On November 11, Rice made her second trip to Iraq, arriving first in Mosul, the primarily Kurdish city about 225 miles northwest of Baghdad, to announce the inauguration of the first PRT. Three other teams, which she felt were worth their weight in gold, were established in three other Iraqi cities. But funding, staffing and security issues delayed some of the others, and a couple of hundred people in the field were not going to make a measurable difference in a country with a population of 25 million.
Enemy-initiated attacks had hit an all-time high of more than 3,000 in October, according to the classified reports.
On Veterans Day, Bush was scheduled to give a speech at the Tobyhanna Army Depot in Pennsylvania, a giant military repair and maintenance facility. A draft of his speech was circulated among the principals, and Rumsfeld noticed that the president was planning to endorse Rice's clear, hold and build language as our strategy.
Rumsfeld called Card about a half hour before the president was scheduled to speak.
Take it out, Rumsfeld said. Take that out.
It's the centerpiece to the speech, Card replied. More than that, it was the centerpiece of their whole strategy.
I recommend that we take it out, Rumsfeld persisted, noting that clear, hold and build just was not happening. The clear part was fine, he said. Clear, we're doing. He meant the military. It's up to the Iraqis to hold. And the State Department's got to work with somebody on the build.
Rumsfeld confirmed to me in an interview that he had asked that the phrase be removed. It might sound good at the moment but come back to haunt them. It's not just us clearing, it's the coalition. And the holding is increasingly them and not us. And the building is, we want to help create environments that they can reconstruct their own country.
Rumsfeld lost that particular battle. The president said, Our strategy is to clear, hold and build.
Gerson didn't understand Rumsfeld's objections. It was the only effective bumper sticker to explain their counterinsurgency strategy.
The other, bigger message in Bush's speech, however, was that the White House was going to come out swinging at anyone who claimed Bush and Cheney had misled the country before the war. The effect was to equate criticism with undermining the troops.
While it's perfectly legitimate to criticize my decision or the conduct of the war, it is deeply irresponsible to rewrite the history of how that war began, Bush said, prompting applause from the audience of troops and veterans. The stakes in the global war on terror are too high, and the national interest is too important, for politicians to throw out false charges, he added, to more applause. These baseless attacks send the wrong signal to our troops and to an enemy that is questioning America's will.
On November 16, Cheney gave an address to a conservative organization called the Frontiers of Freedom Institute, and amplified Bush's challenge. The accusation that they had lied was one of the most dishonest and reprehensible charges ever aired in this city, he said, adding, The saddest part is that our people in uniform have been subjected to these cynical and pernicious falsehoods day in and day out. American soldiers and Marines are out there every day in dangerous conditions and desert temperatures—conducting raids, training Iraqi forces, countering attacks, seizing weapons, and capturing killers—and back home a few opportunists are suggesting they were sent into battle for a lie. The President and I cannot prevent certain politicians from losing their memory, or their backbone—but we're not going to sit by and let them rewrite history.
That day, the White House released a 5,000-word, point-by-point rebuttal of a 913-word New York Times editorial that was sharply critical of Bush's prewar WMD rhetoric, and the more recent administration claims that questioning his actions three years ago is a betrayal of the troops in battle today.
The next day, Congressman Jack Murtha, a Pennsylvania Democrat, introduced a resolution in Congress calling for American troops in Iraq to be redeployed —the military term for returning troops overseas to their home bases— at the earliest practicable date. Murtha, a former Marine Corps drill instructor and the first Vietnam veteran elected to Congress, had excellent sources among the armed forces. No one had better credentials as a supporter of the military than the 73-year-old Murtha. Murtha had voted for the October 2002 resolution authorizing the president to use military force in Iraq. A four-time visitor to Iraq, Murtha made weekly trips to the military hospitals to visit wounded Iraq veterans.
The war in Iraq is not going as advertised, Murtha said. It is a flawed policy wrapped in illusion. The military was suffering, he said on the House floor. Choking back tears, he added, Our military has done everything that has been asked of them. It is time to bring them home. Many of the troops had become demoralized and were poorly equipped. Two years after the war, their very presence in Iraq was impeding Iraq's progress toward stability and self-governance.
This was shocking and House Republicans knew it had to be met head-on. The next day the House had one of its most emotional and raucous debates. Speaker Dennis Hastert asserted that Murtha and other Democrats had adopted a policy of cut and run. They would prefer that the United States surrender to the terrorists who would harm innocent Americans.
House Armed Services Chairman Duncan Hunter, a California Republican, introduced a resolution that cynically twisted Murtha's proposal for a pullout at the earliest practicable date. Hunter's resolution called for an immediate troop pullout. Murtha himself could not and did not vote for it. It was defeated, 403-3.
Later that day, the president's press secretary, Scott McClellan, issued a statement. Congressman Murtha is a respected veteran and politician who has a record of supporting a strong America. So it is baffling that he is endorsing the policy positions of Michael Moore* and the extreme liberal wing of the Democratic party. The eve of an historic democratic election in Iraq is not the time to surrender to the terrorists. After seeing his statement, we remain baffled—nowhere does he explain how retreating from Iraq makes America safer. The upcoming December 15 election in Iraq McClellan referred to was to elect a permanent assembly, which would select a prime minister to serve for four years.
