by Ian Hughes
Finally, the move helped Stilicho with regards to his greatest worry at the start of his guardianship: by having the Senate declare war, the Senate would then be placed in a difficult position to refuse to supply recruits for the army. Despite the fact that calling for recruits would be likely to upset the Senate, since the burden of supplying large numbers of men would fall primarily upon the aristocracy due to their huge landholdings, on 17 June 397 Stilicho issued a law enforcing conscription.32 Symmachus details some of the negotiations which took place between Rome and Milan.33
Predictably, once the law was passed in Milan, embassies were immediately sent from the Senate in Rome asking that the call for recruits be commuted to a tax payment. The embassies proved effective and in two laws, issued on 24 September and 12 November, the conscription was cancelled and commutation for gold was declared, with the rate being assessed at 25 solidi per recruit.34
However, Stilicho remained extremely anxious about the situation and the repeal was reversed. A second series of conscriptions followed. When Florentius, the praefectus urbi Romae, was deemed to have shown insufficient energy in implementing the conscription he was dismissed and replaced by Lampadius, brother of Theodorus (praefectus praetorio Italiae) and uncle of the younger Theodorus (praefectus praetorio Galliarum). Although further petitions from the Senate again resulted in the cancellation of the legislation, they were instead compelled to donate large amounts of grain for the good of the city during the war with Gildo.35
The second cancellation betrays Stilicho’s awareness of his own weakness; he could not afford to alienate the Senate, since he would need their support to maintain his position in the years ahead. Although the increase in tension could have led to widespread opposition to Stilicho’s government, he appears to have balanced the pressures and emerged virtually unscathed from the incident.
However, he had now alienated a number of senators with his policies and one factor that now began to further tell against him was his employment of pagans and heretics (such as Symmachus, who was a confirmed pagan). The more militant Christians amongst the elite in Rome began to stir in opposition to his rule.
On the wider political stage, Stilicho greatly raised the stakes by having the Senate, on behalf of Honorius, declare Gildo hostis publicus. Firstly, this highlighted that the East’s involvement in Western affairs had strengthened rather than weakened Stilicho’s position, and therefore any interference in the hope of destabilizing Stilicho’s position would be unprofitable. Secondly, the involvement of the Senate would make Eutropius more wary of supporting Gildo, since supporting Gildo in opposition to the wishes of the Senate in Rome would have greatly raised the probability of the outbreak of civil war.
The timing of the declaration could hardly have been better, as it was at around this time that Eutropius’ envoys arrived and indicated that, although Eutropius had gone East to face the Huns in person, when he returned he was in favour of accepting Gildo’s desertion of the West. With the backing of the Senate, Stilicho rebuffed Eutropius’ claims, and although several embassies arrived from the East, thanks to his strengthened position Stilicho was able to give them all the same, short reply.36
Since the rift between East and West was growing greater as time passed, Stilicho realized that speed was of the essence; not only did he need to restore the food supply from Africa to Rome before the supplies in Gaul and Spain were exhausted, but he needed to act before Eutropius returned from the East and was put under pressure to reinforce Gildo against attack.
Command against Gildo
It was obvious that Stilicho could not take command in person. In the first instance, he was still hostis publicus in the East and he needed to maintain a low profile in order not to damage relations any more than was strictly necessary, as he still had pretensions about becoming Arcadius’ parens.37 Moreover, defeat or delay would damage his authority in the West and leave him vulnerable to political attack.
And delay was the most likely outcome. Gildo was still the magister militum per Africam, in at least nominal control of the regular Roman forces in Africa and so in command of a formidable force. However, his main power base was amongst the Moorish tribes and so his army was likely to include large numbers of relatively low-quality troops unsuitable for large-scale battles. However, these troops were excellent for ‘guerrilla’ warfare. Unless Gildo was overcome quickly it was certain that he would retire to the interior and the support of the Moorish tribes. In that case, the conflict would become a drawn-out guerrilla campaign which would have severe political implications for Stilicho in Italy.
