by Ian Hughes
The weight of the arguments was overwhelming: Honorius, with an ‘understandable lack of enthusiasm’, acceded to Stilicho’s request that he stay in Italy and act as the focus for those troops loyal to his court.8 Honorius dictated letters for Stilicho to carry to Constantinople, and also drafted orders for Alaric to travel to Pavia and take control of the army in Italy.9 The title he was to be given is unclear; the likelihood is that it was either magister militum vacans or magister militum per Gallias. The claim that he was to be made magister equitum is not stated in any of the sources and is actually negated by another piece of evidence.10 It would appear that at this time Vincentius, who is otherwise unknown, was made magister equitum.11 His appointment would have fulfilled several functions at the same time. First, he would be Stilicho’s representative whilst Stilicho was in Constantinople. Second, such an appointment was probably forced on Stilicho by the emperor and Senate, who would have otherwise been extremely annoyed at having Alaric as the second in command of the Western army. Finally, his appointment would act as a counter to Alaric whilst Stilicho was absent.
According to Zosimus, Stilicho was to go to Constantinople and take control of matters supported by a force of only four legions.12 However, he was also to carry letters of authorization from Honorius, plus a labarum, a standard carrying the image of Christ which was specifically associated with the emperor and attested that the carrier had the emperor’s trust.13 The small force may have been a political necessity. Any more and the expense involved would have weakened Stilicho’s claim that Honorius could not go in person due to the poor state of the treasury and the need for troops in the West. It may also have been decided that this was the optimum force to show that Honorius and Stilicho were serious in their claims, but still weak enough not to suggest that they were prepared to use force to achieve them.
Yet it is difficult to believe that Stilicho could seriously expect a positive welcome in Constantinople. Not only were the laws still in place barring Eastern traders from entering Italian ports, but the East was also attempting to repair the damage caused by Alaric’s invasion of Epirus. The idea that Stilicho could expect that his reception in Constantinople would be anything less than hostile remains dubious. Yet there was no one else who he could trust to go in his stead. Sending another minister at a time of such unrest was, like sending Honorius, courting disaster. Furthermore, nobody had his political authority. If anyone was to go it had to be Stilicho.
What may also have become apparent was the level of the repercussions in the West should Stilicho travel East. Stilicho would be leaving Honorius in the hands of politicians now becoming more vocal in their opposition to Stilicho’s regime. Stilicho must have realized that he was in grave danger. If he remained in Italy to maintain his hold on Honorius, he gave the lie to his claim to be needed in the East. This would lead to accusations that Honorius should have gone and weaken Stilicho’s position. If Stilicho travelled to Constantinople and left Honorius in the care of his enemies, it was clear that Honorius would in all likelihood be turned against him by his opponents. The situation would become even worse if he travelled East and was opposed by the court at Constantinople. Whatever he did, he was likely to lose.
It would appear that all of these considerations weighed heavily on Stilicho. Unable to make up his mind, he failed to move from Bononia, even after receiving the orders to go East. By contrast, Honorius moved to fulfil his duties. Despite being urged by Serena to travel direct to Ravenna, he decided that his first duty was to travel to Pavia so that he could review the troops before their dispatch to Gaul.14 It is not known where Serena herself went. She may have taken her own advice and travelled directly to Ravenna. The only certainty is that she did not accompany the emperor or remain with Stilicho.
Backlash
Olympius was no doubt aware of Honorius’ unhappiness with the decision that Stilicho should go East. It is clear that from now on he was able to dominate Honorius in the same way that Stilicho had previously done, especially as Honorius travelled to Pavia and Stilicho remained at Bononia, so losing intimate contact with the emperor. Olympius knew how to employ Stilicho’s mistake and Honorius was too weak to control matters.
