At this moment, the 299th Rifle Division was defending a sector that extended for 15 kilometers, which lacked an adequate depth of defense and reinforcing artillery. Taking advantage of this, already with the first rush the Germans seized the first line of trenches, and by 17.00 they had reached the northern outskirts of Kisbajom, having made a 3.5-kilometer advance.
The Soviet command hastily shifted the 184th Destroyer Anti-tank Regiment to this area in order to liquidate the enemy’s penetration. But since prior to this, the regiment had already been involved in fighting and was occupying a position that was under enemy observation and fire, the regiment commander called for the placement of a smokescreen to facilitate the removal of the guns from their positions and to minimize losses. Under the smokescreen’s cover, he pulled his unit out of its positions, and then made a 20-kilometer march, all in no more than an hour. At 16.00 it moved into a position on the northern outskirts of Szabás, where at 17.15 it joined battle with attacking enemy infantry and tanks. In the course of three hours, fighting without any infantry protection, the regiment knocked out two assault guns and two halftracks, and gave an initial check to the German attack. This pause allowed the Soviet command to bring up additional reserves to the Kisbajom – Szabás sector and to bring a halt to the German advance.
On 10 – 12 March, German units launched several attacks in the direction of Szabás and Nagykorpád, but they achieved no significant success, and by the evening of 12 March, they began to dig in on the line they had reached.
The command of the German Second Panzer Army, having regrouped its forces between 11 and 13 March, at 11.10 on 14 March launched an attack in the sector of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps, aiming toward Nikla and Osztopán. Units of the 61st Guards Rifle and 10th Guards Airborne Divisions that were defending here were engaged in bitter fighting with German units for the entire day, having deployed all of the divisional and regimental artillery to fire over open sights. In the course of 15 and 16 March, the 57th Army command shifted the 20th Guards Rifle Division to this sector, where together with the 32nd Guards Mechanized Brigade and the artillery units they brought the German offensive to a halt in the Tótszentpál area.
Having encountered stubborn resistance, the units of the Second Panzer Army on 17 March again altered the axis of their attacks, this time striking to the south out of the Szenyér – Marcali area. The enemy managed to batter its way forward for 1.5 kilometers, after which the attack in this sector ground to a halt. With this failure, the German attempts to break through the defenses of the 57th Army came to an end.
ISU-152 self-propelled guns on the march. The ISU-152 was equipped with the powerful 152mm gun and was an irreplaceable means of struggle against enemy fortifications and stone buildings in 1945.
A German Panther Ausf.G with the number “134”, given to it by the Soviet inspection team. The tank has no visible damage. Probably it was abandoned by the crew after experiencing mechanical problems.
A Panther Ausf.G tank, stuck in the mud and disabled.
A German Pz.IV Ausf.H tank, knocked out by Soviet artillery. It offers a good look at its camouflage.
16
Fighting on the Drava River
On the southern sector of the front, near the town of Osijek, the troops of Generaloberst Alexander Löhr’s Army Group E on 6 March 1945 launched a two-prong attack against the position of the Soviet allies and forced a crossing of the Drava River. The first attack out of the Donji Miholjac area struck units of the General Vladimir Stoychev’s Bulgarian First Army, while the second attack out of the Valpovo area hit elements of the Yugoslav Third Army. The Germans managed to seize several bridgeheads across the Drava River, and later expanded them each to an area 8 kilometers wide and 5 kilometers deep.
The Bulgarian 3rd and 11th Infantry Divisions had fallen apart in panic, and their commanders and the command of the 4th Army Corps, to which they were subordinate, made no effort to rally them. Only the intercession by the headquarters of the 3rd Ukrainian Front was able to restore the situation. In Directive No. 00/0P from the Front headquarters, Tolbukhin ordered: “Take measures to prepare the troops for night operations, having with the harshest measures prevented manifestations of panic in all of the [Bulgarian] army’s units. Promptly begin investigating instances of panic in the 3rd and 11th Infantry Divisions and turn over the guilty senior commanders to a tribunal.”
