In the Third Corps, Powell Hill had sustained the humiliation of Bristoe Station, but otherwise had spent a quiet winter. All his division commanders—Anderson, Heth, and Wilcox—were present with their troops. None of the three had been given opportunity of acquiring new fame or of demonstrating higher qualities of command than were credited to them. The corps was competently directed. There was no reason to hope it would be brilliantly led in the operations about to open.
Grim these operations would be, and against an adversary more powerful than ever, more seasoned, and more belligerently led. Ulysses Grant, the man who had beaten Albert Sidney Johnston and John Pemberton and Braxton Bragg, had come east as general-in-chief of the Union forces, and had established his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac. Had he been in Hooker’s place a year previously, he would have faced Jackson and Pender, the old Second Corps in its glory, and the First Corps before the frustrated Longstreet had shaken its command. Now Longstreet was changed, Ewell enfeebled, Early arrogant, and Hill, after eleven months, still not established in reputation as a corps commander.
CHAPTER 30
The Wilderness and Spotsylvania
1
THE WILDERNESS TAKES ITS TOLL
The recall of the First Corps was the last step that could be taken to reinforce the Army of Northern Virginia against the expected offensive of the powerful Federal forces under Grant’s strategic direction. On April 29, Lee and the headquarters staff visited Gordonsville where Old Pete’s veterans were awaiting them. Longstreet would have met one newcomer on the staff—Major General Martin L. Smith, sent to the army as chief engineer. Smith, a New Yorker by birth and a professional soldier, had developed the defenses of Vicksburg. He was a man of intelligence and character. How high his abilities were in field engineering events must show.
The First Corps now could muster no more than 10,000 men of all arms, but it did its dilapidated best to make itself presentable to Lee. As the reviewing party went down the ranks of the two divisions, Charles Field, thirty-six years of age, was in the place of Hood. At the head of McLaws’s division was its senior brigadier and prospective new commander, Joseph W. Kershaw, who was forty-two and known to all the veterans. He had been distinguished in almost every battle he had shared. Pious, intelligent, a clear blond of high-bred, clean-cut features, Kershaw had the bearing of command and a clear voice that seemed to inspire courage when it was raised in battle. Of the brigadiers in the First Corps, the only stranger to Virginia was John Gregg, who had been assigned to command the famous Texas Brigade in succession to Jerome Robertson. Gregg had served in the Gulf States, under Johnston during the Vicksburg campaign, and under Longstreet at Chickamauga. Without professional training in arms, he had the spirit of “a born soldier.”1
All these officers rejoiced to see their gray general on his gray horse, and they cheered him wildly as they passed in review. Longstreet, too, was happy to be with his old chief again. The next few days were tense for lieutenant and chief. From the signal station on Clark’s Mountain, as the month of April drew to its close, Lee viewed the verdant valley of the Rap-idan. After he studied the scene with his glass, he said what the whole army had concluded: “I think those people over there are going to make a move soon.” Turning to young B. L. Wynn, in charge of the signal station, he asked, “Sergeant, do you keep a guard on watch at night?” When Wynn answered in the negative, Lee said, “Well, you must put one on.”2
On May 2 there was smoke in unusual volume along the north bank of the Rapidan. The next day dust clouds and marching columns were visible. About 12 o’clock on the night of May 3-4 the signalmen on Clark’s Mountain could catch glimpses of troops passing in front of distant campfires far across the Rapidan. Army headquarters was notified. Were the lights moving toward Germanna Ford or toward Liberty Mills? Was Grant attempting to turn the Confederate right and proceed in the direction of Fredricksburg, or was he undertaking to pass the Southern left and move on Gordonsville? The signal station could not say. Lee consequently acted on the larger probability. He had the station flash to the right: “General Ewell, have your command ready to move at daylight.”3
Dawn ended doubt: The enemy was moving toward Germanna and Ely’s fords and moving, apparently, with all his forces. From every vantage point the picture was the same—heavy columns of cavalry, endless files of infantry, wagon trains that spread their white sheets for miles on every road. Confederates looked and guessed at the strength of the moving army. It numbered, in reality, 102,000 present for duty. When reinforcements immediately at hand—Burnside’s IX Corps overtook the Army of the Potomac—its effective strength would be at least 116,000. To oppose this host the Confederates had eight divisions of infantry—an effective force of all arms of approximately 64,000. These grim odds made it necessary that each musket do the service of two. The more intelligent of the men were conscious of this. If perhaps the army was not in as good spirits as it had been before Gettysburg, it was ready to fight; it sensed the most difficult of all its struggles.4
From the camps around Orange the infantry began their countermovement on the fourth of May. Ewell marched by the turnpike that ran from Orange to Fredericksburg. Hill conducted Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions by the Orange Plank Road, and left Dick Anderson to guard the upper fords of the Rapidan until it was certain the whole of Meade’s army was moving eastward. Longstreet started from Gordonsville at 4:00 P.M. toward Brock’s Bridge. Thence his route was to be by way of Orange Plank Road and the Catharpin Road. The cavalry covered the advance but concentrated on the right in the hope of enveloping the enemy.
