Well, of course I trust you, Rumsfeld said with his best bedside manner. You're the leader of the United States Navy. Then he turned on a dime. How could you say that? he asked sounding both confrontational and hurt. Then back to the Dr. Rumsfeld routine, saying, I have great confidence, and laying it on pretty thick.
Clark realized that the effusive praise was an astonishingly effective way of pushing away the issue of trust. He didn't want to be picky and small in this interview but he brought up all the studies and reports that Rumsfeld kept from the Joint Chiefs. Mr. Secretary, he said, you have locked us out of this process. As a result, I have read everything that I'm allowed to see, and at this stage still some of the things have not been released to us.
I don't know that you and I, Mr. Secretary, are on the same page for us to be able to lead the United States military and for me to be your senior military adviser. If I'm going to be your senior military adviser, you have to know what I think and I have to know what you think.
Rumsfeld indicated that Clark was making too much of a bunch of paper. We'll have other times to talk about this, he assured Clark.
More than anything else, sir, I do not want to go to the White House tomorrow and have a meeting with President Bush where the first thing he asks is, 'Vern, do you want to be chairman?' We are not ready for that kind of conversation.
Okay, no problem, Rumsfeld said. The president will not offer you the job tomorrow. It will not be handled like this. This is a preliminary interview.
In that case, Clark agreed. Sir, I'm on for tomorrow.
Before his meeting with Bush, Admiral Clark pulled out a copy of the Title X Goldwater-Nichols law on the Joint Chiefs and the chairman. In addition to designating the chairman as the principal military adviser to the president, defense secretary and NSC, the law said that the other service chiefs were also military advisers, and if they disagreed with the chairman their views should be presented as well. On the way to the White House, Clark reminded himself to stress that the Joint Chiefs were not a one-man band.
Clark's only real interaction with Bush had been six months earlier on January 20, 2001, at Bush's inaugural parade. When a large Navy contingent walked by the reviewing stand in front of the White House, Clark, as the top admiral, was escorted up. He saluted Bush and stood by his side, describing the various Navy units. As the last one passed by, Clark squared his heels and saluted again.
Mr. President, he said, it's a pleasure to be here today and be part of this significant event. And the men and women of the United States Navy are prepared to serve under your leadership. And on a personal basis I want you to know I'll be praying for you.
Bush had blanched.
clark was greeted in the Oval Office by Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld. After a few moments of small talk the president said, Well, Vern, what would you think about being chairman of the Joint Chiefs?
Clark shot a glance over at Rumsfeld, and realized he was going to have to tap-dance his butt off. He went into his Rotary Club ramble to keep from saying anything. He said how honored he was to serve as chief of the Navy, and how jointness—the services operating together—was the future.
Bush asked some general questions about the Navy.
Clark had his stock speech down pat and he went into an account of his top five priorities to change the Navy, with a focus on people, readiness and new shipbuilding.
In a little set piece that he hoped would be music to Bush's ears, Clark said that in the 1990s the nation had stopped talking about service, including the military. My Navy's part of it, he said. It was all 'I, I, Me, Me!' I'm not getting this and I'm not getting that—pity party feeling about life. Clark continued, You know, I am a person of faith.
The president just nodded.
My dad was a preacher, Clark continued. Before his first meeting as CNO with all his subordinate admirals, he said, an aide told him, We need a revival meeting. Clark recounted how he then spoke to the admirals and said, We are a people of service. And quality of service doesn't just mean quality of life —medical care, base housing and other fringe benefits. Service meant We're going to start talking about quality of work. Service meant giving of yourself for a higher purpose.
Mission is number one, Clark said. The Continental Congress did not create a Navy so we could cut a fine silhouette on the horizon. Our business is about taking it to the enemy.
Clark mentioned that Rumsfeld liked to talk about transformation, meaning modernization and change in the military. He said that he had been doing transformation before the word was used, certainly before Bush became president and Rumsfeld became secretary of defense.
Cheney said hardly a word, and after the meeting Rumsfeld said nothing to Clark. Clark felt the meeting had been ho-hum, and he didn't think anyone learned much.
Several weeks later, Clark got word that Cheney wanted to meet with him alone. The meeting was scheduled to last 20 minutes, clearly a pro forma effort. The White House was checking the boxes and Clark felt he was not a serious candidate. However, he had time to prepare.
I don't know if you remember, but I was the guy standing over your shoulder during the Gulf War, Clark said. I was the guy that shoved the stack of deployment orders over to you.
Cheney didn't pretend to remember. Clark had been a Navy captain then.
On the overall military situation, Clark indicated that it was a time of difficult adjustment but he felt the principles of transformation being pursued by Rumsfeld were correct.
Cheney wanted to know how he'd risen to become the Navy chief.
Clark said that in 2000 Secretary of Defense William Cohen's civilian chief of staff had asked him, Vern, how did this get so screwed up? referring to the Navy. Clark said his answer was They picked the wrong people. Only one of the top five admirals in the Navy had ever commanded a carrier battle group. There were too many desk admirals. Picking the right leaders with the right operational experience was critical. Whatever you do, don't let it get like that again, he told the vice president.
