Harry Hopkins was also anxious about the future of the world organization, though from a slightly different perspective. He knew from past experience that Churchill’s views on the structure of the United Nations were mercurial, and in an effort to harmonize the stance taken by FDR and Churchill on the voting procedure in advance of that day’s plenary session, he insisted that Anna arrange a meeting between the two. Speaking from his sickbed, Hopkins expressed deep concern about “the Dumbarton Oaks part of the conference.” He urged Anna to arrange for the two men to dine together at noon. Anna agreed, but only on the condition that W. Averill Harriman attend with instructions “to shoo the PM out at 2:45” so that her father could get an hour’s rest before the plenary started and thus “would not have to work steadily from one o’clock to seven-thirty or eight pm when the conference usually comes to an end.”15
The luncheon went ahead as arranged, with Hopkins, Byrnes, Harriman, and Cadogan also in attendance. Although the conversation continued until 3:00, it turned out to be mostly a social affair. “Quite agreeable and amusing,” Cadogan recorded in his diary, “but not awfully useful.” The most exciting aspect of the afternoon, in fact, was finding a room in which Churchill could take his daily afternoon nap, since there would not be time to transport the prime minister back to his residence before the start of the plenary at 4:00. Churchill’s needs resulted in Vice Admiral Brown and General Watson being kicked out of their shared room, much to their displeasure.16
In keeping with his concerns about the need to reassure the America people about the larger purposes of the conference, FDR began the plenary negotiations on the world organization with a blunt warning about the precarious state of American public opinion, which the president characterized as “decisive.” In later years, conservative critics would assail FDR for this tendency to stress domestic sentiments, but his actions represent far more than crass political calculation. Few presidents have understood the necessity of public support more than FDR, and with Stettinius’s alarming report about the fall in the American people’s confidence in future Great Power cooperation still ringing in his ears, his decision to begin with this reference made perfect sense. Moreover, by the time he had reached the Crimea, the advisability of stressing this aspect of US foreign policy had gained considerable currency in the State Department. As Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong put it in a letter to Secretary Stettinius near the end of January 1945, one of the chief barriers to understandings between representatives of a totalitarian state like Soviet Russia and those of a democracy like the United States “was not the difference in language or custom but the fact that they do not know what we mean by public opinion.” The Russians hear us talk of “the necessity of satisfying public opinion,” Armstrong observed, “but it always sounds to them a little like an alibi for not doing what they want.” He urged that “no opportunity should be lost… to impress on them that public opinion in this country is an absolute imperative… and that no official policy can long survive if it runs counter to what the people think is right.”17
In his initial remarks, FDR said that if it was possible “to get agreement on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals,” it would be much more probable “that the United States would be prepared to take a full part in organizing the peace throughout the world.” But to support this plan, the American people would want to see “concrete proposals to prevent war for as long a period as anybody could foresee.” He was not so optimistic “as to believe in eternal peace,” but he did think fifty years without war was possible and with this in mind expressed the hope that his counterparts would now give careful consideration to the American proposal for the voting procedure in the Security Council of the world organization.18
Despite the fact that Stalin had received the American proposal more than a month before, Stalin insisted—somewhat apologetically in the wake of Secretary Stettinius’s review of this matter at the plenary—that he had not had the time to read the document carefully. He also professed a lack of understanding regarding certain aspects of the proposal.
Stettinius tried to counter Stalin’s apparent, or feigned, ignorance with a number of examples of how the voting procedure would work in practice. But none of these seemed to satisfy Stalin, who expressed grave concern about the ability of the smaller powers to air their grievances and make recommendations, which in his view constituted a form of action. He then reminded his colleagues that in December 1939, during the Russo-Finnish War, “the British and the French had used the League of Nations against them and succeeded in isolating and expelling the Soviet Union.”19
Both Churchill and Eden insisted that this misuse of the international community’s power within the world body could not happen under the American formula, and they offered further examples of how the prerogatives of the five permanent members would be protected. But Stalin remained unconvinced. To him, Allied unity, especially among the Big Three, was far more important than the rights of the lesser states. If Russia is accused “of attaching too great importance to the procedure on how to vote,” he said, “[w]e are guilty.”20
Alarmed, FDR noted that of course there would be differences among the Big Three in the future, but permitting discussion of these differences in the Security Council would highlight their ability to solve problems and would “demonstrate the confidence the Great Powers had in each other and in the justice of their own policies.” Stalin countered that this might be true, but continued to insist that he needed more time to study the proposal and suggested they table the discussion on the United Nations for the following day—a suggestion to which FDR reluctantly agreed.21
