by Meda Ryan
Meanwhile Ernie O’Malley pressed for the organisation of some contingency plans in case of war; Lynch reassured him as he had on a previous occasion, that negotiations would begin shortly and that there would be no need for any action. O’Malley then asked if he could inspect the defences of the Four Courts. Lynch consented. The following day, O’Malley, with Paddy O’Brien (Liscarroll) made the inspection and outlined recommendations. He then drew up a report, which he forwarded to Lynch as C/S, but O’Malley said ‘it was not acted upon’. While army negotiations continued, Liam Lynch ordered the Dublin brigade to evacuate some of the positions in the city ‘in order to promote better understanding.’23
It was under the mantle of angry disappointment that the army delegates who had made up the previous convention assembled in Dublin on Sunday 18 June 1922. The explosive atmosphere, which had prevailed over the previous week, remained unabated making discussion of army reunification pointless. Extremely conscious of the imminence of Civil War, Liam Lynch requested that Florence O’Donoghue move for the adoption of the army proposals and so prolong the dreaded day. In an atmosphere of anger, disillusionment and bitterness, the motion for acceptance was debated. Despite the disturbed feelings of many of the delegates the debate was conducted with admirable restraint.
As the meeting proceeded Tom Barry proposed that instead of further discussion on the proposals for army reunification, the convention should consider a motion to resume war against the British forces in Ireland. (Only posts in Dublin and the six counties were then occupied by foreign troops.) This motion was opposed, not only by Liam Lynch and Cathal Brugha, but by practically all the delegates from the First Southern Division and by many others; however, it was supported by members of the Executive opposed to the reunification proposals. Lynch disagreed with Barry, and urged moderation, pointing out that such an action would be irresponsible. Both Barry and Lynch were strong-minded Republicans and spent some time arguing tactics instead of principles. Barry and his supporters believed that direct action would bring the pro-treaty soldiers in Beggars Bush and throughout the country back into a united front and that they could together fight the common enemy – Britain.
Though Seán MacBride agreed in principle with the proposal he said, ‘it was very foolish of Barry to have put forward such a resolution at the convention. It was neither the time nor the place for it. In fact it put the onus of declaring war on Great Britain, on a body of men who had been selected by various units of the army to select an Executive which was to appoint a chief-of-staff and to direct the policy of the army until a Republican Government was formed. I understand that Barry proposed that motion to counter-balance Liam Lynch’s proposal and to avoid a repetition of such incidents. As a policy the substance of his motion was quite right, but by putting it forward at a Convention without consulting anybody as he did, he was putting those who supported that policy into a very awkward position.’24
At the meeting it became apparent from a speech made by Liam Mellows that there was a very big split in the Executive based on the fundamental decision of policy. Lynch, Moylan and Deasy were leading the opposition to Barry’s motion and it became quite clear that once the motion was dealt with, a proposition would be made that the Republican army be united and controlled by the Free State army.
It appeared on the surface at least that the treaty was workable. Tom Barry was totally against this whole idea of being under Free State army control. However, sensing the mood he felt restrained; beyond proposing his motion, which he hoped would bring army unity, he made no attempt to justify it. Though Rory O’Connor and Liam Mellows saw Barry’s mistake in bringing forward this motion as a proposal to the convention, without any previous discussion, they understood that this was the only policy that could be consistently followed by the anti-treatyites. An air of depression and solemnity permeated this convention. Barry’s motion was passed by a couple of votes but was challenged on the grounds that a brigade was present which was not represented at the last convention. Following discussion, the objection was upheld: a fresh vote was taken giving the result 103 for the motion, 118 against. Some heated discussion on the compromise proposals followed, and Lynch declared that he would no longer go on as chief-of-staff.
Twelve members of the Executive who had voted with Barry chose Joseph McKelvey, to replace Liam Lynch, as their new chief-of-staff.
