by Ian Hughes
The assassination of Rufinus
As Stilicho retired with the Western army back to Italy, the new magister militum per Thracias, Gainas, led the Eastern forces back to Constantinople. As they approached the city, the Emperor Arcadius and his praefectus praetorio Orientis Rufinus came out of the city to greet them at Hebdoman. Obviously, in the presence of the Emperor Rufinus was unable to deploy his bodyguard of Huns. During the speeches the troops slowly surrounded the imperial entourage. Suddenly, they struck; without warning Rufinus was torn apart by the troops.
Once again the cause of the attack has been widely discussed by historians, although without any consensus being reached. Some have gone with Claudian’s account, where he claims that Stilicho was working behind the scenes to eliminate his main rival. In this version, Stilicho was responsible for giving the orders for Rufinus’ death. As part of the scenario it is sometimes assumed that Eutropius was in a political alliance with Stilicho at this time, since he took the reins of power from Rufinus and there followed a short period of cooperation between the governments in Milan and Constantinople.
Yet on reflection this would seem unlikely. The only situation in which it would work would be where Stilicho knew Theodosius was about to die and also knew that Rufinus would be a major obstacle in the path of his ambition to control the whole Empire. He would have needed to have known that Arcadius would recall the troops. He would even have needed to know in advance who he could trust in the fast-changing world of imperial politics. Even then, the political arrangements would have had to have been extremely swift, since there was a limited amount of time between Stilicho’s claim to be parens principum of the whole Empire, his marching West and the request by Arcadius that the Eastern army be returned to Constantinople.
The main beneficiary of Rufinus’ fall was Eutropius. As a consequence, it has been suggested that Eutropius was the man who arranged for the troops to kill Rufinus, having as his agent the Gothic general Gainas. Yet, as we shall see, the nature of Eutropius’ fall would seem to preclude the possibility, as Gainas does not seem to have been a willing ally. The nature of politics in the imperial courts resulted in ever-changing alliances, as will be seen below.
Others have proposed that Stilicho made arrangements with Gainas to assassinate Rufinus, holding Rufinus responsible for the recall of the troops and Alaric’s survival in the Balkans.39 The concept has merit: when the order arrived it is likely to have made both men angry and frustrated. Obviously, Stilicho would have now become aware that Rufinus was going to block his attempt to become sole guardian of the Empire. Gainas is likely to have been annoyed, since the order blocked the attempt to force Alaric to battle, a battle in which Gainas was likely to have gained a large amount of credit in the East.
All of these accounts, however, fail to take note of two vital pieces of information. The first is found in Claudian. In his attack on Rufinus, Claudian does not actually claim that Stilicho gave the order to either the troops or their commanders to kill Rufinus. Instead, he states that the troops did it on their own out of a sense of loyalty to Stilicho.40 The concept that the assassination was not undertaken for political motives is reinforced by Philostorgius, who states that Rufinus was killed by the troops partly by the orders of Stilicho, partly in indignation at his scornful treatment, since ‘he had been caught sneering at them’.41 Although it must be accepted that Philostorgius might be following in the footsteps of Claudian, it is interesting that no other individuals are mentioned in connection with the assassination.
As a consequence, it is most likely that the assassination of Rufinus was carried out without overt political motives, except possibly on the part of Gainas. Instead, it should be seen as a reaction by the troops to Rufinus’ treatment of them, possibly exacerbated by the superior treatment they had received under the leadership of Stilicho.42
The political situation in the East quickly clarified and settled down. The praepositus sacri cubiculi Eutropius now benefited from his support of Arcadius. Having earlier supplied Arcadius with a wife, Eutropius was able to step into the vacuum created by Rufinus’ death. He assumed all of Rufinus’ powers and slowly began to extend his influence at court.
Gainas was maintained as the magister militum per Thracias. Although this was probably a step forward in his career, he may have been given the title but no actual troops to command, these being taken by Eutropius for a campaign against the Huns in the East.43 Eutropius provided a staff, but it would seem that Gainas had to raise fresh troops himself. Being given such a nominal command is unlikely to have been appreciated by one of the leading military commanders in the East.