The army on the morning of May 5 resumed its march to confront an enemy now on the south side of the Rapidan and moving toward the Wilderness. Ewell’s orders were to regulate his march on the Turnpike by that of Hill on the Plank Road. If practicable, a general engagement was to be avoided until Longstreet arrived—an order singularly reminiscent of the first day at Gettysburg.5
It was not yet apparent that the operation undertaken by Grant on the Rapidan was part of the farthest-reaching offensive the enemy ever had launched in Virginia. Word was received of the landing at West Point, May 1, of a Federal force thought be to the vanguard of an army that would move on Richmond. Soon the report was that B. F. Butler, with a large naval escort and a river full of transports, was moving up the James toward the capital. This was not to be the only expedition in support of Meade. Franz Sigel had orders to march southward up the Shenandoah Valley. The instructions of George Crook were to advance into southwest Virginia and do all possible damage to the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad. Daily, after May 5, as Lee’s lieutenants grappled with the main army of the most determined Federal commander they yet had encountered, new details of the other contests were to reach them.
The first decision of the commanding general was represented by the swift advance of his army to meet the enemy. On the morning of May 5, Hill continued on the Plank Road, which curved to the northeast. Ewell held to the old Turnpike, which ran more nearly east. At 11:00 A.M. the advance of Ewell’s corps, John M. Jones’s brigade of Johnson’s division, was ordered to halt. The message that always made hearts beat faster was passed down the files: Federals were ahead. They were moving across the Turnpike along the route that led from Germanna Ford to the Orange Plank Road. Mindful of his orders to avoid a general engagement before the arrival of Longstreet, Ewell thought it best to suspend his advance, form line of battle, report his situation to headquarters, and await further instructions. Sandie Pendleton hurried across to the Plank Road, found Lee with A. P. Hill, and brought back word that Ewell was to adhere, if feasible, to previous orders.6
The enemy was no respecter of such orders. The Unionists began what appeared to be merely a demonstration against John M. Jones. To his support Ewell moved up Cullen Battle. Abruptly a furious assault was made on Jones’s front and right flank. It had behind it strength and impetuosity, and in a few minutes Jones’s troops broke. Their commander was killed as he a
ttempted to rally them. As they went back through the line of their support, they threw into confusion the ranks of Battle’s brigade. A sudden and dangerous crisis was upon the Second Corps. The other brigades of Johnson’s division were too far to the left; Rodes was half deployed. That left only Jube Early’s men, the rear division on the march. Dick Ewell galloped back and drew rein by the side of John B. Gordon. “General Gordon,” piped Ewell excitedly, “the fate of the day depends on you, sir!” Gordon answered boldly, “These men will save it, sir!”
Terrain of the Wilderness-Spotsylvania operations of May 4-21, 1864.
