Asking a think tank if it would be willing to strategize for the top policy-makers in a time of extraordinary crisis was like asking General Motors if they would be willing to sell a million more cars. DeMuth, a smooth, debonair lawyer trained at the University of Chicago Law School and expert on government regulation, readily agreed. AEI was practically the intellectual farm team and retirement home for Washington conservatives. Among its scholars and fellows were former House Speaker Newt Gingrich and Lynne Cheney, the wife of the vice president. Cheney himself had been an AEI fellow between his stints as secretary of defense and president and CEO of the giant defense contractor Halliburton.
DeMuth recruited a dozen people. He later said they agreed to serve only if I promised it would all be kept secret.
Included in the group were Bernard Lewis, a Cheney favorite and a scholar of Islam who had written extensively on Middle Eastern tensions with the West; Mark Palmer, a former U.S. ambassador to Hungary who specialized in dictatorships; Fareed Zakaria, the editor of Newsweek International and a Newsweek columnist; Fouad Ajami, director of the Middle East Studies Program at SAIS; James Q. Wilson, a professor and specialist in human morality and crime; and Reuel Marc Gerecht, a former CIA Middle East expert. Rumsfeld assigned his consultant and general fix-it man, Steve Herbits, to participate. Herbits, who had devised the original idea and encouraged Wolfowitz to push it, called the group Bletchley II.
On Thursday night, November 29, 2001, DeMuth assembled the group at a secure conference center in Virginia for a weekend of discussion. They passed around some of the participants' various writings. DeMuth was surprised at the consensus among his group. He stayed up late Sunday night distilling their thoughts into a seven-page, single-spaced document, called Delta of Terrorism. Delta was used in the sense of the mouth of a river from which everything flowed.
In an interview, DeMuth declined to provide a copy of Delta of Terrorism, but he agreed to describe its conclusions.
What we saw on 9/11 and the less dramatic attacks of the '90s like the USS Cole —which killed 17 Navy sailors— manifest that a war was going on within Islam—across the region. It was a deep problem, and 9/11 was not an isolated action that called for policing and crime fighting.
It was a different kind of terrorism than the 1970s version, with locally disaffected groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy. Overall, the report concluded, the United States was likely in for a two-generation battle with radical Islam.
The general analysis was that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where most of the hijackers came from, were the key, but the problems there are intractable. Iran is more important, where they were confident and successful in setting up a radical government. But Iran was similarly difficult to envision dealing with, he said.
But Saddam Hussein was different, weaker, more vulnerable. DeMuth said they had concluded that Baathism is an Arab form of fascism transplanted to Iraq. The Baath Party, controlled by Saddam Hussein, had ruled Iraq since 1968.
We concluded that a confrontation with Saddam was inevitable. He was a gathering threat—the most menacing, active and unavoidable threat. We agreed that Saddam would have to leave the scene before the problem would be addressed. That was the only way to transform the region.
Copies of the memo, straight from the neoconservative playbook, were hand-delivered to the war cabinet members. In at least some cases, it was given a SECRET classification. Cheney was pleased with the memo, and it had a strong impact on President Bush, causing him to focus on the malignancy of the Middle East. Rice found it very, very persuasive.
Rumsfeld later said he remembered the general plan but didn't recall the details of the memo. His design, he said, was to bring together some very fine minds on a highly confidential basis and provide intellectual content for the post-9/11 era.
Herbits was very happy with the way Bletchley II had worked out, although Rumsfeld decided not to make the group permanent. Summarizing their conclusions, Herbits said, We're facing a two-generation war. And start with Iraq.
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bush decided on January 18, 2002, that the protections of the Geneva Conventions would not apply to terrorist suspects detained from al Qaeda and the Taliban. They would be declared unlawful combatants, not entitled to the Geneva protections of prisoners of war.
General Myers had not been involved in the decision. He disagreed with it because it would open the door for mistreatment of U.S. personnel taken as POWs. He argued to Rumsfeld, but he couldn't get the secretary on his side. Worse, he didn't know where Rumsfeld stood.
