19. “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Presidential Decision Directive 25, May 3, 1994.
20. Jim Wold, “Clinton Moves to Limit UN Peacekeeping Role,” Reuters, May 5 1994. Another Pentagon official described the new policy as “We’ll only go where we’re not needed”; Woods, Frontline interview.
21. Woods, Frontline interview.
22. Romeo Dallaire, “The End of Innocence: Rwanda 1994,” in Jonathan Moore, ed., Hard Choices: Moral Dilemmas in Humanitarian Intervention (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), pp. 71–86.
23. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Stories from Rwanda (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1998), pp. 104–107.
24. Iqbal Riza, interview, “The Triumph of Evil,” Frontline, PBS, January 26, 1999, p. 3; available at PBS Online: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/interviews/riza.html.
25. The New York Times ran a tiny blurb describing only “violence between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnic groups”; “New Government Is Delayed as Violence Rocks Rwanda,” New York Times, February 24, 1994, p. A13.
26. United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry, p. 9.
27. Confidential, priority cable from U.S. embassy in Kigali to State Department, March 24, 1994.
28. In the secretary-general’s second report on UNAMIR, issued a week before mass killing began, he wrote, “Continued support for UNAMIR would depend upon the full and prompt implementation of the Arusha peace agreement by the parties. The United Nations presence can be justified only if the parties show the necessary political will to abide by their commitments and to implement the agreement.” “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,” S/1994/360, March 30, 1994.
29. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 19, 599; United Nations, Report of the Independent Inquiry, p. 27.
30. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, April 8, 1994.
31. Meet the Press, NBC, April 10, 1994.
32. Face the Nation, CBS, April 10, 1994.
33. Cited in OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, chap. 10, sec. 15.
34. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 22.
35. Confidential memorandum from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East/Africa James Woods, through Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Chas Freeman, for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner, “Talking Points on Rwanda/Burundi,” April 11, 1994.
36. CNN News, April 7, 1994.
37. Weekend Edition, NPR, April 9, 1994.
38. All Things Considered, NPR, April 9, 1994.
39. Keith B. Richburg, “Slayings Put Rwanda in Chaos; Clerics, Foreigners Among Casualties; Americans to Leave,” Washington Post, April 9, 1994, p. A1.
40. Robert McFadden, “Western Troops Arrive in Rwanda to Aid Foreigners,” New York Times, April 10, 1994, sec. 1, p. A1.
41. Keith B. Richburg, “Westerners Begin Fleeing Rwanda; 170 Americans Leave by Convoy,” Washington Post, April 10, 1994, p. A1.
42. William Schmidt, “Refugee Missionaries from Rwanda Speak of Their Terror, Grief and Guilt,” New York Times, April 12, 1994, p. A6.
43. Donatella Lorch, “Strife in Rwanda: Evacuation; American Evacuees Describe Horrors Faced by Rwandans,” New York Times, April 11, 1994, p. A1.
44. “Tribes Battle for Rwandan Capital; New Massacres Reported,” New York Times, April 16, 1994, p. A5.
45. Other groups also responded quickly. On April 21 the International Federation of Human Rights declared the killings genocide. Official bodies and states began to follow. The pope first used the word on April 27; on the same day the Czechs and Argentines introduced a draft resolution to the Security Council that pointedly included the term; and Boutros-Ghali declared a “real genocide” on ABC’s Nightline on May 4, 1994.
46. Julia Preston, “Death Toll in Rwanda Is Said to Top 100,000; U.N. Votes to Pull out Most Peacekeepers,” Washington Post, April 22, 1994, p. A1.
47. Jennifer Parmelee, “Fade to Blood; Why the International Answer to the Rwandan Atrocities Is Indifference,” Washington Post, April 24, 1994, p. C3.
48. “Aid Agency Fears Genocide Under Way in Rwanda,” Press Association Newsfile, April 28, 1994.
49. Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 177.
50. Confidential memorandum to Ambassador Albright from John S. Boardman, thru Ambassador Walker, “Subject: Your Meeting with Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) Representative Claude Dusaidi, Thursday, April 28, 3:00 P.M.,” April 28, 1994.
