Mobile units were in the Front reserve. They included the 18th and 23rd Tank Corps, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, and the 5th Guards Cavalry Corps.
The 23rd Tank Corps was occupying a position behind the right flank of the 4th Guards Army, north of Lake Velence in the Lovasberény area. The 18th Tank Corps was positioned behind the boundary between the 4th Guards Army and the 26th Army in the Sárosd area. Its position had been selected so that it could reinforce the defense on any portion of the army-level intermediate line either in the sector of the 1st Guards Fortified District or in the sector of the 26th Army’s 30th Rifle Corps. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was assembled behind the center of the 26th Army and could be used, depending on the situation, to strengthen the army-level intermediate line together with the 18th Tank Corps.
The 5th Guards Cavalry Corps (the 11th Guards, 12th Guards and 63rd Cavalry Divisions) was occupying a position on the Front-level defensive belt in the Alap area. Behind it was the Front reserve – the 84th Rifle Division. In case of extreme necessity, the Front’s courses for junior lieutenants, as well as reserve rifle regiments (two from the 27th Army and one from the 4th Guards Army), an artillery regiment and a tank regiment could be committed in order to strengthen the defense. The overall numerical strength of these units was equivalent to two divisions (excepting artillery).
At the end of February and in the first few days of March 1945, select groups of officers assigned by Front headquarters conducted inspections of all the armies and Front units in order to determine their readiness to repel a German offensive. As a result of the inspections, reports were compiled and forwarded to Front headquarters. It is not without interest to cite an excerpt from the report, “On the conditions of the defenses and the defensive capabilities of the 26th Army”, which was put together by staff officers of the Front headquarters on 1 March 1945, especially since it was this army that received the Sixth SS Panzer Army’s main assault (the situation with the defenses was similar for the other armies):
1. Organization of the defense
The 135th Rifle Corps: The depth of the combat formations does not exceed 5-7 kilometers. The forward edge of the defense runs along the line at which the troops halted during their own offensive. As a consequence of this, on separate sectors the forward edge doesn’t conform to its [defensive] role (poor visibility and fields of fire, and limited possibilities for creating earthworks).
Organization of the system of fire: The system of infantry fire has been organized without sufficient thought by the commanders of elements and units. As a rule, in units of the first echelon, all the machine guns and anti-tank rifles have been positioned in a single line along the forward edge, and no depth whatsoever has been created. The exceptions are the 36th and 68th Guards Rifle Divisions, where the battalions of the first echelon have heavy and light machine guns positioned behind the front line.
The commanders and crews of the machine guns know their assignments. Plans of supporting artillery fire have been put together in all the formations and units. The preparation of initial gunnery data has been completed by all the artillery units and elements. The guns have been sighted in and targets registered. The accuracy of the registration fire is satisfactory.
The system of anti-tank defense has been organized by means of creating anti-tank areas and by deploying guns for direct fire on the directions vulnerable to tanks. Antitank means have primarily been echeloned in depth, but there are cases where the antitank artillery has been positioned in a single line.
The artillery in concealed firing positions hasn’t been fully prepared for all-round defense and for repelling tank attacks by direct fire (9 batteries of the 65th Artillery Regiment of the 36th Guards Rifle Division).
Heavy guns in indirect firing positions haven’t been prepared for anti-tank defense (9 batteries of the 25th Cannon Artillery Brigade in the sector of the 36th Guards Rifle Division). Ammunition for all types of weapons in the trenches and positions consists of 1 to 1.5 standard combat loads. In the 36th Guards Rifle Division’s 39th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery Battalion, there are few armor-piercing shells in the gun positions for direct fire. This battalion’s No. 1 gun of the 2nd Battery has just 17 armor-piercing shells.
2. Engineering support for the defenses
Defensive fortifications among the troops haven’t been completed and the work is progressing very slowly. Not a single division of the first echelon has a full profile, continuous trench along the forward edge. There are gaps of 100-300 meters between regimental sectors and even battalion areas of the defense. The plans and norms of constructing defensive positions aren’t being carried out.
The trenches along the forward edge have various depths – from 0.4 meters to 1.4 meters. There are no places for dispersing the troops in the trenches. It is very difficult to carry wounded along the trenches. In the sandy and sandy-loamy soil (36th Guards Rifle Division), trenches are collapsing and are not being rebuilt.
Machine-gun emplacements are poorly equipped, uncovered, and as a result a lot of the positions, especially where the soil is sandy and loamy, have fallen into disrepair. Trenches in the sense of combat and accommodations for the troops are poorly furnished or are completely unfitted. There are no bunkers below the parapet, and not more than 10 to 15% of the dugouts where the troops can rest have been built, and those have thin overhead protection.
In the 36th Guards Rifle Division, the majority of the personnel of the artillery units and second-echelon units are resting in huts. The digging of the second and third line of trenches has been completed.
Minefields in 2-4 belts have been laid in front of each division. A system of fire covers the minefields. No other engineered obstacles have been put in place. The artillery positions, including those of the anti-tank regions as well, are not protected by minefields. The mobile blocking detachments in the divisions (with 250 mines each) and in the regiments (with 50 mines each) are mounted in light vehicles and wagons.