Barry and Rory O’Connor would not accept the continued delay. They left the room, followed by their supporters, announcing that they were returning to the Four Courts. Seán MacBride had the difficult task of announcing that a further convention would be held in the Four Courts the following morning. ‘There was an absolute silence and I could hear my steps like shots from the top of the room to the door.’25A few more delegates left; the Executive was now split; the anti-treaty section of the army was split; the convention broke up in gloom and confusion. A division had come about not on reunification proposals, but on the question of resumption of war with Britain.
The state of the army was chaotic during the ten days which followed this third convention. As the proposals for reunification had not been voted upon, Lynch hoped that reunification was still not dead; however, without the coalition government (Collins/De Valera Pact), there did not seem to be any prospect of acceptance by the majority of the anti-treatyites in the army. If a vote for army reunification proposals had been taken would the outcome have been different? Events were gaining momentum; by this time the political atmosphere created by the treaty division was now cemented by the rejection of the Pact.
1 Dan (Sando) O’Donovan (document – private papers).
2 Michael Farrell, Irish Times, 3 September 1982.
3 Others: Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows, Seán MacBride, Tom Barry.
4 Michael Farrell, Irish Times, 14 December 1982.
5 Seán MacBride, author interview, 11/5/77; See also Seán MacBride, Survivors, p. 117 (editor, Uinseann MacEoin).
6 See also Pax O’Faolain, Survivors, p. 141.
7 Michael Farrell, Irish Times, 14 December 1982.
8 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 251.
9 Liam to his brother, Tom, 18/4/1922, (Lynch private family papers)
10 Liam to his brother Tom, 1/5/1922, (Lynch private family papers).
11 J. J. O’Connell papers – The National Library.
12 Michael Farrell, Irish Times, 14/12/1982.
13 Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives, P7/B/193/7 also P7/B/192/301.
14 Ibid. P7/B/192/71.
15 Ibid, P7/B/192/72.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. P7/B/192/211.
18 Army Council: M/Defence, E. O’Duffy, L. Lynch, Seán Moylan, G. O’Sullivan, L. Mellows, R. O’Connor, F. O’Donoghue. GHQ Staff: chief-of-staff – Eoin O’Duffy; deputy chief-of-staff – Liam Lynch; deputy chief-of-staff – Liam Deasy; adj. general – Florence O’Donoghue; QMG – Seán McMahon; D/intelligence – G. O’Sullivan.
19 Previously Seán O’Hegarty, Tom Hales and Florence O’Donoghue had resigned on the issue of an attempt to forcibly prevent the holding of a general election – they were replaced by Tom Derrig, Tom Barry and Pax Whelan. See also Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 245.
20 P7/B/192/157, Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives.
21 Melbourne Irish News (Australia), 11 April 1924 (Lynch private family papers).
22 Lynch private family papers. Torn letter, date unknown.
23 Ernie O’Malley, The Singing Flame, p. 77
24 Seán MacBride, Survivors, 118.
25 Ibid.
21. Disunity and Civil War
Following the unveiling on 22 June 1922 of a memorial to railway men killed in the First World War, Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, military advisor to the six county administration, was assassinated in London. Commandant Reginald Dunne and Volunteer Joseph O’Sullivan of the IRA London�
�s battalion were arrested. There was no doubt in the minds of the British ministers that the Four Courts garrison was to blame for the killing. This was not so. Whether or not an earlier order given by Michael Collins was never cancelled is still unclear. What is clear is that Dunne and O’Sullivan were acting upon orders which they accepted as official and therefore legitimate. (Subsequently the two men were hanged.) On 24 June, Macready, still in command of the remnant of British forces in Dublin, received orders to attack the Four Courts the following day.1
While preparing to carry out orders the British cabinet altered its decision, cancelled its instructions and instead sent an ultimatum to the Provisional Government on 26 June demanding that the occupation of the Four Courts be brought to an end. Meanwhile, the Four Courts garrison continued to commandeer vehicles and arms from the remaining British troops. The Provisional Government was being criticised by Churchill and other members of the British government for making no move against these attacks. The entire strength of the Republican movement in Ireland could perhaps have been mobilised, had there been a call to close the ranks. The Pact had not been observed and the Dáil was to re-assemble on 30 June. There was no call for reunification of the army against the threat of British demands. Instead, things moved swiftly and inevitably to a climax. Pro-treaty deputy chief-of-staff, J. J. (Ginger) O’Connell was arrested by Republican forces as a reprisal for the arrest of Commandant Leo Henderson who had been held by Provisional Government troops whilst engaged in commandeering transport for the removal of supplies to the north – a project on which both sides were still nominally co-operating. A swift movement against the divided anti-treaty forces could, it was thought, bring an end to hostilities. At 3.40 a.m. on 28 June 1922 the Provisional Government issued an ultimatum to the Four Courts garrison. This was refused. Within an hour the attack on the Four Courts opened.
