by Ian Hughes
Having dispatched the Pannonian Vandals to help secure Gaul, Stilicho was probably either still awaiting news from Epirus or had just learnt that Alaric was still alive when the letters arrived from Honorius.2 The letter cancelling the attack on Illyricum was allegedly sent under the promptings of Serena. This was a clever political move. It absolved Honorius from all responsibility for the attack, laying it squarely at Stilicho’s feet. In effect, it declared that the war against the East was not official and that Stilicho had overstepped his responsibilities. This gave room for negotiation with the East and the possibility of averting conflict. This was critical. Stilicho could not afford to fight a war on two fronts, since he only had enough forces for one offensive. There can be little doubt that messengers were sent to Constantinople to apologize for the invasion and that their main purpose was to ensure that the East did not continue the war.
Yet included within the dispatches for Stilicho was the news that a usurper had arisen in Britain and landed with an army in Gaul.3 News of Constantine’s landing caused a crisis.4 No Roman emperor could admit that an upstart could call themselves Augustus, since this would merely encourage others to challenge his own position.5 Moreover, Stilicho was, in effect, a fourth-century general who realized that the usurpation was the most important thing.6 Stilicho now had no option but to postpone the proposed campaign in Illyricum. Moreover, political considerations in the Senate also caused concern. Opposition to Stilicho’s policies was growing, especially as the defence of Gaul – and especially the senators’ large estates there – was seen as one of the over-riding responsibilities of the Western emperor. Stilicho needed to remain in Italy to maintain the cooperation of the emperor and nullify political opposition in court.7 There is little doubt that he believed that the army in Gaul would have no difficulty in repelling Constantine’s invasion – especially when reinforced with the Pannonian Vandals. Yet the Gauls quickly transferred their allegiance to Constantine and the Gallic army suddenly swelled the ranks of the usurper’s armies.
21. Stilicho’s response to the invasions.
It is probable, given the nature of communications and the delays caused by waiting for rumours to be confirmed as facts, that the campaign season was nearing its end before Stilicho and the Italian army were in any position to strike at Constantine. Taking advantage of the hesitation, Constantine had taken control of the north and centre of Gaul, basing himself in Lyon. No doubt by this time also the news of the defection of Spain had arrived, but this may not have been seen as a major factor yet. After all, Spain was the home of the Theodosian dynasty and there will have been long-standing loyalty to the house in at least some of the peninsula. The main concern still remained Constantine’s actions in Gaul and potential action in Italy.
Despite having taken control of most of Gaul, Constantine made no attempt to conquer Arles. The Honorian administration of Gaul had retreated to there and founded an emergency headquarters for the praefectus praetoriano Galliarum. Instead, Constantine remained in Lyon and began to mint coins stressing his desire to be a colleague of Honorius, not a rival.
Stilicho was ordered to meet Honorius in Rome to decide upon what course of action to take. At the same time, Honorius issued a series of laws concerning the invasion.8 In desperation Honorius, probably in agreement with Stilicho, sent conciliatory messages to the East. Although this has been interpreted as Stilicho breaking his treaty with Alaric, this is not the case; Alaric was a member of the Roman armed forces and had simply been doing as ordered. Although his orders had changed, there is no evidence that his agreement to serve Stilicho was affected.9
With the entire army in Italy geared towards the invasion of Illyricum, Stilicho was in no position to move quickly to face the threat in Gaul. The army on the Adriatic was ordered to move to north-west Italy in preparation for hostilities. The fleet was ordered to disperse and return to its normal duties, where appropriate being used to carry a proportion of the large amount of supplies up the River Po to the new rendezvous. In this, Stilicho made an excellent choice.
By choosing Pavia, on the River Ticinus, a branch of the River Po, Stilicho made it easier to move supplies by sea and river from the Adriatic to the new mustering point. Furthermore, Pavia is in an ideal position both to monitor the crossings over the Alps from Gaul and from which to launch an attack into Gaul from Italy. Furthermore, it was ideally placed to launch an attack on the flank or rear of any troops heading for Milan or Ravenna (Map 21). In this manner Stilicho could guard against an attack from Constantine whilst at the same time keep his options open as to where to strike into Gaul.