Observing the proceedings, James Byrnes could not help feeling “deeply disturbed by the clear evidence that Stalin had not considered or even read our proposal on voting in the Security Council even though it had been sent to him… on December 5.” He’d had “sixty-three days” to “familiarize himself with the subject,” and thus it seemed clear to Byrnes that Stalin “was not greatly interested in the United Nations organization.”22
Another observer, Lord Moran, agreed. The discussion on the United Nations Organization brought the differences between Stalin and Roosevelt into sharp relief, he noted in his diary: “In American eyes, the first purpose of this conference is to lay the foundation of an international peace organization.… But Stalin can see no point in vague sentiments and misty aspirations for the freedom of certain small nations. He is only concerned with the borders of Poland, with reparations and with what he can pick up in the Far East. These are tangible things that he can get his teeth into.… Roosevelt would like to proscribe for the world, Stalin is content to make clear what the Soviet Union will swallow.”23
IT WAS ON THIS LESS THAN AUSPICIOUS NOTE THAT THE THREE POWERS began the difficult and seemingly endless effort to reach a settlement to the Polish question at Yalta. There were two main issues that stood in the way of a final agreement: the frontiers of the future state and the creation of a new interim government that all three powers could recognize. Thanks to the discussions over Poland that had taken place at Tehran, the question of Poland’s eastern frontier had been largely decided, as both Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed in principle to support Stalin’s demand that it follow the Curzon Line. The one significant modification to this proposal—suggested by FDR at Tehran and reiterated in his opening comments on Poland at Yalta—was the inclusion of Lvov and the oil fields of Galicia to the southwest of the city on the Polish side of the border. This stance was also in keeping with the conversations FDR had with Mikolajczyk at the White House in June 1944, and with the briefing papers FDR had received from the State Department before his departure. Furthermore, all three powers had come to a general understanding that in return for the territory lost in the east, Poland would receive compensation through the acquisition of territory in East Prussia and additional German lands in the west. Having recapitulated all of these points as he opened the negotiations on Poland, FDR reverted to his earlier argument a
bout the importance of public opinion with the observation that there were 6–7 million Poles in the United States, most of whom were willing to accept the Curzon Line as the eastern border of postwar Poland. The president said he would have an easier time convincing his nation to support the new Polish border if the Soviet government would yield Poland the city of Lvov and perhaps the oil lands to its southwest.24
The most important question, however, was the one concerning the permanent government of Poland. The general opinion in the United States, FDR said, “is against our recognizing the Lublin Government on the grounds that it represents only a small section of the Polish population. We favor the creation of a Polish government that would resolve the political differences by creating a government of national unity, a government which would represent all of the major Polish political parties,” which he identified by name. He then recommended that the Allies establish a Presidential Council, composed of a small number of Poles from both within and outside Poland—including, perhaps, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk—who would be charged with the duty of creating a more permanent government, which, of course, would maintain friendly relations with Russia in the years ahead.25
Roosevelt’s plea on behalf of Poland inspired Churchill to mount a much more spirited defense of Polish independence than the one he had made to Stalin in October 1944. Consistent with his previous stance, Churchill endorsed the Curzon Line and like FDR, said he was more interested in Poland’s sovereign independence and freedom than in its borders. For the British, this was a matter of honor, since they had gone to war in the first place in defense of Poland. Yet freedom for Poland, he went on, should “not be made to cover any hostile design by Poland or any Polish group, possibly in intrigue with Germany, against Russia.”26
Stalin was not impressed by these arguments, however, and after a ten-minute recess he returned to the table to counter Roosevelt’s and Churchill’s calls for concessions with stern conviction. He understood that for Great Britain, honor dictated a secure and independent future for Poland, but he reminded the prime minister that for Russia the future of Poland was not merely a matter of honor but also one of survival. Throughout history, Poland had been the corridor through which Russia’s enemies had attacked it. Over the previous thirty years, the Germans had done so twice. This had been possible because Poland had been weak. Russia thus wanted to see a strong, powerful, and independent Poland.27
As for Poland’s eastern frontier, Stalin maintained that it had been determined not by Russia but by Lord Curzon and Georges Clémenceau after World War I, and that FDR and Churchill could hardly expect him to be “less Russian” than these two statesmen by ceding this territory to the Poles. Stalin also refused to grant Lvov and the oil fields near it to Poland. This area was populated largely by Ukrainians, he insisted, who had suffered greatly in the war. Maintaining the region as part of the Soviet Republic of Ukraine was therefore just.
