If they did not start an advance, new instructions were necessary. Stuart doubtless asked for them.
Late that rainy night Major McClellan awakened Stuart with a dispatch from army headquarters. It was from Lee, written at 5:00 P.M. in answer to Stuart’s messages of the morning. Said the commander, in three sentences that were to weigh in the balance of a nation’s destiny: “If General Hooker’s army remains inactive, you can leave two brigades to watch him, and withdraw with the three others, but should he not appear to be moving northward, I think you had better withdraw this side of the mountains tomorrow night…. You will, however, be able to judge whether you can pass around their army without hindrance, doing them all the damage you can, and cross the river east of the mountains. In either case, after crossing the river, you must move on and feel the right of Ewel’s troops, collecting information, provisions, &c.” After giving general instructions for the cavalry to be left behind, Lee added, “… I think the sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow [June 24], the better.”21
This was language to chew and digest. If Hooker’s army remained “inactive,” then three brigades and presumably Jeb himself must return to the main army. The proviso was firm, but discretion was left. Stuart was free to determine whether he could “pass around” the Federal army “without hindrance.” If he could do that, he could cross the river “east of the mountains.”
Taken together, then, the instructions of June 22 and June 23 coupled two conditions for a crossing west of the mountains: If Hooker remained inactive and Stuart could not pass around Hooker’s sprawling force unhindered, then three cavalry brigades must rejoin the main army and cross via Shepherdstown. That was displeasing to Stuart not only because it robbed him of independent adventure but also because it would throw his columns on congested roads. He reasoned that he had authority to cross east of the Blue Ridge even in the rear of the enemy, if this could be done “without hindrance.” Jeb knew that this term was not intended to exclude contact with the enemy. Lee’s letter of June 23 enjoined him to do the Federals “all the damage you can.”
What was possible was permissible. That, as Stuart saw it, was the substance of his orders. He did not define “hindrance” rigidly in
terms of days and hours. He did not realize that he would be hindered most seriously were he delayed in crossing the Potomac to “feel the right of Ewell” and collect information and provisions. Stuart’summed up his interpretation of his orders when he said later: “… it was deemed practicable to move entirely in the enemy’s rear, intercepting his communications with his base (Washington), and, inflicting damage upon his rear, to rejoin the army in Pennsylvania in time to participate in its actual conflicts.”22
In the conviction that he could shape his route as opportunity required, Stuart on the twenty-fourth made his preparations. The men were to cook three days’ rations to be carried on their persons. Horses, like men, must live off the land. Six fieldpieces, their caissons, and the ambulances were to be the only wheeled vehicles. Everything must be ready to move soon after midnight of June 24-25. Lee had said, “The sooner you cross into Maryland, after tomorrow, the better.” Jeb would not lose a minute.
Orders were to take three brigades and leave two. The five among which choice had to be made were Hampton’s, Fitz Lee’s, Rooney Lee’s, Grumble Jones’s, and Beverly Robertson’s. Duty in the Valley surely was less exacting than a long raid in the enemy’s country would be. To watch the passes and clear the Valley was, moreover, the type of duty in which Grumble Jones was proficient. He was rated the best outpost officer in the cavalry division. Besides, he was the one officer, among all subordinates, with whom Stuart could not operate on friendly terms. Let Jones and his brigade remain. With him, Beverly Robertson could maneuver or wait. Everyone knew that Robertson was entirely unpredictable in battle. He would not be suited for the work that might be awaiting the Confederates north of the Potomac. The harder duty must be assigned the strongest units. Nothing should be done to break up the combination of Hampton and the Lees. They had shared numerous raids; they were a team and knew how to fight together.23
By nightfall of the twenty-fourth all instructions had been given. Thousands of troopers clattered into the rendezvous at Salem. The man whom Stuart most joyfully welcomed was Fitz Lee, returning to duty after a month’s absence due to inflammatory rheumatism. His cousin, Rooney Lee, was recovering from a leg wound received at Brandy Station; in temporary command of the Third Brigade was its senior colonel, John R. Chambliss, a West Pointer, retired lieutenant of the old army, and a competent man who was learning rapidly.
With these brigadiers, old and new, Stuart got the column under way about 1:00 A.M. of the twenty-fifth. Passage through Bull Run Mountain was easy and unobserved, but on the familiar Warrenton-Centreville turn-pike he soon encountered Hancock’s II Corps. This mass of Federal infantry was moving north on almost the line of march that Stuart intended to follow. Such information as Stuart could collect from natives indicated that Union forces were still well to the east. A report of the movement of Hancock’s corps was sent to Lee, but if Stuart that night debated whether he should turn back and cross the Potomac west of the Blue Ridge, he dropped no hint of it and asked no advice. Probabilities are that he gave no thought to withdrawal. The quickest, surest route would be southeastward and then northward. If the march were rapid enough, it would put the cavalry between the Federals and Washington … Washington! The very name itself was an argument for the downstream crossing!24
On June 26 the three brigades moved east past Bristoe Station and Brentsville and then on a long northerly arc to a bivouac south of Wolf Run Shoals on the Occoquan. Nowhere on the march were any Federals encountered, but nowhere was any forage found. The country had been swept bare. Halts had to be called to graze the weakened animals. Orders had been to cross the Potomac as soon as practicable after the twenty-fourth. In more than fifty hours Stuart had covered but thirty-four miles. He still was at least two score miles from the nearest ford. The fast-moving cavalry had covered less ground in two days than the most laggard infantry would have accounted respectable. None of Stuart’s companions recorded that he spoke on the twenty-seventh of any tardiness. He was interested far more in the news sent by his outposts that the Federals had disappeared from Wolf Run Shoals. That opened the way.