These moves took time. In the event, Stilicho decided to wait for the new year’s campaign season to open before opposing Constantine. This was a sensible decision, since unless the campaign was successful in an incredibly short time, communications with an army in Gaul would be difficult in the winter months, with the passes over the Alps either blocked or at least extremely hazardous, making a detour necessary. Furthermore, what action to take remained unclear.
Stilicho remained with the emperor and his advisors into early 408, debating what should be done and countering the recriminations that were no doubt being raised against him.10 These will have included the anger of the emperor, as it is unlikely that he would have been happy with the decision to declare war on the East over the control of Illyricum, an action which had removed the army from northern Italy and easy access to Gaul, so making Constantine’s conquest of Gaul easier.11 Although no record of these talks remains, it is more than likely that they centred upon a few main facts. The most important of these was that Stilicho had been so engrossed in his preparations to go to war with the East, itself with little justification, that he had neglected two of the main duties of a Roman leader: defence against invasion and the prevention of usurpation. Despite the fact that the invasion of Roman territory by barbarians was unbearable, the Empire would eventually win. But the rise of a usurper threatened the survival of the emperor himself. No doubt these arguments and recriminations mainly revolved around the fact that Gaul and Spain had been lost and that the emperor was close to losing his throne. Added to these factors was the economic one. The emperor in Italy now had no taxes from Spain, Britain and most of Gaul. Additionally, the lands owned by the senators in the south of Gaul had now either been conquered by Constantine or were under direct threat of annexation. For Stilicho, speed was essential before the coffers were emptied and yet more support was lost; troops who are unpaid tend to find excuses not to fight.
Yet as was just noted, little appears to have been done during the remainder of 407. Along with concerns over the weather, it is almost certain that one of the reasons for delay was political. Without doubt, placatory envoys were sent to the East and early in 408 the Eastern nominee as consul was officially recognized in the West.12 Moreover, as has already been noted, Spain was a stronghold for the Theodosian house. The Theodosian family in Spain would have wanted to support Honorius in his time of need, but have been uncertain as to which course to take. Consequently, it is likely that during the winter months messengers were passing between Italy and Spain, coordinating a revolt of those members of the family in the peninsula willing to act. Plans may also have been made to coordinate their actions with an attack across the Alps from Italy.
It would appear that two members of the family, Didymus and Verinianus, agreed to act. Although they were on bad terms with each other, they agreed to forget their differences and join against the common foe Constantine, and set about raising an army from their dependents.13 Two further members of the Theodosian house, Theodosiolus and Lagodius, did not take part in the revolt.14
The revolt led by Didymus and Verinianus and planned for early 408 was of inestimable value to Stilicho. Forcing Constantine to divide his forces would deprive him of troops in Gaul and so help any forces sent to attack him from Italy. It is also sometimes claimed that Stilicho was sending messengers into Gaul to incite barbarians already there to cause further cha
os and so weaken Constantine’s position.15 There is no evidence for such a claim and it is far more likely that these disturbances were caused by later events in Spain.16
Alaric
Prior to his attempt to cross to Illyricum, Stilicho had heard a rumour that Alaric was dead. However, this was proved to be a false report when news arrived that Alaric was alive and well and waiting with his troops in Epirus. Yet the planned invasion was now impossible. Furthermore, to ensure victory, Stilicho would need to muster all of his available resources to deal with the uprising. As part of the process it has been proposed that Stilicho ordered Alaric to leave Epirus.17 This interpretation goes against the accepted theory, based on Zosimus, that from the moment Stilicho heard of the rebellion of Constantine Alaric was left to his own devices.18 Nonetheless, Stilicho ordering Alaric to move is almost certainly true. The idea that during the political crisis, when Stilicho and Honorius were desperately trying to repair the rift with the East, Alaric would be left in Epirus is hard to believe. Taking into account the need to avoid conflict with the East, and the need to muster all available forces, it is more likely that Stilicho ordered Alaric to withdraw to Noricum, and, whilst garrisoning the province against attack, await further instructions.19 The concept is further reinforced by Zosimus, who later notes that Alaric sent his brother-in-law Athaulf with a group of Goths and Huns to defend Pannonia from attack.20 The news reported by Zosimus was simply confirmation that Alaric had done as ordered. The reason for the manner of the report by Zosimus is that he knew the end result and all of his account is twisted by his knowledge of the conclusion.