Stalin also brought up a claim he had made earlier about agents of the London Poles engaging in violent activities in the rear of the Red Army, killing Russian soldiers and attacking supply depots. He further maintained that the Lublin Poles, whom he said should now be referred to as the Warsaw Poles, had as great a “democratic base” as de Gaulle had in France, and that the composition of the Polish government was an internal Polish matter. Finally, in reference to the proposal that the three powers create an interim government for the country, he wryly observed that even though he was often accused of being a dictator, “he had enough democratic feeling to refuse to create a Polish government without the Poles being consulted.”28
Stalin’s impassioned oration on Poland, which included an offer to bring some members of the Lublin Poles to the Crimea for consultation, turned out to be the longest speech made by any of the three leaders at Yalta. He was clearly vexed by the Polish question and made the unusual decision to stand while he spoke. It was clear, Bohlen recorded, that “the Americans and the British faced a formidable task in trying to salvage anything on Poland.” When Stalin finished talking, Hopkins passed a note to a grim-faced FDR suggesting that they return to the matter tomorrow. Roosevelt did not take much convincing and, noting the lateness of the hour, brought the meeting to a close at 7:45 p.m.29
Unsettled by the vehemence with which Stalin defended the Soviet position on Poland, FDR decided to issue a direct written appeal to the marshal, instructing Bohlen and Hopkins that evening to prepare a letter that could be delivered to Stalin that very night. After conferring with Bohlen on the draft, and making arrangements for both Eden and Churchill to see it, he sent the missive by courier to the Yusupov Palace. In it, FDR indicated he was “greatly disturbed” that the three leaders had not been able to come to “a meeting of minds about the political setup in Poland.” The president stressed that it was vitally important to put this issue behind them in large part because the American people “will look with a critical eye on what they consider a disagreement between us at this vital stage in the war.” Indeed, they might conclude that “if we cannot get a meeting of the minds now, when our armies are converging on a common enemy, how can we get an understanding on even more vital things in the future?” FDR understood Stalin’s determination to safeguard the Red Army from attacks from the rear as it moved into Germany, but he stated categorically that the United States “cannot recognize the Lublin government as now composed.” Noting that Stalin had suggested at the end of his lengthy oration that the Big Three could bring representatives from Lublin to Yalta for consultation, FDR suggested that he do so at once, including, at the suggestion of Churchill and Eden, at least three non-Lublin Poles.30
THE NEXT MORNING, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 7, FDR TOOK A LATE breakfast and tried to get a little extra rest in preparation for the day ahead. The lack of progress on Poland the day before was troubling, but like others in the American delegation, his foremost concern that morning was the fate of the United Nations, which now seemed to be inextricably linked to the fate of the Polish state. Secretary of State Stettinius was also worried and, at FDR’s instruction, went off to see Hopkins, Byrnes, and other members of the State Department staff to discuss the UN impasse in advance of the noon meeting of the foreign ministers. The US delegation’s hope was that Stettinius might be able to shift the original agenda for the luncheon meeting and instead convince Foreign Ministers Molotov and Eden to concentrate on the United Nations. But Molotov, the host of the gathering on this occasion, refused Stettinius’s request to take up the voting procedure. Thus, by the time Stettinius returned to the Livadia Palace that afternoon to report back to the president and his colleagues, his anxiety over the future of the United Nations was even more pronounced than it had been that morning.31
Unbeknownst to the Americans, however, Stalin had been thrown somewhat on the defensive by the strong stand FDR had taken in his letter on Poland. Coupled with Churchill’s firm stance the previous afternoon, the letter led Stalin to conclude that he faced a united Anglo-American front on a question that he believed vital to Soviet security. The plenary session that afternoon thus became a critical moment for all three powers: the start of an intense period of negotiations that would determine the fate of millions of people. It also represented a test of each man’s abilities as a negotiator, and here Stalin would prove himself, as Anthony Eden later commented, a man of considerable skill.32
FDR opened the fourth plenary session by asking the foreign ministers if they had anything to report, which led to a brief overview of a number of issues, none of which had been settled. He then requested that the group return to the discussion of Poland. Stalin immediately interjected—in a likely fabrication—that he had just received the president’s letter an hour before. Then, taking note of the suggestion that he follow up on the idea of inviting members of the Lublin Poles to Yalta, he explained that he had tried to do so, but unfortunately they could not be reached. He felt there was little hope of finding the representatives that FDR had mentioned in his letter, but he would keep trying. In the me
antime, he assured the president that his typists were busy preparing a document on Poland that he believed would please his counterparts. But since this was not yet ready, he suggested they return to their discussion of the voting question; then, turning toward Foreign Minister Molotov, he asked him to state the Soviet position.33
As FDR and Stettinius listened intently, Molotov announced that after due consideration of Stettinius’s report, the Soviet government was ready to accept the American voting formula in its entirety “without further comment or amendments.” After months of struggle over the issue, Molotov’s unexpected proclamation was a major breakthrough; as former Ambassador Maisky recorded, an audible sigh of relief swept through the American delegation at this news. But Molotov was not finished. He added that the Soviets would no longer insist on UN membership for all sixteen of the Soviet Republics, as they had at Dumbarton Oaks, but would now be content with two or three, suggesting Ukraine and Byelorussia as the two most viable candidates.34
FDR was understandably delighted at the Soviets’ sudden change of heart on the voting procedure in the Security Council, which he characterized as “a great step forward.” On the other hand, even though the Soviet proposal to reduce the number of seats the USSR held in the General Assembly from sixteen to three was welcome news, the fact that the Soviets had made this offer more or less in conjunction with their sudden about-face on the voting procedure placed FDR in a difficult position. The president had consistently and quite publicly argued in favor of “one nation, one vote,” and hence his initial response to Molotov’s proposed reduction was to pass a note to Stettinius on which he had scribbled “Not so good.” Still, he did not want to endanger this chance to move the United Nations effort forward, and after acknowledging how close they were to a final agreement on the matter, he suggested that the three foreign ministers study the question of granting Ukraine and Belarus seats in the General Assembly while preparations were made to convene a conference to set up the world organization as soon as possible, preferably before the end of March.
The Last 100 Days Page 13