In addition, the political situation in Rome and Milan was tense and Stilicho was unwilling to leave a political vacuum by taking command in Africa. Should Stilicho leave the thirteen-year-old Honorius in the care of others, the half-expected delay in the retaking of Africa would lead to opposition politicians in Rome seizing the initiative and claiming power. As a consequence, the possibility that Stilicho would lead the army in person was never likely to be a reality.38
Mascezel
As a result of his deliberations Stilicho now needed to appoint someone to lead the expedition. The obvious choice, for a variety of reasons, was Mascezel, the brother of Gildo. Having survived the attempt on his life, Mascezel had fled to Milan in aid of support, and Gildo’s decision to kill his sons meant that there was little chance of Mascezel joining Gildo against Stilicho. Furthermore, by sending Mascezel, Stilicho could downplay the gravity of the situation, changing it from one that was the concern of the two imperial governments to one that was the outcome of a local family feud. In this way, he could send Mascezel without it being seen as an all-out attack on an imperial province that had been potentially claimed by the court at Constantinople. By removing himself from command, the result was that any action from Constantinople would result in them being perceived as the aggressor and, if that happened, this would help him in dealing with the Senate and the population of Rome.
Yet there are two further aspects to be considered. In 373 Mascezel had sided with his brother Firmus during the latter’s revolt against the Empire. Thanks to his loyalty to Firmus, it is probable that Mascezel remained high in the affections of those local tribes who had also supported Firmus. This may have been one of the reasons for Gildo being compelled by Valentinian I to retain Mascezel in the country during his time as governor: his presence would act as a check on Gildo’s influence and so reduce the risk of a new revolt. Furthermore, he appears to have been a strict Catholic, a fact which Stilicho may have been counting on to secure support from fellow Catholics in Africa. In contrast, Gildo was a Donatist.39 If Mascezel was as popular as suggested, then he could claim the support of the majority of the tribes against Gildo, so reducing the need for Stilicho to send large forces and also – hopefully – reducing Gildo’s power base and so making his quick defeat more likely. Finally, unlike Stilicho, Mascezel had already fought over the African terrain and this experience could prove vital in a battle with Gildo, who would have a similar knowledge.40
Mascezel’s ability to count on local support seems to be supported by the nature of the forces Stilicho organized for the attack. We are not given an exact breakdown of the troops sent to Africa by Stilicho. The little information we have comes from Claudian and Orosius. According to Orosius, the army under Mascezel comprised some 5,000 men.41 Claudian includes a list of units, and when this is compared to the units listed in the Notitia Dignitatum it becomes clear that these were all units of the elite palatina. Therefore, these units could reasonably expect such a mention, but obviously there is no guarantee that forces from ‘lower-ranking’ units were not also included in the army and were not mentioned by Claudian as being of little note.42
The following table gives a list of the forces listed by Claudian and attempts to link them with units in the Notitia Dignitatum.
Table 1: a possible derivation of the list given by Claudian: Bell. Gild. 418–23
Given the speed of muster, it is reason
able to assume that these units formed at least a large proportion of the forces placed under the command of Mascezel. Although in theory Roman fleets were maintained as part of the army, in practice these were not kept in continuous commission, probably due to cost.43 Furthermore, the speed was such that it is unlikely that with such short notice many vessels could be gathered that were suitable for the transport of horses, which were carried in specially designed vessels.44 Yet this may not have been of major importance to Mascezel; he could rely on support from his own people when he arrived back in Africa, and the Moors were famous for their light horsemen. As a consequence, it would appear that Mascezel was sent to Africa with little or no cavalry support, these instead being supplied by allies joining him upon his arrival. Whilst Mascezel prepared for the upcoming campaign, Stilicho arranged for the billeting of the remainder of the Italian army throughout Italy. If the war went badly, Stilicho would quickly be able to gather them together and lead a second expedition to Africa.45
Mascezel and the Christians
Mascezel is a shadowy figure who has been relegated to practical obscurity by the sources. The little we know suggests that his alliance with Stilicho would be less than easy. As was already noted, he was a Catholic and during his brief stay in Milan he appears to have attached himself to the powerful Catholic party at court. By doing this he allied himself to a group that was at odds with Stilicho, since they were strongly opposed to his policy of leniency towards heretics and pagans (such as Claudian and Symmachus).46 An example of his piety is given in Orosius, where he is shown as holding up the expedition by stopping en route to Africa at the island of Capraria while he fasted and prayed with the resident monks.47 It was clear that he would join the opposition to Stilicho’s rule, a situation that Stilicho would find hard to tolerate.
