Since the Japanese naval air arm had made long and assiduous preparations toward achieving qualitative and numerical superiority long before the outbreak of war, it was possible to satisfy these two prerequisites in the early fighting. Before long, however, the enemy was rapidly whittling down the quantitative superiority and, one year after the war had begun, the qualitative superiority was hanging by a thread and was fast disappearing.
With our victorious sweep in the Pacific marred only by the single minor incident of Wake Island, our naval air forces began to suffer even more than usual the difficulties of an air war which began to favor the enemy.
The first single-engine American fighter seriously to challenge the Zero was the Chance-Vought F4U Corsair. At first this fighter was reported to our naval intelligence as a carrier-borne plane which had failed in its carrier-qualification tests because of poor deck-landing characteristics. The main American counteroffensives which were launched from Guadalcanal, however, favored the use of the new fighter because of the availability of land bases.
In a short period of time the excellent qualities of the Corsair became only too evident, and the enemy rapidly increased the Corsair fighter strength in the Solomons campaign; the strongest increase was noted about February of 1943, when we withdrew from Guadalcanal Island.
Faster than the Zero in level flight and capable of infinitely greater diving speeds, the Corsairs soon proved to be a great nuisance to our fighters. So long as the number of Corsairs in any particular dogfighting engagement was not too great, the Zero fighters managed to cope with the enemy planes. As the total number of Corsairs increased, however, the outnumbered Zeros ran into serious trouble, and the Japanese fighter commands were soon faced with serious losses inflicted by the speedy American Navy fighters. The Corsair was the first single-engine fighter which clearly surpassed the Zero in performance.
During the Gilberts campaign in September of 1943, the enemy’s new Grumman F6F Hellcat fighter made its debut. The carrier-borne fighter plane was to become one of the Zero’s most formidable opponents.
Our first reports on the new Grumman fighter stated that its design had been affected by a careful American examination of a Zero fighter captured in the Aleutians in the spring of 1942. To some extent this appeared to be so, since the philosophy of weight-saving was carried throughout the Hellcat’s structure to an extent without parallel in other American aircraft of that time.
There is no doubt that the new Hellcat was superior in every respect to the Zero except in the factors of maneuver-ability and range. It carried heavier armament, could outclimb and outdive the Zero, could fly at higher altitudes, and was well protected with self-sealing fuel tanks and armor plate. Like the Wildcat and Corsair, the new Grumman was armed with six 12.7-mm. machine guns, but it carried a much greater load of ammunition than the other fighters.
Of the many American fighter planes we encountered in the Pacific, the Hellcat was the only aircraft which could acquit itself with distinction in a fighter-vs.-fighter dog-fight. The Americans claimed that with the Hellcat the United States Navy had recovered for the first time since the war’s beginning the ability to engage the Japanese Zeke (Zero) in close-in fighting. The favorite American maneuver was to assign a pair of fighters to attack a Zero fighter in a steep dive during which high speed was attained; once the Zero was within range of the enemy guns, the Hellcats would open fire, roar past, and make a sharp turn to withdraw.
Of the many American fighters the Hellcat was the only plane the design of which was undertaken after the attack on Pearl Harbor, and then placed in mass production for Pacific use. More than ten thousand F6F fighters were built before production ceased at the end of 1945.
Like the Corsair, the Hellcat was equipped with a Pratt & Whitney 2,000-horsepower, air-cooled, “Double Wasp” radial engine. The more powerful the engine in a fighter plane, the better its performance will be. This is especially true of fighters in which climbing ability is stressed. With increased engine power a fighter plane may also increase its armament, be fitted with self-sealing fuel tanks, armor plate, and other equipment, and not unduly sacrifice performance.
Japanese engineers had too long delayed their efforts toward producing practicable, powerful aircraft engines, and a wide gap existed between the superior products of the United States and the engines we could produce. Despite our strenuous efforts, we could not hope to match the superb products of American technology. In 1944, Mitsubishi rushed mass production of its 2,000-horsepower-class Ha-42 engine, but the engine’s weight prohibited its successful use on fighter planes.
Lieutenant Commander Mitsugu Kofukuda, Flight Commander of the 6th Air Corps assigned to the Buin air base, participated in the Guadalcanal battle during the seven months following the American invasion. Commander Kofukuda later edited copious notes he had kept through the campaign; these afford unusual insight into air activities and combat of that period:
“Throughout the Guadalcanal campaign, a variety of American Army and Navy aircraft participated in combat against Japanese forces. The majority of fighter planes encountered during the invasion were Navy Grumman F4F Wildcats and Army Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks, but the F4F fighters increased greatly in number after the battle had begun. Bell P-39 Airacobras were observed in fair numbers when the campaign began, but these were gradually replaced with the big Lockheed P-38 Lightning fighters. Chance-Vought F4U Corsairs participated in the Guadalcanal fighting only toward the end of the campaign.
“The stubby Grumman Wildcats featured performance characteristics generally similar to those of our Zero fighters, but the enemy plane proved inferior in almost every respect to the Zero. Because of the general similarity, however, dogfights between the Wildcats and Zeros were not uncommon. In these combats the Japanese pilots possessed a decided advantage, since the Zero could outmaneuver its opponent and was able to outclimb, and could fly faster than, the Grummans.