A strong emperor would have been able to neutralize the opposition, using the opposition to Stilicho to strengthen his own position and break free from Stilicho’s domination. With luck and judgement, he could have achieved a balance between the opposing parties where he held the upper hand. In this way, Honorius could have retained the services of Stilicho in a suitably subordinate position. Unfortunately, Honorius was not strong. Although it was clear that Honorius wanted to rule in his own right, he was too weak and insecure and so uncertain of Stilicho’s motives. Olympius was able to play on the suspicions of the emperor, ensuring that the rift between the two men grew.
Moreover, Honorius was a terrible judge of character. He was made to believe that Stilicho had ulterior motives, but did not realize that the men telling him these things had political aims of their own. However, he did have a certain amount of low cunning, so continued to allow Stilicho’s enemies at court to undermine the general’s position.15
As a further dilemma, Stilicho’s plan to send Alaric into Gaul at the head of a combined army was sensible but fatally weakened his position and was the greatest mistake of his career.16 The decision was extremely unpopular with the Roman forces, who would have preferred to serve under a Roman figure, especially either Stilicho or Honorius. The appointment of a man they had memories of fighting in Italy itself ensured that discontent in the army reached new levels. They did not want to serve under a barbarian whose loyalty to Rome was extremely suspect and they did not have the same level of trust towards Alaric as had Stilicho.
Dissatisfaction will not have remained confined to the regular army. Many leaders of the Germanic forces serving under Stilicho had previously served with Alaric and deserted him for Rome. Alaric could easily use his position to exact revenge on the men who had deserted him. The Germanic federates too would have been unhappy with the new proposals.17
The same level of opposition certainly appeared in the Senate. For many years they had opposed the employment of barbarians in the army. They now had the humiliation of having Alaric appointed to one of the highest ranks in the army, subordinate only to Stilicho, Vincentius, and in theory the emperor. This same man had recently demanded a vast amount of money on threat of invasion, and will have known that many of the senators had opposed him in the Senate meeting to discuss his demands. As a high-ranking official, he might be prepared to use his new-found power to extract vengeance. The deal whereby Alaric was sent against Constantine was interpreted as a betrayal by the Senate and was seen as giving a valid motive for a conspiracy against Stilicho.18
At the same time as Honorius was listening to the whisperings of court officials, discontents were spreading rumours amongst both the troops and the general populace that Stilicho was actually in league with the barbarians – especially Alaric and the 12,000 Goths that had joined Stilicho after Radagaisus’ defeat. As evidence of this he had failed in his duty, allowed a usurper to rise in the Prefecture of Gaul and when it was imperative that he focus on the West, instead he was intending to head East.19 His place as magister utriusque militiae was at the head of the army defeating Constantine III in Gaul. The fact that he was ignoring his responsibilities meant that he had an ulterior motive behind his convoluted schemes. The one that was advanced was that he wanted to replace Theodosius II in the East with his own son Eucherius. Like Theodosius II, Eucherius was a member of the imperial family and was the adoptive grandson of Theodosius I, who had publicly recognized Eucherius before his death in 395. Dissatisfaction with Stilicho’s policies was now becoming increasingly widespread.
Stilicho
Eventually, the level of opposition grew to such an extent that it became obvious that a crisis was looming. The victories of 402 (Alaric) and 406 (Radagaisus) were forgotten.20 As has already been noted, it is probable that,
allied to the dawning realization that he would not be welcome in the East, Stilicho’s inactivity was a reaction to the growing enmity. It is possible that by now accusations that he wanted to crown Eucherius in Constantinople had reached even his own ears. He dared not head East, since then it was certain that his opponents would use it as proof that he wanted to elevate Eucherius to emperor of the East. If he returned to Honorius, his opponents could claim that he was failing to follow Honorius’ orders to go to the Eastern court, so setting himself above the emperor. Nor could he travel to Pavia to regain the loyalty of the army, since this could be interpreted as an attempt to wrest their loyalty away from Honorius and so be the precursor to an attempt to place Eucherius on the throne in the West. The summer was spent devising plans but not implementing them.21
Pavia
Whilst Stilicho delayed in taking any concrete action, Honorius left Bononia and travelled to Pavia to fulfil his duties as emperor and leader of the armed forces. Once Honorius and the rest of the court had separated from Stilicho, Olympius decided to make his move. He approached Honorius and made the claim that Stilicho wanted to travel to Constantinople to fulfil his aim of removing Theodosius II and replacing him with Eucherius.22 He continued to make these claims to the emperor until after their arrival at Pavia on 13 August.