Chapter Seven
The Rhine and the Greek Campaign, 396–7
Stilicho
At the end of the campaigning year of 395 Stilicho arrived back in Italy. It was obvious that he did not have the resources to deal with Alaric, although this remained one of his top priorities. Yet in some ways this may have been a relief, as by this time he must have been aware that tensions on the borders along the Rhine were becoming high. A campaign on the Rhine frontier would be advantageous in three respects. The first is that he would be able to secure the frontier against attack, a necessity for when he reopened hostilities against Alaric in the East. The second is that a successful campaign would allow him to recruit troops from submissive kings, so reinforcing the army that had been weakened by the West’s successive losses in civil wars to Theodosius. The third is that it would give the army a successful campaign and so begin the process of restoring the morale damaged by previous defeats.
The East
Either before the end of 395 or early in 396 messages arrived in Milan from Constantinople. We have no clear indication of the extent or precise nature of the diplomatic exchanges that took place at this time. It is clear that both Stilicho and Eutropius agreed on many things. In some ways Eutropius may have been a better political and strategic leader than Stilicho. He may have realized eight years before Stilicho that the Prefecture of Illyricum was vital to the defence of the West.
Illyricum, and especially the Diocese of Pannonia, was extremely important to the defence of Italy.1 Cassiodorus goes so far as to state that Raetia and Noricum were the ‘bars and bolts’ of Italy.2 By the fourth century the Claustra Alpium Iuliarum (Fortifications of the Julian Alps), which had probably been founded under Constantine, had been extended to secure both the defences into Italy and the logistical land links into the Danubian provinces.3 Furthermore, if enemies were at large in the Balkans, Illyricum was vital to the defence of Italy as it allowed the defenders to garrison and patrol both sides of the Julian Alps. This was essential in that it resulted in the Alps being the second line of defence, so any defeated troops could fall back and defend the passes against pursuing enemies. Furthermore, knowing that the Alps would be defended would act as a deterrent to further attack. As a final point, control of both sides of the Alps would enable the defenders to monitor the line of approach of enemy forces and so allow them to mount an ambush as the enemy crossed the passes – as evidenced by Arbogast’s ambush of Theodosius at the Battle of the Frigidus.
12. The return of the Diocese of Illyricum (previously Pannonia).
As long as the Empire was united and the East was strong, the control of Pannonia was irrelevant. The East would, in part, be using the resources and revenues from Illyricum to defend the diocese from external attack. However, once the East was no longer able to control the provinces – as had happened following the Gothic War of 376–82 – Italy suddenly became a frontier province that was exposed to fast attacks across the Julian Alps, and had little defensive capability with which to repel them.
In addition, there was the obvious fact that it supplied taxes to whoever governed it. Finally, and much more importantly, Illyricum was a valuable source of recruits. Without control of the prefecture, which was renowned for its men and horses, the Western army had major problems recruiting enough quality troops for the army.4 Eutropius may have come to
the conclusion that when Stilicho had attacked Alaric in 396 at least part of his actions was determined by the need to protect Milan and Italy from Alaric.
These considerations may have affected Eutropius in his decision to give part of Illyricum back to the West. However, there was another pressing reason for Eutropius to cede the provinces to the West. By transferring responsibility for their defence to Stilicho and the West, the provincial garrisons that were in place to protect against attack, both from Alaric and across the Danube, could be withdrawn and employed by Eutropius in his projected campaign against the Huns in Asia Minor, or at least be used to garrison Constantinople whilst he was away.5 Archaeology suggests that after 394 the Alpine passes were no longer systematically defended, possibly as the garrison was withdrawn to the East and Stilicho was only sporadically able to man the defences due to other commitments keeping his troops employed elsewhere.6
As a consequence, Eutropius came to a formal agreement with Stilicho which transferred the Diocese of Pannonia (Pannonia, Noricum and Dalmatia) from the East to the West. Now Stilicho had a buffer-zone between the heart of his Empire and Alaric. By ceding Pannonia to Stilicho, Eutropius might have been hoping that Stilicho would overlook his claims to the East and focus instead upon the problems of the West. In this, at least for a short time, Eutropius appeared to have been successful, as Stilicho was to spend all of 396 campaigning in the West.
