As we see, the number of combat-ready tanks was much smaller than their total number. The losses suffered in the preceding offensives noticeably reduced the shock strength of the four German panzer divisions. Reinforcement of the Schwerpunkt was a necessary precondition for the success of Operation Konrad III. The fresh 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion (45 King Tigers and 3 self-propelled anti-aircraft guns) was a fine addition, with the help of which it might be possible to batter down the Soviet defenses. The 303rd Assault Gun Brigade entered the battle fully equipped with StuG III (75mm guns) and StuH (105mm guns) self-propelled guns – a total of 45 vehicles. The addition of I Battalion of the 24th Panzer Regiment (which initially belonged to the 24th Panzer Division and numbered 60 Panthers, of which 45 were combat-ready on 19 January 1945) to the 1st Panzer Division’s roster was an equally useful reinforcement.
Table 2 Condition of the Tank Park of the 1st, 3rd, 3rd SS and 5th SS Panzer Divisions on 15 January 1945
Note: The number to the left of the parentheses gives the total number of tanks and assault guns including those under short-term repair, while the number within the parentheses indicates the number that were serviceable.
Artillery support for the offensive was to be provided by the 403rd Volks Artillery Corps and the 17th Volks Mortar Brigade (equipped with launchers for rocket shells with a caliber from 150mm to 300mm). The Volks Artillery Corps had mixed battalions of 105mm light field howitzers and up to 210mm mortars, as well as 170mm cannons, including captured Soviet 122mm guns. In view of the shortage of aviation fuel, the long-range 170mm cannon were given assignments that were typical for the Luftwaffe – to block the approach of Soviet reserves.
In essence, the new plan of the German command was a reincarnation of Operation Paula, which had previously been rejected due to the lack of fuel. Problems with attacking through forests and hilly defiles forced a second look at an offensive across the plain. The land between Lake Balaton and Székesfehérvár was almost ideally suitable for tank operations. This was a slightly rolling plain with isolated forests and patches of woods. The snowpack was shallow; in the woods, gullies and wine vineyards, the fresh snow cover reached 20 centimeters, but on the open plains it was only 5 to 10 centimeters deep and offered no hindrance to the maneuver of armor.
Although the terrain between Balaton and Székesfehérvár was more advantageous for the use of armor than the Vértes and Pilis Hills, there was the problem of overcoming canals. In Gille’s order it is stated: “After suppressing the initial enemy resistance, the 5th SS Panzer Division, 3rd SS Panzer Division and 1st Panzer Division, paying no attention to a threat to their flanks, will advance to the line of the [Sárviz] canal and seize a bridgehead in order to prevent the enemy from consolidating along the canal, and will secure a crossing of our forces to the opposite bank with the aim of continuing the offensive.”
In the situation that the units and formations of the 4th Guards Army were in at the beginning of January 1945, a rapid breakthrough to the Sárviz Canal and the seizure of a crossing over it had been for all practical purposes unrealistic. However, by the morning of 18 January, the defense in this sector had been significantly weakened. The army and Front reserves were positioned behind the center (near Székesfehérvár) and right flank of the 4th Guards Army. The 3rd Ukrainian Front had been given the 133rd Rifle Corps (the 21st, 104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions) from the Stavka Reserve, but by 18 January its assembly on the western bank of the Danube hadn’t been completed. The only advantage the defense owned was the time that had been spent fortifying the positions between 30/31 December 1944 and 17 January 1945.
The 3rd Ukrainian Front’s aviation grouping by the start of the third German offensive had gone through changes in its composition. The combat roster of the 17th Air Army on 17 January 1945 is given in the following numbers (operational/under repair):
La-5 fighters – 148/40;
Iak-3 and Iak-9 fighters – 154/30;
Il-2 ground attack aircraft – 265/33;
B-3 (A-20 Boston bombers) – 97/10;
Po-2 night bombers – 94/2;
Pe-2 reconnaissance aircraft – 18/2;
Iak-9 reconnaissance aircraft – 8/1;
Il-2 artillery spotters – 15/1;
Iak-9 artillery spotters – 9/3.