Once there, Olympius made several visits to a hospital in which sick soldiers were recovering and began to voice the same claim in their hearing.23 Understandably, the rumour caused widespread alarm, especially since the troops already felt ill-disposed to Stilicho thanks to his apparent preference for ‘barbarians’ over the regular forces.
On the fourth day after the arrival of the emperor, the troops were ordered to muster for inspection prior to departure for the war against Constantine.24 At a signal from Olympius a mutiny broke out in the army. The troops broke ranks, seized and then killed Limenius, the praefectus praetorio Galliarum who had earlier (401) been comes sacrarum largitionem, and Chariobaudes, the magister militum per Gallias, who had recently fled from Arles in the face of Constantine’s advance. Alongside them Vincentius, the new magister equitum, and Salvius, the comes domesticorum, were also killed.25 As the mutiny spread Honorius retreated to the palace and the remainder of the magistrates dispersed in flight. The mutiny quickly exceeded Olympius’ ability to control it. The soldiers spread throughout the city, seizing and killing any officials that they could find who were classed as supporters of Stilicho.
Finally, the emperor put on a simple tunic and advanced into the centre of the city, from where he slowly managed to exert some control over the mutineers. Yet his control remained minimal; when the quaestor, another Salvius, clasped at the emperor’s feet and begged for mercy, the soldiers simply dragged him away and killed him. Fearful for his safety the emperor once again withdrew to the palace.
In the late afternoon the troops began to calm down and a death toll of the magistrates was taken. Alongside those already named, Naimorius the magister officiorum, Patroinus the comes sacrarum largitionum, possibly Ursicinus the comes rerum privatarum, and Longinianus the praefectus praetorio Italiae were found to be dead.26 Alongside these distinguished people were ‘a host of ordinary people not easy to calculate’.27
News of the mutiny was quickly carried to Stilicho in Bononia. However, it was as yet unclear whether Honorius was amongst the fallen magistrates. The only troops Stilicho had with him appear to have been federates. During the course of a hasty council Stilicho and the barbarian leaders decided upon one of two courses of action. If Honorius had been killed, it was decided to unleash the federates on the Roman troops at Pavia, so sending a clear message of what to expect to any other troops in Italy thinking of mutiny. However, if the emperor was safe then only the ringleaders of the mutiny should be punished, despite the fact that many of Stilicho’s leading supporters had been killed. When news was received that the emperor was still alive, Stilicho unaccountably reneged on the decision to punish the ringleaders, instead heading for Ravenna.28
In the circumstances, this is entirely understandable. With the only information being gathered from confused reports, Stilicho was unsure of whether the ‘mutiny’ was indeed a mutiny. It may have been the first sign that Honorius had lost patience with him. In that circumstance, setting the barbarians under his control on the troops under the emperor was tantamount to a declaration of rebellion against Honorius.
Whatever the cause, the decision was not supported by his federate allies, who still wanted to attack the Roman troops at Pavia. When it became clear that this was not going to happen, the majority of the federates decided to leave and set themselves apart from Stilicho until the political situation became clearer, and especially until they knew whether Stilicho was still the leading magistrate in the West. Sarus, however, the Goth who had led the attack on Constantine, waited until everyone was asleep and then led his men in an attack on Stilicho’s bucellarii, his Hunnic bodyguard. Whilst they slept the Goths crept up and killed them all, before taking control of the entire baggage train, after which Sarus retired to his tent.29 Shortly afterwards he left the scene and roamed Italy before once again taking service with Honorius.
Not knowing who to trust, even amongst his own federates, Stilicho fled to Ravenna and sent orders to all of the cities which had families of the barbarians in their midst, telling them that on no account should they admit federate forces into their cities.30 There he awaited developments.
