As soon as Early was back in Virginia, four Federal commanders—Sigel, Hunter, Averell, and Crook—gathered their forces to attack him. From Washington, Horatio G. Wright’s VI Corps pursued. When Jube slipped away to the west, there followed a succession of skirmishes. The first affair of any importance was on July 20, when Ramseur was attacked suddenly by Averell near Stephenson’s Depot. To the amazement of everyone, part of Hoke’s trusted old brigade ran and spread confusion among Robert Johnston’s troops. In the panic, 267 unwounded officers and men were captured. “I am greatly mortified at the result,” Ramseur confessed to his wife. “… Newspaper editors and stay-at-home croakers will sit back in safe places and condemn me.” Early felt that Ramseur had not taken “the proper precautions” in advancing, but beyond that he did not criticize his young lieutenant. The wound to the pride of the ambitious and devoted young Carolinian remained.11
Four days later, Ramseur had partial revenge in a sharp little action on the old battleground at Kernstown. There again a critic might have observed that the battle was fought by Echols’s division which Breckinridge brilliantly led. The other divisions merely waited to join in the pursuit. Crook was routed with substantial losses, and the Confederate officers captured on the twentieth were recovered.12
Early now learned that during his advance to Washington, the homes of Alexander Hunter, a state senator, Colonel A. R. Boteler, and Colonel Edmund Lee, a kinsman of the commanding general, had been burned wantonly by the Federals. “I came to the conclusion,” Early wrote afterward, “it was time to open the eyes of the people of the North to this enormity, by an example in the way of retaliation.” John McCausland with his own and Bradley Johnson’s brigade were started on July 29 for Chambers-burg, Pennsylvania, which Early selected as the object of reprisal. McCausland’s instructions were to demand $100,000 in gold or $500,000 in greenbacks for the indemnification of the persons whose property had been put to the torch by the Federals. If this indemnity was not forthcoming at once, McCausland was to reduce the town to ashes.
About 5:30 A.M., July 30, the Confederate cavalry brigades entered Chambersburg and presented their demand. The first member of the town council who was told of this was instant in answer: The citizens would not pay 5 cents. McCausland waited until 9 o’clock and then directed that the town be fired. His order provoked virtual mutiny on the part of some of his officers and men; he had to put Colonel William E. Peters of the 21st Virginia under arrest. As soon as the fires at Chambersburg were well ablaze, McCausland began his withdrawal toward the Potomac. He was prompt to relieve Colonel Peters of arrest, and doubtless was unaware of the many acts of robbery and violence charged against stragglers and thieves in his command. In his military autobiography Early wrote: “For this act I, alone, am responsible…. I see no reason to regret my conduct on this occasion.”13
The lower Shenandoah Valley, scene of Early’s operations, July-September 1864.
At the moment, Fate, as well as General W.W. Averell, seemed to pursue McCausland and Bradley Johnson on their return from Chambers-burg. At Moorefield, in the belief that they were safe, the Confederate commanders relaxed their vigilance, with the familiar result. Averell descended on Johnson’s camp in a surprise attack before daylight on August 7 and routed his brigade. McCausland’s force was driven also. Averell reported that he captured 4 guns, 420 prisoners, and over 400 horses. Bradley Johnson himself was caught but was able to escape.14
The affair at Moorefield led to a violent denunciation of McCausland by Bradley Johnson. Johnson’s account of the misbehavior of some of the troopers confirmed everything the residents of the burned Pennsylvania town were saying. He charged men of McCausland’s brigade with infamous conduct: “Every crime in the catalogue of infamy has been committed, I believe, except murder and rape…. Pillage and sack of private dwellings took place hourly.” Johnson sought a court of inquiry, but Early ignored this. He seemed powerless to control or to reorganize his cavalry. Painfully he was to discover that looting and robbery by a certain type of soldier are to him what traditionally the taste of human blood is to the tiger. Early was more than conservative when he said of the rout at Moorefield what he should have applied to the whole of the disgraceful Chambersburg raid: “This affair had a very damaging effect upon my cavalry for the rest of the campaign.”15
Before McCausland and Johnson rejoined Early with their shamed and shattered men, a major change in the campaign had occurred. The Shenandoah Valley once more became a major theater of war. Lee had become convinced that Grant was dispatching other troops to aid Wright’s VI Corps in assailing Early. On August 6, in conference with the President, Lee decided to send Kershaw’s division of infantry and Fitz Lee’s cavalry to assist the Second Corps. Under Dick Anderson, these troops at the outset were to operate in Early’s behalf east of the Blue Ridge. To this region Lee was prepared to move still other units of his weakened army if it should develop that Grant was detaching heavily to the same quarter.