Immediately Gordon wheeled a regiment into line for a counterattack. A similar thrust by Junius Daniel of Rodes’s division confused the Federals. Ewell gained time enough to form a new line and recover the ground lost by Jones. In this grim work Battle’s brigade, which had recovered quickly, bore a conspicuous part. The situation was eased. Meade’s attack was stopped. The Confederates’ heaviest loss, after that of John M. Jones, was in the mortal wounding of one of the new brigadiers, Leroy Stafford, and the serious injury of John Pegram, who was shot in the leg.7
As combat lost its violence on the Turnpike, it rose in wrath on the Orange Plank Road. As Hill advanced with Heth’s and Wilcox’s divisions, they heard on their flank the echo of Ewell’s action. About 1 o’clock they began skirmishing against Federals organizing on the Brock Road a line perpendicular to the Plank Road. Little happened until about 3 o’clock. A staff officer from Lee’s headquarters found Harry Heth and explained that the commanding general was anxious that Heth occupy the Brock Road if this could be done without bringing on a general engagement. Heth answered that the Federals held the road in strength. Whether he could drive them from it could be determined only by using his entire division. Before anything more could be determined, the bluecoats attacked.
Defense was stern and desperate. So heavy were the attacks on Heth and Wilcox that at one time the only troops not engaged in the wild fighting were 125 Alabamians acting as guard over the prisoners. Even this detachment had to be called to repulse the assault. In the opinion of Porter Alexander, who had seen most of the battles, none of them had been fiercer. At nightfall the enemy still was in firm possession of the Brock Road, but in the mad exchanges of the furious day he had done no more than hold his own. When weary Southern commanders could draw breath, they exchanged congratulations. Ewell sent to headquarters his special commendation of John B. Gordon and Junius Daniel. Lee had praise for Cooke and Kirkland of Heth’s division. Strong as the enemy had shown himself to be, the Confederates must retain the initiative. The decision at army headquarters was to turn the left of the enemy on May 6, if it was not too far extended and, if it was, to try to cut him off from his base by enveloping his right. Indications were that the attack on the left would prove the more promising.8
An immediate question was whether anything should be done to untangle the front of Heth and Wilcox. Both generals were much concerned. They wanted to leave only a skirmish line where the fighting of the day had ended and form a new line to the rear. Wilcox, in his anxiety, rode at once to Lee. Anderson’s division, Lee explained, had been instructed to move forward: “He and Longstreet will be up, and the two divisions that have been so actively engaged will be relieved before day.” Wilcox had to content himself with this. Harry Heth went to Hill instead of Lee. Heth insisted that a skirmish line “could drive both my division and Wilcox’s, situated as we now are. We shall certainly be attacked early in the morning.” Hill was sick but sought to be reassuring: “Longstreet will be up in a few hours. He will form in your front. I don’t propose that you shall do any fighting tomorrow.” The men must be tired; let them rest. Heth was not satisfied. Twice more he came back to argue with Hill. The lieutenant general became vexed: “Damn it, Heth, I don’t want to hear any more about it. The men shall not be disturbed.”9
This was final. Heth and Wilcox awaited with gnawing, time-dragging anxiety the arrival of Longstreet; but i o’clock, then 2 and at last 3 o’clock passed with no word that the First Corps was approaching. In the Wilderness the east reddened and the light came, and at 5 o’clock, on the stroke, the Federals began a careful but determined advance.
Wilcox’s men were slightly in advance and first received the shock. Scattered as they were, they soon were driven. They did not run fast or far, but they ran. Heth’s troops, according to General Wilcox, did not wait for the onslaught. They made for the rear at once to form their line. In the eyes of brave men who kept their heads and stopped to load and fire, the break of two veteran divisions was a disgrace. Cowards simply ran till they were out of range. Wilcox hurried to General Lee and, at the instance of the commanding general, went down the Plank Road to find Longstreet.
Powell Hill was too ill to do more than share the tense anxiety. The burden fell on Lee and his staff. Toward high ground north of the Plank Road the enemy was moving steadily and almost unopposed. Farther northward, the Unionists were working their way into the space that unavoidably had been left between Hill’s left and Ewell’s right. The crisis was instant and desperate. Unless Longstreet came up quickly, the center of the army would be penetrated, the Third Corps rolled up, and what remained of it hurled back on Ewell toward the Rapidan. There had been no danger more acute since the day the Federals had shattered the Confederate line at Sharpsburg.