51. On April 8 Dallaire had warned that a ruthless campaign of “ethnic cleansing and terror” was under way. Riza remembered, “There was no reference to an impending genocide. . . . This term of ethnic killings and ethnic cleansing had been there for a long time and it was adopted, of course, from Bosnia. Ethnic cleansing does not necessarily mean genocide; it means terror to drive people away”; Iqbal Riza, Frontline interview, pp. 9–10.
52. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, p. 636.
53. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda,” May 1, 1994; emphasis added.
54. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, April 28, 1994, pp. 1–4.
55. Melvern, A People Betrayed, p. 179.
56. Ibid., p. 180.
57. Confidential cable from U.S.-UN to Secretary of State Warren Christopher and embassies, April 27, 1994.
58. United Nations Security Council, “Statement by the President of the Security Council,” April 30, 1994, S/PRST/1994/21.
59. Secret memorandum from Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research Toby Gati to Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose and Legal Adviser Conrad Harper “Rwanda—Geneva Convention Violations,” May 18, 1994.
60. Ibid.
61. Confidential cable from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the U.S. Mission to the UN in Geneva and embassies, “Subject: UN Human Rights Commission: ‘Genocide’ at Special Session on Rwanda,” May 24, 1994.
62. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, June 10, 1994.
63. Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. to Supply 60 Vehicles for U.N. Troops in Rwanda,” New York Times, June 16, 1994, p. A12.
64. Rita Beamish, “Clinton Shocked at Presidents’ Death, Subsequent Violence,” Associated Press, April 7, 1994.
65. “Take Care of My Children,” Washington Post, April 8, 1994, p. A21.
66. Confidential cable from Secretary of State Warren Christopher to the U.S. Mission to the UN, April 15, 1994.
67. UN Security Council Resolution 912, April 21, 1994.
68. OAU, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide, chap. 12, sec. 42.
69. Dallaire, “The End of Innocence,” p. 82.
70. Interagency Working Group, “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda,” May 1, 1994.
71. Ibid.
72. Memo from Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank G. Wisner to Deputy National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, “Rwanda: Jamming Civilian Radio Broadcasts,” May 5, 1994.
73. Interagency Working Group, “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda.”
74. “One, Two, Many Rwandas?” Washington Post, April 17, 1994, p. C6. The Washington Post published a letter from Amnesty International Executive Director William Schulz almost two weeks later, on May 1, 1994, “U.S. Leadership in Rwanda Crisis,” p. C6. Schulz’s letter expressed shock at the Post’s assumption that the United States had no leadership role to play in the Rwandan crisis. “In a disaster of such huge proportions, it is understandable that we may feel impotent and be tempted to cope by withdrawing,” Schulz wrote. “We must resist this tendency, however, for it is precisely such isolation and distance that allow us to accept as inevitable the killing of 100,000 people in two weeks.” He juxtaposed the paper’s spirited editorial support for intervention in Bosnia with its timidity on Rwanda. “As the tragedy unf
olds, one has to wonder why the atrocities in Bosnia receive the widespread attention they do while the massacre of tens of thousands in an African country is met with a collective denial of responsibility and a hasty retreat.” He urged the United States to “turn its attention to doing whatever it can to alleviate the plight of the equally innocent and defenseless civilian population of Rwanda whose lives are no less worthy of protection.” Schulz pressed the United States to support expanding the UN presence and assisting in the evacuation of at-risk Rwandans.
75. “Cold Choices in Rwanda,” New York Times, April 23, 1994, p. A24.
76. Nightline, ABC, May 4, 1994.
77. Steven Livingstone and Todd Eachus, “Rwanda: U.S. Policy and Television Coverage,” in Howard Adelman and Astri Suhrke, eds., The Path of a Genocide: The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1999), p. 209.
78. Paul Richter, “Rwanda Violence Stumps World Leaders; Africa: Though Clinton and Boutros Boutros-Ghali Have Made Guarded Threats, Calls for Action Have Been Eerily Absent,” Los Angeles Times, April 30, 1994, p. A13.
79. Kevin Merida, “TransAfrica Leader to Fast in Protest; Robinson Labels U.S. Policy on Haitians Discriminatory, Racist,” Washington Post, April 12, 1994, p. A15.