“The initial and one-sided victories which the Zero fighters scored in the early phase of the war endowed the plane with ‘mysterious’ characteristics—mysterious only to the American pilots, of course. The Zero’s flashing maneuver-ability and speed, which had resulted in the destruction of hundreds of enemy planes, seemed to convince the American pilots that the Zero could not be defeated in a close-in battle in which the opponents were of equal number.
“In fact, our pilots reported that, when an enemy fighter-plane force sighted a Zero formation of equal strength, it usually would refuse to join combat and would flee. This observation was made chiefly in the Solomons area, although, of course, such enemy timidity was not always to be relied upon. On many occasions, courageous enemy pilots would not only dive in to attack our formations when they were of equal strength, but would not hesitate to assault our fighter and bomber formations even when heavily outnumbered.
“However, there was no denying the fact that our pilots enjoyed absolute confidence in their ability always to emerge victorious from an air battle in which enemy and friendly forces were of equal number. Such confidence was not limited to the pilots; it was shared by the air force headquarters staffs.
“When our Zero pilots were forced into an engagement in which their strength was about half that of the enemy, the usual outcome was a wild melee which usually resulted in equal damage to both opponents.
“As the maneuverability of the Army P-38 and P-40 fighter was markedly inferior to that of the Zero, the enemy pilots soon learned to avoid dogfights, in which they were at a decided disadvantage. While the P-40 possessed approximately the same maximum speed as the Zero, it lacked the rate of climb of our fighter and could not hope to match the Zero in close combat.
“The P-40 pilots therefore took advantage of their superior diving speed, and almost always resorted to ‘shoot and retreat’ tactics. Thus, the P-40s usually refused combat unless they possessed the advantage of altitude, which enabled them to dive into the Zero formations with blazing guns and race away at a diving
speed beyond that possible for the Zero.
“Soon after their introduction to combat, the big, heavy P-38 fighters learned to take advantage of their excellent high altitude speed and performance and of their superior diving speed. They adopted the tactics of diving from high altitude, slashing into the Zero formations with their heavy machine guns and cannon, and zooming upwards in a climb no Zero could hope to match. Taking every advantage of their superior high-altitude performance and high speed, they were rarely caught in a position in which they could be forced to engage in close-in fighting. It appeared to be a rule of the P-38 pilots not to fight with a Zero fighter at less than 300 miles per hour, at which point the Zero suffered from sluggish aileron action.
“On some occasions P-38 formations would descend from their usual great altitude in high-speed formation dives; the initial attacking wave scattered the Zeros. Other formations would follow from their vantage points to rip through the disorganized Zero fighter, inflicting unexpectedly heavy losses.
“Single-engined bombers encountered in the Guadalcanal campaign were the Navy’s two-seat Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers and the three-seat Grumman TBF Avenger torpedo bombers. Twin-engined bombers included the Army’s North American B-25 Mitchells and Martin B-26 Marauders. The Zeros sometimes caught Navy Consolidated-Vultee PBY Catalina flying boats. Although this is no reflection on their respective combat capabilities as bombers, none of these aircraft proved difficult opponents for the Zero fighter.
“The four-engined B-17 and B-24 bombers were, generally speaking, the most difficult enemy aircraft for the Zeros to shoot down. Because of their excellent self-sealing fuel tanks, they were extremely difficult to set afire with the Zero’s 20-mm. cannon shells. Our fighter pilots soon learned that the B-17s and B-24s could rarely be destroyed unless the pilots or vital parts of the aircraft were hit and rendered useless.
“The fierce resistance with which the heavy American bombers opposed our fighters, unlike that of our own land-based medium attack bombers which too often fell easy prey to enemy fighters, was a most serious problem. In my opinion, which is shared by many Japanese combat officers, the ability of the B-17 and B-24 to defend themselves and carry out their intended missions despite enemy fighter opposition was the deciding factor in the final outcome of the war.
“A considerable number of these bombers fell prey to our Zero fighters, but their destruction was accomplished only after persistent and merciless attacks, usually at high cost to our own fighters. A survey of our air-combat operations against these bombers indicates clearly that they were rarely destroyed by the conventional attack of only a few fighters.
“As the war progressed, the ability of these bombers to defend themselves became almost unbelievable; their defensive fire power, speed, operational ceiling, and ability to absorb the punishment of our fighters constantly astonished Japanese pilots.
“By the time the Boeing B-29 Superfortress appeared on the combat front, we had achieved great strides in increasing the fire power of our fighters and interceptors. However, even these steps came too late, for the B-29 represented a remarkable advance over the tough B-17, and we were unable to keep pace with American engineering developments.
“Another factor soon entered into the capacity of the enemy’s heavy bombers to flout our air defenses. When the B-29s finally appeared in large numbers over the Japanese homeland, the quality of our fighter pilots had deteriorated disastrously. New pilots were unable effectively to press home their attacks on the enemy bombers, which soon began to run rampant over our cities.