Murtha's was a voice from deep inside the soul and conscience of the American military. Informed military officers knew he was speaking for many more than himself.
* Moore made the controversial anti-Bush documentary film Fahrenheit 9/11.
Card tried to have a private, candid session with Laura Bush about every six weeks to hear her concerns. He set aside an hour and a half for each meeting. Sometimes it took 30 minutes, sometimes the full hour and a half and on occasion two hours.
The first lady was distressed about the war, but Card knew that she was not aware of the classified intelligence or information on Iraq. Nonetheless she often pressed him for information.
I can't talk about that, Card said.
Well, he won't tell me either.
The first lady was worried that Rumsfeld was hurting her husband, and her perspective seemed to reflect Rice's concern about Rumsfeld's overbearing style and tendency to dominate. Card knew that the first lady and Rice often took long walks together on the Camp David weekends.
I agree with you, Card said. On one level he was trying to educate and explain, but he was also lobbying. So he outlined his problems with Rumsfeld and how he believed it was time for a change.
Well, does the president know about that? she asked. Was he being candid with her husband?
Card said he was. That's why I'm arguing. He said, however, that so far his advice on the Rumsfeld situation had been considered and rejected.
He's happy with this, the first lady said, but I'm not. Another time she said, I don't know why he's not upset with this.
For much of the year the president had been working out how he might explain the strategy to win in Iraq. In Nebraska on February 4, 2005, he had said, Our strategy is clear. We're going to help the Iraqis defend themselves. We'll accelerate training. . . . We'll help them stand up a high-quality security force.
And when that mission is complete, and Iraq is democratic and free and able to defend herself, our troops will come home with the honor they deserve.
The problem was that training Iraqis and building Iraqi defenses is not a strategy for classic military victory—the kinetics of bombing and engagements with other military forces. Generals Abizaid and Casey realized that the goal of neutralizing the insurgents as outlined in the classified Campaign Plan had not been realized. In a practical sense the military had adopted a transition strategy to shift the problem to the Iraqis, as opposed to a strategy to win. Neutralizing or even defeating the insurgency was too hard. The plan was to train the Iraqi security forces to do it.
The key was to make the transition strategy sound like progress. In an address to the nation from Fort Bragg, North Carolina, on June 28, 2005, the president said, Our strategy can be summed up this way: As the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.
Abizaid went before Congress and later appeared on television on Sunday, October 2, 2005. We've got close to 200,000 Iraqi security forces in the field, we've come a long way, the general told NBC's Tim Russert. I'm optimistic.
Indeed the number of Iraqi security forces had been going up steadily while the number of U.S. forces had remained constant. But the classified reports showed that over the previous eight months the enemy-initiated attacks had gone up pretty steadily to 2,500 in the month of September 2005.
Abizaid kept in touch with a bunch of old Army buddies—many from West Point and mostly retired, including retired Army General Wayne Downing and Jim Kimsey a founder of America Online. They were worried that Iraq was slowly turning into Vietnam—it would either wind down prematurely or become a war that was not winnable.
Some of them visited Abizaid at his headquarters in Doha and then in Iraq. Abizaid held to the position that the war was now about the Iraqis. They had to win the war now. The U.S. military had done all it could. It was critical, he argued, that they lower the American troop presence. It was still the face of an occupation with American forces patrolling, kicking down doors, looking at the Iraqi women, which infuriated the Iraqi men.
We've got to get the fuck out, he said.
Abizaid's old friends were worried sick that another Vietnam or anything that looked like Vietnam would be the end of the volunteer army. What's the strategy for winning? They pressed him.
That's not my job, Abizaid insisted.
No, it is part of your job, they insisted. Abizaid was the articulate one. He could talk for an hour and it sounded great, better than anyone.
No, Abizaid said. Articulating strategy belonged to others.
Who?
The president and Condi Rice because Rumsfeld doesn't have any credibility anymore, he said.
Hadley heard similar complaints that there was no strategy. He wanted to launch a public relations offensive. He assigned his NSC director for Iraq, Meghan O'Sullivan, to comb through the classified documents that he thought outlined their strategy, and see what could be made public.
In June 2005, Hadley had recruited Peter Feaver, 43, a Duke University professor of political science and Navy Reserve officer who had worked on the Clinton NSC, to the NSC staff. Feaver had studied the impact of war on public opinion and concluded that the public was more tolerant of combat losses than politicians or senior military officers. He felt that Clinton came close to almost questioning his authority as commander in chief to order someone to his death. This had cascaded down so that the political and military leadership during his presidency had virtually no tolerance for casualties.
Feaver's survey work suggested that the public would tolerate casualties if they believed the war policy was reasonable, aimed at winning. O'Sullivan and Feaver worked on a strategy document that would depict a reasonable path to victory. Feaver believed the document they came up with showed mixed progress, and did not mindlessly declare a necessity to stay the course.
