Keep From All Thoughtful Men
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e. Our broad concept of encircling and advancing step by step, with a view to closing in on Germany, will remain sound regardless of future developments in the European situation, for it envisages the only practical way in which military and economic pressure may be brought to bear effectively against Germany. The loss of potential bases of operation, presently available, would render the accomplishment of our strategic plans extremely difficult and costly. It is important, therefore, that the Allies take effective measures to hold the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North African areas. Also the islands off the north-western coast of Africa should be denied to the enemy. Before undertaking operations in connection with the establishment of additional military bases, for example, in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Africa, and the Low Countries, a careful survey of the areas of projected operations and a thorough examination of the enemy capabilities are mandatory. The unfortunate Norway campaign of 1940 is a glaring example of a total lack of appreciation of such realities on the part of those responsible for the British expedition. The Germans employed approximately 175,000 men, strongly supported by the Air Force, to conquer and secure their lodgment in Norway. Special Task Forces, including two mountain divisions and numerous parachute units, made effective contributions to the success of the operation. Having gained a foothold, the Germans quickly established themselves in order to hold their bases and to facilitate exploitation. The British Forces dispatched against Norway totaled about 24,000 men, with no mountain troops and with inadequate air supporting units. The failure of the British Expedition is directly attributable to insufficient and inappropriate means. If and when the situation indicates the feasibility of an Allied expedition, against Norway for example, powerful and appropriate means, especially trained and equipped for the task, must be provided. Large and effective reserves must be readily available to preclude dislodgement of the initial forces and to facilitate subsequent exploitation. A careful study of Norway, including the terrain and communications net, and a survey of possible enemy capabilities, indicate the necessity for mountain, infantry foot and motorized divisions, numerous parachute, tank, antitank, antiaircraft, and air-borne units. The force required for the entire operation may total several hundred thousand men. The execution of the plan would be predicated on sea and local air superiority. The size of this force may appear large. However, even though our enemy may not be strong initially in the area of projected operations, the mobility of modern fighting means will enable him to concentrate destructive forces against us with unprecedented speed and surprise effect. The foregoing considerations apply with equal emphasis to proposed forces for other theatres of operations. Careful studies, concerning the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, the Near East, and Africa, have been made by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated Ground Forces (See Tab A). The enemy capabilities in those theatres in 1943 would obviously be conjecture. Task Forces consisting principally of armored and motorized divisions must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the Middle East, France, and the Low Countries. The exact strength and composition of the Task Forces, necessary to seize and maintain military bases, will be determined immediately prior to the operation. We can avoid the unfortunate disasters experienced by our potential allies in Norway, France, the Balkans, and in Crete by planning now and creating quickly the production capacity necessary to equip the ground forces recommended (Tab A). We must not suffer ignominious defeat and be expelled from the bases that we elect to establish. If the premises and assumptions made earlier in this study are appropriate and sound, additional strategically located bases are vital to the splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force and finally may serve as areas of departure for the combined operations of air and ground forces. The seizure, retention, and effective utilization of these bases is predicated on the successful operations of adequate sea, air, and ground forces.
5. Shipping was a bottleneck in the last war and again increased demands will be placed on all transportation facilities, particularly water, by constant troop movements and the expanded war industrial and economic effort. In order to transport and maintain effective forces in European areas, several million tons of shipping and adequate port facilities must be made available essentially for military service. To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theatre of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1,500 ships. But it is highly improbable that the situation in Europe will develop in such a manner as to permit or to require operations involving the movement of so large a force across the Atlantic within the limited time of one year, even if the ship tonnage were available. The progressive building-up of large military forces in the theatre will probably extend over a period of at least two years. This progressive movement would greatly reduce the demands upon maritime shipping for essentially military purposes and further would extend the period of time for the augmentation of maritime shipping now available. The realization of our present national policies may require operations in distant theatres by military forces of unprecedented strength. It would be folly to create strong fighting forces without providing the transportation to move and maintain them in the contemplated theatres of operations. The maximum possible shipbuilding capacity of our country, coordinated of course with other essential demands upon industry and raw materials, must be exploited and continued in operation for the next several years.
6. The foregoing considerations clearly indicate the importance of creating a productive capacity in this country that will provide the most modern equipment designed to give mobility and destructive power to our striking forces. The forces that we now estimate as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in July 1943. We may require much larger forces than those indicated below, and correspondingly greater increased quantities of equipment. Emphasis has been placed on destructive power and mobility, with a view to offensive maneuvers in our principal theatre of operations (Europe). The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the role of ground units in the supreme effort to defeat our potential enemies total 5 Field Armies consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, air-borne, mountain, and cavalry) with appropriate supporting and service elements. The strategic concept outlined in this paper contemplates distribution of U.S. ground forces approximately as follows: (More specific data will be found in Tab A.)
