Of other officers, three only had opportunity of distinguishing themselves in the Mine Run operations. Maryland Steuart fought vigorously when he was assailed on the twenty-seventh. As Steuart’s superior, Allegheny Johnson was prompt in grasping the situation and vigorous in correcting it. His troop movements were intelligent. The other officer who added to his soldierly reputation was cavalryman Tom Rosser. He attacked a Federal corps ordnance train, destroying 35 or 40 wagons, and brought off 8, together with 7 ambulances, 230 animals, and 95 prisoners.10 The vigilance of his patrol and the vigor of his onslaught were his own.
The most serious adverse entry in the Mine Run campaign was the general failure of the army to achieve any military result. That had been true of Bristoe and, most lamentably, of Rappahannock Bridge. For the five months since the return from Pennsylvania, the record had been negative, though more than 4,200 casualties had been sustained. In every operation there had been creditable performance. Each failure could be explained logically. The great difference was that before Gettysburg there had been few failures to be explained. From headquarters, where his discerning eye saw everything, Walter Taylor wrote an ominous sentence: “I only wish the general had good lieutenants; we miss Jackson and Longstreet terribly.”11
2
LONGSTREET IS WEIGHED
After Mine Run the infantry of the Army of Northern Virginia fought no battle for five months. Promotions were few during the period because fatalities were negligible. In January 1864, John R. Chambliss, Jr., who had acted for months as commander of Rooney Lee’s troopers, was made brigadier general. The next month, Colonel Nathaniel H. Harris of the 19th Mississippi, an officer of proven parts, was advanced in rank to succeed Carnot Posey, who had died in November of the wound received at Bristoe Station.
The only other promotions were in the artillery, which had not shown at Gettysburg in the Second and Third Corps a leadership equal to that of the First. In September Armistead L. Long of Lees staff had been advanced to brigadier general and placed in charge of the guns of the Second Corps, which were not handled acceptably by the corps chief after the wounding of Stapleton Crutchfield. Before the war Long had been an artillerist of some reputation, and Lee had used him in reconnaissance and posting batteries. Long was returned regretfully from staff to line, because he was most useful at army headquarters; but Lee did not feel that a man of Long’s experience should be withheld from a field service in which men of professional training were few.
Concerning other artillerists, Pendleton, at Lee’s instance, reported in detail. Some were recommended for higher rank. Transfer was proposed for several who, in Pendleton’s opinion, were incompetent or physically incapacitated. The principal promotion suggested by Pendleton was that of E. Porter Alexander to the rank of brigadier general and command of the artillery of the First Corps. Like advancement was not advocated for R. Lindsay Walker, chief of artillery of the Third Corps. The reason probably was that under the governing law the artillery of the army was entitled to three general officers only. As Pendleton and Long already held that rank, there was place for Alexander but not for Walker also. Pendleton reported that “some of the best officers of this corps,” finding promotion slow, were seeking transfer to other arms. This was an unwelcome state of affairs because the artillery officers with the rank of company or field officers were of an average competence definitely above that of infantrymen or cavalrymen of like rank.12
Although battles were not fought, the winter was far from quiet. It was an alternation of excitement and misery. When the commanding general was not present to repress jealousies, they began to develop among old comrades. Ugly disputes eclipsed gallant deeds. Much the worst strife was in the absent First Corps. The new experiences of that command, in combat and controversy, did more than the previous two years of campaign to show the character, the capacities and the limitations, of James Longstreet. Any element of mystery that had clung to him by reason of habitual silence was stripped off him by his own pen.