Up to 70% of the troops in the field have been provided with an entrenching tool.
3. Security of the boundaries
The boundaries have been secured according to the scheme that was proposed by army headquarters to the Front headquarters.
4. Organization of command and control
All of the command posts of the regiments, divisions and corps are located in populated locations, in huts. All of the signal stations are in huts. There are no prepared bunkers for accommodating the command posts; only slit trenches are available. Local civilians are living in the vicinity of the command posts, including in the area of the army command post, while in the 36th Guards Rifle Division, local civilians are even present at the command post and the observation posts of the regiments and battalions.
The observation posts in the majority of cases are primitive: a bunker with a thin cover, or else observation is done from buildings, haystacks, etc. Around the clock sentry duties have been organized at the observation posts. Communications with the command and the interaction of all the links have been organized.
5. Organization of battlefield reconnaissance
Observation of the battlefield has been organized insufficiently clearly. Reconnaissance patrols for seizing “tongues” [prisoners willing to talk] are being conducted by non-essential individuals and in the majority of cases are having no success (155th, 36th Guards, and 233rd Rifle Divisions).
6. Vigilance and combat service
Most of the unit personnel know their assignments. At nighttime, entire companies of the first echelon at the forward edge are on the alert, while in daylight hours 50 to 60% of the personnel are resting. Vigilance of the personnel is not on a sufficiently high level. Everyone knows the password, but as a rule it is not requested, and everyone trusts the word “of their own guys” both at the front line and in the depth of the combat formations.
Discipline in certain combat units of the army is not on a sufficiently high level. The appearance of many officers and soldiers is slove
nly (without epaulets, belts, unbuttoned, etc.)
7. The manning level of the rifle companies and the count of personnel:
30th Rifle Corps – 155th Rifle Division’s companies are at average strength: 286th Rifle Regiment – 20 men per company; 436th Rifle Regiment – 80-90 men per company; 659th Rifle Regiment – 75-80 men per company; 36th Guards Rifle Division – companies have about 80 men each; the 68th Guards Rifle Division – companies average 55-60 men each.
135th Rifle Corps – 233rd Rifle Division: companies are at 30 to 35 men each; 74th Rifle Division: 55 to 60 men each; 236th Rifle Division: 40 to 50 men each.
8. Morale and living conditions of the officers and soldiers
The morale of the personnel is fully healthy. Soldiers and officers in the overwhelming majority honorably and conscientiously carry out their assigned tasks.
Nutritional sustenance has been organized fully satisfactorily. Officers and soldiers on the meal plan for the front receive two high-caloric, hot meals per day, which are in the majority of cases tasty. There was not a single complaint from the officers and soldiers about poor rations.
The conditions of the uniforms is basically satisfactory, but of various types. Many soldiers and officers are wearing civilian attire, especially in those divisions that fought in Budapest.
CONCLUSIONS
1. Organization of the defense basically conforms to the established tasks, the demands of the Front’s order, and the combat experience of the troops, with the exception of the aforementioned shortcomings.
2. Work on the defenses is being conducted according to plan, but is behind schedule, and the quality of the work is low. Control over the fulfillment of the work on the defenses has been organized with insufficient clarity.
3. Troops of the army are in a state of constant combat readiness.
Results of the inspection have been passed along to the commanders of the units and formations. The uncovered shortcomings, time allowing, are being eliminated on location.
The group of officers of the Front headquarters that conducted the inspection of the condition of the army’s defense. … (signatures)
The defensive operation of the Soviet forces at Lake Balaton in March 1945 is interesting for the fact that the main role in repelling the German offensive and in the struggle against enemy tanks was played by artillery units. Therefore, let’s take a closer look at them.
The 3rd Ukrainian Front on 6 March 1945 had 185 artillery and mortar regiments. All of these units, as well as the artillery elements of the rifle divisions, numbered a total of 2,556 82mm – 160mm mortars, 2,955 45mm – 203mm guns, 612 20mm-85mm anti-aircraft guns, and 293 Katiusha rocket launchers.
Many artillery units of the 3rd Ukrainian Front had prior experience of actions on the defensive, especially anti-tank defense, which they acquired during the January 1945 battles. However, their combat capability had been reduced by the significant deficit of guns, and of vehicles especially. For example, if the equipage of the artillery units of army and Front subordination with mortars, and 57mm and 76mm guns amounted to only 57 to 65% of table strength, and with towing means 70 to 85%, then with vehicles – only 28.3% of table strength. Only the 105th Large-caliber Howitzer Brigade and the 12th Destroyer Anti-tank Brigade (16 76mm ZIS-3 cannons and 20 57mm ZIS-2) were fully equipped according to their respective TO&E.
As concerns the rifle divisions, the equipage of their artillery units was even lower. For example, on 3 March 1945, in the divisions of the 4th Guards Army there were available only 6 regimental and 20 divisional 76mm guns each, and 9 122mm howitzers; in the 26th Army’s divisions, there were 4-5 regimental and 12 divisional 76mm guns each, and 7 122mm howitzers; in the 27th Army, the respective numbers were 9, 22 and 10-11 guns each.