He did not have long to wait. It was now clear to Honorius that the troops at Pavia were no longer serving Stilicho, instead being loyal to Olympius. It was also clear, as demonstrated by the execution at his feet of the quaestor Salvius, that they did not serve Honorius. Fearful for his safety, the young emperor – who was not yet twenty-four – decided that the only way of guaranteeing his own safety was to obey the requests of Olympius. Olympius, having now gained control over the emperor, sent imperial decrees to Ravenna, ordering the troops there to put Stilicho under house arrest. It is unclear how Honorius felt about this state of affairs. Although usually accepted as grateful to be free of Stilicho’s dominance, the circumstances surrounding the events suggest that he might instead have had little choice but to do as ordered and had been forced to recognize that he was now under the domination of Olympius. It was unclear yet as to whether or not he would escape with his life, since so many leading members of the previous regime had been killed.
Apparently, news reached Stilicho of his impending arrest and he quickly sought sanctuary in a nearby church. His servants and those federates still loyal to him armed themselves and waited upon events. At daybreak on 22 August the soldiers, led by one Heraclianus, entered the church and swore an oath before the bishop that they had been ordered by the emperor not to kill but to arrest Stilicho.31 Forming a military guard, the soldiers led Stilicho out of the church. At this point Heraclianus produced a second letter, condemning Stilicho to death for his ‘crimes against the state’.32 Eucherius, who at this point was not mentioned in the dispatches, fled towards Rome. Stilicho was prepared for his execution. At this point Stilicho’s servants and loyal federates made to rescue him from execution. Stilicho stopped them with ‘terrible threats and submitted his neck to the sword’.33 On his death, chaos and anarchy broke out in Italy.
Conclusion
Honorius usually emerges from the mutiny at Pavia as a weak emperor who was unsure of what to do, sending Stilicho to his death in a fit of petulance at not being allowed to rule on his own initiative. Yet prior to Pavia, there are signs that Honorius was his own man who was willing to listen to advice from Stilicho – for example in his desire to go to Constantinople to support Theodosius II. However, in one respect he was a political realist. When Olympius took control of the mutiny it was clear that Olympius now had the support of the army. The army which had just mutinied had shown itself capable of ignoring the emperor’s presence by killing Salvius when he clung to the emperor’s knees and asked for shelter. The episode would not have filled Honorius with
confidence and demonstrated that whoever controlled the army could – in effect – force the emperor to do his bidding. When Honorius sent the letters for Stilicho’s arrest and execution, there is a good chance that this was under duress and that he only sent them because he did not know what would happen if he defied Olympius.
When the news arrived that Stilicho was dead, Olympius took control of the situation. Stilicho’s property was confiscated, his adherents arrested and tortured to secure proof of his treasonable conspiracy and Eucherius, Stilicho’s son, was arrested and executed. Olympius also promulgated laws damning Stilicho and his supporters.34 As part of the damnatio memoriae inscriptions dedicated to Stilicho were located and his name erased from them (see Plate 2).
Events after the death of Stilicho
After the death of Stilicho, all court affairs were controlled by Olympius … and the emperor distributed the other offices to Olympius’ nominees. A widespread search was made for Stilicho’s friends and supporters. Deuterius, the Praepositus Sacri Cubiculi, and Petrus, the Primicerius Notarium were brought to trial and public torture was used to make them inform against Stilicho. When, however, they revealed nothing against either themselves or him and Olympius had wasted his efforts, he had them clubbed to death.
Zosimus, 5.36.1–2
Other supporters of Stilicho were similarly treated in an attempt to prove that he had had designs on the throne, but all of them failed, hence the edict issued on 22 November 408, which solely alleged that Stilicho was charged with encouraging the barbarians to make trouble, not with having designs upon the throne, either for himself or for Eucherius.35 The only ‘success’ that Olympius had was in arranging that Thermantia, Honorius’ second wife and Stilicho’s daughter, was dismissed from court and returned to her mother in Rome.