“At 5:00 P.M. we received a radio message from our submarine I-56, which had been patrolling east of Singapore. The submarine commander stated: ‘3:50 P.M. Two battleships proceeding northward.’
“We could not understand the discrepancy between the report of the reconnaissance plane, which stated that the warships were still within the British base, and the submarine report that the Prince of Wales and the Repulse had taken to the high seas. Whatever the outcome, the Genzan Air Corps was ordered to assemble immediately for torpedo attack.
“Had the two powerful warships actually left the Singapore Naval Base? Or were there other enemy battleships in the area? Perhaps heavy cruisers had been mistaken for the battleships. Whatever the character of the British ships, their speed would bring them off the coast of Kota Bharu the following day. They must be located and destroyed before their powerful guns had the opportunity to destroy the invasion fleet.
“The order for torpedo attack was shortly received.
“The Type 98 reconnaissance plane returning to its base from the Singapore flight was ordered to change its destination and land immediately at the Saigon airfield. The photograph negatives were hurriedly developed. Now we knew the truth. What had appeared to the naked eye from a great altitude to be warships were actually two large cargo vessels.
“The absence of the Prince of Wales and the Repulse from Singapore Naval Base was confirmed. Delay was not permissible. The enemy’s intentions were very clear; they were moving against the Kota Bharu invasion force. Our submarines, however, had lost contact with the enemy fleet and the exact whereabouts of the British vessels remained a mystery.
“7:00 P.M., All preparations for the torpedo attack were completed. With hopes of locating and attacking the British warships that evening or even during the night, we took off from our base in high spirits.
“We could not understand how the Army discovered that we were leaving in search of the enemy ships, but large numbers of our Army men had assembled at the base to see us off. The torpedoes were a great source of wonder to them. They waved and cheered loudly as our bombers left the ground.
“I do not understand why, but the occurrences of this day remain clearly in my mind. I was anxious to press the attack against the enemy. I can remember every small detail involving tonight’s mission.
“Cumulo-nimbus clouds filled the sky as we flew south along the French Indochina coast, indicating that the weather might prove unfavorable. However, I did not fear for the safety of my men in the event we should run into storms. Every one of my planes that were scattered by the storm of two days ago had returned safely to the base, attesting to the ability of their pilots. Tonight we were determined to carry the attack to the enemy even if storms should break up the formations, and if no more than two planes could fly together. We were determined not to be balked by the weather.
“All planes descended below cloud level in search of the enemy.
“A radio order received from Vice-Admiral Nobutake Kondo, Commander in Chief of the South Area Force, indicated that all available surface and air units would be mobilized for night attack. Our submarine had sighted the enemy battleships; now, it was our air force’s turn to destroy them. We did not intend to let our surface fleet take this big game away from us! Our fighting spirit was high!
“The sun had dropped below the horizon. Visibility was very poor, and we were flying in three-plane formation.
“Unfortunately, there was still a serious problem to be solved. We had not decided, when the operation began, on any definite measures for differentiating between the enemy vessels and our own warships during close-range sea battles, when such identification can be extremely difficult. We did not know the definite location of the enemy warships; furthermore, we had no information as to the location of our own ships this night. How were we to distinguish one from another?
“Even during daylight, identification of warships is generally difficult; at night, it becomes almost impossible. There is actually great danger of attacking our own warships and airplanes during combined operations of our sea and air forces except under special conditions, such as when the vessels of either the enemy or friendly forces remain stationery.
“Not having received any training on this matter, and not having had time to discuss warship identification before we took off, our air and sea forces were rushing into the battle blindly. It seemed as if we might be caught in our own traps!
“The clouds seemed to stretch endlessly over the ocean. We could not emerge from them, and the task of observing the ocean surface was becoming increasingly difficult. We could not fly much higher than one thousand feet. Under such conditions our chances for discovering the enemy fleet were doubtful unless we happened to fly directly over the British ships, or crossed their wakes.
“However, the situation was not hopeless. We had many airplanes searching the ocean and any one of them might sight the enemy forces. There was also the chance that we might discover the enemy inadvertently in the event that he sighted our planes and fired upon them. When one flies in almost total darkness one feels that the enemy might appear suddenly and without warning before one’s eyes.
“Farther and farther we flew southward in search of the enemy fleet.
“A radio report from one of our searching bombers brought jubilation to our hearts. The anxiously sought enemy vessels had been sighted!
“The radio report continued: ‘We have dropped a flare bomb.’
“One of the Mihoro Air Corps bombers had succeeded in sighting the enemy. With high spirits we drove our planes to maximum speed and hastened toward the location of the enemy ships. Already the attack might be under way! We extracted the last ounce of power from our motors trying to make the airplanes go faster and faster. Soon another radio message was received.
“‘The vessel under our flare is the Chokai.’
“Good heavens! Instead of being disappointed, I was appalled! We were in great danger of bombing our own fleet in place of the enemy’s. Instead of attacking the British warships, we must now be extremely careful to avoid bombing and torpedoing the Japanese vessels in the area. Had we missed this last message, we would have pressed the attack against the Chokai, a heavy cruiser and the flagship of Vice-Admiral Ozawa!