The total number of operational aircraft was 808.
As we see, the number of Il-2s, in comparison with what the 17th Air Army had at the beginning of January, was significantly reduced. In contrast, the number of fighters grew. Moreover, the composition of the fighter complement had changed – there were more La-5 fighters in the air over Hungary.
The final “signal light” to the Soviet command was the lull in the fighting that was observed on 15 and 16 January 1945 in the sector of defense of the 1st Guards Fortified District. An unusual, unsettling calm settled over the front; the enemy artillery and mortars fell virtually silent. There was also not a single deserter from the Hungarian units. Prior to this, 205 Hungarians had come across the lines by 15 January 1945, an average of more than 10 a day. On 16 January, however, the flow of deserters suddenly ceased. The lack of deserters suggested that the Germans had taken over this sector of the front from the Hungarians. On the night of 17/18 January, the silence was disturbed by the rumbling of motors, the sound of carts, and even human voices that were being carried by the wind. At the same time, the Germans were tightly sealing their front lines; Soviet scouting parties and reconnaissance probes were unable to penetrate the front line.
At 6.30 on 18 January, after a short artillery preparation, four German panzer divisions went on the offensive. Faithful to their tactics, the Germans attacked several sectors and concentrated their forces on narrow fronts. In the section in his attack orders regarding the Soviet defenses, Gille stated: “The combat capability of a fortified district on the defensive should be rated as high.” However, in the given case the Germans were overrating the capabilities of the 1st Guards Fortified District. A fortified district was fine for covering passive sectors of the front. Despite the fact that it had 90% of its table strength, Major General Nikitin’s 1st Guards Fortified District numbered just 3,122 men, 38 76mm guns, 31 45mm guns, 7 120mm mortars, 32 82mm mortars, 129 heavy machine guns and 124 light machine guns. Nikitin had four battalions in his front line and one in reserve. Only the sectors of the front that were covering routes vulnerable to tanks or roads were mined.
The artillery battalions of the Fortified District met the attacking German tanks with fire from their 45mm anti-tank guns, but their shells ricocheted harmlessly off the armor. The guns were shot up at pointblank range or were crushed beneath tank treads. The fire of the 76mm antitank guns was somewhat more effective, but there were few of them. Unfortunately, there were no SU-100 tank destroyer elements on the path of the King Tigers of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion. They had all shifted to the 4th Guards Army’s right flank. The anti-tank reserve of the 135th Rifle Corps commander was the 1202nd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment, which was equipped with 20 SU-76. This regiment had only just received the brand new SU-76 self-propelled guns straight from the factory and had taken its place within the 4th Guards Army shortly before the described events. On 18 January it found itself in the path of Totenkopf, which had been reinforced with King Tigers. The lightly armored SU-76 could offer no serious resistance to the heavy tanks, although they tried to open fire at the King Tigers at a pointblank range from 100 to 150 meters with armor-piercing discarding-sabot shells. Over the day, 12 SU-76 were left burned out, 6 more were disabled, and one became bogged down and was blown up by its crew. Having lost practically all its vehicles, the once again “horseless” regiment retreated to the east. If the anti-tank defenses of the 1st Guards Fortified District proved to be weak, its electrified barbed wire entanglements showed themselves to be highly effective – according to Soviet data, the remains of up to 200 German soldiers were found on them.
Commander of the 18th Tank Corps Major General of Tank Forces P.D. Govorunenk
o.
A knocked-out German Panther tank. The penetrating shell hole is clearly visible in the upper forward armor.
A burned-out German Panther Ausf. G tank. The tank has plainly “settled” as a result of the collapse of the torsion bars due to the fire. (TsAMO)
A Hummel self-propelled artillery vehicle destroyed by artillery fire. The number “5” has been painted on by the Soviet inspection team.