Secretary of State Powell asked the president to reconsider. At a later NSC meeting with Bush and Cheney, Myers and Rumsfeld were not in agreement. It was one of the few times they had not coordinated ahead of time to bring Myers's position in line with Rumsfeld's.
Mr. President, Myers said, you may notice I'm the only guy here without any backup. I don't have a lawyer. The other NSC principals had their legal advisers there. I don't think this is a legal issue. And I understand technically why the Geneva Conventions do not apply to these combatants. They weren't all fighting in organized national armies or wearing uniforms, as the conventions required. I got that. But I think there is another issue we need to think about that maybe hasn't gotten enough light.
Myers said he worried about the impact on U.S. POWs. You have to remember that as we treat them, probably so we're going to be treated. That was the best-case scenario, the going-in hope. We may be treated worse, but we should not give them an opening. Terrorists or other future enemies could easily use the U.S. policy against the Taliban as an argument that they too could ignore the Geneva Conventions.
By February, the president had decided to compromise. The Taliban would be covered by the Geneva Conventions, although they would not be classified as prisoners of war who had the highest levels of protection and who could not, for example, be physically coerced during interrogations. The administration would not consider al Qaeda terrorists covered at all, although detainees would be treated humanely.
Press Secretary Ari Fleischer was supposed to read the decision to the press on February 7, but Steve Hadley, Rice's deputy, had sent a copy to Rumsfeld giving him a heads-up. Rumsfeld had a last-minute objection— as was often the case—and Hadley told Fleischer not to read it.
Bush was watching Fleischer's briefing that day. When it ended at 1:28 p.m., the president was surprised that Fleischer had not announced the decision.
Bush called Fleischer. I cleared that statement, the president said, and instructed the press secretary to go out and read it. At 1:40 p.m.—just 12 minutes after he'd walked off the podium—Fleischer appeared again in the press room for an unusual, unscheduled second daily briefing.
The Geneva Convention will apply to the Taliban detainees, but not to the al Qaeda international terrorists, Fleischer announced, and pointed out the important distinction that Taliban detainees are not entitled to POW status.
The President has maintained the United States' commitment to the principles of the Geneva Convention, while recognizing that the Convention simply does not cover every situation in which people may be captured or detained by military forces, as we see in Afghanistan today.
President Bush had spent most of August 2002 on vacation at his ranch in Crawford, Texas. Bandar joined him there for a visit on Tuesday, August 27, 2002, a year to the day after the 2001 meeting in which Bandar had delivered the Crown Prince's message and successfully pressured Bush to declare explicit U.S. support for an independent, sovereign Palestinian state. The two had hours to talk that morning. Bandar had met personally with Saddam four times in the five years from 1985 to 1990, and he shared his own reactions, along with those of King Fahd, who had met with Saddam many times.
Bandar recalled for Bush a conversation King Fahd had with Saddam after the November 20,1979, takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca by hundreds of militants who claimed the Saudi government was becoming too liberal and friendly to the West. Saddam had been vice president and
acting leader for some time, but he had just become president and was attending his first Arab summit meeting.
Kill those people, Saddam advised Fahd.
Fahd said when the militants were arrested, their leaders would be executed and the others would go to jail.
Oh, my, I'm worried, Saddam said. I'm embarrassed by your comments.
Fahd asked Saddam what he meant.
In my mind there is no question you are going to kill all 500. That's a given. Listen to me carefully, Fahd. Every man in this group who has a brother or father—kill them. If they have a cousin who you think is man enough to go for revenge, kill him. Those 500 people is a given. But you must spread the fear of God in everything that belongs to them, and that's the only way you can sleep at night.
According to Bandar, Saddam required his bodyguards to do two things to prove themselves: kill somebody else from within their own tribe and kill somebody from another tribe. So there would be a double vendetta.
Bandar explained: This is smart evil because if you take the evil out of it, it makes sense. If I want to trust you with my life, I want to make sure nowhere else you are safe except with me.