“We were sorely dejected. It appeared that we did not have very good opportunity this night to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and to launch an attack. Soon after the Chokai was sighted an order was received from Rear Admiral Matsunaga:
“‘Discontinue operation. All planes return to base.’
“The order to call off the search for the enemy enabled us to relax our tense muscles. Yet, we remained undecided as to what to do. It was possible that the British warships had broken through our air-sea screen and might even now be hurling their shells against our transports lying off Kota Bharu. That was my greatest fear. We stifled the urge to continue searching for the enemy for a little while longer, and turned back toward the base. Orders must be followed without hesitation.
“It seemed as if our problems this night would never end. To attempt a landing with a torpedo after the safety pin had been pulled is an extremely hazardous undertaking; we were anxious to dump the deadly weapons into the sea before landing. But no, we could not do this because the supply of torpedoes at the French Indochina bases was sorely limited.
“There was only one torpedo for each airplane. We could not afford to lose a single one.
“To insure against possible landing accidents on the blacked-out field, each plane was kept in the air until the moon had risen. It was not until midnight that the landing strip became visible in the moonlight, and the planes could land.
“Despite the exhaustion brought on by the harrowing flight through stormy weather, the long hours spent in the air, and the nerve-racking landings with armed torpedoes, we were not given a chance to rest. Calling on our reserve stamina and courage, we worked through almost the entire night preparing for the next day’s missio
n.
“Our primary duty involved reconnaissance. Since the movement of the enemy warships was completely unknown after our submarine lost the British vessels, it was the task of the bombers to search out their whereabouts. While every effort would be made to locate the enemy ships if they were still at sea, we had to consider the possibility that the warships might have returned to Singapore.
“Should they already be within the port, the enemy’s resistance would be much greater and our attacks less effective. We would have to contend not only with the antiaircraft weapons of the ships, but also with those of the naval base. Our airplanes would be limited in their attack formations. The worst problem of all was that, should we be forced to attack with torpedoes in Singapore itself, our bombers would not have sufficient fuel to return to their bases.
“We must by all means seek out and destroy the enemy vessels this morning. It was thereupon decided to send out nine attack bombers and two Type 98 reconnaissance aircraft to search for the British warships early in the morning of December 10. At the same time we would dispatch a strong attack force to Singapore, regardless of the movement of the enemy vessels.
“Today’s search mission was so difficult that, according to the pilots’ calculations, only about half of the area in which the British ships might be found could possibly be covered. Although the desire of the commanding officers to use as many planes as possible out of the total available force of a hundred aircraft was understandable, I did not think these tactics intelligent. The men were almost worn out.
“December 10. The sky was clear—good visibility today! No unexpected troubles developed, and all battle preparations were completed on time for takeoff.
“At 6:25 A.M. all reconnaissance planes left their bases simultaneously. Between 7:35 and 9:30 A.M. torpedo and bombing units took off. The airplanes mobilized for action this day included nine Type 96 attack bombers, and two Type 98 reconnaissance aircraft for search duty; twenty-six Type 96 attack bombers and twenty-six Type 1 attack bombers to carry torpedoes; and thirty-four Type 96 attack bombers carrying bombs.
“The leader of the reconnaissance group took a position in the center part of the search area, where the chance of sighting the enemy ships would be the greatest. The airplane carried many cameras with which to photograph the enemy ships and the scene of battle. The reconnaissance aircraft flying parallel to the leader succeeded in sighting the enemy first; unfortunately, this latter plane did not carry cameras.
“I participated in this operation as 2nd Squadron Leader of torpedo bombers of the Genzan Air Corps.
“In torpedo practice with my bomber on the ground, the aircraft released its torpedo without trouble. We knew when the torpedo had left the airplane by the strong vibrations transmitted to the airframe at the moment of release.
“As my particular bomber was a most dependable aircraft assigned for my exclusive use, I was completely at ease with both the plane and its engines. Everyone in the corps had full confidence in his craft.
“All the crew members are veterans of the battles in China. But this was their first sea battle, and torpedoing enemy vessels is a hazardous operation. All my men felt pleasure as well as anxiety as we anticipated the coming battle.
“ ‘Sir, what angle of fire shall I follow?’ I was asked by a faithful young pilot in my squadron. Many factors enter into the final decision for the angle of fire to release the torpedo, but most of these must be determined by visual observation. The general principle of torpedo attack is easily understood. However, under combat conditions where the position of the target relative to the aircraft changes from moment to moment, only a considerable amount of past practice can accurately determine the precise angle of fire to release torpedoes.
“After giving the young pilot general instructions, I told him, ‘If you become too confused to determine the proper angle of fire, fly very low and aim your torpedo directly at the bow.’
“Our commander, Admiral Matsunaga, painstakingly and kindheartedly gave all the men their orders. When he had finished, Captain Kosei Maeda, our commanding officer, lectured the men severely. He told them to calm down and to put their strength in their abdomen. Commander Kamero Sonokawa, the corps flight officer, issued detailed instructions on the possible movement of the enemy, and outlined the plan of assault. Lieutenant Commander Niichi Nakanishi, the wing commander for the day, elaborated further on the attack plans.
