There were exceptions, of course, and during my final stay at Rabaul the seaplane group commander proved to be one of these. He and his men often flew dangerous missions to save the lives of those air-crew members downed at sea. Their seaplanes were small and few in number; despite their most intensive efforts, they could do little.
These were some of the “behind-the-scenes” factors at Rabaul. Our situation worsened steadily, and finally reached the point where we were deluged by a storm of enemy bombs and bullets. Clearly we could not remain much longer at Rabaul. Incredibly, all during my stay I did not once become ill. Every last member of Rear Admiral Jojima’s staff, including the admiral, suffered either from dengue fever or malaria, or both. Perhaps the reasons why I escaped sickness was that, although I had had land duty longer than any member of the headquarters staff, and I was obliged to remain outdoors longer than usual, I always exercised the greatest care in selecting food and water. Further, I ignored the oppressive heat and wore nothing but long trousers and boots. These were not as comfortable, I admit, as the cooler short trousers, but they were preferable to fever and illness.
On February 29, 1944, after having lost the majority of its men and most of its planes in a single harrowing month of incessant battle, the 2nd Carrier Division gave up the fight for Rabaul. The embittered division abandoned this vital air base and withdrew to Turk.
CHAPTER 23
The End Is in Sight: Defense of the Mariana Islands
WITH RABAUL ABANDONED to the enemy, the Navy realized that soon it would be forced to commit its planes and ships to another vital defense operation. American aircraft-carrier task forces roamed the entire Pacific Ocean in unbelievable strength, hammering with rapid blows at even our strongest island bastions. By the end of May of 1944 it appeared probable that the Marianas were next on the list for an allout assault. When the Americans finally struck, it was with overwhelming quantitative and qualitative power. So severly beaten were our sea, air, and land forces that the Battle of the Mariana Islands drove Prime Minister Hideki Tojo from office. Further, the loss in ships and planes so crippled the Navy that it was never able again to engage the enemy in what could be described as a “well-organized operation.”
By late 1943 the Navy high command realized that the Pacific War was rapidly approaching its climax. America’s devastating carrier task force assaults, especially against the Gilbert and Marshall island groups, proved beyond any doubt that the enemy regarded our surface fleet strength with increasing disdain. Tokyo realized further that the Marianas attack was but a matter of time; we would be called on to defend this crucial island with our maximum strength and many of our officers feared that the anticipated American assault would be the war’s last decisive battle. The United States possessed far greater air and naval strength and increased its advantage by employing fighter planes considerably superior to the aging Zero.
There was good reason to believe that the Marianas conflict might give the enemy the final advantage necessary to defeat Japan. Should American marines and troops successfully occupy the islands, then the Japanese homeland itself would fall within the effective bombing range of the Army Air Force’s new B-29 bomber, which could well cripple our production. We had never seen the B-29, but Navy intelligence believed it had completely reliable information on the airplane, obtained from a former B-29 test pilot who had been shot down in the Solomon Islands in the summer of 1943. The information later proved to be accurate.
Another danger arising from American occupation of the Marianas was that the enemy could employ the islands as a home base for their aircraft carriers, which could then strike directly at New Guinea, the Philippine Islands, and even the Japanese mainland. A successful American move in this direction would gravely imperil our position in the Pacific. Even should our Army remain intact in the Philippines and on Formosa and Okinawa, the enemy carrier task forces, longrange land-based bombers, and submarines could cut the vital communications lines between our factories and our sources of raw materials in the Pacific. Not only would our industry suffer, but the loss of these supply lines would create serious food shortages among our people.
With these factors to consider, the Navy prepared to hurl against the expected enemy attack every available airplane and warship. The Marianas’ defense was to be a maximum effort; we would greet the Americans with an impenetrable wall of fire and steel. To make certain that our planes would be flown by veterans as well as novices, the Navy drew instructors from its training air corps and assigned them to the front. Every serviceable plane and ship moved into the area of decision.