At another time Saddam pointed to the people around him—high and low—and told Fahd, They are the most loyal to me.
It is nice to be surrounded by the most loyal people, Fahd replied.
Oh, no, no, I didn't say that, Your Majesty, Saddam corrected. I told you they are very loyal to me because every one of them, his hand is bloody. Every one of them knows that when I die, you will never find a piece this big from my body. Saddam indicated the smallest piece of flesh between his fingers. I'll be cut to pieces, and if that happens to me, they're all finished.
From his personal meetings with the Iraqi dictator, Bandar said, The most amazing thing about Saddam is how confident he looks, how relaxed he looks, and how charming he is—and how deadly. And each of these attributes are clear and at the same time.
Saddam could make his most senior generals shake, Bandar said. Once, while Bandar met with Saddam in the 1980s while trying to broker an end to the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam told him, Bandar, all those people are loyal to me. I know a man by looking into his eyes. I can tell you if he is loyal or not. And if his eyes start blinking, I know he is a traitor and then I exterminate him.
Bandar said that Saddam was excited to show his power, and said it in such a gentle voice and in such a genteel manner that it took five seconds to realize he was serious.
You are a man with presence, Bandar told the Iraqi dictator. I would not be surprised that some poor young officer or minister might panic, which is natural. Are you going to tell me you are going to kill somebody because he panicked only because he is in awe of you?
Ha, ha, ha, ha, HA! Saddam replied with the most deadly laugh. He then tapped Bandar on the shoulder. I'd rather kill somebody, not sure if he is a traitor, than let one traitor get by.
In the fall of 2002, Tenet and Bush had a 30-second conversation in which Bush made it clear that war with Iraq was necessary and inevitable. Tenet was extremely surprised, but the president's short remarks were made with such conviction that Tenet suddenly realized they were on a march to war. There was something about the hard resolve in Bush's body language that made Tenet realize that all the TOP SECRET talk and war planning had a specific purpose. Bush said that the risks presented by Saddam would grow with time.
We're not going to wait, he said.
On November 4, 2002, Rob Richer, a veteran covert operator and former CIA chief of station in Amman, Jordan, took over as head of the Near East and South Asia Division of the CIA operations directorate, overseeing the entire Middle East. It was the key operations billet with hands-on management of clandestine work in the region. Within a month, as his Iraq Operations Group was moving two CIA paramilitary teams secretly into northern Iraq, Richer attended his first meeting on Iraq and asked Tenet if it really looked like war.
You bet your ass, Tenet said bluntly. It's not a matter of if. It's a matter of when. This president is going to war. Make the plans. We're going.
Tenet refined some of his thoughts in discussions with John O. Brennan, one of his closest confidants. Brennan, a veteran of 22 years with the agency, had been the White House daily intelligence briefer for two years during the Clinton administration, and later served as CIA station chief in Saudi Arabia, and as Tenet's chief of staff for two years. He was now the deputy executive director at CIA headquarters.
Tenet told Brennan he believed war was coming and Bush was determined. He said he found that there was a part of Bush that might still be deliberating while some others under him, like Cheney and Wolfowitz, had absolutely decided that war was coming.
Tenet told Brennan that in his gut he didn't think invading Iraq was the right thing to do. Bush and the others were just really naive, thinking they would just be able to go into Iraq and overturn the government.
This is a mistake, Tenet finally told Brennan.
But Tenet never conveyed these misgivings to the president. Bush had never asked him directly for his bottom-line counsel, although Tenet felt that Bush had nevertheless opened the door in their conversations to the point where Tenet could have said, No, this is crazy, this won't work, you shouldn't do this. But Tenet never said it.