General Dalton, director of military operations, urged the use of artillery to bombard the Four Courts. ‘It was my belief that the using of these guns would have a demoralising effect on the garrison inside, that they would shortly surrender.’2Field guns, borrowed from the British forces, and supervised by British personnel, were used to shell the historic building. The Civil War had truly begun.
The shelling continued until noon on Friday 30 June. Fire had spread through most of the building by Friday morning and by mid-day the position had become untenable. Two of the garrison had been killed and a number wounded. Explosives which had been loaded on trucks for the north blew up and killed a number of pro-treaty forces.
The first prisoner of the Civil War was Tom Barry who tried to gain entrance disguised as a nurse. Other prisoners included Rory O’Connor, Liam Mellows, Joe McKelvey, Dick Barrett, Seán MacBride and Peadar O’Donnell.
Liam Lynch and a number of his officers were at the Clarence Hotel across the river from the Four Courts when the attack opened. Awakened by the eighteen pounders, they quickly assembled and, without hesitation, decided to support the men on whom the Provisional Government forces had opened attack. That decision by Lynch and his men brought the First Southern Division as well as other Republican units throughout the country into the conflict and ended any possibility that the aggressors might have had easy victory. The Provisional Government had miscalculated that there had never been a complete break between the majority of the Executive in the Four Courts and the minority in the Clarence Hotel. Earlier that week Lynch had spoken to O’Connor, Mellows, McKelvey and other members and they were still trying to work out a policy on which they could agree. Lynch had resumed his role as chief-of-staff on 27 June following a meeting in the Four Courts.3
A council of war of the officers in the Clarence issued a hurried proclamation calling on the army to resume the fight for the Republic; this was signed by the members of the Executive present. A decision was taken that the Southern Division officers return to their commands. Lynch would go south and set up headquarters in the country. Oscar Traynor was in command in Dublin. (He started to mobilise the Dublin brigade in support of the men in the Four Courts.)
On their way from the Clarence Hotel to Kingsbridge railway station when returning south Liam Lynch, Liam Deasy and Seán Culhane were halted by a party of Provisional Government troops under Liam Tobin and taken to Wellington barracks. Lynch and Deasy were interviewed separately by Eoin O’Duffy. ‘You’d better be on your way south,’ O’Duffy said, accompanying his parting words with a handshake.4
In the Provisional Government War News dated 22 July it was alleged that Lynch was released by O’Duffy because he said he gave his ‘word of honour that he disapproved of the policy of irregulars and would not assist them.’
