by Ian Hughes
A passage from Zosimus suggests that her death resulted in political turmoil in the East, possibly reflected in the removal of Eutychianus from office as praefectus praetorio Orientis and his replacement by Anthemius.34 With this in mind, Stilicho may have used the change of regime to make one last attempt to reassert his claim to be parens of Arcadius, or at least demand control of the whole of the Prefecture of Illyricum. Without Claudian’s poems, we have no way of knowing.
The potential dual claim to Illyricum and acceptance as parens did have one major effect. It caused relations between the two imperial brothers to reach breaking point. Before anything further could be done, Italy was once more invaded by Germanic tribesmen, this time led by the Goth Radagaisus.
Radagaisus
The origin of Radagaisus is clouded in mystery. Called ‘King of the Goths’, it is likely that he was the leader of a Gothic tribe that had remained north of the Danube under Hunnic control.35 It is possible that as the Hunnic king Uldin extended his power he claimed suzerainty over Radagaisus. It is also possible that in part Radagaisus was unable to counter Hunnic power due to Stilicho’s policies. Stilicho’s absorption with events in Italy and Illyricum may have meant that Radagaisus, and other leaders like him, lost their subsidies and so struggled to maintain large armies with which to counter the Huns. As a result, the level of control wielded by Uldin appears to have grown to an unacceptable level and Radagaisus decided to invade the Roman Empire rather than remain under Hun rule. His goals are unclear, yet it is possible that he was hoping to emulate Alaric and obtain land and a title for himself in the West. It is highly unlikely that he believed that he could overthrow the might of the Empire.
According to Zosimus Radagaisus gathered together his followers, along with others who also no longer wanted to be under Hunnic rule, and crossed the Danube and the Rhine into the Empire. The passage deserves closer attention.
While, however, Alaric was standing by ready to obey Stilicho’s orders, Radagaisus gathered 400,000 Gauls and Germans from over the Danube and the Rhine and started to invade Italy.
Zosimus, 5.26.3
The phrase ‘Gauls and Germans’ was, by this date, simply traditional literary terminology for non-Romans across the Rhine and Danube. However, the use of both terms strongly suggests that Radagaisus did not lead only his own tribe, but that he was joined by others also willing to risk entry to the Empire in preference to remaining under Hunnic rule.
Furthermore, the statement that he crossed both the Rhine and the Danube is important. It suggests that he did not pass through Illyricum or Pannonia as is sometimes claimed.36 Instead, he probably crossed the border and ravaged Raetia in the summer before crossing the Alps at the Brenner Pass, entering Italy towards the end of the year before the snows fell.37 This would help explain why Alaric took no part in the events that followed.38 The invasion did not pass near him and he preferred to maintain his position as a Roman commander than risk all again by joining an invasion led by a different ‘king’. After all, even were they successful, the size of Radagaisus’ forces would have ensured that Alaric was subordinate, a situation he is unlikely to have wanted.
18. Radagaisus’ invasion of Italy.
As a further incentive, it is likely that at this point Stilicho, realizing that should Alaric join Radagaisus they would be unbeatable with the forces he had at his command, arranged for an exchange of hostages with Alaric.39 One of these hostages was Aetius, who was later to have such a great influence on events in his own right. Secure in his position, Alaric remained quiet and defended Noricum and Pannonia against further incursions from across the Danube.
Finally, the suggestion that Radagaisus had 400,000 men is a patent exaggeration. Even the figure of 200,000 suggested by Orosius is far too high and probably owed more to the fears of the Italians and Stilicho’s later propaganda than to an attempt to estimate the actual numbers.40 It is more likely that his forces numbered not much more than 20,000 fighting men at the most, although the number of non-combatants will have pushed the number of people he led much higher.41
Despite the fact that the figures are exaggerated, the large number of dependents did have an effect upon Radagaisus’ strategy. Once in Italy he made the decision to split his forces into three.42 This was probably forced upon him: with a large number of people to feed over winter, he had no option but to split his forces if they were to avoid the dangers of famine. Unfortunately, the decision would be his undoing.