Clark said that he had started stupid study or stupid school for the new admirals. Instead of the old indoctrination for new flag officers built around etiquette, how to hold a knife and fork at foreign embassies or the White House, they now had a two-week course focused on core issues. Admirals didn't know anything about finance, he said. They only knew how to spend money, not how to manage budgets. So they taught real finance to the admirals. From his studies about how to be a CEO, he tried to get the admirals to spend their time according to the modern business model: one third of the time on the top priorities, one third on executive placement and development, and the final third on evaluating the product or results.
You know, Clark added, in this town we never do the last one third. We just build a new budget. That is wrong. We have got to figure out how to do this better. That's what I'm teaching my guys to do. This was part of my agenda. It wasn't Don Rumsfeld's agenda. This was what we came here to do.
Cheney was receptive, so Clark turned to goings-on during the Clinton administration. It was clear that the vice president liked to hear these old war stories.
Make sure you have people around that will tell the president exactly what the facts are and not like we did in Kosovo, Clark said. Clark recounted how as the Joint Staff's operations director, or J-3, he had attended the White House meetings in 1999 when Clinton decided to deal with Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing. Whether it was a miscalculation or simply sugarcoating, President Clinton's advisers first told him that Milosevic would fold if he were threatened. When he didn't fold, Clinton was told bombing would do the trick.
It was all supposed to be over in 48 hours and then in 72 hours, Clark said. Instead it took 78 days of bombing to get Milosevic to cave. You needed a roomful of psychiatrists to counsel all the cabinet members to make sure none of them slit their wrists, because they had so grossly misrepresented what was going to happen and the way they cased this for the president. Some of the Clinton natio
nal security team had been selling hope and had lost their sense of realism, Clark said.
And you want to make sure you never, ever get caught in that situation, Clark said.
In Kosovo, the optimism was so deep, Clark said, that they had a 72-hour strike plan but there was nothing planned to follow it. Zero, he said. No plan if the optimism didn't turn out, so they really had to scramble. With your background here, he told the former defense secretary, you'll be able to play a role in this that will be different than has happened around here in a long time. And for goodness sake, pick a chairman that won't ever let that happen.
Cheney seemed all grins, taking it all in, seeming to want to listen. So Clark went on, saying that General Shelton had insisted that the chiefs read Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, the 1997 book by H. R. McMaster, a 1984 West Point graduate. The military leaders during Vietnam were weak and failed to give their best military advice, Clark said. The chiefs had not worked together and they did not have rapport with the civilian leadership.
Clark said the Vietnam-era military leaders had lost their ability to affect the process in a way that kept the president from doing things that were detrimental to the nation. They lost their voice, didn't talk straight, and McNamara manipulated the system. The country and the military paid a price for it. Mr. Vice President, whatever you do, you've got to make sure you pick a military leader who will never let that happen again.
Clark went back to when he'd been a Navy captain during the Gulf War. He had watched the relationship between Cheney as secretary of defense and Powell as JCS chairman. As far as he could tell, Clark said, it was the ideal model—an independent-minded chairman who was nonetheless close to the secretary of defense. There was a strain between Rumsfeld and Shelton, Clark noted. You know, Clark continued, this connection, getting the right guy really is a big deal. It's going to be a big challenge with Rumsfeld. He added, I've got a fabulous job. I want you to understand that. And I've got it rolling in the Navy. And that was something he, the president and Rumsfeld might want to keep in mind when making a selection.
Well, Cheney said, I can see that you'd be a great resource in this job.
The meeting lasted one hour and 20 minutes—an hour longer than scheduled. Clark left thinking, Wow. I wonder how this plays. He had laid it on the line, but felt it had been a very warm meeting. He believed he had connected with Cheney and that the tide was turning in his favor.
Soon Clark was summoned back to the White House to meet for another 30 minutes with both Bush and Cheney. He was given no advance notice.
Mr. President, Clark said, you know I've got a terrific job here. This is not something I covet doing.
Yeah, Bush said, that's what they tell me. You don't really care if you get the job, do you? Why is that?
Well, Mr. President, the admiral responded, first of all, I consider it an honor of a lifetime to be able to serve. And, he said, it could be difficult for a service chief, steeped in his own program and service problems, to move up to the chairmanship, which required total jointness. But there's one other really important reason. You know, ambition is important in people. But too much ambition, my observation, in senior military leaders is a dangerous thing.
Clark let the point just hang, but he thought, be careful with this notion of ambition, dummy. No one could become president without being pretty ambitious. Of course, Clark attempted to recover, there are places and positions that you couldn't possibly seek unless you had ambition. But the military positions are first positions of service. And I think when ambition gets in the way of service that it's a dangerous thing.
Vern and I had a great meeting a couple of days ago, Cheney said. Vern's got a lot of things going on in the Navy, things that I think it's important that he share with you. Why don't you tell him in more detail what you're doing in the Navy.