Bragg began, in October 1863, the partial investment of Chattanooga, but he made little progress beyond that of rendering the Federal lines of supply somewhat hazardous. General George H. Thomas, who succeeded Rosecrans, proceeded to secure his supply line by placing a strong force downstream on the Tennessee at Brown’s Ferry. At the sight of this operation, Longstreet’s fighting blood was stirred. He gained Bragg’s approval for a night attack on the Federal rear guard at Wauhatchie, three miles from the main force at the ferry. To make the assault Longstreet selected Micah Jenkins, then in temporary charge of Hood’s division, and Evander Law, in command of a detached brigade. The two had been bitter rivals for Hood’s position, and in their night attack, always a difficult operation, they did not work together. Law suffered lightly in the failed attack, while Jenkins sustained 356 casualties. Longstreet’s report of the affair asserted that the difference in casualties showed a “want of conduct” on the part of Law. As Law’s troops were veterans, their behavior had to be attributed “to a strong feeling of jealousy among the brigadier-generals.”13
Besides Law, the commander of the Texas Brigade, Jerome B. Robertson, was blamed by Longstreet for the failure at Wauhatchie. Old Pete went to Bragg seeking Robertson’s removal. The equities are not easily established in the case of Robertson or in the controversy between Law and Jenkins, but the effect was to impair a division which had been, all in all, probably the finest combat force in the Army of Northern Virginia. An absence of a month and a half from that army had sufficed to produce dissension, talk of incompetence, and a whisper of something morally worse than lack of cooperation!
The next move of Longstreet was to deepen these differences and to spread dissatisfaction to McLaws’s command. For reasons that have not been clear to others, if indeed they were plain to him, Bragg decided to weaken further a weak army in the face of a strong adversary and send Longstreet to deal with General Burnside, who was guarding East Tennessee with a force of some 22,200 men based in Knoxville. Longstreet was as anxious to leave Bragg as the commanding general was to be rid of him. The force that left the Chattanooga line November 5-6 consisted of about 12,000 men of all arms. Longstreet considered it scarcely half as strong as it should be for the mission. Inefficient staff work, lame transportation, and lack of cooperation at Bragg’s headquarters deepened Old Pete’s discouragement. He pushed on but, in retrospect at least, considered himself persecuted. In his memoirs he wrote, “It began to look more like a campaign against Longstreet than against Burnside.”14
On the fourteenth, approaching Knoxville, contact was made with Burnside’s forces, with the prospect of battle, but the enemy slipped away. Again, as at Wauhatchie, there were rumors of a lack of concert between Law and Jenkins. At Knoxville the Federals awaited attack behind strong earthworks. Longstreet proceeded with no suggestion of haste and with some maneuvers that suggested his unfruitful operation of the previous spring against Suffolk.
On November 23 came word that the Federals at Chattanooga had moved out of their defenses and attacked Bragg. The situation suddenly became more complicated. If Bragg worsted the enemy, now under the vigilant direction of U. S. Grant, the outlook at Knoxville would be bright. Longstreet might get reinforcements and, at the least, have his rear safe from serious threat. Were Bragg defeated, Longstreet might be caught between two forces. In that event, if he were lucky enough to escape destruction, he would be compelled to retreat into East Tennessee. A different prospect, surely, this was from the picture of victory that Longstreet had painted two and a half months previously, when he had bidden farewell to Lee!
An earthwork fortification at the northwest corner of Knoxville’s defenses called Fort Sanders was selected as the target. The attack was to be delivered at dawn on November 29 by two of McLaws’s brigades, to be followed en échelon on the left by Jenkins. Intelligence gathered by Jenkins on the forbidding ditch and parapet in front of the fort was alarming, and he wrote to Longstreet in warning. Old Pete was devoted to Jenkins. Nex
t to Pickett, perhaps, he esteemed the ambitious young South Carolinian more highly than he did any of his subordinates; but he did not like his undertone of misgiving. “Do not listen to the idea of failing and we shall not fail,” he exhorted Jenkins. “… Let me urge you not to entertain such feelings for a moment. Do not let any one fail, or any thing.”
This was not Longstreet’s sole vexation. Rumors had come that Bragg had been engaged heavily at Chattanooga in a battle of undetermined result. McLaws asked whether the attack on Knoxville should not be deferred until the outcome for Bragg’s army was known: “If the enemy has been beaten at Chattanooga, do we not gain by delay at this point? If we have been defeated at Chattanooga, do we not risk our entire force by an assault here?” If defeated at both places, he asked, “would we be in condition to force our way to the army in Virginia?” Longstreet replied sharply: “There is neither safety nor honor in any other course than the one I have chosen and ordered…. The assault must be made at the time appointed, and must be made with a determination which will insure success.”15
After that there could be no hesitation or further argument on the part of McLaws, but it was ominous that both the division commanders, men of unquestioned courage, felt so much concern that they expressed their doubts to their chief. This never had happened before on the eve of an attack. If Longstreet observed that fact, he did not permit it to show in his action. He made no alteration in his plans.