There remained the question of who to appoint as the military commander for the upcoming war. Stilicho could not afford to go himself. Apart from the danger of being killed, he would also lose the political domination of Honorius, a factor becoming increasingly vital to his survival. Furthermore, a defeat would lose him much of the prestige gained by his recent victories, allowing the opposition to grow and coalesce.
The attack on Gaul
In the end the Goth Sarus, who had changed allegiance from Alaric to Stilicho after the Battle of Pollentia in 402, was appointed to the command in Gaul, probably as comes rei militaris, with the specific brief of defeating Constantine.21 At this time the two main representatives of the emperor in Gaul were Limenius, the praefectus praetoriano Galliarum, and Chariobaudes, the magister militum per Gallias.22 It may be thought odd that Chariobaudes was not given command of the force, but since he had lost the trust of the Gallic army, which had deserted to Constantine, it may have been thought that he did not have the prestige to win them back. He may also have lacked Sarus’ military ability as well as Sarus’ political connections at court.
Stilicho has sometimes been criticized for not dealing with the barbarians devastating Gaul, instead focusing on Constantine’s usurpation.23 This is unfair. The fact that Constantine quickly reached the south of Gaul shows that Stilicho did not have the time necessary to react to the depredations of the barbarians in the north of Gaul (Map 21). Furthermore, the line of Constantine’s advance precluded actions in the north. Any such manoeuvres would have to detour around Constantine, who would thus be in position to threaten their lines of communication. Stilicho was never in a position to deal with the barbarian invaders.
For the attack in Gaul the new comes rei militaris Sarus was given a relatively small but highly mobile force with which to oppose Constantine, probably composed of his own Gothic followers and picked elements of the Italian field army.24 It is possible that Stilicho was hoping that Sarus’ campaign would mirror that of Mascezel against Gildo: a quick assault that would take Constantine by surprise and allow him to be defeated heavily, so overthrowing his regime before it was able to fully establish itself. Furthermore, as noted above, it is likely that Didymus and Verinianus also declared their revolt early in the year, possibly coordinating their rebellion with Sarus’ planned assault.
In early 408, the counter-attack by Sarus was launched.25 After crossing the Alps, Sarus advanced towards Lyon. Constantine was aware of his movements and sent Justinianus against him. Sarus won a complete victory, killing Justinianus, many of his men and capturing a ‘vast amount of booty’.26 Learning that Constantine was at Valentia (Valence) Sarus quickly advanced and managed to catch Constantine while he was still in Valence. Sarus laid siege to the city in the knowledge that capturing Constantine would almost certainly end the rebellion.
Constantine’s other magister, Nebiogast, now arrived on the scene and entered negotiations with Sarus. We are unsure about the nature of these talks. It is usually assumed that Nebiogast was attempting to change allegiance, but he may have been attempting to negotiate a truce on behalf of Constantine; the wording of the source does not specify which.27 Having come to an agreement with Sarus, Nebiogast was treacherously killed.
The time that Constantine had spent in the north of Gaul now saved him. Following the victory over the Saxons and his time spent reforming the Rhine frontiers, he had sent Edobich, a Frank, and Gerontius, a Briton, to raise troops. After he had been besieged by Sarus for only seven days they led their newly recruited force south, relieving the siege. Constantine’s move to Valence and the swift arrival of a large relief force is usually ignored by historians, yet they are vital to an understanding of the course of events.
