Section IV. The Labor Supply
The discussion above has already suggested that next to foreign raw materials that cannot be easily replaced, the supply of labor is the most fundamental factor in evaluating the feasibility of a huge production program. Given an unlimited supply of labor and the existence within a country of all essential raw materials, it should be possible within a comparatively brief period of time to produce the necessary end products, even if it requires a preliminary period of construction of new facilities or of production of new equipment. It is for this reason, I believe, that in the countries that have been engaged in a prolonged war effort it is the shortage of crucial raw materials not available within the country and even more the shortage of labor that become the primary obstacle to arise in the pace of war and total output.
The evaluation of the military requirements program in terms of labor supply is, therefore, most important. And the results of such rough evaluation as were presented by Hinrichs appear to suggest that an outlay of $60 billion on military production and construction in 1942 is out of the realm of feasibility. This total would require by the end of 1942, a quarterly rate of expenditure of some $25 to $26 billion; and would call for employment in war production work of some 33 million workers. If one adds to it armed forces of somewhat over 5 million men, the total number engaged in the war effort would amount to 38 million. On the other hand, the minimum needed for civilian production and agriculture is 32 million (with about 40 million so employed at present). The required total working force by the end of 1942 (including the men in the armed forces) would amount then to 70 million. According to Hinrichs, we can count on a maximum labor force of only 60 million. The 1942 program is, therefore, beyond the bounds of the possible labor supply.
According to Hinrichs, the program for 1943 is even more impossible, in terms of the labor supply involved. It would call for an employment of 37 million workers in war production alone; and with the addition of 8 to 9 million men in the armed forces, would call for the absorption of 45 to 46 million men in the war effort. If we add to it the minimum employment needed for civilian production and agriculture (of 32 million), and the necessary cushion for float unemployment, (of some 2 to 3 million), the total requirement is for a labor force of over 80 million men and women. According to Hinrichs, it is unreasonable to expect such an enormous working force. On the other hand, to quote his letter: “The Victory Program would require $16 billion expenditures in the last quarter of 1943. This will require 20 million workers on defense production. We can create an adequate labor force to carry this burden. It is about the job that we did in mobilizing the labor force in 1918.” On this calculation, (i.e. the old Victory program) the demands in the last quarter of 1943 would be for: 20 million in war production, 9 million in the armed forces, 32 million on civilian and agriculture, unemployed float of 2 million—a total of 61 million. At present there are about 51 million people employed in all types of work or in the armed forces.
I would like to have the opportunity to study more closely Hinrichs’figures, and especially test them against the experience of other countries with a longer history of the war effort. But at the present juncture, I can only give you the gist of Hinrichs’ conclusions. In terms of 1942, the maximum that his figures suggest would be somewhat over $45 billion; assuming a rate of $16 billion in the end of 1941 (and one of $8 billion in the first quarter of 1942), we would obtain an annual total (along a straight line) of some $148 billion in 1942. On the same basis, a maximum of $64 billion would be expected in 1943. All values here are of course, in 1941 prices.
APPENDIX 3
Wedemeyer’s Victory Program1
Ultimate Requirements Study Estimate of Army Ground Forces
The specific operations necessary to accomplish the defeat of the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time. Irrespective of the nature and scope of these operations, we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat. Such requirement establishes the necessity for powerful ground elements, flexibly organized into task forces which are equipped and trained to do their respective jobs. The Germans and their associates with between 11 and 12 million men under arms, now have approximately 300 divisions fully equipped and splendidly trained. It is estimated that they can have by 1943 a total of 400 divisions available in the European Theatre.
The important influence of the air Army in modern combat has been irrefutably established. The degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theatre will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed. The necessity for a strong sea force, consisting principally of fast cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, torpedo boats, and submarines, continues in spite of the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Employment of enemy air units has not yet deprived naval vessels of their vital role on the high seas, but has greatly accelerated methods and changed the technique in their equipment. It appears that the success of naval operations, assuming air support, will still be determined by sound strategic concepts and adroit leadership. A sea blockade will not accomplish an economic strangulation or military defeat of Germany. Nor will air operations alone bring victory. Air and sea forces will make important contributions but effective and adequate ground forces must be available to close with and destroy the enemy within his citadel.
3. It is therefore imperative that we create the productive capacity to provide equipment for the following:a. Appropriate forces distributed for the defense of the United States, outlying possessions, and bases selected to facilitate the defense of the country and the Western Hemisphere.
b. Task Forces which can effectively conduct military operations, primarily in the European Theatre, as well as in the Western Hemisphere and in other strategically important areas.
c. The military forces of associates and friendly Powers committed to the policy of opposing Nazi aggression. Quantities to be limited only by our own strategic requirements and the ability of the friendly Powers to use the equipment effectively.
4. A sound approach to the problem of determining appropriate military means requires careful consideration of WHERE, HOW, and WHEN they will be employed to defeat our potential enemies and to assist our associates.
a. WHERE. Accepting the premise that we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces, our principal theatre of war is Central Europe. Possible subsidiary theatres include Africa, the Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Far East; however, the operations in those theatres must be so conducted as to facilitate the decisive employment of Allied forces in Central Europe.
b. HOW. The combined and carefully coordinated operations of our military forces, in collaboration with associated Powers, must accomplish the following:1. The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis and associated Powers must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and water areas contiguous to Europe.
2. Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.
3. The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, ports, and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.
4. The combat effectiveness of the German military forces must be greatly reduced by over-extension, dispersion, shortage of materiel, including fuel, and a deterioration of the Home Front. Popular support of the war by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, the destruction wrought, and chaos created.