Not long did leaders have to hold their breath. Up the Plank Road in parallel columns the First Corps was moving fast. “Here they come!” cried delighted artillerists in greeting to the veterans of Hood’s old division, now under Field, who formed the van on the left. Barksdale’s famous old Mississippi brigade headed Kershaw’s division on the right-hand side of the road. Quickly Longstreet ordered Gregg to establish the line to the north while Humphreys, Barksdale’s successor, placed his regiments in line south of the road. It was John Gregg’s red hour, his first great opportunity. As the Texans were forming under his eye, he saw approaching him the commanding general and several staff officers. “General,” Lee called out as he drew rein, “what brigade is this?”
“The Texas Brigade!” was the proud answer. “I am glad to see it,” said Lee. “When you go in there, I wish you to give those men the cold steel—they will stand and fight all day, and never move unless you charge them.” Gregg drew in his breath and shouted, “Attention, Texas Brigade! The eyes of General Lee are upon you. Forward, march!” Lee lifted his hat and raised himself in his stirrups. “Texans always move them!” The men nearest began to cheer; his words were passed down the line; the cheer spread. “I would charge hell itself for that old man,” cried one courier as he paused between yells. For a moment the commanding general appeared intent on leading the charge himself. The Texans cried “Lee to the rear!” and would not go forward until “Marse Robert” went to a place of safety.
In a short time Lee rode up to the knoll where Longstreet was waiting for his troops to complete their formation. The staff had never known the commanding general to be so intensely excited. Colonel Venable whispered to Longstreet that he had experienced the greatest difficulty in persuading Lee to leave the Texans; would Longstreet please prevail on him to go farther to the rear? Longstreet spoke up with affectionate bluntness, saying that if the commanding general intended to direct the First Corps, he personally would be glad to ride to a place of safety.10
Old Pete watched as Lee reluctantly went a few hundred yards to the rear, then turned to his task. He was at his combative best in organizing a front line. The most shaken of the withdrawing Third Corps men already had passed through Longstreet’s troops amid the jeers and laughter of the veterans. “Do you belong to Lee’s army?” they yelled. “You’re worse than Bragg’s men!” Then, without a break or waver, Field’s and Kershaw’s arriving regiments prepared for the shock of receiving the enemy. There was no time to trim a line, to throw out skirmishers and then counterattack. Federals were almost on the heels of every fugitive.
Longstreet’s spirits and activity mounte
d with the danger. He rode straight to the front and shouted his commands in a voice that rose above the battle. Now on the left, now on the right, exhortation was mingled with orders. Old Pete’s very presence seemed to strengthen his men. Soon he had a line from which volley after volley was poured into the enemy. Said one of his artillerists, “Longstreet, always grand in battle, never shone as he did here.” Slowly but with supreme resolution Kershaw began to advance. Field moved forward on the other side of the road, with Gregg’s Texans in the lead and Benning’s Georgians directly behind them. Every step was contested, but back toward Heth’s position of the previous night, back toward the ground occupied by Wilcox, the veterans of Longstreet pushed the Union regiments. Resistance gradually weakened. By about 9:45 A.M. the opposing forces were approximately where the day’s fighting had started. A hot fire continued, but neither side attempted for the moment to drive the other.11
Lee was not content to have the situation remain one of wasteful exchanges of lead. Nor was Longstreet willing to end his battle in stalemate. Strategically and tactically a Confederate attack was dictated. Force for it, Dick Anderson’s division of the Third Corps, was at hand. Expert reconnaissance was assured also. The army’s new chief engineer, Martin Smith, had been sent out to examine the enemy’s position, and he reported that the Federal left extended a short distance only to the south of the Plank Road. It would be entirely feasible to turn that flank. Longstreet listened intently and pondered. He would try it! And if he were facing a gap in the Federal line instead of its actual left, then he would find the extreme left and turn that, too. Smith was directed to reconnoiter beyond the Brock Road to find the farthest position of the Federals.
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