It should not be thought that the division between Christianity and Paganism was simply one of religion, although it is possible to perceive it as such. The conflict was one of the loyalties and customs accorded to the old gods of Rome as against the ‘brash, intolerantly aggressive newcomer’ that was Christianity.48 The pagans in the Senate saw themselves as the ‘pars melior humani generis’ (‘the better part of the human race’).49 They were men of wealth, breeding, influence and culture who were defending the pagan past which had raised Rome to Empire against the Christianity that seemed to be attempting to erase that past. As part of the conflict, the pagans interpreted the downturn in the Empire’s fortunes as being caused by the rejection of the old gods and the adoption of the new. The accusation and counter-accusation resulted in the production of many literary works defending the differing faiths. Those Christian works that survive form the basis of much of the historical interpretations on the life of Stilicho who, as an Arian and an employer of non-Christians, was denounced by most ‘good’ Christians as bringing about the fall of the Empire.
The African campaign
The expedition against Gildo set sail from Pisa in November 397.50 They passed Liguria on the right and Etruria on the left, before they stopped at Capraria to allow Mascezel to pray with the monks.51 Upon leaving the island they avoided Corsica but were scattered by a storm as they passed Sardinia.52 The various parts of the fleet landed as far apart as Sulci, Olbia and Caralis before they finally gathered together at Caralis for the rest of the journey.53 From Caralis it is certain that the expedition sailed to Sicily, as sailing direct to Africa from Sardinia was too long a journey for the available vessels.
Africa
We have no clear idea what Gildo was doing in Africa as these events unfolded. It is likely that throughout the crisis he remained in or near to Carthage. Here he would be available to receive ambassadors from both East and West and be ready to dictate a prompt reply to be taken to Constantinople or Milan. There is no doubt that Mascezel had informers in Africa ready to tell him where Gildo was located. It is most likely that these informed him of Gildo’s whereabouts while he was in Sicily.54
Having learned of his brother’s position, Mascezel sailed to a nearby location and quickly disembarked the troops. Moreover, he was allegedly certain of victory as the spirit of the recently deceased Bishop Ambrose appeared to him in a dream and foretold his victory.55 Mascezel must have known that Gildo was unaware of his arrival and was unlikely to have maintained many of his troops near to his location – if only to ease any problems of supply. What happened next remains unclear. Zosimus writes that after disembarking near to Gildo, Mascezel ‘so thoroughly worsted him in a sharp battle’ that Gildo lost hope and hanged himself.56 This is not the complete story. Gildo had many troops and supporters so the loss of one battle is not really enough to account for his despair. It is more likely that upon hearing of Mascezel’s advance many of Gildo’s supporters deserted him and joined his brother.57 The much-reduced force was then defeated in battle and Gildo attempted to escape. In his second poem against Eutropius, Claudian claims that Gildo’s flight was hindered by winds: ‘those same winds which hindered Gildo’s flight may seek to drown thee in the sea’.58 This suggests that Gildo attempted to escape by sea, but adverse winds confined him to harbour – possibly at Carthage. Realising that he could not escape, and was certain to be captured, Gildo lost hope and committed suicide.
14.Mascezel’s route to Africa.