It is clear that Constantine expected an attack over the Alps, hence his move south to Valence and the swift dispatch of Justinianus to fight Sarus. Yet the speed of his actions suggests that Constantine was confident of victory. If he was convinced that Justinianus would win, then there was no need for him to arrange the large-scale reinforcements that now arrived on the scene.
Therefore, there must have been a separate reason to amass large numbers of Franks and Romans. Since he was still attempting to convince the court at Ravenna that he wished to be a colleague, and not a rival, these troops are unlikely to have been raised for an invasion of southern Gaul. Given the timescale, neither were they raised specifically to raise the siege of Valence. It is hard to believe that troops could have been raised, organized and then led to relieve the siege in less than two weeks.
As a consequence, they must have been required for a separate task. This can only have been to go to Spain. Early in 408 news must have reached Constantine of the rebellion of Didymus and Verinianus. They probably declared their intentions before the beginning of the campaign season, to allow them to amass troops before Constantine could take any action. It must be that the new troops in Gaul were raised specifically with the aim of a reconquest of Spain. After assembling in the north they marched south to join Constantine, who no doubt was planning to send them to Spain under one of the magistri – probably Nebiogast as Justinianus was obviously to be retained for the defence of Gaul. It was simply coincidence that as they approached the south of Gaul they found that they had a major crisis to deal with; Constantine was besieged in Valence.
It would appear that Constantine had managed to send messengers through the lines of the siege to request help, and it would also appear that he had appointed Edobich and Gerontius as the new magistri following the death of Justinianus and Nebiogast. This implies that these two men were already well known to Constantine and high in his esteem. They now led the recently raised troops to the rescue.
There was no battle fought outside the city. It would appear that as they moved to the attack Sarus retired in the face of overwhelming numbers and in fear of the military skill of Gerontius and Edobich. It also seems that he was forced to retire at speed, since he lost a large amount of his baggage train to the enemy. Although strategically a defeat, the fact that Sarus had managed to win a battle and kill both of Constantine’s magistri no doubt considerably heartened the court in Italy. However, humiliation ensued for Sarus: when he attempted to retreat across the Alps his crossing was opposed by local bacaudae. With the enemy in hot pursuit, he was forced to buy a crossing by giving the bacaudae the remains of his baggage train.28
When
news of Sarus’ return was announced, although the ease of Sarus’ first victory gave cause for hope, there can be little doubt that the later defeat damaged Stilicho’s reputation. Yet Sarus had not been defeated in battle, and had actually won a significant victory. The Senate, rather than being downhearted, may have actually gained confidence by the news that a small expeditionary force had come so close to success. However, the attack had made it clear to Constantine that he was not going to be accepted as a fellow Augustus by Honorius and in late spring, believing that Constantine would now launch an attack of his own, the remnant of the imperial government in Gaul followed Limenius and Chariobaudes as they returned in haste to Italy.
The second marriage of Honorius
Earlier, at approximately the same time as Constantine first conquered Arles, some time in May 408 Stilicho married his second daughter, Aemilia Materna Thermantia (commonly known as Thermantia), to the Emperor Honorius, who was now aged twenty-three. Unfortunately, as is usual in the story of Stilicho, the circumstances surrounding the marriage are unclear and open to interpretation.
We do know that Honorius was earlier married to Stilicho’s eldest daughter Maria. We know that prior to the second marriage Maria had died, but we do not know the date of her death. Nor do we know for certain whether Honorius, Stilicho or Serena were the moving force behind the second marriage. It is commonly accepted that it was Stilicho who arranged the marriage in an attempt to bolster his weakening position by ensuring that he remained the father-in-law of the emperor. It is a lot easier simply to accept the statement of Zosimus that Honorius wanted to marry Thermantia, and in this was supported by Serena who was fearful of losing her power and prestige.29 In the same passage Zosimus claims that Stilicho was against the match. This is probably more feasible. Although the marriage would reunite Stilicho and Honorius as father-and son-in-law, it was politically dangerous.