In Rome the news of the invasion caused a crisis so great that disturbances broke out. These concerned the belief in pagan circles that the disaster had been caused by the abandonment of the old gods, with the ensuing desire to renew the festivals and regain their protection. Obviously, this was opposed by the Christians. Furthermore, the panic was greater than that caused by the invasion of Alaric since in Christian circles it was accepted that, although a heretic, as an Arian Alaric was at least a Christian. Radagaisus, as a barbarian pagan who worshipped half-known, evil deities, was the ‘most savage by far’ of the two.43
Over winter Radagaisus and his forces appear to have roamed over large areas at will, plundering the villages and towns and devastating ‘many cities’.44 Even Rome appears to have been under threat, though this may have been the reaction of the citizens rather than a real possibility.45 Stilicho was outnumbered and remained with his army at Ticinum.46 However, he sent orders for troops from the Rhine frontier to move to Italy to reinforce his army, and ordered all of the available Huns and Alans to also meet him in the new year, as well as ordering a recruitment programme to swell his forces in Italy.47 Furthermore, two edicts, dated 17 April and 19 April 406 (and so at the height of the invasion), called on the inhabitants of Gaul to arm themselves for the peace of their country; it was being made clear that any further invasion, this time from across the Rhine, would have to be dealt with locally until the war against Radagaisus was over.48
Once the campaigning season began the two Gothic forces not under Radagaisus’ personal command moved separately into Italy to continue their attacks. Radagaisus, with the largest force, moved to besiege Florentia. Once Stilicho had received his reinforcements and his army had reached its maximum size, he advanced on Radagaisus as the Goth continued his siege operations. According to Zosimus Stilicho’s force mustered, ‘thirty numeri (units) and as many auxiliaries as he could get from the Alans and the Huns’, the latter possibly led in person by Uldin.49 No doubt Uldin was keen to help the Romans, since he wanted to maintain his authority over his subjects. A successful joint campaign with the Romans would demonstrate the futility of attempting to escape from his power.50 Included in the Western army at this time were the Goths enrolled after the victory at Verona, led by Sarus, and it is interesting to note that they seem to have had little difficulty in facing their ‘cousins’ in battle.
The defeat of Radagaisus
It is likely that, aside from having the largest army he could muster to hand, Stilicho also wanted to move fast and catch Radagaisus whilst his forces were divided and before he could summon the other two groups of Goths to his aid. Stilicho crossed the Arno and quickly advanced to the relief of Florentia.51
The city was in dire straits and on the point of starvation when Stilicho arrived.52 Following his victory over Alaric Stilicho now had confidence in his own abilities and did not hesitate to launch an attack. It is probable that Radagaisus’ forces were encamped at strategic points around the city as part of the siege. Taken by surprise, Radagaisus was unable to gather his troops and respond to the attack. The Goths were driven back and forced to take refuge on the heights around Faesulae. So precipitous was his flight that ‘not even one Roman was wounded, much less slain’.53
Here the tables were turned, since although Radagaisus and his men were in too strong a position for Stilicho to assault, they were now surrounded and in turn quickly reduced to the point of starvation. Furthermore, trapped on the hill Radagaisus was unable to summon the other two groups to his aid. In t
hese desperate straits Radagaisus decided to abandon his men and make an attempt to escape, although in his defence it is possible that he was making a personal attempt to reach the other two Gothic forces and lead them in an attempt to raise the siege. The attempt was unsuccessful and he was captured by Roman troops. Stilicho felt no need to treat softly with the defeated Goth. He was executed together with his sons on 23 August 406 outside the gates of the city he had tried to capture.54 With his ‘defection’ and capture his troops on the hills surrendered. Some 12,000 men were taken into Roman service.55
The size of the opposing forces56
Much has been made of the number of troops given by Zosimus as being mustered by Stilicho. With thirty numeri it should, in theory, be possible to calculate the number of Roman troops at the battle, although the number of federates would still remain open to doubt. Yet the attempt is fraught with danger. Firstly, the exact number of troops in any specific unit is unknown. Secondly, we may be right in assuming that Stilicho’s recruitment drive had helped to fill gaps in the ranks, but whether this was the case or not is completely unknown. As a result, many of the numeri may have been greatly under strength.