Clark summarized his five priorities and stressed the importance of people and the need for a new definition of service. He said retention of officers and enlisted men in the Navy was going up because of programs to improve not only the quality of life but the quality of service. Retention was so high that he was soon going to have to create a new program to start forcing people out of the Navy.
Before the meeting Clark had been escorted to wait in the Roosevelt Room, instead of the normal holding place for visitors in the West Wing lobby, and he knew that Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Richard Myers had seen Bush and Cheney just before him. He wanted to display a little inside knowledge, so he said to the president he understood the choice was probably between Myers and himself. I wanted to tell you Dick Myers will be a fine chairman, Clark said. His choice of fine was intentional. Not great or perfect. Just fine.
Clark said it was vital that Bush pick a chairman whose announcement would make the whole military stand up and cheer. It was critical, he said, that the men and women in the military from down in the ranks up to the top commanders have confidence in their leaders. That was a key issue not only in recruitment and retention, but in performance. A military that does not respect its own leaders will not flourish, he said.
The president asked Clark about his understanding of the role of a JCS chairman.
Principal military adviser to the president, the secretary of defense and the National Security Council, Clark said, noting he had been the Joint Staff director and knew the law. But the chairman principally and first works for the secretary of defense, Clark said, adding that Goldwater-Nichols required the chairman to represent the views and opinions of the other chiefs.
Tell him about your experience with Kosovo, Cheney said to Clark. The one you shared with me.
I wasn't a four-star, I was a three-star, Clark told the president. I was the guy who worked for the chairman. I got to watch the chairman up close and personal. He recalled how he came to the White House with Shelton in 1999 for what he called the getting-ready-to-go-shoot talks, and was sometimes sitting at the table in the Cabinet Room or Situation Room, sometimes sitting right behind the chairman. It was important that President Clinton get the facts, realistic evaluations, he said. When you get ready to pull the trigger, Clark said, you have got to have a chairman that you have absolute total confidence that you've gotten the whole story from.
Overselling was a big problem, Clark said, recounting the Kosovo bombing story and the need for shrinks in the Clinton Cabinet Room.
Bush chuckled.
So, this relationship with the president and the chairman is important. What's really important here is the relationship between the secretary and the chairman. Now being that guy on the sidelines, coming up through my career, I've been able to observe this. And the model you want to emulate is the model that existed when that guy —he pointed to Cheney— was the SecDef and Colin Powell was the chairman.
Cheney said nothing, but he knew that his relationship with Powell had not been nearly as perfect and seamless as it was being portrayed.
It's flattering that I'm over talking to you, Clark went on. But, you know, in a crunch that's not nearly as important as what's going to come over here to you via the SecDef. That's the guy you're going to be talking to.
He continued, This interview's really interesting. Clark looked right at Bush. And a connection between you and I, if I were to be the chairman, is important but not nearly as important as the connection between the chairman and the secretary of defense. So of utmost importance is that you get a chairman who has a great connection with the secretary of defense.
Do you have that relationship with Don Rumsfeld? Bush asked.
Not yet, Clark replied.
Hmmm, okay, Bush said.
Clark believed in divine intervention. He left the meeting hoping that he might get the job but also thankful for the chance to tell the president what the military really needed, what the president needed to do, and how he ought to think about the military matters. Many of his colleagues would have killed for the opportuni
ty.
In addition, Clark believed that he brought few if any of the trappings that bound so many of his peers, especially from the service academies. He felt that he had not had to kiss ass along the way to get there.
Shelton had been talking with Rumsfeld regularly, trying to keep his hand in the selection process for his successor. Since it was now down to Clark or Myers, Shelton thought he owed Rumsfeld his recommendation.
Vern is the best by far, he said. Clark would push hard against Rumsfeld, which Shelton felt was exactly what Rumsfeld needed. But Myers was the exact opposite. He would state his view, but if Rumsfeld disagreed, would withdraw and acquiesce. Shelton had seen it happen.
Rumsfeld smiled and merely said, Okay.
Shelton did not tell Clark or Myers about his recommendation. He wasn't at all sure which way it would go, and he didn't want any acrimony.
Around this time, Steve Herbits had lunch alone with Rumsfeld, who said the choice was indeed down to Clark or Myers.
If you want transformation to happen in this building, Herbits said, then Vern Clark's your man. He is brilliant analytically, he is a leader of change, he knows how to get people moving. Clark had taken on the most hidebound of military cultures—the U.S. Navy. He knows how to pick change agents. He changed the Navy. He's done an unbelievable job.
But, there was one argument to be made for Myers, Herbits said. If you think there's a chance that you're going to war, you better pick Dick.
Why?
Because Dick has more war-fighting experience, Herbits replied. Myers had flown 600 hours in combat over Vietnam. Though it had been three decades ago, it might have symbolic importance. And the military will trust him more in a military situation than they will Vern, who has got all the credentials but he doesn't have the war-fighting experience.
Bob Woodward Page 8