80. “The Month in Review,” Current History, September 1994, p. 293.
81. Eleanor Clift and Tom Brazaitis, War Without Bloodshed: The Art of Politics (New York: Scribner, 1996), p. 304.
82. Paul Simon, P.S.: The Autobiography of Paul Simon (Chicago: Bonus Books, 1999), pp. 340–341.
83. All Things Considered, NPR, July 22, 1994.
84. Melvern, A People Betrayed, pp. 202–203.
85. Des Forges, Leave None to Tell the Story, pp. 624–625.
86. Confidential cable from Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott to the U.S. Mission to the UN, May 13 1994.
87. Holly Burkhalter, “The Question of Genocide: The Clinton Administration,” World Policy Journal, Winter 1994, p. 50.
88. The RPF was opposed to the deployment both because of its mistrust of France and because the rebels were trying to consolidate their territorial gains in the south and west, where Operation Turquoise was to be launched.
89. On June 22, 1994, the Security Council, under UN Resolution 929, authorized France to deploy a Chapter VII “temporary multinational force” to establish secure humanitarian areas. The duration of the deployment was limited to two months. Around Gisenyi, before the French arrival, the Hutu officials broadcast a message to “Hutu girls,” telling them, “Wash yourselves and put on a good dress to welcome our French allies. The Tutsi girls are all dead, so you have your chance.” Quoted by Gerard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 292.
90. SWB/France 2 TV, July 14, 1994, quoted in ibid., p. 297.
91. White House briefing, Federal News Service, July 15, 1994.
92. UN Security Council, statement by the president of the Security Council, August 25, 1994, S/PRST/1994/48.
93. “At Last, Rwanda’s Pain Registers,” New York Times, July 23, 1994, p. A18.
94. U.S. Lieutenant General Daniel Schroeder, the U.S. commander of the joint task force on Rwanda, initially seemed poised to be very supportive of Dallaire, his UN counterpart. But after his political masters laid out the rules of the road, Schroeder backed off from his prior commitments. “He wasn’t allowed to sustain a single injury, so he essentially stayed out of Rwanda,” Dallaire recalls. “It was surreal. You had American NGOs running around Rwanda left and right. Yet U.S. forces couldn’t leave their compound.”
95. White House briefing, Federal News Service, July 29, 1994.
96. Quoted in Milton Leitenberg, “U.S. and UN Acts Escalate Genocide and Increase Costs in Rwanda” in Helen Fein, ed., The Prevention of Genocide: Rwanda and Yugoslavia Reconsidered (New York: Institute for the Study of Genocide, 1994), pp. 41–42.
97. U.S. Information Agency press conference, Rwanda, Federal News Service, August 24, 1994.
98. Melvern, A People Betrayed, pp. 216–217.
99. Secretary-General Kofi Annan at first refused to permit Dallaire to testify. Under public pressure, however, Annan granted a waiver to the general to appear as a witness on matters directly relevant to the case against a Rwandan mayor, Jean Paul Akayesu. The waiver explicitly excluded confidential document and cable traffic between Rwanda and the UN mission in New York. Daphna Shraga, a UN legal affairs officer, said that the trial was “not the appropriate context within which the performance of a peacekeeping operation, the propriety and adequacy of its mandate, its operational activities and the decision-making processes relating thereto, should be assessed”; United Nations, “General Dallaire, Former Commander of UNAMIR, Gives Testimony Before International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,” Press Release L/2856, February 25, 1988, p. 2.
100. Lara Santoro, “Rwanda Massacres Were Avoidable, General Says,” Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 1998, p. 7.
101. Dallaire, “The End of Innocence,” p. 79.
102. Allan Thompson, “General May Recount Rwanda Horror Again; Tribunal Likely to Recall Canadian,” Toronto Star, February 27, 1998, p. A1.
103. Ibid.
104. James Bennet, “Clinton Declares U.S., with World, Failed Rwandans,” New York Times, March 26, 1998, pp. A6, A12.
105. Mike Blanchfield, “General Battles Rwanda ‘Demons’: After Witnessing the Atrocities of Genocide, Romeo Dallaire Has Had to Endure the Belgian Government’s Criticism,” Ottawa Citizen, December 13, 1998, p. A3.