Even before the two great opponents were committed to battle, however, our defense preparations suffered what proved later to be a damaging blow. The Navy knew almost for a certainty that the showdown would come soon, but could not convince the Army of the urgent need for immediate action. General Hideki Tojo, then Minister of the Army as well as Prime Minister, stated emphatically that there existed no need for such feverish and “hysterical” defenses, since the Americans would not attack in strength. So believing, he refused to commit a single Army plane to the Mariana Islands. We could do nothing to disabuse him of his mistaken confidence.
On June 11, 1944, the enemy carrier task forces began their bombardment of the Marianas. At the time the Japanese Combined Fleet defense lines consisted of the following:
1. Admiral Soemu Toyoda, Commander in Chief of the Combined Fleet, directed the overall operations from his headquarters aboard his flagship Oyodo, in Hiroshima Bay.
2. Vice-Admiral Kakuji Kakuda, Commander of the First Air Fleet (land-based aircrafts), controlled approximately one thousand warplanes. Operating from headquarters on Tinian Island, he assigned his planes to the Marianas, Carolines, Iwo Jima, and Truk.
3. Vice-Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, Commander of the First Task Fleet and the Third Fleet, was assigned a carrier task force made up of the largest number of aircraft carriers gathered together since the Hawaiian Operation. His force waited the oncoming battle at Tawitawi anchorage in the southwest area of the Sulu Sea, west of the Philippine Islands. Under Ozawa’s command was a fleet of seventy-three vessels, including nine aircraft carriers, and the 74,000-ton battleships Yamato and Musashi, each with nine eighteen-inch guns. Admiral Ozawa’s orders were to coordinate his movements with the Kakuda land-based air fleets; to conserve his limited fuel supply Ozawa elected to remain as long as possible at Tawitawi before engaging the enemy.
4. In addition to these forces, Vice-Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, Commander in Chief of the Central Pacific Fleet and the commander of the Pearl Harbor attack, controlled the Marines and other naval units which were to defend the Marianas against enemy amphibious operations.
On June 13 the enemy confirmed our worst fears, and began the initial aerial bombardment against the Marianas. Fighters and bombers in great number attacked ground positions of the islands, pursued all shipping in the area, and began to exact a heavy toll of our defending planes. Admiral Toyoda ordered the Ozawa Force to move against the enemy fleet at once; unfortunately, Ozawa had to refuel his ships and could not arrive west of the beleaguered islands prior to June 18.
During the week necessary for Ozawa’s carriers to reach the Marianas, the Kakuda land-based air force waged a desperate defense against the swarms of enemy carrier-based fighters and bombers. It was a losing battle from the start, and Kakuda’s available planes decreased alarmingly in strength, forfeiting control of the local air to the Americans. Their planes pounded Kakuda’s positions mercilessly, destroying vital installations and causing heavy casualties to his men. Kakuda’s pilots lacked the training necessary to offer strong resistance to the aggressive American pilots, and the defending Zeros fought hopeless battles against the marauding Hellcat fighters which outperformed and outnumbered our own planes. Our dive bombers and torpedo bombers launched several raids against the enemy carriers, but never stood a chance against the determined defense of the Hellcat fighters and the unbelievable a
ccuracy and volume of the ship’s antiaircraft guns. By the time Ozawa arrived at the scene of battle, Kakuda’s defenses had been shattered. Most of his planes were gone, he lacked experienced pilots, and the Marianas installations were reduced to a shambles.
The Americans could not have planned their operation better. Events occurred almost as if we were cooperating with the attack, for, by the time the Ozawa Force drew within bomber range of the American carriers, Kakuda’s land-based planes no longer existed as an operational air fleet. He had been so soundly defeated that Ozawa was forced to fight alone, without the support from Kakuda for which he had originally hoped. Of the two major opposing air groups the Americans were called on to face, they first virtually annihilated the land-based units, then turned, with almost their original strength intact, to deal with Ozawa.
Our intelligence reported that the Americans were attacking the Marianas in four separate carrier groups, with a total of twelve aircraft carriers. Against these Ozawa had nine such ships in three groups, with the three largest carriers, the Taiho, Shokaku, and Zuikaku; two medium carriers, the Junyo and Hiyo; and the four smaller ships, the Ryuho, Chiyoda, Chitose, and Zuiho.