Iceland 29,000
Scotland 11,000
England 41,000
Ireland 25,000
Hawaii 61,000
Puerto Rico 34,000
Panama 42,000
Alaska 29,000
Philippine Islands 25,000
Smaller Outlying Bases 32,000
Potential Task Forces
First Army 775,000
Third Army 590,000
Fourth Army 710,000
Brazil 86,000
Colombia-Ecuador-Peru 37,000
TOTAL 2,500,000
Strategic Reserves for which production capacity must be established but whose activation, location, and training will be determined by developments in the international situation 3,000,000
Troops in the Zone of the Interior and Fixed Defense Units (Ground) 1,200,000
TOTAL GROUND FORCES 6,700,000
TAB A
The Ground Forces estimated as necessary to provide for the security of the U.S. outlying possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and to make available appropriate forces for projected military operations follow:
1. Units organized, fully equipped, and trained as soon as practicable:
A. Military Bases and Outlying Possessions.
Newfoundland 5,690
Greenland 2,531
Caribbean Bases 40,199
Puerto Rico 34,757
Panama 42,614
Hawaii 61,337
Philippines 25,397
Alaska 28,823
Iceland 28,709
Bases in British Isles 76,160
TOTAL 346,217
B. Potential Task Forces
Brazil
1 Army Corps (1 Div. foot, 1 Div. Air-Borne) 42,392
2 Artillery Battalions Pack 1,804
1 Cavalry Regiment 1,591
5 Parachute Battalions 2,590
1 Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions 3,619
2 Aircraft Warning Regiments 2,600
2 Tank Battalions (Light) 1,086
3 Anti-Tank Battalions 2,100
Services 28,864
Total 86,646
Colombia-Ecuador-Peru
1 Division 15,245
2 Artillery Battalions 1,400
3 Parachute Battalions 1,554
1 Antiaircraft Regiment and 2 Medium Battalions 3,619
2 Tank Battalions (Light) 1,086
1 Aircraft Warning Regiment 1,300
Services 13,035
Total 37,239
First Army
1 Army of 3 Corps of 3 Divs. ea. 242,216
2 Armored Corps of 2 Amid Div. ea. 53,556
8 Divisions (4 Mtzd, 2 Mtn, 2 Abn) 108,516
5 Parachute Bns. 2,590
13 Artillery Bns. (4 heavy, 6 [105mm], 375mm How Pk) 9,906
20 Antiaircraft Regts and 10 extra Bus. 37mm 46,970
11 Tank Battalions (3 Medium and 5 Light) 4,839
12 Aircraft Warning Regts 15,600
10 Tank Destroyer Bns; and 10 Anti-Tank Bn (Gun) 14,000
Services (Ord., QM, Sig., Engr., Med.) 278,069
Total 776,262
Third Army
1 Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) 242,216
1 Armored Corps (2 Divisions) 26,778
2 Divisions Motorized 32,258
6 Artillery Battalions (Medium & Heavy) 4,300
1 Cavalry Corps and 2 H-Mecz Regiments 26,867
2 Air-Borne Divisions 20,000
5 Parachute Battalions 2,590
5 Antiaircraft Regiments and 3 Med. Bns. 12,166
3 Aircraft Warning Regiments 3,900
15 Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank Battalions 10,500
Services 207,860
Total 589,435
Fourth Army
1 Army (3 Corps, 9 Divisions) 242,216
1 Armored Corps (2 Divisions) 25,394
4 Divisions, Motorized 64,516
8 Artillery Battalions (Med. or Heavy) 8,800
4 Divisions (2 Mountain, 2 Air-Borne) 44,000
2 Parachute Battalions 1,036
15 Antiaircraft Regiments and 10 Med. Bns. 37,345
8 Tank Battalions (Medium or Light) 4,839
6 Aircraft Warning Regiments 7,800
25 Tank Destroyers or Anti-Tank
Battalions 17,500
Services 256,413
Total 709,859
TOTALTASK FORCES 2,199,441
A. The troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces in military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theatre; follows:
Military Bases and Outlying
Possessions 346,217
Potential Task Forces 2,199,441
TOTAL 2,545,658
2. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million for the reserve units indicated below. Activation, location and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.