106. Luke Fisher, “Besieged by Stress: The Horrors of Rwanda Haunt a General,” MacLeans, October 12, 1998, p. 24.
Chapter 11, Srebrenica
1. The rebellion Mladic mentioned was a Serb uprising crushed by the Turks in 1804. David Rohde, Endgame: The Betrayal and Fall of Srebrenica, Europe’s Worst Massacre Since World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997), p. 167.
2. Ibid., p. 79.
3. Ibid., p. 369.
4. Confidential cable from U.S. embassy in Sarajevo to Secretary of State Warren Christopher, July 11, 1995; these documents were declassified through the Freedom of Information Act at the request of Bob Silk, a New York lawyer, who filed the request on behalf of the group Students Against Genocide.
5. Rohde, Endgame, p. 101.
6. Human Rights Watch, Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Fall of Srebrenica and the Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), p. 16.
7. Rohde, Endgame, p. 132.
8. UN, Report of the Secretary General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35, The Fall of Srebrenica, November 15, 1999, p. 106, para. 478.
9. “President Clinton’s Remarks Before Meeting with Congressional Leaders,” U.S. Newswire, July 11, 1995.
10. UN, Report of the Secretary General, p. 72, para. 315.
11. Stephen Engelberg and Tim Weiner, “Massacre in Bosnia; Srebrenica: The Days of Slaughter,” New York Times, October 29, 1995, sec. 1, p. 1.
12. Human Rights Watch, The Fall of Srebrenica, p. 20.
13. Engelberg and Weiner, “Massacre in Bosnia.”
14. Rohde, Endgame, pp. 242, 256, 280.
15. Ibid., p. 194.
16. DPI International Report, Online Newsletter, July 12, 1995, quoted in Human Rights Watch, The Fall of Srebrenica, p. 48. This UN propensity for spinning its disasters and debacles was one of the ugliest features of the mission. Akashi’s efforts in 1995 were only the latest in a long tradition of packaging failure as success. In 1992, the first year of the war, Lieutenant Colonel Barry Frewer famously informed an open-mouthed press corps that there was no siege of Sarajevo, only “a tactically advantageous position.” When the Serbs took territory, burning and looting houses and expelling civilians in their path, UN officials said they were “adjusting” the confrontation line. David Rieff, “Nothing Was Delivered,” New Republic, May 1, 2000, p. 27. And during previous Serb attacks against safe areas, UN officials r
epeatedly tried to put a happy face on the shrinking territory under their protection, obfuscating the boundaries of the safe areas and claiming an ever narrower diameter under their authority. Reporters used to joke that Serb attacks led to such predictable efforts by UN officials to shrink the enclaves that the only reliable definition of a “safe area” was the “smallest concentric space into which a bullet cannot pass.”
17. UN, Report of the Secretary General, p. 87, para. 390.
18. Chris Hedges, “Balkans: ‘Srebrenica Is Our Country,’ Serbs Boast; Leader Rejects UN Demand to Return Safe Area,” New York Times, July 13, 1995, p. A6.
19. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, July 12, 1995.
20. Yasushi Akashi to Kofi Annan, July 14, 1995.
21. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, July 12, 1995.
22. Rohde, Endgame, p. 225.
23. Bob Woodward, The Choice (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), pp. 259–260; Chuck Lane, “The Fall of Srebrenica,” The New Republic, August 16, 1995, pp. 14–18.
24. UN, Report of the Secretary General, p. 80, para. 350.
25. Engelberg and Weiner, “Massacre in Bosnia.”
26. Michael Dobbs and R. Jeffrey Smith, “New Proof Offered of Serb Atrocities; U.S. Analysts Identify More Mass Graves,” Washington Post, October 29, 1995, p. A1.
27. State Department briefing, Federal News Service, July 12, 1995.
28. John Pomfret, “Witnesses Allege Abuses by Serbs; Killings, Abductions Cited; Search for Missing to Begin,” Washington Post, July 16, 1995, p. A1.
29. Rohde, Endgame, p. 332.
A Problem From Hell Page 76