Stilicho
Unaware that the expedition would be such a rapid success, once it had left Stilicho took steps to further establish his position as head of the West. Obviously, one part of his strategy was to accept the involvement of the Roman Senate by restoring a certain amount of power to that body. This had the beneficial repercussion that the Senate now became involved in difficult political decisions, which allowed Stilicho to ascribe blame elsewhere and so allow him to take a backward step and be seen merely as one of the top men, rather than as the supreme leader.59 He also began to change the leadership of the army, placing men of his own choosing in important positions. This had the very important consequence that only Stilicho could now rely on the army for support: any attempt to remove him would likely provoke a vicious response from the army.
However, Stilicho does not appear to have considered these measures enough in themselves to secure his position as parens over Honorius. Possibly echoing the political move made earlier by Eutropius, Stilicho decided that he needed to marry his daughter Maria, who was now about twelve years old, to the young emperor. Accordingly, Maria was married to Honorius, probably in February 398.60
Yet politically there was also a need for the marriage: as Mascezel had found, there was continuing opposition – especially amongst Christians – to Stilicho’s status as parens principum. By marrying his daughter to the emperor, Stilicho reinforced his claim to be parens to Honorius. Claudian supported the marriage. In January 398 he produced ‘Quarto Consulatu Honorii Augusti’ (‘Panegyric on the Fourth Consulate of the Emperor Honorius’), which made no mention of the ongoing war, although there are allusions to the previous conflict between c.372 and 375 when the comes Theodosius had defeated Gildo’s brother Firmus.61 For the ceremony itself he composed the ‘Epithalamium de Nuptiis Honorii Augusti’ (‘Marriage of the Emperor Honorius’ often referred to as ‘Epithalamium of Honorius and Maria’), a propaganda tool in which Stilicho is lauded as the ‘guardian of peace with honour’.62 What may be just as important is the unusual practice of placing the main speech in the Epithalamium in the mouths of the army; this was against tradition and may have been a way of reminding the audience that Stilicho’s main claim to power remained his command of the army.63
Any opposition to this arrangement will have been muted; after all, Honorius was only fourteen and clearly not capable of running the affairs of the West. Moreover, with every passing day Stilicho was becoming more secure and there was little anyone could do to stop the marriage. On the other hand, it is possible that many in court were dismayed by the wedding, realizing that by this act Stilicho had reinforced his relationship to the young emperor: parens principum, adopted brother-in-law, and now fath
er-in-law.
When news of Mascezel’s triumph reached Rome there would have been much rejoicing and relief; the threat of the blockade was removed and the citizens could rely once again upon a regular shipment of food from Africa rather than worrying about how soon the stocks in Gaul and Spain would run out. For Honorius there was an extra bonus. As was the rule in such cases, upon his death Gildo’s lands were confiscated and given to the emperor. These were found to be so extensive that a new post had to be created, the comes Gildoniaci patrimonii (count of the patrimony of Gildo), to administer them.64
Mascezel returned in triumph to Milan. His glory was to be short-lived; according to Zosimus, he was crossing a bridge in company with Stilicho and a group of imperial guardsmen when, on a pre-arranged signal, he was pushed into the river and drowned.65 Although this may be little more than Eastern propaganda, the fact that Mascezel had allied himself with the Catholic opposition to Stilicho, plus the fact that he had returned a hero after an exceptionally fast victory, means that, if an accident, it was an extremely fortunate accident for Stilicho. It is more likely that, on this occasion, Stilicho did indeed arrange for his potential rival to be eliminated.
Not content with Mascezel’s death, it was clear that, politically, Mascezel would not be allowed to gain the credit for the campaign. In his poems Claudian ensured that Stilicho received the credit, with Mascezel’s contribution to the war being minimized.66 Yet this is not really surprising: there was a long tradition throughout Roman history of emperors claiming the responsibility for victories achieved by their subordinates. The main difference between these examples and Stilicho is that Stilicho was not, in fact, the emperor, although his power at this point was actually probably greater than some previous emperors had wielded.