Onward the troopers toiled to the Orange and Alexandria Railroad at Fairfax Station, then to Fairfax Court House, where, to the infinite cheer of hungry boys, several sutlers’ shacks were found, fallen upon, and emptied. Perhaps it was as much for the pleasure of the men as for the grazing of the horses that Stuart allowed a halt of several hours. Word came that the Army of the Potomac was converging on Leesburg and that the local defense troops were retiring to Washington. Now the best approach to the Potomac would be via the road between Alexandria and Leesburg that paralleled the river. At Dranesville the trail of the enemy was fresh. Federal campfires still were smouldering; Sedgwick’s VI Corps, said the villagers, had marched off that morning in the direction of Leesburg. After reconnaissance and delay, the troopers and the guns crossed the Potomac without loss at Rowser’s Ford. Stuart had been on the road seventy-two hours and still was on the southern edge of Maryland soil. He did not know where Lee was. All the information the cavalryman got was that the Army of the Potomac was en route to Frederick. In this state of affairs, Lee’s instructions to take position on Ewell’s right applied. Said Stuart: “I realized the importance of joining our army in Pennsylvania, and resumed the journey northward early on the 28th.”25
Route of Stuart’s raid, from Salem, June 25, to Gettysburg, July 2, 1863.
The intention was undeniable. So were three obstacles. The first was lack of information of Ewell’s position. Lee had said that Ewell’s right-hand column would move toward the Susquehanna by the Emmitsburg route, but with the Federals in Frederick, that road was one to be avoided. The alternative route to the Susquehanna was via Westminster, to the east. In making that movement, a second manifest obstacle to a swift march was the condition of men and mounts. They were worn and hungry and must be subsisted on what could be collected. Some delay was certain to result. The third obstacle to a prompt junction with Ewell developed almost in the hour the cavalry reached Maryland. It was the familiar one, and the most destructive foe of discipline—booty.
In Rockville the cavalrymen suddenly had the most lamentable good fortune that ever had fallen to their lot. Rockville, as it chanced, was on the direct supply line between Washington and Hooker’s army, and toward the town, Stuart learned, a Federal wagon train was moving. All he had to do was to wait. Surprise was complete. In a mad chase the troopers destroyed many vehicles and captured 125 of them. Said Colonel R.L.T. Beale: “The wagons were brand new, the mules fat and sleek and the harness in use for the first time. Such a train we had never seen before and did not see again.” This wagon train was Jeb’s stumbling block. The length of the road and the weariness of his men might be surmounted by cheer and resolution; but a captured train of “125 best United States model wagons and splendid teams”—this must be brought back to Virginia, no matter where; meantime, it had to be carried.26
Stuart determined, as a minimum next exploit, to cut the enemy’s second line of supply, that of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. After much delay collecting the captured wagons and paroling the 400 prisoners, the railroad was reached and the tracks torn up. This produced no fine, smashing train wrecks like those at Bristoe Station the previous August, and Stuart’s only reward was the doubtful one of possessing for some hours a railroad that otherwise might have been employed in the service of the enemy.
Reaching Westminster about 5:00 P.M. on June 29, the troopers found forage and rations enough for the entire command as well as a good night’s sleep. For his part, Stuart would have been hurt and ashamed had he known how anxiously Lee was inquiring for news of him and how faltering was the movement of the army in the absence of the cavalry. Ignorant of his chief’s distress, Jeb was not concerned, apparently, over the encumbrance of his wagon train. June 30 brought the column to Hanover, east of Gettysburg, and a brisk clash with Federal cavalry.27
Hampered as he was by his train, Stuart could not bring himself to abandon it.
Believing the column to be not far from Lee’s infantry, he reasoned that he should deliver the vehicles to his chief for use in collecting provisions from rich Pennsylvania. Once again, the crux of a military solution was the choice of a line of march. To escape the Federal cavalry operating to the westward, he would detour east and north toward the Susquehanna. Newspapers told him of Early’s arrival on the twenty-eighth—two days previously—in York. This indicated for the cavalry a night march to unite with Jube. Said Stuart afterwards: “Whole regiments slept in the saddle, their faithful animals keeping the road unguided.”28
Such was the night of June 30 for Jeb Stuart, a third of the men whose state of mind was making history for America while the Confederate army converged on Gettysburg. He had gone on and on in the exercise of the discretion Lee had given. Almost six days Stuart had been on his raid. Not a single time had he heard from any of the infantry commanders with whom he was directed to cooperate. One dispatch only he had sent, and that on the twenty-fifth. Other adventure was to be his, but nothing he had achieved and nothing he could hope to accomplish with his exhausted men could offset the harm which the events of coming days were to show he already had done to his chief and his cause.
CHAPTER 26
Two Days of Battle
1
PROMISE OF ANOTHER TRIUMPH
That night of June 30, while Stuart’s sleepy boys plodded along, Dick Ewell was fuming over discretionary orders. Longstreet confidently was expecting his plan of a tactical defensive to be accepted by his chief. And A. P. Hill was preparing for the advance of part of his troops from Cash-town to Gettysburg at the end of a long advance from the Rappahannock. When Lee had made ready to move toward Pennsylvania, he left Hill and the Third Corps to watch Hooker’s army and to occupy it while the First and Second corps slipped away. This was the most responsible assignment, the most shining proof of Lee’s confidence, that the new corps commander could have asked or received.
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