Old Jube needed Anderson and all additional reinforcement he could get, because news of the enemy’s plans was ominous. Imboden reported on August 9 that a heavy Federal concentration was in progress at Harper’s Ferry. His information was that the VI and XIX Corps, as well as Crook’s troops, were being assembled and that they were under a new commander. Quickly the outposts learned that Early’s adversary was Major General Phil Sheridan.16
With confident heart and probably in contemptuous spirit, Early determined to set the pace and occupy Sheridan by ceaseless maneuver. He began a succession of marches and demonstrations that puzzled Sheridan and created the impression of far greater force than the Confederates mustered. In this deception he was assisted by Anderson. Fitz Lee also gave skillful aid both in maneuver and in the attempted reorganization of Early’s disorganized cavalry. It was manifest that relief had to be given Robert Ransom, whose illness kept him from field service. He was succeeded by one of Fitz Lee’s former brigadiers, Lunsford L. Lomax. In surrendering his assignment, Ransom suggested many changes: Broad reorganization was necessary to bring Early’s cavalry “to anything like a state of efficiency.” Bragg forwarded these suggestions to Early, who, in the face of new warnings, did not take in hand any reorganization. Whatever was done in that essential had to be undertaken by Fitz Lee and Lomax. Early persisted—it is impossible to say why—in his curious neglect of his cavalry.17
During the first month of Early’s maneuvering he did not gain a favorable impression of Sheridan. If it was his opponent’s policy, said Early, “to convince me that he was not an energetic commander, his strategy was a complete success….” Early, in a word, became overconfident, a dangerous state of mind for any commander prior to actual test of his adversary. It was doubly hazardous for Early because after little more than a month he lost his infantry reinforcement. Anderson and Kershaw were ordered back to the Army of Northern Virginia. This loss did not curb Old Jubilee.
On September 18, Early had Gordon’s division bivouacked at Bunker Hill. Rodes and Breckinridge were at Stephenson’s Depot, and Ramseur one mile east of Winchester. Lomax’s cavalry picketed the left, Fitz Lee the right. The strength of this force was reckoned by Early at 8,500 infantry, 2,900 cavalry, and 3 battalions of artillery—a total of about 12,150. In comparison, though Early did not know even the approximate figures, Sheridan could muster about 40,000 for the field, of whom more than 6,400 were cavalry.18
This strong Union army at length was moving. Standing on the defensive during August in obedience to Grant’s orders, Sheridan had received heavy cavalry reinforcement while waiting. Now that he had reports of Kershaw’s withdrawal, he determined to strike. Soon after dawn on September 19, Early learned that the Federals had forced the crossing of the Opequon on the Berryville road leading to Winchester. Immediately he ordered Gordon to support Ramseur. Then, as quickly as his horse could carry him there, Early rode to Ramseur’s position east of Winchester. So plain were the indications of an attack that he directed his remaining infan
try, that of Rodes and Breckinridge, to hurry to the ground where the young North Carolinian was standing in furious determination to wipe out the disgrace of his recent defeat at Stephenson’s Depot.
Gordon led his men on the field about 10:00 A.M. Behind him, looking as much the god of war as ever, Robert Rodes advanced with three of his brigades. Almost before Gordon could be deployed on the extreme left, or Rodes could be placed between him and Ramseur, the attack opened on the line to which Ramseur skillfully had withdrawn. There was no mystery or finesse about this initial Federal advance. It manifestly was an effort to hold Ramseur in front while another column turned his left. Early’s black eyes burned at the sight of this. He would meet it and show young Mr. Sheridan how the Army of Northern Virginia fought! Let Gordon and Rodes outflank the flankers and rout them.