What Lynch had said to O’Duffy was, ‘I think ye are all mad.’5Lynch and O’Duffy had always been good friends and had worked hand in hand during the long drawn out conferences for army reunification; so it is understood that it was through goodwill O’Duffy had allowed Lynch to go free, believing that he would help limit the Civil War in the south. Upon release, Lynch, Deasy and Culhane joined the other southern officers at Kingsbridge. Séamus Robinson, who was going to Tipperary to raise some troops, chastised Lynch and Deasy for creating the division of which the Provisional Government had taken advantage. Lynch sternly replied, ‘We are all together now’, and tried to persuade Robinson not to return with forces to Dublin as Robinson had planned. Lynch then outlined a strategy in which the anti-treatyites would work together keeping the south united, so that finally the treatyites ‘would succumb to the better force’. Robinson was determined to return to Dublin. They parted and went their separate ways.6
Lynch, Deasy and the others took a train which did not, however, go beyond Newbridge. Seán and Con Moylan went to Kilcullen where they procured a car and returned to pick up Lynch, Deasy, Culhane and Seán McSwiney. (A group which included Frank Barrett of Clare had got another car.) Lynch’s party was held up at Castlecomer by a section of the Provisional Government troops under Captain Murphy. Seán Moylan bluffed his way out and obtained a supply of petrol and oil for the car. As they were about to resume their journey the officer courteously invited them to the barracks for a meal. Lynch declined and said he wanted to be on his way, but Deasy intervened and revealed that they had not eaten since early morning. Lynch then agreed. They were treated to a very substantial meal. The men talked freely about the war and spoke about the regretful conflict which had arisen since the signing of the treaty. According to Deasy, ‘whatever tension had previously existed, quickly melted away’. Both sides of the group who sat around the table expressed a genuine hope that the conflict would not develop any further. It was past midnight as Lynch and his men rose to go, expressing their gratitude for the courtesy and generosity that had been extended to them. One of the officers then produced a large sheet of ruled foolscap, placed it on the table and invited the men to leave autographs as a token of friendship and as a souvenir of comrades in arms. Lynch, with Deasy and the other men, did so. There was a warm handshake and a salute from the guard, then both sides parted.
Lynch was very annoyed when, a few days later, the Provisional Government announced that Deasy and himself had assured O’Duffy that they were neutral, or at least that they would take no part in the war and that this was confirmed by their signatures as autographs in Castlecomer barracks.
In the War News it was alleged that Lynch, who had been released in Dublin by O’Duffy was later that day re-arrested at Castlecomer and again released, ‘repeating to Col Prout that he would not take part in the fight’. This statement and that alleged to have been made to O’Duffy were untrue, and though no more than propaganda, they were unhelpful in the prevailing tense climate. Deasy maintained that this was a sad epilogue to a night when the military ‘and ourselves fraternised so freely and parted in such a friendly manner’.7
That night, after Lynch and the others had left Castlecomer and joined the Cork
/Dublin road at Urlingford, they were again stopped at Littleton, but, almost immediately, allowed to continue. At Cashel they were held up again, but there Tom Carnew, another old friend, gave them the all clear. They arrived at Mallow around 8.30 a.m. on 29 June. On this, the feast of SS Peter and Paul, they had breakfast and went to Mass. For the remainder of the day they engaged in a full stocktaking exercise, and Lynch summoned a meeting of those officers in the brigade who could be contacted. At this meeting there was unanimous agreement to organise forces on a war footing and to first capture Limerick city and so gain control of the Shannon crossing. It was Lynch’s hope, according to Paddy O’Brien, ‘that by isolating the south and cementing it, the Provisional Government forces could become frustrated and so relent their holding’.8
Lynch wrote to all units in order to state his exact position and also the course events were taking:
Owing to statements to some newspapers and general false rumours amongst the army, I deem it necessary that all ranks should know at once the position of Army Command. It is not possible to give a full outline of situation until a more satisfactory army position prevails. Army Executive recently differed in the matter of policy which was brought about by the final proposal of Minister for Defence for army unification. As a result while remaining a member of Executive I have not carried on as C/S since Convention of 18th inst. Owing to attack on GHQ and other posts occupied by our troops by Dáil forces, and position created by draft Free State Constitution, I have again taken up duty as C/S since Thursday, 29th inst, with Temporary HQ at Mallow. Communications are established with all Southern, Western and Eastern Divisions, and a united plan of action being carried out. Assistant C/S has been detailed to command Dublin and Northern areas, and I am in constant communication with the latter. By this evening we hope to have made rapid progress towards complete control of west and southern Ireland for the Republic. Latest reports from Dublin show that the Dublin brigade have control of situation and that reinforcements and supplies are being dispatched through their assistance.