Eutropius may also have hoped that this concession would remove Stilicho’s desire to face Alaric in battle: the East had enough problems with both internal and external difficulties, without including Stilicho and the Western Empire amongst them. The Huns were still ranging without check through the East and Eutropius seems to have seen them as a far greater danger than Alaric, and there were ongoing problems in negotiations with the Persian Empire. He may also have decided very early that a sure way to cement his position in power would be to lead an army against the Huns and secure a victory in person. Yet this could only be achieved with both Stilicho and Alaric removed as threats. By giving Stilicho the Western provinces of Illyricum, he may have hoped to pacify the head of the Western government. The only way he could gain control over Alaric would be by giving him the military position he craved.
In some modern works covering this period there is a problem concerning the perceived discrepancy in the allocation of the title of praefectus praetorio Illyrici by both East and West. In the West, at some time either late in 396 or early in 397, Stilicho appointed Theodorus as praefectus praetorio Italiae, Africae et Illyrici.7 Simultaneously, beginning in June or July 397 until 12 November 399, Anatolius was appointed as praefectus praetorio Illyrici in Constantinople.8
This has been interpreted as a response to Stilicho being declared hostis publicus (public enemy) in the East and is further used as evidence that even at this early stage Stilicho wanted to control Illyricum; his designation of Theodorus is seen as a counter to that of Anatolius and is interpreted as a sign of increasing tensions between East and West.9 Yet a close scrutiny of events shows that this is not the case.
The first fact that is usually overlooked is that Theodorus’ appointment dates to before the Greek campaign of 397 and the declaration of hostis publicus.10 The appointment does not appear to be a response to the declaration in the East, and so should not be seen as having ulterior motives.11
Furthermore, the post of praefectus praetorio Italiae, Africae et Illyrici (praetorian prefect of Italy, Africa and Illyricum) is a traditional post in the West, as evidenced by the insignia within the Notitia Dignitatum. As a consequence, the appointment should simply be interpreted as Stilicho allotting a traditional post to Theodorus. This was necessary as there was now a need to administer the Illyrican Diocese of Pannonia that had been returned to the West by Eutropius. The Eastern Prefect Anatolius remained in control of the remainder of Illyricum, but it should be acknowledged that Anatolius was the only one of the two allowed to pass laws, and these laws applied throughout the prefecture as long as they did not interfere with Western control. All known laws concerning Illyricum of this period are rendered in Constantinople.12
The Army
Before Eutropius could exert any control over Alaric he needed to stamp his authority on the East, and especially on the army. When Eutropius assumed control after the fall of Rufinus he had a major dilemma. The East once more had a large army to either protect the Balkans or to attack the Huns, yet it was stationed in Constantinople. As a consequence, any individual given control of this large force could immediately use it to gain more influence in the governing of the Empire. This situation needed to be avoided and any general’s potential influence minimized.13 To do this Eutropius would have to act immediately as any delay would play into the hands of the military administration.
The immediate outcome was that Eutropius continued to employ Rufinus’ method of using non-military means of solving military problems. The main danger to his authority was Timasius, the magister equitum et peditum who had served Theodosius in the Frigidus campaign alongside Stilicho. Early in 396 Eutropius arranged for allegations of treason to be brought against Timasius, and he was exiled before, allegedly, dying whilst trying to escape. At the same time another leading general, Abundantius, was also convicted and exiled. The latter case shows that Eutropius had little time for sentimentality, as it was Abundantius that had gained him his place in the imperial household.