Hadley sent the draft out to the principals. Rumsfeld had numerous comments, carefully hedging. The final document said, We expect, but cannot guarantee, that our force posture will change over the year. In other words, there was no timetable for withdrawing forces.
The document was given the title National Strategy for Victory in Iraq. It was right out of the Kissinger playbook—the only meaningful exit strategy would be victory.
Bush approved and the plan was to put out a 35-page Strategy for Victory in September. But on August 29, Hurricane Katrina devastated New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, and caught the Bush administration flat-footed. The rollout had to be delayed.
Card's relationship with Rumsfeld was always difficult. A vast majority of the times, Rumsfeld accepted Card's word that the president wanted certain things done and gave the chief of staff the benefit of the doubt when he passed on an order. But a handful of times Rumsfeld balked.
In the days after Katrina, Bush had decided more National Guard troops were needed, and asked Card to relay the message to Rumsfeld.
You know, I don't report to you, Rumsfeld said.
I know you don't report to me, Card replied. You report to the president. But believe me, he would like you to do this.
I'm not going to do it unless the president tells me, Rumsfeld told the chief of staff. Too many strains and obligations were being placed on the Guard.
Card protested that he had just talked to the president, who had made an absolute decision.
Then he's going to have to tell me, Rumsfeld said.
Hey, the president said to Card later, Rumsfeld called me up. I thought you were going to handle that.
I did, Card said dryly, but he wanted to hear it from you, I guess.
After Thanksgiving, Card made another concentrated effort to get the president to replace Rumsfeld. He didn't want the president to have blinders on. Rumsfeld's assault on clear, hold and build was only one example. Many of the Republican and Democratic leaders were telling Card privately that they just could not deal with him. He was more arrogant and unresponsive than ever. Card was also hearing from members of the old foreign policy establishment connected to the president's father—the Gray Beards, he called them—who were complaining more and more. A focus was Rumsfeld.
Who's going to do the job? the president asked Card.
Card again mentioned Jim Baker. How do we get Roger Clemens back into the game? Card asked, comparing Baker to one of the all-time great pitchers. Clemens had retired from the New York Yankees in 2003, only to come back for another year with his hometown Houston Astros. He can still pitch, Card said about Baker.
Bush reminded him that they were at war. Rumsfeld was transforming the military, hadn't been insubordinate, and needed to get the new Pentagon budget approved. Replacing him would be disruptive to the upcoming Iraqi election December 15. Interesting, the president said nonetheless. Interesting.
Card could see that the point was sitting in Bush's mind. Maybe it would come out. But the president would not even authorize Card to send out feelers or to enter into any discussion with Baker.
The 35-page National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was finally released on November 30, 2005. No war has ever been won on a timetable and neither will this one, the executive summary said. U.S. forces would be withdrawn as the political process advances and Iraqi security forces grow and gain experience. While our military presence may become less visible, it will remain lethal and decisive, able to confront the enemy wherever it may organize. Our mission in Iraq is to win the war. Our troops will return home when the mission is complete.
Part of the plan was for Bush to give four speeches on Iraq, starting with one that day at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. Dozens of large Plan for Victory signs hung in the background. Bush used the word victory 15 times, insisted he would not compromise, and maintained his upbeat tone. He conceded a few mistakes, saying that the training of Iraqi security forces, for example, had not always gone smoothly, but said that lessons had been learned. We changed the way the Iraqi police are trained. Now, police rec
ruits spend more of their time outside the classroom with intensive hands-on training in antiterrorism operations and real-world survival skills.
Bush's war policy had not changed, but the news coverage suggested he was being more explicit and comprehensive. From Iraq, The Washington Post reported that day, violence was no mere abstraction. On the streets of Baghdad, such optimistic rhetoric contrasts sharply with the thunder of suicide bombs, the scream of ambulance sirens, the roar of racing police cars bearing men with masks and machine guns, the grim daily reports of assassinations, murders and hostage-taking.
On the same day Bush spoke, nine farmworkers were killed when gunmen opened fire on a bus near Baqubah, snipers fired on the office of a National Assembly member in the capital, and three Iraqi army officers were wounded when a bomb went off near their patrol. In Fallujah, 20,000 people marched in a funeral for a Sunni cleric shot while leaving prayers.
The violence on the ground had not changed. But a dispatch from Baghdad by two respected New York Times correspondents, John F. Burns and Dexter Filkins, went the furthest, noticing a change in the president. Headlined, For Once, President and His Generals See the Same War, they called Bush's speech a watershed, because it acknowledged the immense difficulties in training Iraqis and getting Iraqi army and police battalions to the point where they could hold their own against the insurgency.
On December 7, the president flew to New York City to address the Council on Foreign Relations for the second of four planned speeches on Iraq.
Today we mark the anniversary of a fateful day in American history, he said, and compared Pearl Harbor with 9/11. It was still his main theme.
Later that afternoon in Washington, Bush invited the Republican House leaders, including the 15 deputy whips who were the core organization of the Republican Party in the House, to the White House. These were the ambitious Republicans that Bush wanted to hold close. Cheney, Rove, Card and Bartlett attended the meeting in the Oval Room of the White House residence.
Bob Woodward Page 50