The 1st Carrier Division, under the direct command of Vice-Admiral Ozawa, consisted of the Taiho, Shokaku, and the Suikaku and the Zuikaku. Aboard these three large vessels were the 601st Air Corps with eighty-one Zeros, nine Type 2 Judy reconnaissance planes, eighty-one Judy dive bombers (Suisei), and fifty-four Jill attack bombers (Tenzan). Each carrier accommodated approximately a third of the total striking force. Under Rear Admiral Takaji Jojima’s command was the 2nd Carrier Division with the Junyo, Hiyo, and the Ryuho. Aboard the three carriers were the 652nd Air Corps’ eighty-one Zeros, twenty-seven Val dive bombers, nine Type 2 Judy dive bombers, and twenty-seven Jill attack bombers. The third group was Rear Admiral Sueo Obayashi’s 3rd Carrier Division with the Chiyoda, Chitose, and the Zuiho, which carried the 653rd Air Corps’ sixty-three Zeros, six Jills, and twelve Kates.
The nine aircraft carriers accommodated a total of four hundred and fifty planes, or more than fifty planes over the maximum number available to the Nagumo Force which attacked Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, Ozawa had a greater advantage in that he controlled nine aircraft carriers, not six. If he were to lose one or more of these carriers, he could minimize his aircraft losses by landing the planes from a sunken vessel aboard its sister ships.
The nine carriers concentrated at Tawitawi were regarded by many of our naval officers as assurance of victory in the Marianas battle. We had never assembled in one striking force so much carrier aviation, and our pilots were convinced that they would shatter the attacking American fleet. It appears, however, that these people who enjoyed such premature success thought only in terms of the total available aircraft carriers and their planes, failing to give due consideration to the human factor. Vital to every battle is the indefinable element we term aggressiveness, or spirit, or esprit de corps; whatever it is, the Americans had it. Our forces lacked the close coordination and unity of the American groups, and so were at a disadvantage. Those officers who boasted—prior to the battle, of course—of the terrible havoc our fleet would wreak among the Americans were due to suffer terrible disappointments.
On June 19 the great carrier-vs.-carrier air battles began, west of the Mariana Islands. Ozawa threw every available airplane against the American carriers in an all-out attempt to destroy the American ships. The effort failed to produce any results whatsoever, and, while Ozawa suffered considerable losses to his fighters and bombers, the American ships sailed on undaunted. Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, informed that our carriers were several hundred miles from his own vessels, wisely decided to postpone his bomber attacks against our fleet. Instead, he ordered every Hellcat fighter plane into the air to meet our attacking bombers. As a result of this fierce resistance from enemy planes which easily outflew our own aircraft, only a few bombers managed to break through the American fighter screen to the carriers. Here they met a veritable cyclone of antiaircraft fire. The results of the attack were negligible. Ozawa, on the other hand, lost the majority of his planes in the battle and simultaneously lost what future advantage he had hoped for in the way of making mass air attacks against the enemy.
Ozawa’s powerful aircraft force did not suffer the expected enemy aerial attack and, even as his men began to relax with the realization that the American planes were not approaching, disaster struck. Aboard his flagship, Taiho, Ozawa received word from his radio room that a submarine attack was under way. The next moment, at 0800, the Taiho literally blew up under his feet; the enemy submarine Albacore had loosed six torpedoes, most of which struck the Taiho, but Japan’s newest and strongest 35,000-ton carrier neither listed nor slackened her speed. Despite the comparatively minor damage of the torpedo strikes, gasoline vapor from a broken large tank and pipelines gradually seeped out to fill the entire interior of the big carrier. Ozawa was obliged to transfer by destroyer to the cruiser Haguro. Ninety minutes after the Albacore fired her torpedoes Taiho was wracked by a tremendous explosion. The tremendous detonations shattered all control aboard the vessel and at 1640 hours she went down.
Ready to board his new flagship, Ozawa suffered another blow. At 1120 hours another enemy submarine had attacked, and four of the six torpedoes fired (by the Cavalla) had shattered the Shokaku. The great carrier blew apart several hours later and sank.