What held him back was complex. Despite his doubts, Tenet assured Bush on December 21, 2002, that the case that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the prime articulated reason for the looming invasion, was a slam dunk. For Tenet, the temptation to invade was real because there was no doubt the U.S. could overthrow Saddam and totally defeat the Iraqi military with some ease. And there was all that great momentum, all the CIA and military planning, including getting a few other countries such as Great Britain to commit to action. It was hard to step back. As Tenet said once afterward, If you get up on your toes, you can't walk away. We sucked in all of these allies—the Saudis, the Jordanians—and we just couldn't pull the plug on them. They were giving us all this sub rosa support.
Lastly there was Cheney. Was the vice president putting all his experience and surface coolness behind a strong push? Had he told Bush, Yes, you've got to do it ? Tenet had never been in the room when that had happened, but he believed Cheney was privately pressuring Bush, arguing strongly for war as the only solution to the Saddam Hussein problem.
In late September 2002, Rumsfeld met with General Franks, his operations director, Air Force Major General Victor E. Gene Renuart Jr. and Douglas J. Feith, the Pentagon's undersecretary for policy. Feith, 49, was a protégé of Richard Perle, the former Reagan defense official who was one of the most outspoken Iraq hawks.
Rumsfeld said that Defense was better set up to run postwar Iraq than the State Department, and he believed that Defense should and would be put in charge.
Feith agreed and said he wanted his policy operation to lead the postwar effort. Over the past months, he had been attending secret interagency luncheon meetings of the deputies run by Steve Hadley. They had discussed the issues at length, and Feith had pulled together a five-inch-thick notebook outlining the discussions and the planning.
Make a copy of this for Condi, Rumsfeld said, seeming impressed with the book. If there was war with Iraq, he stressed, he wanted to make sure that it was not another Bosnia. In Iraq he wanted the reconstruction and political issues worked out in advance. We do not want to be in a position where the failure of somebody to do those things ties our forces down indefinitely the way they seem to be tied down in Bosnia indefinitely. Rumsfeld had been pushing to cut the number of NATO troops still serving in Bosnia, which had recently been as high as 18,000.
Feith would handle the job for Defense, Rumsfeld said. His goal was very precise: Unity of effort and unity of leadership for the full range of reconstruction activities that need to be performed in order to say that mission is over and the troops can leave.
Boss, did you just hear what I think I heard? Renuart said to Franks as they left the meeting.
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bsp; What did you think you heard? Franks inquired.
Well, Renuart, a fighter pilot, who took notes in a book nicknamed the Black Book of Death, said, it sounds to me like OSD Policy — Feith's office— has responsibility for planning post-conflict and our responsibility is security. And we don't own the reconstruction stuff.
That's the way I look at it too, the Central Command commander said.
I think we just dodged a big bullet, Renuart said.
Well you may be right, Franks said. I've got my marching orders. The secretary wants us to focus on security.
Feith and his deputies began drafting policy guidance, establishing working groups and creating specific cells to examine issues such as energy, stability and sovereignty. Rumsfeld agreed to create a new office specifically for reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.
You're going to be responsible for this, Feith said to Rumsfeld. Let's get the office created.
Yes, Rumsfeld agreed, let's get the office created. Then he said no, then he said yes, then no again. They discussed it repeatedly. Feith spoke to Hadley, who explained that a diplomatic settlement with Saddam was still an option, so they didn't want to create a postwar office.
In late September, 49-year-old Army Major General James Spider Marks was preparing for the assignment of a lifetime: top intelligence officer for the U.S.-led forces planning to invade Iraq. For Marks it was the culmination of 27 years in the Army. Nicknamed Spider since his high school days as a 6-foot-1, 150-pound football player, Marks was third-generation West Point, graduating in 1975, a month after the fall of Saigon, perhaps the low point for U.S. military morale. Marks was one of only seven out of the 875 in his class to reach two-star rank, and he was determined not to screw up this critical assignment.
Still rail-thin, handsome in a youthful way, mildly dashing and totally gung ho, Marks would serve directly under the ground commander, Lieutenant General David D. McKiernan. Both men knew accurate, timely intelligence would be crucial, perhaps defining success or failure.
Bob Woodward Page 11