The majority of the artillery was distributed among the armies and corps. Front reserve had the 19th Breakthrough Artillery Division (seven artillery brigades), the 12th Destroyer Anti-tank Artillery, 170th Light Artillery and 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigades, the 105th Largecaliber Howitzer Brigade, three “Katiusha” rocket launcher brigades, two artillery regiments, a heavy mortar brigade and a mortar regiment. In addition, the 19th Breakthrough Artillery Division had been set aside only for supporting the forthcoming offensive; its use on the defensive was banned by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.
The artillery that had been distributed for supporting the rifle corps, divisions and regiments was merged into artillery groups of various sizes. Regimental artillery groups were created in all the divisions of the first echelon: for example, two divisions of the 4th Guards Army’s 20th Guards Rifle Corps had five such artillery groups, consisting of two 76mm regiments, a howitzer regiment and a mortar regiment each, while six divisions of the 26th Army had 16 artillery groups (of 6 mortar and 6 artillery regiments each). As a rule, two to four battalions comprised an artillery or mortar regiment. In the 57th Army, which had less artillery than the others, 12 artillery groups of one to two battalions each had been created. The inherent artillery of the rifle regiments or rifle battalions was not included in the artillery groups.
In addition to the regimental artillery groups, the 5th Guards Airborne Division and the 155th and 36th Guards Rifle Divisions, which were defending especially important directions, had divisional artillery groups. The latter could bring concentrated artillery fire down across the division’s entire defensive front.
Corps artillery groups were organized only in three rifle corps – the 135th, 6th Guards and 64th. In addition, the 4th Guards and 26th Armies created army artillery groups of two artillery brigades each. They were able to bring down concentrated artillery fire simultaneously on an area of up to 30 hectares, drop a moving artillery barrage on a front of 1,300 meters, or a fixed artillery barrage on a front of 3,000 meters.
Taking into account the deficit of artillery guns and vehicles, and in anticipation of the large scale of the forthcoming battle, the Front command developed several alternatives for maneuvering the artillery units, depending on the enemy’s actions.
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Anti-tank Defenses
As has already been mentioned, directives of the Front commander with respect to organizing anti-tank defenses went out to the troops on 25-26 February. In addition to the anti-tank artillery, the directives called for involving the guns of the rifle units, all the cannon batteries of the divisional and army artillery, as well as the reinforcing artillery, all of the anti-aircraft artillery of medium caliber, and tanks and self-propelled artillery vehicles in the struggle against the enemy tanks. This totaled more than 4,000 guns with a caliber ranging from 45mm to 152mm.
Particular attention was paid to organizing the anti-tank defenses on the sector between Lake Velence and Lake Balaton: At the order of the Front commander, seven of the eight destroyer anti-tank artillery brigades and two of the three light artillery brigades were subordinated to the 4th Guards Army and 26th Army, in the process giving the former 12 and the latter 16 destroyer anti-tank and light artillery regiments, or 2/3 of all the available artillery regiments.
In the defensive sectors of these two armies, a network of powerful anti-tank regions was developed, starting at a distance of 500-800 meters behind the front lines and extending back from the front lines to a depth of up to 30 to 35 kilometers. There were 32 such anti-tank regions in the sector of the 4th Guards Army, and 34 in the sector of the 26th Army.
Anti-tank regions were located on the most likely directions vulnerable to tanks. For example, in the sector between Lake Velence and the Sárviz Canal, the Soviet command determined three such directions: Dinnyés – Kis Velence, which ran along the southern shore of Lake Velence; Seregélyes – Adony; and Aba – Sárkeresztúr. On the first of these, there was a highway, but lying in front of the 1st Guards Fortified District that was defending here, there was a valley that in the first days of March was in flood from the melting snow. Thus there was only one anti-tank area on this axis. The town of Seregélyes, which was a major road hub, was l
ocated on the second axis vulnerable to tanks. In order to cover it, two large anti-tank areas with 20-25 anti-tank guns in each were positioned here, with another seven small anti-tank areas in the depth of the defenses. The Székesfehérvár – Cece highway and several smaller roads ran through the third axis that was vulnerable to tanks. In order to protect the given sector, three anti-tank areas with 15-20 antitank guns each were organized in the first line of defense, backed up by two anti-tank areas in the depth of the defenses. In addition, on all the possible sectors of German tank movement, lines for deploying the anti-tank reserves and the mobile blocking detachments were prepared.
The artillery units that were situated in indirect firing positions were also prepared for the struggle against tanks; some of the guns were deployed so that they could fire over open sights or lay longrange direct fire. In the depth of the defenses, additional anti-tank areas set up with self-propelled artillery regiments and brigades, as well as the artillery and tanks of the mechanized and tank corps.
In order to counter the enemy tanks more successfully, so-called “ambush” and “decoy” guns were widely used. The former as a rule were positioned perpendicular to the anticipated direction of advance of the enemy tanks and were to wait for the opportunity to open close-range flanking fire. The “decoy” guns, on the other hand, were used to attract the attention of the German tanks and self-propelled guns in order to lure them into the sights of other guns that hadn’t yet opened fire.
Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945 Page 16