The rupturing of the 1st Guards Fortified District’s front enabled the 1st Panzer Division to envelop the left flank of the 252nd Rifle Division defending to the north and to emerge in its rear. Its left-flank 928th Rifle Regiment was encircled and its men were attempting to break out in small groups. The 932nd Rifle Regiment defending on the right of it was compelled to fall back to the line of a canal flowing south of Székesfehérvár, where it took up a new line of defense. Having penetrated the forward units of the 135th Rifle Corps, the attacking German tanks quickly advanced to Úrhida, where the headquarters of the 135th Rifle Corps was located. Command and control over the corps was lost.
The quick collapse of the 135th Rifle Corps’ defenses led to the fact that the anti-tank reserves that were moving up to the front went into action from the march, having no time to prepare positions. The 1249th Destroyer Anti-tank Regiment of the 49th Destroyer Anti-tank Brigade already at 8.30 18 January was taken from its current positions and sent to block the path of advance of the German tanks. The regiment moved out toward Lepsény on the southern flank of the German offensive, which was 10 kilometers behind the starting front lines. The 1249th Destroyer Antitank Regiment was equipped with captured German 75mm anti-tank guns. However, it simply had no time to prepare positions. Already en route to the designated area, at 13.00 18 January the anti-tank regiment came under fire from German tanks, which were from the forward units of the 3rd Panzer Division that was advancing toward the Sió Canal. The regiment was forced to deploy hastily and to accept battle from the march. The attacking panzers quickly enveloped the unprepared positions and overran the guns. The regiment quickly lost all 19 of its anti-tank guns. The same fate befell the 438th Destroyer Anti-tank Regiment on the northern flank of the German offensive. It also went into battle from the march, deployed under fire, and quickly lost all 21 of the guns it had.
One of the first mechanized formations that rushed to meet the new German offensive was the 7th Mechanized Corps. It was positioned in the vicinity of Székesfehérvár, from which point it could move quickly to the south into the sector of the neighboring 135th Rifle Corps. Tolbukhin quickly gave the 7th Mechanized Corps the assignment to take up a front behind the crumbling positions of the 1st Guards Fortified District. However, attacked by the freshly arrived Panthers and King Tigers, the defense of the Fortified District’s artillery battalions collapsed too quickly, before the mechanized brigades could move up to support them. Units of the 7th Mechanized Corps bumped into the enemy while on the march, without a compact front, and wound up enveloped as the enemy tanks exploited the gaps between their rolling columns. As a result they were forced to fall back to the Sárviz Canal. However, it should be noted that for the heavy tanks of the 509th Heavy Panzer Battalion, the first day of the offensive was not a holiday stroll. Over the day, 11 King Tigers were lost, 7 of them irrecoverably. The battalion’s advance came to a halt in front of the demolished bridges across the Sárviz Canal.
The 93rd Rifle Division and elements of the 252nd Rifle Division reached the Sárviz Canal. However, the blown-up bridges managed to check only the left-flank grouping of IV SS Panzer Corps. Further to the south, the canal’s bank was totally undefended, and the two SS panzer divisions were able to push on to the east against no resistance. The half-measure in the form of frontline courses of junior lieutenants and the battalions of reserve regiments that were thrown into battle were unable to hold the German attackers for very long.
The 18th Tank Corps could become the lifeline in this situation. It had already played an important role in the defensive battles in the first days of January. By the start of Operation Konrad III, it had retained its combat effectiveness – on 17 January the 18th Tank Corps numbered 66 T-34, 8 ISU-122 and 5 SU-85 in service. Govorunenko’s corps had again become subordinate to Front command and was positioned in an area southwest of Budapest. Reports had come in from deserters and prisoners about a prepared breakout attempt by the encircled garrison to the west, and the 18th Tank Corps was supposed to prevent it. The position on the path of a possible breakout from Budapest was not particularly satisfactory for use of the corps on the left flank of the 4th Guards Army. The tankers and motorized riflemen would have to show miraculous speed. But already at 17.00 on 18 January, the brigades of the 18th Tank Corps were moving out in order to take up a defense along the line of the Sárviz Canal. The new defensive positions had to be occupied by 8.00 19 January.