Before Early’s orders reached them, Gordon and Rodes themselves had decided to undertake this maneuver. Gordon proceeded at once to the front. Rodes turned away to observe his line, advancing under well-placed enemy fire. The fine black horse of the general—as familiar to the troops as Rodes himself—became restive. Rodes was trying to control the animal when a shell burst near him. A fragment struck the general on the head and knocked him from his horse. Although his heart beat feebly for a few minutes, he knew nothing. His troops had to go on without him. Presently, on the left flank, Rodes’s absent brigade, Battle’s, came up and attacked as ferociously as at Spotsylvania. Swiftly and with heavy loss the enemy was driven back.19
The repulse was sharp; the day appeared to have been won, though at heavy cost in the death of Rodes. The situation seemed even less dangerous as the minutes passed because of the arrival of Breckinridge, delayed repelling cavalry on the Opequon. Early held one of Breckinridge’s brigades on the left and sent the remaining two to the right, now his weaker flank. Scarcely had the dispositions been made when the cavalry on the left was seen retiring in disorder before a powerful force of the enemy’s mounted troops. Early brought Breckinridge back to the extreme left, where he was able to halt the enemy’s advance. A simultaneous attack against the left, farther to the front, was repulsed also. Then noise accomplished what force had failed to do. As the men of Gordon, Rodes, and Ramseur heard the firing on their left flank, they became uneasy. In spite of all their officers could do, they began to make for the rear.
In growing confusion, Early fell back to a line of breastworks close to the town. With his old pugnacity and in the imperturbable manner of all his fighting he prepared to beat off the enemy, but soon he was attacked in front as well as on the left. Word was brought that the enemy was turning the right. Reluctantly Old Jube had to order a general withdrawal. The spirit of retreat was rising. Some of the troops were close to panic.20
Confederate infantry positions, Third Battle of Winchester, September 19,1864. Encircled numerals indicate: (1) bivouac of Gordon and Rodes, night of September 18-19; (2) Breckinridge’s forenoon action; (3) Ramseur’s first position; (4) engaging position of Rodes and Gordon; (5) Ramseur’s second position; (6) Confederate position about 4:30 P.M.; (7) final Confederate line, about 5:00 P.M.; (8) line of retreat to Fisher’s Hill.
Soldiers who survived the onslaught now rallied south of the town. Then, rapidly, but not in rout, they retreated twenty miles to Fisher’s Hill which, in Early’s opinion, “was the only place where a stand could be made.” He found that of his little army of 12,000, he had lost 3,611 of his infantry and artillerymen—1,818 of them captured—and probably 1,000 of his cavalry. This was almost 40 per cent of the force with which he had withstood Sheridan’s advance. The command had suffered proportionately. Besides Rodes, who was irreplaceable at the moment, Early lost A. C. Godwin of Hoke’s old brigade in circumstances that duplicated those of Rodes’s death. Godwin seemed to have been promoted solely to be slain. He had held his commission forty days. Fitz Lee had been wounded seriously by a ball in the thigh—a most deplorable injury because it deprived Lomax of help in the reorganization of the cavalry.
Now, at Fisher’s Hill, came another heavy loss of a different character: John C. Breckinridge received orders to return at once to his own Department of Southwest Virginia. Breckinridge had cooperated ably and heartily with Early and had fought at Winchester as a man who courted death. When Gordon protested that the Kentuckian was exposing himself needlessly, Breckinridge had said simply, “Well, General, there is little left for me if our cause is to fail.” The departure of Breckinridge and his troops, after the grievous losses of Winchester, would have made Early’s situation hopeless had he not received assurance of the early return of Kershaw. More cavalry was promised also.21
While awaiting these reinforcements, Early had to undertake reorganization. Little choice was his. With Rodes dead and Breckinridge gone, there were three men only in his army who could be regarded as sufficiently experienced to handle a division. Two of these were, of course, Gordon and Ramseur. The third was John Pegram. He had been commanding a brigade under Ramseur, but had led acceptably a division in the Army of Tennessee. Early gave Ramseur the division of Rodes. In command of Ramseur’s men, Pegram was left as senior brigadier. To Gordon was transferred the forces previously called Breckinridge’s division but styled Wharton’s division during the time Breckinridge, as corps commander, had been directing both his division and Gordon’s. This was the best arrangement that could be made. Ramseur’s conduct at Winchester had been as brilliant as anything in his career and was full atonement for any charge of negligence in the affair at Stephenson’s Depot. Gordon was never as happy under Early as he had been when Lee was in general command, but he was bold, intelligent, and capable of raising the morale of ill-disciplined or discouraged troops. Pegram was an experiment but probably a safe one.