Obediently, at the scheduled hour, the assault columns rushed forward. Soon they piled into the deep ditch, slippery with half-frozen mud, of Fort Sanders. The ditch was jammed, a trap, a grave trench. The defense was too powerful. Assault was hopeless. If the men remained there, every one of them would be killed. Longstreet ordered the recall. The attack had failed. Get out the survivors and stop the fight. That was his order.
Hardly had fire ceased when Longstreet was handed a telegram from Richmond. He read: “General Bragg has fallen back before superior forces at Ringgold and hopes to make a stand there, and … cooperation is necessary and the greatest promptitude is required.” It was signed by Jefferson Davis.16
Braxton Bragg had prepared the road to ruin by permitting the Federals to open sure lines of supply at Chattanooga. The dispatch of Longstreet to Knoxville had weakened his long, concave line. Himself of doubtful military competence, Bragg had faced in Grant an able, self-reliant, aggressive adversary who had in Sherman and Thomas two lieutenants of unusual capacity. As a result of these circumstances and of incredibly bad tactics, Bragg had lost Lookout Mountain oil November 24 and the next day had sustained a heavy defeat on Missionary Ridge. His casualties of 2,500 were not excessive, but his loss of 40 guns was serious, and his men’s loss of confidence in him was worse. He had retreated to Ringgold and then Dalton, Georgia.
From there word was relayed to Longstreet: “General Bragg desires me to say he wishes you to fall back with your command upon Dalton if possible. If you find that impracticable, he thinks you will have to fall back toward Virginia.” In perplexity of mind, Longstreet called a council of his lieutenants, whose opinion was to remain in East Tennessee. It shaped Longstreet’s action. He remained in front of Knoxville, holding Burnside, until intelligence reached him that Sherman was approaching to relieve the garrison. On the night of the third of December the trains were put in motion northeastward. The infantry followed on the night of the fourth.17
As Longstreet turned his back on Knoxville, all informed Southerners, outside his own circle, felt that he had sustained a humiliating defeat. In that mirror of Confederate gossip, the diary of Mrs. Chesnut, the opinion of a multitude was reflected: “Detached from General Lee, what a horrible failure. What a slow old humbug is Longstreet.”18 At Chickamauga he had been the Longstreet of Second Manassas, but at Knoxville he was back in front of Suffolk. The entire war had witnessed no repulse more complete, by a force of insignificant numbers. In Fort Sanders a garrison of less than 250 men was responsible for much of the loss of 813 sustained by some of the most renowned regiments of the famous First Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.
The advance of these veteran troops had been organized carelessly. They had converged in too narrow a zone. Supports had crowded upon them. The whole plan of action had been clumsily executed. On the day of the frustrated assault and at the council of war that evening, Longstreet said nothing, so far as the record shows, to indicate that he held McLaws responsible for the failure. When he had reflected upon the failure of the campaign, Longstreet decided that the fault was not his but that of his senior division commander. McLaws, he told himself, had not cooperated acceptably during the Knoxville campaign. He wrathfully concluded, also, that McLaws had not shown confidence in the plans of operations or in the leadership of his chief. McLaws’s letter of November 29, urging that the assault on Fort Sanders wait on news from Bragg, probably was one of several such incidents that stuck in Longstreet’s memory.
On December 17, in his encampment at Rogersville, Tennessee, Longstreet sprung a sensation that was to trouble him for many a day. In a few brief sentences he relieved McLaws of command, directed that officer to proceed to Augusta, Georgia, and placed the division under the senior brigadier. McLaws had no intimation that this was to happen to him, and asked the reason. Longstreet’s A.A.G. replied: “I am directed to say that throughout the campaign on which we are engaged you have exhibited a want of confidence in the efforts and plans which the commanding general has thought proper to adopt, and he is apprehensive that this feeling will extend more or less to the troops under your command.”
