In the town square Ewell seemed in no hurry. He drew rein under a tree and chatted cheerfully with those around him. It began to look as if he did not intend to make a decision on his own account. As firing persisted in the town, Ewell was prevailed upon to leave the square and go to a house on the outskirts. Gradually then his composure began to weaken. He grew restless and excited. Presently up rode General Trimble. “Well, General,” Trimble began in the candor of long association, “we have had a grand success; are you not going to follow it up and push our advantage?”
Ewell replied that General Lee had instructed him not to bring on a general engagement without orders, and that he would wait for them. Trimble said that Lee’s orders could not apply, that a hard battle already had been fought, and that the advantage should be developed. Ewell visibly was disturbed by this, but he made no reply. Trimble persisted. Still Ewell asserted that he should not act further without orders. In wrath, which he probably did not conceal, Trimble rode off to see for himself what opportunity offered.
Presently he was back, more than ever convinced from what he had observed that no time should be lost in occupying the high ground southeast of Gettysburg. “General,” said Trimble in his emphatic manner, pointing to Culp’s Hill, “there is an eminence of commanding position, and not now occupied…. I advise you to send a brigade and hold it if we are to remain here.” Was he sure it commanded the town, Ewell asked. “Certainly it does, as you can see, and it ought to be held by us at once.” Then, as Trimble remembered it, “General Ewell made some impatient reply, and the conversation dropped.”11
Jubal Early had marched through Gettysburg the previous week, and Ewell had sent to him for an opinion as to where Allegheny Johnson’s division might best be placed. The answer came back that Johnson, on arrival, move at once to Culp’s Hill because it commanded the enemy position—precisely the counsel Trimble had given. With this came a sketchy report from Extra Billy Smith of the enemy advancing against the Confederate left and rear. This somewhat alarmed Ewell. He wanted more details and he wished Early’s counsel at first-hand. A messenger was sent to bring Early to field headquarters. Until he arrived, nothing was to be done.
When Early was conducted to Ewell’s post of command, he repeated that Culp’s Hill, which apparently was unoccupied by the enemy, should be taken by Johnson. Further, he went on, he felt sure that Cemetery Hill could be taken readily if Ewell would advance from the north and Hill from the west. Early added that he had sent a verbal suggestion to Hill that the Third Corps make the assault. It was imperative that the high ground be taken at once by storm. Ewell accepted, though with no enthusiasm, the suggestion that he get help from his right in an attack on Cemetery Hill. Lieutenant J. P. Smith must ride to General Lee and tell him that Ewell could attack and take the hill if given support from the west.
While Smith was delivering this message to Lee, Major Walter Taylor of the headquarters staff visited Ewell. From Seminary Ridge, said Taylor, the commanding general could see the Federals retreating in great confusion. It would only be necessary to press “those people,” Lee went on, to secure the heights. If possible, Lee wished Ewell to do this. Before Ewell could consider the matter, Smith was back with a supplementary message: Lee “regretted that his people were not up to support him on the right, but he wished him to take the Cemetery Hill if it were possible.” He would “ride over and see him very soon.” This meant that if Cemetery Hill was to be taken, Ewell must do it with his own men. More than that, whether Taylor and Smith made the fact plain or not, Lee meant that his earlier orders for the avoidance of a general engagement still applied. To quote Lee’s own words, “General Ewell was … instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army….”12
Ewell’s concerns were several. He had concern over the Union batteries on Cemetery Hill. Also, there might be truth to Extra Billy Smith’s report of Federals marching down from York toward the left. Still again, the force with which Ewell could attack was small. Two brigades of Early’s and the tired survivors of Rodes’s confused charges—these were all he had for the assault. Nor would this force have any support from the right. Lee himself said that. If Johnson was near at hand, he soon could seize Culp’s Hill and from it could dominate Cemetery Hill. So Ewell reasoned.
Soon Rodes joined them. Old Bald Head had no instructions for either of the divisional commanders. He was waiting for Johnson’s arrival and also for the promised visit from Lee. Nor could he dismiss his concern regarding the situation on the left. Early continued to insist that the trouble was not a hostile advance but panic on the part of Extra Billy Smith. Ewell remained skeptical and presently chose to see for himself if the left actually was in danger of being turned. With Early and Rodes he went to high ground east of Gettysburg from which a long stretch of the highway to York was visible. Skirmishers appeared at a distance too far for their uniforms to be distinguished. “There they come now!” cried Rodes, who believed them to be Federals. Early doubtless swore. Gordon, he explained, was in the direction of the skirmishers’ advance. Ewell did not profess to know whether he was looking at friend or foe, but directed his staff to ascertain. It was close to sunset now. Not a blow had been struck against the enemy on the hills south of Gettysburg. After Ewell returned from his fruitless reconnoiter, word came that the skirmishers on the left were in fact Confederate.13
Now, through gathering dusk, there was a stir outside Ewell’s headquarters: The commanding general was dismounting. Cordially Ewell met him and escorted him to a little arbor at the rear of the house, the coolest available place that warm night. Ewell had not seen Lee since June 10. This was the first time he ever had been directly under Lee in combat. Always previously, during Lee’s command, Ewell had received his orders from Jackson. Chance decided that at a time when everything forecast a great battle, the Second Corps commander was to have his introduction, as an immediate subordinate, to the mind of Lee.