A. Strategic Reserves.
2 Armies (10 Army Corps, 27 Divisions)
14 Armored Corps (53 Armored Divisions)
51 Divisions Motorized
115 Artillery Battalions (Pack Medium or Heavy)
9 Divisions (2 Cavalry, 6 Mountain)
3 Airborne
22 Parachute Battalions
129 Antiaircraft Regiments and 133 Medium Battalions
86 Tank Battalions (70 Medium, 6 Light, 10 Heavy)
29 Aircraft Warning Regiments
290 Tank Destroyer Battalions
262 Anti-Tank Battalions (Gun)
TOTAL: APPROXIMATELY 3,000,000
3.
Ground troops required for the Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units 1,200,000
4.
Recapitulation of Ground Forces
Military Bases and Outlying
Possessions 346,217
Potential Task Forces 2,199,441
Zone of Interior—Fixed Defenses 1,200,000
TOTAL 3,745,658
Units in reserve to be activated
when situation requires 3,000,000
TOTALARMYGROUND FORCES 6,745,658
5.
Air Force requirements (details submitted in a separate study)
Air Force Combat 1,100,000
Zone of the Interior Service units 950,000
TOTAL AIR FORCE 2,050,000
6.
Army Ground Forces 6,745,658
Army Air Forces 2,050,000
TOTAL ARMY FORCES 8,795,658
APPENDIX 4
Nathan’s 6 October Memorandum for War Production Board Meeting1
Planning Committee Document No. 205
The Problem of Program Determination
(Report by Robert R. Nathan to the War Production Board, presented at the meeting on 6 October 1942)
This discussion addresses itself to the need for reviewing the production program for this country in comparison with the country’s productive capacity. Under the production program we include the objectives for munitions, war industrial facilities, war construction, civilian-type products needed for the armed forces and Lend-Lease, and the essential needs of the civilian economy. The set of claims upon resources that this over-all problem represents are then to be compared with the country’s productive capacity, as it can be measured now and can be foreseen for the immediate future.
The reason for discussing now this adjustment of the program to capacity lies in the danger of production objectives substantially in excess of the limits of feasibility. In considering limits of capacity and resources, we assume that strenuous effort will be made to reduce civilian consumption to the essential minimum; to use materials, facilities, and labor in the most efficient manner; to gear our economic and institutional habits to the pitch of intensity that is required in an all-out effort. But if, on assumptions of such intensive utilization of the economy for war production purposes, we still find the production program in excess of feasible limits, then there is real need for discussing how the program can be adjusted to the limit of capacity.
But perhaps we should have a program in excess of capacity. There is one major advantage in having a program too large—in that there is constant pressure for an all-out war effort. Perhaps the disadvantages, which have already made themselves felt, may have been a cheap price to have paid for the speed with which armament production has increased and with which the output of civilian goods, in competition with war goods, has declined. However, the amounts of critical materials and resources now being used for non-essential purposes are relatively slight and the advantage of having a program, well above feasibility now appears to be more than offset by its disadvantages. Further, with excess fabricating capacity in many areas, there will be continued pressure for conserving the use of critical materials; and this pressure need no longer come from an over-sized program.
What are the disadvantages of having an excessively large program? In the first place, it brings imbalance in production as among various end items and as between complementary items and components. The easier parts of the program will be fully achieved, and, unless tightly controlled, will run ahead of schedule or beyond objectives, at the expense of more difficult items. There is already evidence of this situat
ion.
When the program is beyond attainment, it is impossible to avoid the development of excess fabricating capacity. Each procurement unit must establish facilities to achieve its objectives and the net result is bound to be idle or only partly utilized plants. Having some excess capacity may be useful as permitting greater flexibility in the program; but substantial excess capacity means wastage of materials and, even more important, may result in a serious morale situation among workers and management. Unless the program is now adjusted, we may be increasingly faced with the slowing down and closing of plants throughout the country.
A very important danger of an overly large program is the failure to meet the most important segments of the program. This is illustrated in the case of aircraft where the allocation of materials and of machine tools has not been adequate to meet the objectives. As long as the programs are determined through compromises made monthly or quarterly at the Requirements Committee level, it will be most difficult to avoid cutting the most important parts of the program as well as other parts. Not only aircraft agencies but also merchant shipbuilding units have complained about having their requirements reduced relative to what was necessary to meet the objectives.
A further disadvantage of an excess program is the lack of flexibility in items and categories. As new weapons, models, or designs are required on the basis of battle experience, it will be more difficult to obtain the earliest possible production unless there is some margin within the program. It is much easier to introduce new equipment when some specific other part of the program need not be eliminated to compensate for the item. To some degree the entire question of quality vs. quantity is tied up with the size of the program in relation to resources.