It is probably safe to assume that each of the numeri will have mustered at the most 500 men. As a result the maximum size for Stilicho’s ‘native’ forces would be 15,000 men, although the number is likely to have been lower than this in reality due, amongst other causes, to desertion, illness, and an inability to recruit enough troops. With the supporting federates the number may be estimated at a maximum of somewhere around 20,000 men, which at any time in the life of the Empire was a sizeable force. This would explain why Stilicho was prepared to move fast and confront Radagaisus in the open.
Estimating the size of Radagaisus’ forces poses an even greater difficulty, since the numbers given in our sources are far too high. As has already been noted, Zosimus claims that Radagaisus had 400,000 men and Olympiodorus claims 200,000.57 Although the numbers will have included large numbers of dependents rather than simply able-bodied men, it is clear that the figures owe more to the fear of the Italians at having been invaded again than they do to a sober attempt to calculate the forces Radagaisus had at his disposal.
Most modern commentators have – understandably – not attempted to calculate the size of Radagaisus’ forces, mainly due no doubt to any estimate being based solely upon guesswork.58 However, if the invasion was an attempt to escape from Hunnic dominance, then it should not be seen simply as a military operation. A large proportion of Radagaisus’ followers would have been non-combatants: the families and dependents of the warriors spearheading the invasion. Given the context, the numbers crossing into Italy would indeed be very large.
The only real clue we have as to the forces Radagaisus had at his disposal is the figure of 12,000 men taken into Roman service after the execution of Radagaisus.59 It has plausibly been suggested that Olympiodorus had two reports of the campaign, one based on wild rumours and the other upon an official account of the recruitment figures. In order to accept the reported total of Radagaisus’ troops as 400,000 he classed the 12,000 that were enrolled in the army as ‘leaders’.60 This allowed for the rest to be captured as slaves.
It is likely that this is not the whole story and close analysis can give a different interpretation. When Radagaisus invaded Italy he soon split his forces into three.61 It is probable, though impossible to prove, that he retained the largest group under his personal command. When he was defeated at Faesulae there were 12,000 men who were taken into the Roman army and their dependents treated as military families.
The other two groups may have been smaller, numbering only a few thousand warriors each at the most, plus attendant families. It would not seem unreasonable, therefore, if the total invasion force that entered Italy numbered around 50,000. This extremely large number would help to explain the grossly inflated figures quoted in the ancient sources.
The end of the invasion
Once word spread that the main force under Radagaisus had been defeated, the other two groups appear to have quickly lost heart. It is possible that the two groups suffered different fates. Stilicho gave orders to the Huns to attack at least one of them and they were quickly defeated or chased from Italy, with some possibly escaping across the Alps into Gaul.62 However, there was a later rumour that he had negotiated with the other group, so it is possible that at least one of them was persuaded to leave Italy, although the truth of the claim is open to doubt.63 So many people were captured and sold into slavery that the slave markets in Rome were flooded with new slaves and prices collapsed due to the sheer number available.64 Although the invasion had lasted into a second year, the scale of the victory and the speed with which all three groups had been defeated elevated Stilicho to the highest military position he was ever to achieve. Monuments, including a triumphal arch, were erected in his honour by the order of the Senate.65 Unfortunately, the victory also gave him, for the first time, an army capable of offensive, not just defensive action.
Chapter Twelve
Stilicho and the Invasion of Illyricum,
406–407
Following the defeat of Radagaisus, Stilicho’s reputation had reached its peak. The almost bloodless victory and the assimilation of 12,000 new recruits into the army meant that his position was practically unassailable. Yet paradoxically, it is probably at this time that opposition towards his regime gained increasing momentum.