“Had Japan developed such bombers as the B-17, I believe the war would have taken a different course. We did not have a single warplane comparable to these aircraft, and Japanese forces paid a heavy price for this lack. As was demonstrated by the qualities of the Zero fighter and the Type 1 land-based medium attack bomber, our aeronautical engineering standards had been raised to a high level. No one can deny, however, that our engineers and airmen, when comparing our bombers to those of the enemy, felt keenly the difference—the great difference—in the national strength of America and Japan.
“In all fairness to our aeronautical industry, there was a marked difference in the strategic concepts evolved by Japan and the United States, with a wide gap between the two nations’ emphasis on the self-protection of large aircraft. But it is equally true that this difference stemmed from the Americans’ scientific ability to keep their aircraft flying despite enemy damage. Developing this characteristic to its ultimate in World War II, they were able to send their unescorted bombers on missions deep within Japanese territory, secure in the knowledge that, despite our best efforts, they stood an excellent chance of returning to their home bases.”
Authors’ note: Japan had suffered serious losses in combat with the Type 1 land-based medium attack bomber (the G4M1), which was wryly nicknamed the Type 1 Lighter by its crews because of its highly inflammable qualities. When the bomber was revised into the G4M2 modification, the company designers and Navy engineers concentrated their efforts toward increasing the plane’s flight range, and completely neglected any attempt to improve the bomber’s ability to survive enemy fire power.
It is no exaggeration to say that this action constituted one of our navy’s greatest technical blunders in the war, a mistake which was comparable to our strategic errors in the disastrous Midway and Guadalcanal operations in that the continued high loss of the Type 1 bombers to enemy guns seriously affected the final outcome of the war.
Commander Kofukuda’s report continues:
Tactics of Enemy Aircraft: “During the Guadalcanal campaign, the enemy held to a policy of not committing his air forces to battle before attaining a local superiority of strength; these tactics appeared to hold true whether land, sea, or air forces were involved.
“In the air battles between opposing fighter plane formations, the enemy invariably refused to join in combat unless he enjoyed numerical superiority; when confronted with a superior number of Zero fighters, he refused to engage, lest he sustain unnecessary losses.
“As a result, our fighter pilots were forced to take great risks when committed to battle, while the enemy based his fighter tactics upon conditions most favorable to his success. This peculiar situation resulted from the fact that, when the enemy chose to fight, he invariably did so when we were outnumbered. The enemy pilots left our men little opportunity to evade combat; for when they did engage the Zeros, the outnumbered Japanese pilots were forced to fight desperately to survive against the numerous American fighter planes.
“Another marked difference in the tactics of both opponents was to be found in the aerial weapons with which their respective fighter planes were armed. The United States mounted the heavy 12.7-mm. machine gun with a high rate of fire in almost all their warplanes, while the Zero carried two light machine guns plus two 20-mm. cannon. The wing cannon had a relatively low firing rate, but were designed to destroy an enemy aircraft with one or more hits. This weapon was indispensable to the Zero, which had been designed from the outset to contend with both enemy fighters and bombers.”
Base Construction Capacity: “A world of difference existed between the ability of the Japanese and Americans to construct air bases in the combat theaters. Basically, we relied upon primitive manpower to clear jungles and pound out airstrips for our planes, while the Americans literally descended in a mass mechanical invasion on jungle, coral, and rock to carve out their air-base facilities. This difference in method undeniably and seriously affected the air operations of both belligerents, much to the benefit of the Americans.
“The construction of adequate air-base installations facilitated rapid and large-scale movement of the enemy’s air forces, thus contributing directly to a great increase in his combat strength in any theater of action. Moreover, the vast and numerous bases gave the enemy the capacity to maintain large groups of interceptors in the air, and deny Japanese bombers the opportunity to destroy enemy pla
nes on the ground.
“It was obvious that the ability of American engineers to establish air bases wherever and whenever they chose, while Japan struggled against the limitations of primitive methods and a lack of material and engineering construction skill, must affect the final outcome of the war to no minor degree in favor of the United States.
“One of the major points which has too often been overlooked in an evaluation of fighting power, but which determined to a large extent the efficiency of air units, was that of hygienic installations. Japanese engineers paid scant attention to this problem, dismissing the pressing matter of mosquito protection by simply rigging mosquito nets in personnel quarters. Sanitary facilities were basically crude and ineffective; certainly they contributed nothing to the morale of ground and air crews.
“The Americans, by contrast, swept clean vast areas surrounding their ground installations with advanced mechanical aids. Through exhaustive disinfecting operations, they banished flies and mosquitos from their air bases and paid similar attention to every phase of sanitation and disease.
“Some may consider this a prosaic matter, but it was vital to the men forced to live on desert islands and in the midst of jungles swarming with disease and insect life. The inevitable outcome of such neglect was a tremendous difference in the health of the American and Japanese personnel who were assigned to these forward air facilities.”
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In such matters as the support of our combat weapons, the Japanese Army and Navy proved to be woefully neglectful. It was a classic blunder, for which we paid dearly. Disease and insect plagues can hinder air operations as effectively as enemy attack.
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