“It was then my turn, as the 2nd Squadron Leader, to speak, but there was nothing left for me to say.
“By the time my men had heard the instructions from the section leader, and the chief of each plane who followed me, they had forgotten the previous lengthy instructions. The young crew members were thinking perhaps not of the long orders but about the lunch in the planes.
“Young crew members are usually innocent of battle. A tasty lunch boosts their morale more than medals of valor or certificates of merit. Of all the food carried in the bombers, bean-paste-coated rice cake, called ohagi, is the best liked. If, in addition, coffee syrup is carried in the vacuum bottles, they are in very high spirits, and exhibit their great pleasure by the expressions on their faces even before the airplane takes off.
“It is an indisputable fact that there usually appears a trace of anxiety or uncertainty on the face of every man while on a bombing mission. When, however, a man exhibits calmness and efficiency in his duties, we feel proudly that he is really a crack crew member. Just how well the men will actually perform their duties in combat rests upon the skill and ability of the wing commanders and the squadron leaders.
“It is now 7:55 A.M., and the reconnaissance planes which left before dawn should be beyond the French Indochina coast and over the open sea. All the torpedo bombers took to the air and set a course straight for Singapore. Our foremost concern was our fuel supply.
“Ever since September the Genzan Air Corps had made continuous studies on how to save fuel and increase the flight endurance of our bombers. We learned how to take advantage of wind conditions, and what were the best power settings. Through careful use of the mixture-control lever we had succeeded in increasing our range by 20 per cent without adding to our fuel load, as compared to our missions in China.
“As our planes carried torpedoes today, we had in our tanks about 30 per cent less fuel than normal. We flew in a very large formation, and for reasons of safety our radius of operation was fixed at a maximum of four hundred nautical miles. However, should we find the enemy ships more than four hundred nautical miles from Saigon, we would naturally press home the attack. All pilots were trying to use as little fuel as possible.
“As the miles slipped beneath our wings and we flew farther south, the weather constantly improved. Finally the sky was completely clear. We maintained a flight altitude of between 8,300 and 10,000 feet.
“Nearly 10:00 A.M. What is the matter with our reconnaissance planes? Still no sign of the enemy. In spite of the good weather and clear visibility, is it possible the reconnaissance planes still cannot find the British warships? By now our planes should be more than five hundred nautical miles from Saigon. Wing Commander Nakanishi, flying just ahead of my bomber, must also be growing very impatient.
“We have passed the danger line of four hundred nautical miles from Saigon. Still no report on the enemy ships. It is as though we were enveloped in complete darkness. The pilots are becoming more and more anxious about their remaining fuel. We measured the rate of fuel consumption as carefully as possible and reduced it to the lowest possible level. It was not the best way to treat the engines, but we had little choice. Perhaps because of our severe mixture control, one of my bombers developed engine trouble and was forced to leave the formation and return to base. I could not send even one plane as escort. Including my own, the number of planes in my squadron was reduced to seven.
“At 11:45 A.M. we sighted a small vessel off to our left. The sea was absolutely calm. The ship appeared to be a cargo vessel of about
five hundred or six hundred tons. Singapore was near. Since it was possible that other enemy vessels might be in the vicinity, I ordered my men to stay alert. No other object could be seen; this was unusual.
“Keeping a sharp lookout above and behind us for enemy planes, we tightened all formations and maintained our flight due south.
“Without warning the entire 3rd Squadron dropped out of the mass formation and flew toward the small cargo vessel. Soon they circled over the ship. I could not understand what the squadron leader could possibly be doing.
“The enemy vessel suddenly changed its course, and no sooner had it begun its twisting evasive action than a salvo of bombs fell more than seven hundred feet away from the ship without inflicting any damage! What was wrong with the 3rd Squadron leader? Nine 1,100-pound bombs were lost, dissipated without results, after all the trouble of carrying them for such a long time!
“The level-bomber squadron had already wheeled out of formation and was returning to its home base. We continued to fly southward. Far ahead and to our right we could make out the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula.
“If the enemy fleet was on the high seas, we certainly should have been able to sight it. Our commander appeared determined to seek out the enemy vessels right in Singapore if he failed to find them on the ocean.
“We were dangerously close to passing the ‘point of no return,’ when we would lack the fuel to return to our base. Our only hope, in the event that we passed this point, was to make a forced landing at Kota Bharu, which our troops had already invaded.
“All this time we were without word as to what had happened to the Mihoro and Kanoya Air Corps wings. There was no information as to their whereabouts. Perhaps, however, they purposely silenced their radios for fear of alerting the enemy.
“At 12:20 P.M., my wireless operator informed me that he had just received a message. I instantly left the pilot’s seat and used the code book to decipher the message, which revealed that the enemy fleet had been found! On the face of everyone aboard the plane there appeared excitement and a joy at having finally discovered the enemy. Soon there would be battle! The message read:
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