McLaws had been a major general since May 23, 1862, and had been in nearly all the principal battles of Lee’s army. He was not accounted among the ablest of the division commanders, but he was respected as a man and a soldier. To relieve him of command was to startle thousands of Southerners. From Augusta he forwarded to the adjutant general the correspondence that had passed. He insisted: “I have differed in opinion with General Longstreet concerning many things, but that this difference has influenced my own conduct or that of the troops under my command I utterly deny. I therefore respectfully request that my division be restored to my command.”19
Longstreet decided to undertake to make good his complaint against McLaws by the presentation of formal charges and specifications. McLaws’s alleged general lack of cooperation during the campaign was ignored now. All three of the specifications were drawn from McLaws’s failure to take precautions in the assault on Fort Sanders. McLaws struck back hard. In a letter he evidently designed to be circulated among his friends in Richmond, he said that Longstreet “attempted to make me a blind to run public inquiry off from his complete failure in the whole Tennessee campaign…. The difficulty with Genl. L. and myself commenced at Chickamauga when I, not believing that he was a greater man than Genl. Bragg kept aloof from the coalition which was forming against him, headed by Genl. L…. Genl. L. has never forgiven me my not joining that clique…. When it is considered that Genl. L failed to assault the enemy before reaching Knoxville, and his long delay before the place, … and that he has nothing to recommend him as a commander but the possession of a certain bullheadedness, it is mortifying when one feels that he is allowed to tyrannize, as he is doing.”
McLaws pressed for trial before a court-martial and for restoration to his command. If held, this court-martial was not to be the only one of importance that would be convened at the instance of the lieutenant general. In the opinion of Longstreet, Jerome Robertson at the head of the Texas Brigade had indulged in pessimistic utterances which Longstreet took to be part of an effort to dodge heavy duty. With the letter that carried the charges against McLaws there was an arraignment of Robertson for specified remarks “calculated to discourage … the said regimental commanders … and weaken their confidence in the movement then in progress” and, in general, “to prevent that hearty and hopeful cooperation necessary to success.”20
Longstreet was not unconscious of the fact that the filing of charges ag
ainst two of his senior officers was almost as much a reflection on him as on them. At the moment he was in the depths. Gone was the desire to direct an army of his own; gone, too, was the confidence in which he had come to Tennessee. He wrote the adjutant general that he was cut off from communication with Bragg and desired to be “assigned as part of some other officers command.” He went on to say that if East Tennessee was to be held for future operations, he wished them to be under another commander. “I regret to say that a combination of circumstances has so operated during the campaign in East Tennessee as to prevent the complete destruction of the enemy’s forces in this part of the State. It is fair to infer that the fault entirely is with me, and I desire, therefore, that some other commander be tried.”
Longstreet doubtless wrote this in humiliation, but if he expected the President or the War Department to placate him with soft words and compliments he was disappointed. He was notified that it was doubtful whether he could relieve an officer from duty and send that individual beyond the limits of the command. Mr. Davis took a serious view of the charges against McLaws and deferred the question of Longstreet’s request to be relieved of responsibility in East Tennessee. At length the court-martial was set for February 3, 1864, then delayed until the twelfth. First to be heard was the complaint against Jerome Robertson. If there was a verdict the record of it has not been found, though Robertson was suspended from his famous command. Much later, in June, he was ordered to take command of the “reserve forces of the State of Texas.” His transfer marked his final disappearance from the First Corps. Longstreet doubtless was glad to be rid of the Texan.
It was February 13 when the trial of McLaws began. McLaws had prepared for it with much care and he had the better of it. The trial was interrupted and prolonged, and would not be adjourned finally until March 19. The court’s findings were announced on May 4; McLaws was found guilty of one specification only—“failing in the details of his attack to make arrangements essential to his success” in the assault on Fort Sanders. Sentence was suspension from rank and command for sixty days, but Adjutant General Cooper overturned the verdict due to “irregularities” in the court’s procedures. McLaws was ordered to be restored to command of his division. As will be seen, however, the commanding general of the Army of Northern Virginia would have a say in this matter.21
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