At Fisher’s Hill, which was near Strasburg, Early felt compelled to occupy a line almost four miles long—far too long for so small a force. In order to cover the front at all, while holding the Valley Pike, he dismounted Lomax’s cavalry, which included the unstable, poorly disciplined units, and placed these troops, under their new commander, on his left. Late on the afternoon of September 22, Sheridan struck this exposed left, swept down it, took up the attack near the center, and forced a disorderly general retreat. The artillerists of the Second Corps had to cover this hurried withdrawal and, in doing so, held their ground too long. Twelve of the guns were taken, a serious loss, but in a realistic sense the minimum price that Early could have paid for escape. Casualties in the infantry and artillery were 1,235. Of these, almost 1,000 were prisoners or stragglers who did not return to the ranks.22
The most lamented individual casualty was the beloved and capable Sandie Pendleton, former A.A.G. to Jackson. In May 1864 this superb young officer had declined promotion to brigade command because he believed he was more useful on the staff. After service past reckoning, to Ewell and to Early, he fell while attempting to rally routed troops to form a line south of Fisher’s Hill. He died the next day.23
The broken brigades reached Waynesboro, at the foot of the Blue Ridge, on September 28. En route they were cheered by the return of Kershaw, with 2,700 effectives. By October 5, Rosser’s brigade of 600 cavalry arrived to reinforce Early. That indomitable lieutenant general, “bloody but unbowed,” wrote later that on the arrival of these reinforcements, who “about made up my losses at Winchester and Fisher’s Hill,” he determined to take the offensive.24 In a short time he undertook to do so, but, strategically, the chapter that began with the advance to Lynchburg in June had been ended.
Force and results considered, it was a chapter as full of honor as of disaster. Early had succeeded in drawing from the Army of the Potomac the whole of the VI Corps, which was an infantry force larger than his own total strength, had occupied Sheridan and one division of cavalry from James River, and had compelled the Federals to consolidate against him the troops of Crook and Averell who might have engaged in attacks on Confederate supply lines. This was a remarkable achievement for a command that at no stage of operations counted mo
re than 13,200 infantry and about 3,700 cavalry—a force steadily and swiftly reduced.
The weight of these odds was not realized at army headquarters in Petersburg. Even when crediting Sheridan with fewer men than that officer commanded, Lee thought that Early’s “reverses,” as he termed them, could be “remedied.” Said the commanding general, “One victory will put all things right.” His chief criticism, voiced to Early, was that “you have operated more with divisions than with your concentrated strength.” Lee perceived also, as Early did at length, that next to the heavy odds against which the Valley commander had fought, his defeats had been due to “the inefficiency of the greater part of” his cavalry. Early did not admit that this inefficiency was attributable to any failure of his to use a firm hand with his undisciplined troopers.25
The fullest of failure, with no allowance for the success of his diversion, was charged against Early. He had created many animosities by his snarling manner and his bitter sarcasms. Now his criticisms came home to him. Foremost among his adversaries was one of his former brigadiers, the governor of Virginia, William Smith. The charges of Smith were obvious—that Early had been surprised, that his tactics were poor, that he had lost guns. More serious was the allegation that the troops no longer believed Early “a safe commander.” In a knowledge of the military limitations that had accompanied Extra Billy Smith’s personal bravery, professional soldiers might laugh to see him in the role of critic. Before the Virginia people, with whom he was most popular, Smith’s lack of standing as a professional soldier did not disqualify him. What he was saying, thousands were thinking. For the first time since the Army of Northern Virginia was reorganized by Lee after the Seven Days, public clamor was rising against one of his senior officers.26
Lee's Lieutenants Page 97