Not taking any more chances with the allies, the Soviet command on 7 March transferred units of the 133rd Rifle Corps and artillery to the areas of the German bridgeheads on the Drava River, and also committed aircraft. For the sake of justice, it should be said that units of the Yugoslav Third Army – the 16th and 51st Infantry Divisions – put up bitter resistance to the Germans, and with counterattacks managed to throw the enemy back across the river. The Yugoslav divisions had Soviet arms and equipment (in particular artillery), but had been formed on the basis of partisan detachments and were still not part of the regular army.
In subsequent days, the Germans were unsuccessful in their efforts to expand the Drava bridgeheads that they occupied. Powerful artillery fire and strikes by ground attack aircraft of the 17th Air Army prevented the attackers from transferring a sufficient number of troops to the northern bank. All of the German efforts to advance further on this sector of the front met with failure, although isolated attempts were noted right up to and including 16 March.
Thus, during Operation Frühlingserwachen, the German troops were unable to reach their assigned objectives. As a result of 10 days of stubborn fighting, at the cost of enormous losses, they were able to make a 30-kilometer advance west of the Sárviz Canal, but south of Lake Velence the advance didn’t exceed 12 kilometers, and it was fewer still south of Lake Balaton, in the 57th Army’s sector.
A SU-100 self-propelled gun. These self-propelled guns became the Red Army’s serious counter to the German “beasts” – the Tiger and Panther tanks – at Lake Balaton.
A knocked-out Panther; most likely, this tank became the victim of anti-tank fire from both flanks – the gun is pivoted to the left, and a shell hole is plainly visible in the right side of the hull.
The same machine as in the previous photograph, seen from a different angle. It is clearly visible that the tank is lacking a Zimmerit coating.
A Panther Ausf.A, left abandoned by its crew.
17
The Use of the Front’s Tank Forces
The use of the 3rd Ukrainian Front’s tank forces during the March battles is of interest. It had been planned beforehand to use the tanks and self-propelled guns in order to strengthen the defense on prepared lines, and with the start of the German offensive, the tank formations were moved up to these lines.
The tactics of strict defense were adopted by the tank and self-propelled guns – the armored vehicles were dug into the ground among the infantry’s combat positions, or else kept concealed in ambush. In order to facilitate a more responsive command arrangement over the tank formations, they transferred from subordination to the Front to the control of the army commanders.
The tank’s combat formations on the defensive depended on the situation and the assignment. For example, the 18th Tank Corps, having taken position among the combat positions of the infantry south of Seregélyes, assigned each tank brigade its own sector of defense, while the motorized rifle brigade was distributed by battalion among the tank brigades. The defense was organized around individual strongpoints, each of which had 2-5 tanks, a platoon of motorized infantry, and 2-3 guns.
The 18th Tank Corps was reinforced with the 207th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade of SU-100 tank destroyers, which took up positions by battery in the second echelon of defense. At the same time, the tank destroyers had prepared firing positions in the first echelon, to which they moved up during enemy tank attacks. All of this allowed the creation of a dense wall of anti-tank and antipersonnel fire in front of the 18th Tank Corps’ positions, and in the course of 10 days of savage fighting, the enemy was in fact una
ble to break through the defense in this sector.
Thus, on 7 and 8 March alone, units of the 18th Tank Corps knocked out or destroyed 33 German tanks and self-propelled guns. In return, their own losses amounted to a total of 16 tanks or assault guns, including 2 T-34, 2 ISU-122 and 3 SU-76 knocked out, and 6 T-34 and 3 ISU-122 burned out.
Part of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps occupied positions in the Heinrich Estate, Sárkeresztúr, Cece, Sárbogárd area. Here the defense was organized around company-sized strongpoints, each of which contained 5 to 8 tanks or self-propelled guns. The strongpoints had standard trenches, machine-gun nests, dug-in combat vehicles, and anti-tank gun positions. The anti-tank guns moved up into their positions only in order to conduct fire, but spent the rest of their time in shelters. The SU-100 tank destroyer batteries were positioned in the second echelon, and with sudden counterattacks they would destroy the enemy’s tanks and halftracks.