Having removed the two leading military men in the East, Eutropius was now able to fill the ensuing vacancies with men of his own choosing. Furthermore, his actions in removing military leaders also removed military opposition to another plan that he had. It would allow him to open negotiations with Alaric concerning his desire for a post in the army.
At the same time as dealing with the problems caused by the army, Eutropius was certainly promoting men of his own choosing to senior positions within the civilian bureaucracy. Alongside these appointments he had some of the duties of the praefectus praetorio Orientis transferred to the magister officiorum in order to weaken the power of the prefect and ensure that the successors to Rufinus’ post did not succeed to his level of influence.
Unfortunately for Eutropius, the trials of his opponents and the overhaul of the bureaucracy and the positioning of his own men took time. It is probable that he was not securely in control until late in 396, so any negotiations with Alaric were opened either late that year or early in 397.14 In the interim, Alaric had not been idle. He had moved his forces into an area little-touched by barbarian attacks across the Danube.
396
Alaric
With Stilicho busy elsewhere and the Eastern army focused upon the Huns rampaging through the East, Alaric appears to have been left with a virtually free hand. He realized that any attempt upon the West would only provoke Stilicho into another major campaign, so a foray into Italy was out of the question. Yet although he must have appreciated that he had no chance of taking Constantinople, he still needed to maintain pressure on the Eastern government to assign him a command. Alaric decided to lead his men into an area long untouched by war, and so rich in the booty and supplies his followers needed.
Taking the defenders by surprise, he marched through the pass at Thermopylae and entered Greece. Zosimus claims that Alaric was allowed to move through the pass due to treachery on the part of Antiochus, proconsul Achaiae (proconsul of Greece) and Gerontius (commander of the garrison at Thermopylae). Both of these individuals had allegedly been appointed specifically for the purpose by the treacherous Rufinus. This should not be taken at face value; in Zosimus most reverses are described as being due to treachery.15 It is more likely that Gerontius was appointed to command the pass at Thermopylae with only a small force, either detached from Stilicho’s army or direct from Constantinople. Although certainty is impossible, it may be that he had the forces described by the Historia Augusta as being given to the future Emperor Claudius II in the third century. If so, he had command of two hundred infantry, one hundred heavy cavalry,
sixty other cavalry, sixty archers and one thousand raw recruits.16 With so few troops, and with the majority being raw recruits, it is obvious why Gerontius did not attempt to stop Alaric and his larger force of seasoned veterans.
Alaric quickly terrorized Greece: the only major cities left untouched were Thebes and Athens. However, the nature of these ‘attacks’ is uncertain. The behaviour of his forces in Greece does not imply that they wanted land distant from the Hunnic threat, but that Alaric was still hoping for a post in the Roman army.17 As a consequence, it is likely that he did not attack and slaughter the inhabitants of Greece. It is more likely that he followed the same policy as that adopted by the Goths between 378 and 382, where they threatened to attack cities unless they were provided with goods and provisions. The theory that Alaric intended to remain in Greece is certainly possible, but unfortunately it is impossible to prove, either one way or the other.18
Stilicho
When Alaric moved south, Stilicho would have been certain that Italy was, for the present, secure from attack. According to Paulinus, early in 396 Stilicho was in Milan.19 He had two main concerns. One was to cement his position as head of the Western government. This was actually to be relatively easy. Alongside his control of the army, Stilicho was surrounded by men like himself, the protégés and appointees of Theodosius. After Theodosius’ victory at the Frigidus Theodosius was determined to maintain control of the Western half of the Empire. Accordingly, he had appointed trusted individuals to positions of power in the West. Stilicho continued the policy of appointing men who had been involved in Theodosius’ councils and who, like Stilicho, could be relied upon to continue the policies of Theodosius. He simultaneously appointed individuals from Italy in order to maintain the support of the Senate. In these appointments he was helped by Symmachus, who continually provided suggestions and recommended individuals from the Western court to serve in specific posts.20