The army commander asked for details of the situation on the front of the Second Corps. No reference was made to the possibility of attack that evening on Cemetery Hill. Without discussion, all four officers realized that the time for this was past. The question to be considered was that of action the next day. After Ewell, Rodes, and Early had made their explanations, Ewell heard Lee ask: “Can’t you, with your corps, attack on this flank at daylight tomorrow?”
Ewell had no immediate answer, but Early did. Jube felt his reconnaissance that afternoon and his casual examination of the ground the previous week, en route to York, gave him the best understanding of the terrain. He said flatly that he did not believe an attack should be made southward from Gettysburg against Cemetery Hill the next day. Success was doubtful. Loss inevitably would be large. Ewell listened and concurred. Rodes, too, believed no attack could prudently be made against the hill from the front of the Second Corps. At length, as if convinced, Lee said questioningly: “Then perhaps I had better draw you around towards my right, as the line will be very long and thin if you remain here, and the enemy may come down and break through it?”
Again it was Early who, without a by-your-leave, spoke up before Ewell attempted to answer. Lee need have no concern, said Jube; the enemy could not break the Second Corps line. Ewell found Early’s opinion and his own once more in accord. Rodes was on the same side. Unanimous as were these views, it must have been manifest to Ewell that his counsel was not altogether to Lee’s liking. The commanding general, in fact, was perplexed, almost stunned, at finding a defensive state of mind among his lieutenants. In the end, before Lee rode off, this understanding was reached: Lee was to attack the next morning on the right; Ewell was to make a demonstration on the left, and convert this into an attack if opportunity offered, and was to pursue the Federals if the attack on the right drove the blue army from its position.14
Ewell now received the staff officers who had been reconnoitering on the York road. T
hey had been on Culps Hill and reported it unoccupied. As Johnson’s division was then moving into position, it was reasonable to assume these veterans could seize Culp’s Hill. If so, delay during the afternoon would have cost nothing. Hardly had this prospect developed when Ewell received a note from Lee. He had examined anew the situation on the right and concluded that an attack there had a good prospect of success. Unless Ewell was satisfied the Second Corps could be used to advantage where it was, said Lee, it should be moved to the right. This stirred Ewell. Now that reconnaissance showed Culp’s Hill unoccupied, he felt there was good prospect of striking a heavy blow there. He must present Lee the report of the reconnaissance. The only way to do this would be to ride over to army headquarters.
Old Bald Head rode through the night to Lee’s headquarters. He found the commanding general attentive and ready to consider alternatives. Lee’s one reason for deciding to shift Ewell to the right had been doubt of the ability of Ewell to make up his mind to do anything. Now that Ewell had determined to attack Culp’s Hill, Lee with few words agreed that the Second Corps should remain on the left. The plan that had been formulated at the council in the arbor was reaffirmed: In the morning a demonstration was to be made on the left and, if promising, was to be turned into an assault.15
Back Ewell rode to his own front, and hurried off an aide to tell Johnson to occupy Culp’s Hill. No time must be lost in taking the ground that was, in Ewell’s opinion, the key to the Federal citadel. The officer returned with startling news. A reconnaissance party sent by Johnson up Culp’s Hill had encountered the Federals in superior numbers. The enemy undoubtedly was on the eminence Old Allegheny was ordered to take.
With this message Johnson enclosed a dispatch taken from a captured Federal courier. It placed George Sykes’s V Corps four miles to the east of Gettysburg and almost in rear of the position Johnson was to occupy. It indicated, also, that Henry Slocum’s XII Corps must be close to Gettysburg. Prisoners had said earlier that the Federals had two corps around the town, the I and the XI. A third might have arrived; a fourth was to reach Gettysburg early the next morning.
Ewell’s staff officer continued his report: General Johnson had said he would not attack until Ewell was apprised of the fact that the Federals occupied Culp’s Hill. Further orders would be awaited by Johnson. “Day was now breaking,” Ewell wrote afterwards, “and it was too late for any change of plan.”16
3
THE ARMY SLIPS BACK A YEAR
James Longstreet’s first of July was as unsatisfactory as Ewell’s. He rode toward Gettysburg in the company of the commanding general until the sound of Hill’s battle prompted Lee to hurry forward. Longstreet followed with McLaws’s and Hood’s divisions. Pickett was left at Chambersburg; Law’s brigade was held on guard at New Guilford. About 5:00 P.M. Longstreet joined Lee on Seminary Ridge whence there was a wide sweep of vision: the town ahead, a long trough-like meadow to the right front, and east of that, stone-littered Cemetery Ridge, which swept southward and gave place to the two eminences that bulked almost as if they were mountains—Little Round Top and Round Top.