Tank ambushes were widely and successfully employed. For these, groups of tanks and selfpropelled guns would take concealment on the flanks of the anticipated axis of advance of enemy tanks, calculating to take shots at their side or rear facing. Artillery guns were usually positioned in order to protect the tanks that were waiting in ambush. Combat experience demonstrated that when organizing tank ambushes, it was useful to use decoy tanks, which by their actions were supposed to lure the enemy armor into the flanking fire of the tanks concealed in ambush.
The 18th Tank Regiment of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, which was defending in the Sárkeresztúr area, adopted a rather curious tactic. When the regiment’s positions were attacked by up to a battalion of infantry, in order not to reveal the locations of the tank ambushes, the regiment commander Lieutenant Colonel Lysenko decided to counterattack the enemy with T-34 recovery tanks and armored halftracks. In this fashion, the tankers repelled two attacks by German infantry and took 35 Germans prisoner.
The SU-100 self-propelled artillery guns showed themselves to be quite effective in the March battles. In addition to the SU-100s of the 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade and of the two regiments in the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, with which the 3rd Ukrainian Front started the battle, on 9 March the 207th (62 SU-100, 2 T-34, 3 SU-57) and 209th (56 SU-100, 2 T-34, 3 SU-57) Self-propelled Artillery Brigades arrived to join the Front. Upon their arrival, the 207th Brigade was sent to the 27th Army, and the 209th Brigade went to the 26th Army. Thus, by 10 March 1945, the total number of SU-100 tank destroyers in the area of Lake Balaton (after deducting the combat losses) amounted to 188.
These self-propelled guns were actively used on the defense in cooperation with the infantry in order to repel enemy tank attacks, as well as to cover the bridges across the Sárviz and Sió Canals. They proved quite effective in these tasks. For example, the 208th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade over the course of 8 March and 9 March knocked out 14 German tanks and self-propelled guns, as well as 33 enemy halftracks, while losing 8 SU-100 destroyed and 4 disabled.
In order to combat enemy tanks, the SU-100s primarily operated out of ambush positions. SU-100 batteries were deployed in covered positions, camouflaged in woods, or on the reverse slopes of hills and ridges. In front of them, at a distance of 100-200 meters, firing positions with good visibility and good fields of fire were prepared, and as a rule, they offered 360° of fire. In the positions or next to them, observation posts were set up, in which there would be an officer who had a communications link with the battery. Whenever German tanks appeared at a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters, the tank destroyers would move up into their firing positions, fire several rounds, and then use reverse drive to pull back into cover. Such a tactic justified itself when repelling enemy attacks in the areas of Sáregres and Simontornya. For example, on 11 March, a battery of the 209th Self-propelled Artillery Brigade’s 1953rd Self-propelled Artillery Regiment, having taken up an ambush position in a dense patch of woods west of Simontornya’s train station, repelled an attack of 14 German tanks, three of which were set on fire at a range of 1,500 meters.
The normal range for firing from the SU-100 at heavy German tanks was 1,000 to 1,300 meters, but out to 1,500 meters, and sometimes even longer, when firing at medium tanks and self-propelled guns. The SU-100s as a rule fired from fixed positions, but sometimes from short halts. From the indicated ranges, the SU-100 could inflict damage to all types of German armor, and as a rule, with the very first on-target shell.
Cooperation between the self-propelled guns and other units was implemented in the following fashion. The commander of the self-propelled regiment and the rifle regiment commander as a rule were located in the same observation post or had telephone contact with each other. The commanders of the rifle battalion and of a self-propelled gun battery would personally work out all questions of cooperation on the spot, and in case of need, also had telephone communications. The commander of the SU-100 brigade maintained constant radio contact with the commander of the rifle division to which his brigade was attached. This allowed the transmission of information regularly in the course of fighting and the reaching of necessary decisions.