The Roman political elite continued to adhere to the outdated standards of a bygone era. Rome was to be defended by Roman citizens and battles against barbarians were to be crushing victories in which the dead enemy were piled high as a symbol of Rome’s supremacy. Although Radagaisus was executed, the sparing of any of his followers ran counter to senatorial beliefs. Furthermore, once beaten the opposition was to be either killed or sold as slaves. They were particularly not to be taken into the Roman army in large numbers.
By taking 12,000 Goths into Roman service Stilicho made a dual mistake that began to tell against him. Firstly, the senatorial elite resented the fact that he was not conducting wars in the manner which Rome expected, especially when it was allied to Alaric’s ‘escape’ in 402. Secondly, and just as importantly, the regular army began to resent the fact that Stilicho was relying more and more on barbarian recruits. By this time his bucellarii (bodyguard) was composed of Huns, an honour that no doubt the regular forces felt should have gone to a unit of their own. The tension was greatly exacerbated by the command structure in the Italian army. The regular troops were under regular officers, only the most high-ranking of which would be expected to act in the consilium, or ‘council’ of the magister peditum. However, it is likely that a large number of barbarian nobles would expect to be included in military discussions. By this late stage there were probably many such barbarian leaders, all in command of small, independent formations. Stilicho could not afford to alienate these men in case they revolted and either joined an enemy during the course of a battle or simply led their men out of imperial service and into brigandage. With the extremely large number of barbarian ‘nobles’ in the consilium, the Roman commanders and troops began to feel as if they had been displaced by barbarians, and that Stilicho was now deferring to barbarian advice rather than relying on Roman officers.
Events in the East
After the death of Eudoxia in childbirth in 404 her ‘corrupt clique’ continued to dominate the East until they were overthrown in 405. They were replaced by a broader-based coalition headed by Anthemius, who became the new praefectus praetorio Orientis, a post he was to hold until 414.1 The new regime managed to stop the ‘Johannite disorders’ (the outbreaks of violence centred around John Chrysostom: Chapter 11) and so secure peace in the capital. Furthermore, Anthemius had earlier been sent to Persia, possibly in 399, to negotiate a peace treaty with the new Persian ruler, Yezdigerd I.2 Anthemius was now able to make the most of his previous personal contact with Yezdigerd to secure enduring peaceful relations between Cons
tantinople and Persia. This was a vital breathing space in which the East could order its affairs and regroup – helped by the fact that the new regime remained in place for nine years, ensuring continuity of policy and simple stability for the Empire. However, as a side effect it was obvious that such a stable regime had no need to seek the help of Stilicho, nor to agree to any demands he made. Any claims to be parens or to Illyricum were rebuffed.
Stilicho
Thanks to the ensuing tension between East and West, Stilicho refused to acknowledge the East’s consul for 405. Relations continued to decline. At the same time, Stilicho’s hold upon Honorius was threatened by a personal tragedy; either late in 406 or early in 407 Honorius’ wife Maria died. Honorius was no longer Stilicho’s son-in-law. Although Serena, Stilicho’s wife and Honorius’ adopted sister, appears to have quickly arranged for Honorius to marry their other daughter, Thermantia, this would take time and it is clear that such a marriage would be likely to increase opposition to Stilicho’s dominance. Stilicho needed to maintain his military supremacy in order to bolster his political superiority.
However, a further incident occurred that helped relations to deteriorate even further. In 407 John Chrysostom died in exile. Honorius, Stilicho and Pope Innocent I had attempted to intervene on his behalf. His death meant that East and West would find it difficult to reconcile their differences over his treatment.
Eventually, Stilicho decided to act. With his claims to the guardianship of Arcadius and to the Prefecture of Illyricum refused, in late 406 he made preparations for an attack upon the East that would take place in 407.3 This policy had only been made possible by his victory over Radagaisus. With the army bolstered by 12,000 extra men, Stilicho could, for the first time since 397, contemplate taking the initiative and attacking rather than waiting to be attacked. Moreover, the overwhelming defeat of Radagaisus meant that Stilicho’s profile abroad would be raised even higher. There was little likelihood of the tribes on the frontiers taking advantage of his absence for a campaign season, as they had heard about Radagaisus’ execution.