Ill fortune did not stop here. On the following day, June 20, Ozawa changed his flagship to the Zuikaku and prepared to launch a maximum-effort bombing and torpedo attack against the American fleet. Even as the planes were being fueled and armed, enemy dive bombers, torpedo bombers, and fighter planes in great number raided our carriers. The American attack was savage and well executed; split asunder by bombs and torpedoes, the Hiyo went down, along with two tankers loaded with critically needed fuel. The Zuikaku, Junyo, Ryuho, and Chiyoda all suffered heavy damage, as did the battleship Haruna and another tanker. Reeling from the devastating blow, Ozawa’s carriers launched a punitive night attack with ten torpedo bombers. None of our planes could hit the enemy carriers.
The combination of sea and air losses shattered the effectiveness of Ozawa’s task force as a fighting unit. It was impossible for him to even attempt a comeback against the formidable American fleet which stormed, almost without a scratch, against his fleeing ships.
The Americans called their smashing air victory the “Marianas Turkey Shoot,” and with good reason. With the battle concluded, Ozawa had only forty-seven airplanes in fighting shape; twenty-five Zeros, six torpedo bombers, two dive bombers, and twelve miscellaneous aircraft. The enemy losses were trifling in comparison, for they lost but twenty-six aircraft in combat.
Thus ended the Marianas Sea Battle, which our Navy had entered with the greatest carrier and air strength in its history. The great battle concluded with the Navy suffering its worst defeat, the consequences of which exceeded even our losses at Midway.
We examined the various phases of the action in an attempt to determine what had denied Admiral Ozawa the victory which, on paper at least, his great carrier and air strength should have afforded. As air staff officer to Rear Admiral Jojima, 2nd Carrier Division, I (Okumiya) had available the data from which I drew the following conclusions.
First, our aircrews lacked the training necessary to coordinate their attacks in combat. For two years prior to the Marianas battle I had been the 2nd Carrier Division’s air staff officer, and at no time did I feel our air group leaders possessed the minimum capabilities required for combat leadership. The preceding two years had witnessed a marked lowering of the requirements necessary for air-group leadership, and it soon became obvious that we were entrusting vital combat command to men who were greatly in need of further operational training.
When I was first assigned to the air staff of the 4th Carrier Division, just prior to the Midway-Aleutian Operation, the Nagumo Force’s overall air-group leader was Commander Mitsu
o Fuchida, who had led the air attack against Pearl Harbor. Fuchida had graduated from the fifty-second (1924) class of Etajima Naval Academy. In the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942, Lieutenant Commander Mamoru Seki was Nagumo’s overall air-group leader; like myself, Seki entered Etajima in 1927 as a member of the fifty-eighth (1930) graduating class. However, the air-group leaders who participated in the Marianas Battle included Lieutenant Commander Jyotaro Iwami of the Jojima Force from the sixty-second (1934) graduating class, and Lieutenant Commander Akira Tarui of the Ozawa Force, and Lieutenant Commander Masayuki Yamagami of the Obayashi Force from the sixty-forty (1936) graduating class.
In other words, in only the two-odd short years since I was appointed to the carrier division’s air staff, the average age of the senior air-group leaders had dropped by at least ten years. Unfortunately, too, the skill of the air crews which flew in the Marianas conflict had deteriorated in direct proportion to the average reduced age of their commanding officers.
One example especially illustrates the marked loss of combat flying skill. When my carrier force (the 2nd Carrier Division) joined the Santa Cruz battle, our dive-bomber pilots had established and maintained an enviable rate of accuracy in their attack. In a bombing operation by nine planes against the target ship Settsu, an old battleship 160 meters in length and 20 meters in width, which could maintain an evasive pattern speed of sixteen knots on the open sea, the nine planes frequently scored nine hits. Just prior to the Marianas fight, however, the same nine-plane formation diving against the Settsu rarely scored more than one hit. We could not expect our aircrews, only recently assigned to aircraft carriers, to achieve high flying skill and bombing accuracy in only a few weeks. And it was these men, sorely in need of months of training, who flew against the powerful, well-defended American fleet. Within two and a half years after the war’s start, our training standards and air-crew proficiency had deteriorated to a point where the men stood little chance of survival against the enemy. The marked loss in minimum qualifications underscored dramatically the fact that our personnel preparations for this war never had been adequate.
Zero Page 30