Nevertheless, during the battle, a number of genuine miscalculations in the organization of cooperation with the SU-100s were revealed. For example, fire cover provided by the field artillery for the self-propelled guns was poorly organized, the infantry didn’t render assistance to the crews when attempting to pass through swampy areas of terrain, and several of the all-arms commanders tried to use the SU-100 in the role of infantry support tanks. For example, the commander of the 36th Guards Rifle Division ordered a battery of tank destroyers to lead an infantry attack. Because of the absence of infantry and artillery cover, the SU-100s came under the fire of German antitank guns, as a result of which three of the tank destroyers were left burning.
A substantial shortcoming of the SU-100, which was revealed in the course of fighting, was its absence of a machine gun. Because of this, the vehicle had no close range defense against infantry and proved defenseless against assaulting German infantry. As a temporary measure, it was proposed to give each crew a light machine gun, and to give 8-10 light machine guns to the company of submachine gunners in the SU-100 self-propelled artillery regiments.
In the first days of the German offensive, even training units were used to reinforce the Front’s tank units. For example, on 8 March, the 22nd Tank Regiment, which was formed from a training regiment with the same numerical designation, arrived in the 26th Army. In a report it was noted that “in view of the fact that the tanks were from the table of equipment of a training tank battalion and were located on a training ground and in a tank park, and as well of the fact that it was 115 kilometers to its assigned place of assembly, the regiment was 11 hours late in arriving.” Altogether, the 22nd Tank Regiment had 11 T-34, 3 SU-76, 1 SU-85 and 1 KV-1s. This unit conducted combat operations right up to 16 March.
As concerns the replenishment of materiel, over the period between 6 and 16 March, the 3rd Ukrainian Front received only one batch of replacement tanks and self-propelled guns – on 10 March, 75 SU-76, 20 Sherman tanks and 20 T-34 arrived from the rear. The self-propelled guns were used to replenish the 1896th, 1891st and 1202 Self-propelled Regiments, the 18th Tank Corps, and the self-propelled gun battalions of the 4th Guards Army, while the Shermans went to the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the T-34s went to the 23rd Tank Corps. In addition, a certain number of tanks were put back into service by the Front’s 3rd Mobile Tank Repair Shop. For example, on 6 March the 18th Tank Corps received 20 repaired T-34s from it.
A bogged-down and abandoned Panther Ausf.G. Judging from the attached tow cable, the Germans had unsuccessfully attempted to free the tank from the mud.
An ISU-152 on the move. In the background, Hungary’s characteristic hilly terrain is visible.
A Flakpanzer IV Wirbelwind self-propelled anti-aircraft vehicle, destroyed by the direct hit of a large caliber shell. The gaping hole in the side of the hull is clearly visible.
Soviet offi
cers examining a Pz.IV tank, abandoned on a street of a Hungarian town. Note the tank’s Schürzen armored skirting, designed to protect the tank against anti-tank rifle rounds and hollow-charge shells.
18
Conclusions
The final German offensive of the Second World War was planned on a grand scale. However, even at this time – spring 1945 was already around the corner – many German calculations were based on an underestimation of the enemy’s possibilities.
In a tactical respect, the German panzer divisions proved to be much weaker than they had been in preceding operations, for example, in the January 1945 Konrad operations. Soviet documents on this subject stated:
If in the preceding operation the enemy had employed broad maneuvers with his mechanized troops, then in the given operation, the maneuvering from one sector to another was insignificant. The enemy fought on one axis using only separate groups of tanks shifted from one sector to another within the boundaries of the formation’s operations.
The defensive battles at Lake Balaton in March 1945 are interesting by the fact that the main burden of the struggle with enemy tanks lay upon the artillery. Soviet tank units played a secondary role in the fighting.
Tomb of the Panzerwaffe: The Defeat of the Sixth SS Panzer Army in Hungary 1945 Page 21