5. Existing military bases (the British Isles and the Near East) must be maintained. Additional bases, which encircle and close in on the Nazi citadel, must be established in order to facilitate air operations designed to shatter the German indust
rial and economic life. Such bases may also provide feasible points of departure for the combined operations of ground and air forces. In disposing of our forces, we must guard against dispersion of means in operations that do not make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany.
6. The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theatre (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).
c. WHEN. The following factors with regard to the time element are important in determining the production capacity necessary to realize our national objectives:1. The lag between plan and execution is considerable. Past experience indicates that from eighteen months to two years are required.
2. How many months will Germany require to defeat Russia, to reconstitute her forces subsequent to Russia’s defeat and to exploit to any perceptible degree the vast resources of Russia? It is believed that Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that, militarily, Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will “Coventry” all industrial areas, lines of communications and sources of raw materials east of the line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before she will largely profit economically by her “drive to the east.” The maintenance of huge armies of occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintaining splendidly organized intelligence and communications nets, and employing strategically located, highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized, and motorized), Germany may control the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thus releasing the bulk of the military for other tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table, covering the production of munitions, the creation of trained military forces, and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground, and sea), is strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theatre.
3. We are confronted by two possibilities: first, a rapidly accelerated all-out effort with a view to conducting decisive, offensive operations against the enemy before he can liquidate or recoup from his struggle with Russia; second, a long drawn-out war of attrition. Under our present production schedule, we will soon have adequate military means to defend our outlying possessions and bases and to provide for the security of the Western Hemisphere, but we will not be able to provide sufficient appropriate forces for timely offensive action in the principal theatre of operations. The urgency for positive action exists, particularly while the enemy is contained militarily in Russia. It would strongly contribute to the early and decisive defeat of the Axis Powers, if the Allied forces could seize and firmly establish military bases from which immediate air and subsequent ground and air operations might be undertaken.
4. The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner, but the production of materiel must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present, the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the Axis, the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task, and gain the wholehearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves. Otherwise, we will be confronted in the not distant future by a Germany strongly entrenched economically, supported by newly acquired sources of vital supplies and industries, with her military forces operating on interior lines, and in a position of hegemony in Europe which will be comparatively easy to defend and maintain.
5. The time by which production can reach the levels defined by our national objectives is highly speculative. July 1, 1943, has been established as the earliest date on which the equipment necessary to initiate and sustain our projected operations can be provided. The ability of industry to meet this requirement is contingent upon many intangibles; however, the program can be definitely accomplished, in fact, greatly exceeded, if the industrial potential of the country is fully exploited. The urgency of speed and the desirability of employing our present great economic and industrial advantage over our potential enemies cannot be overemphasized.
4. Strategic Employment of Ground Forcesa. The future alignment of Powers and their respective combat capacities cannot be accurately predicted. In order to arrive at a plausible basis from which to determine our future requirements, the following assumptions pertaining to the world situation as of July 1, 1943, are made:1. Russia is substantially impotent militarily in Europe. Resistance in in Siberia, to include the Maritime Provinces, probably continuing.
2. The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign; by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.
3. The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Far East Maritime Provinces, or by the threat of United States–British military and economic reprisals.
4. Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.
5. The French will probably continue their passive collaboration with Germany.
6. Control of the Mediterranean Theatre, including North Africa and the Near East, remains disputed.
7. The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.
b. If these assumptions are correct, or even reasonably sound, on July 1, 1943, there will be no military bases remaining in Allied hands, other than the United Kingdom, possibly the northern coast of Africa, and the Near East. The establishment of additional bases, for example, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula, and Northwest Africa, will be bitterly contested by the Axis. However, to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany, those bases and others even more difficult to establish must be available to the Allies. Obviously, carefully planned action, involving appropriate sea, air, and ground units must be undertaken. Allied success is directly contingent upon the coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise and mobility, supported by sufficient reserves in materiel and manpower to insure a succession of effective impulses throughout the operations.
c. Latest information pertaining to the potential industrial capacities and military strengths of the opposing Powers (excluding the U.S.), as of July 1, 1943, indicates that the Axis Powers will have about 400 divisions available in the European–Near East Theatre and the Allied Powers approximately 100 divisions. To accomplish the numerical superiority, about 2 to 1, usually considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allies would have to raise about 700 divisions. A force of 700 divisions with appropriate supporting and service troops would approximate 22 million men. If Great Britain and the United States should induct so many men for military service, added to the tremendous numbers already under arms, the economic and industrial effort, necessary to conduct the war, would be definitely imperiled.
d. It is believed that the enemy can be defeated without creating the numerical superiority indicated. Effective employment of modern air and ground fighting machines and a tight economic blockade may create conditions that will make the realization of the Allied War Aims perfectly feasible with numerically less fighting men. Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide of battle for France. If the French Army had had sufficient tanks and planes, and quantities of antitank and antiaircraft materiel, France might have remained a dominant power in Europe. In June 1941, when the Germans lau
nched their invasion of Russia, they knew that their adversary was numerically superior and could maintain that superiority in spite of tremendous losses. They probably also knew that Stalin was creating a military force of great power, consisting primarily of effective modern fighting machines, and that if they delayed their “drive to the east” another year, Russia would possess armadas of air and ground machines which would not only render an offensive campaign impossible, but would make large demands upon the German military to secure her eastern frontier. The Crete campaign also presents illuminating evidence in favor of modern fighting means when opposed by superior numbers that are equipped with inappropriate means and are operating under World War I static tactical concepts. Approximately 17,000 Germans attacked and conquered the island which was defended by about 30,000 British.
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