However, in view of the rapid advance of the German divisions that had broken into operational space, the idea of creating a new front along the line of the Sárviz Canal proved to be stillborn and could not be realized. By the end of day 18 January, there were no Soviet forces whatsoever on the line of the canal in the area of the town of Sárkeresztúr. As a consequence of this, the attacking SS units were able to create a bridgehead across the canal unhindered, put down bridges across it, and continue their further advance to the east that night. Accordingly, the brigades of the 18th Tank Corps entered combat on the morning of 19 January short of the canal, deprived of any good defensive terrain.
The arrival of the divisions of Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps at the Sárviz Canal cut the path of retreat for the artillery units of the 135th Rifle Corps. Fighting in encirclement, they quickly expended their available ammunition and lost a number of guns and mortars to enemy tank and artillery fire, as well as to overrunning enemy tanks. In this situation, the artillerymen disabled their remaining guns and attempted to break out on foot.
The situation increasingly began to bring back to mind episodes of the summer of 1941. For even greater similarity, the situation in the air changed for a period of time. The Luftwaffe managed to seize the initiative. The 4th Guards Army’s journal of combat operations has an eloquent entry about the Luftwaffe’s activities for 19 January: “The skies cleared, and the enemy air force reigned supreme in the air, meeting no resistance on the part of our air force.” Similar words can be found as well in the 252nd Rifle Division’s journal of combat operations:
The enemy air force conducted active operations with Me-109 aircraft, which strafed and bombed our baggage trains, vehicles loaded with ammunition, and approaching reserves of infantry and artillery, thereby creating traffic jams at crossroads and canal crossings, as a result of which the regular supply of ammunition, food and fuel was disrupted, as well as the reinforcement of our units operating at the front with personnel and equipment.
Soviet units in Hungary in January 1945 for a short spell were experiencing the same thing as those who had heard the melancholy howl of the Stuka dive sirens in the summers of 1941 and 1942.
For the sake of justice, it needs to be said that the similarity was mostly superficial. The Messerschmitts loaded with 50kg and 250kg bombs were, of course, less dangerous as strike aircraft than the Stukas loaded with 500kg bombs that were precisely delivered out of dives. Moreover, the dozens of sorties of fighter-bombers in no way compared with the 800-1,000 individual bomber sorties on the axes of the main attacks of the German forces in the most terrible days for the Red Army. In addition, the activity of the 17th Air Army on 18 January, despite the poor weather, was rather high – 718 individual sorties, the majority of which were ground attack missions (547 individual combat sorties by fighters and Il-2s). Soviet pilots engaged in 48 aerial combats, in which they claimed downing 19 Me-109s and 18 FW-190s. In comparison, over the entire month of January 1945, there were 327 aerial combats, which meant the single day of 18 January comprised 15% of all the month’s air battles.
The emergence of the Germans into operational space allowed
them to strike out simultaneously in several directions, thereby increasing the perimeter of the wedge they had driven into the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s sector. It was no longer possible to seal off this penetration with the introduction of reserves and formations taken from quiet sectors. The 18th Tank Corps and units of the 133rd Rifle Corps that were moving toward the Sárviz Canal wound up enveloped from the north and south. Isolated from the Front’s main forces, they in fact fell into encirclement. The pocket around them was still not continuous; the encirclement was mostly perceptible in the cutting of main lines of supply, and not complete encirclement by enemy tanks and infantry in solid lines in all directions.
After enveloping and encircling the tank and rifle corps from the Front reserve, the units of Gille’s IV SS Panzer Corps no longer faced any obstacles for a further advance to the east. On the afternoon of 19 January, the IV SS Panzer Corps reached the Danube River and the 3rd Panzer Division took Dunapentele [present-day Dunaújváros, which grew up around the former village]. The situation had deteriorated to the point where the 3rd Ukrainian Front command was given the right to determine for itself whether it should continue to hold the bridgehead on the western bank of the Danube or to abandon it. Marshal F.I. Tolbukhin, in a later assessment of the actions of our troops in the area of Lake Balaton in January 1945 stated:
Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945 Page 6