Longstreet studied through his glasses the position of the enemy, studied it with an eye to the defensive tactics he thought the Confederates should employ. From the Round Tops nearly all the way to the hill just south of Gettysburg, he observed that the sides of the ridge were rough and an obstacle to a swift descent by the Federals for an attack on Seminary Ridge. A certain satisfaction there was for Longstreet in the strength of the Federal position: It discouraged a Confederate attack and invited the defensive on which his heart was set. Fortune was smiling on him! It had given him the ideal theater for another Fredericksburg, an easy repulse of a foolish assault and rich fruits of victory from the Longstreet plan!
At length he lowered his glasses and turned to Lee, and there commenced a long conference. Lee began with some observation to the effect that he felt he should attack the enemy. Longstreet immediately objected that this was not desirable. He may have added that an attack was contrary to the plan discussed before the army left Virginia. If that was part of Longstreet’s remark, Lee ignored it then and did not remember it afterwards. He never had intended to commit himself to any such plan, and he may not even have understood to what Longstreet referred. In his report Lee said candidly that he had not intended to “deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked,” but he had never contemplated a campaign without the possibility of a battle, and he certainly had made no pledge concerning that or the strategy or tactics to be employed. Whatever the language of Longstreet’s objection that afternoon on Seminary Ridge, Lee answered, in effect, If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.
This remark opened a frank exchange of views. The sound general strategy, said Longstreet, was to get between Meade and Washington, to threaten the flank and rear of the Federals and force them to attack on good defensive terrain. If operations became necessary where the army then was, the troops should be shifted toward Round Top. Meade then could be threatened, if maneuver was the aim, or attacked to better advantage if battle was to be delivered. In what manner Lee answered, Longstreet did not relate. Subsequently he wrote: “[Lee] seemed under a subdued excitement, which occasionally took possession of him when ‘the hunt was up,’ and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory.”17
Actually Lee was reasoning the larger alternatives. He could withdraw; he could remain where he was and await the next Federal move; or he could attack without delay. To retreat in the face of a strong, pursuing adversary was to take heavy risks. As for waiting, it would not be possible to remain on the defensive for any length of time. Supplies were low; the army was living off the land; the Federals could easily block the mountain passes and limit the area in which the Southern army could forage. Hunger, perhaps starvation, might be the cost of a prolonged defensive.
If, by elimination, an offensive was indicated, the army either could maneuver to the right, as Longstreet urged, or it could attack the Federals before they could concentrate. The objections to maneuvering between the enemy and Washington were manifest: In the absence of the cavalry, the position of the Federals could not be determined readily. A southward shift might involve days of delay during which the army would suffer for food precisely as it would if it remained on the defensive. So little possibility did Lee see of successful maneuver that he scarcely regarded it as a separate alternative. Immediate attack was, in his eyes, the wisest course. There was good reason to assume that Cemetery Ridge was not held, as yet, in strength. In Lee’s succinct appraisal, “A battle had, therefore, became in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.”
It is not known how much of this Lee explained to Longstreet. As he was unaware of the extent to which the heart of his senior lieutenant was fixed on the defensive, he probably wasted few words and employed no diplomacy. Longstreet said little more. After Lee returned from his conference with Ewell, he told Longstreet and Hill, so Armistead Long testified, “Gentlemen, we will attack the enemy in the morning as early as practicable.” When Old Pete left army headquarters late in the evening, he was sure of Lee’s intention to attack, but was not sure Lee had decided where the attack would be delivered or with what force. For his part, Longstreet was determined to prevent, if he could, an attack he believed to be unwise. Better not to have fought that day, he said, than to have left the Federals in a position from which the whole army would be needed, and then at great sacrifice, to drive the enemy.18
Longstreet rose at 3:00 A.M. on July 2 and found Lee on Seminary Ridge anxious to ascertain how heavily the Federals had been reinforced during the night on the opposing high ground. Engineers S. R. Johnston and J. J. Clarke were sent to reconnoiter as far as possible to the right, but without waiting for their report Longstreet renewed his argument for the defensive tactics of a maneuver around the left of the Union army. His appeal made no i
mpression on the commanding general. Lee still believed the one practicable course was to attack the Federals on Cemetery Ridge at once, before they could complete their concentration. A. P. Hill joined the conference. Briefly, it was decided that Longstreet should deliver the attack from the extreme Confederate right. Hood’s division now, about 7:30, was approaching. Behind Hood was McLaws. Longstreet heard Lee say to Hood, in a brief exchange of greetings, “The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him, he will whip us.”
By the time McLaws arrived, Lee had matured the tactical plan of attack, and he summoned the Georgian to tell him what he had to do. Longstreet was walking nearby and heard Lee explain a plan for an oblique attack on Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg road, which ran between Seminary and Cemetery ridges. “Can you do it?” Lee asked of McLaws. “I know nothing to prevent me,” McLaws said. He wanted to go in advance and reconnoiter. Lee said Captain Johnston of his staff had been ordered to reconnoiter the ground. “I will go with him,” McLaws began, but got no further. Longstreet strode up and broke in: “No, sir, I do not wish you to leave your division.” Then he leaned over and drew his finger across the map. “I wish your division placed so.”
“No, General,” Lee replied quietly, “I wish it placed just opposite.” McLaws observed that he would like, in either event, to go over the ground with Johnston. Bluntly, Longstreet forbade. He manifestly was irritated.19
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