by Meda Ryan
A group of officers stood with Liam Lynch in the barrack square It was a heart-breaking moment. Suddenly Dan Mulvihill’s fine voice rang out in the popular aria from Verdi’s Ill Travatore, ‘Home to our Mountains’. Appreciation of Dan’s performance flashed on every face, and the dejection of the hour was somewhat lightened.
As Liam Lynch looked back at the burning building he pondered and asked what would the next chapter be for him. He did not expect an answer. The first phase of the Civil War had ended and a new one was about to begin.11
1 Connie Neenan, Survivors, p. 244
2 Ibid.
3 Liam Deasy, author interview, 5/12/1972.
4 Paddy O’Brien, author interview, 6/8/1975.
5 Mulcahy papers University College, Dublin, Archives, P7/B/192/ 173; see also Eoin Neeson, Civil War in Ireland, pp. 88, 89; also Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, pp. 262, 263.
6 See Appendix I.
7 P. G. 57 Minutes, 12 July 1922; also P7/B/244/58, Mulcahy papers, University College Dublin, Archives.
8 C. Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution, p. 357.
9 Ibid. p. 359.
10 Document captured at Blessington – Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin Archives, P7/A/80.
11 Interview with Siobhán (Creedon) Langford, 6/9/1976; Siobhán Langford, In Hope and in Sadness, p. 241.
23. Memo on Michael Collins’ death
After the evacuation of Fermoy on 11 August 1922 the adjutant general, Con Moloney, had established headquarters in the Glen of Aherlow. He also acted as adjutant to the Southern Command. (Both headquarters were in the Glen but Lynch did not move into that area until 25 September.) The change over to guerrilla warfare cost the Republican forces time and effort and produced a series of new problems. Morale, which had been high during the fight against the British, was now considerably set back. Peace negotiations were formulated by persons who were neutral in the Civil War.
On 28 July 1922 at a meeting in Fermoy, Frank Daly and Professor O’Rahilly, put two specific questions to Liam Lynch: (1) Would he agree to cease hostilities if the other side did? and (2) in the event of the second Dáil meeting, would he recognise its authority?
The following day Lynch replied:
… when the Provisional Government cease their attack on us, defensive action on our part can cease ... If the Second Dáil, which is the Government of the Republic or any other elected assembly carry on such Government I see no difficulty as to allegiance of the army.1
Lynch’s reply was sent to Michael Collins, together with two queries asking if he was prepared ‘to arrange such a cessation of hostilities as General Liam Lynch intimates he is prepared to accept’, and also if he would ‘agree to call forthwith a meeting of the Second Dáil.’
Collins replied on 4 August:
... So far as the army is concerned I am merely obeying the orders of my Government and all the general staff and soldiers of the army merely carrying out the instructions given in accordance with such orders. This Government has made it fully clear that its desire is to secure obedience to proper authority. When an expression of such obedience comes from the irregular leader I take it there will no longer be any necessity for arms conflict. When the irregulars – leaders and men – see fit to obey the wishes of the people, as expressed to their elected representatives, when they will give up their arms and cease their depredations on the persons and property of Irish citizens, there would be no longer need for hostility.2
Collins made it clear that this was an ‘official answer as presumably your communication was meant to be addressed to the Government’ and went on to refer to the form which prisoners, taken in the recent conflict, had been asked to sign and which most of them had refused. He therefore inferred from it that these men intended to take up arms again against the Provisional Government. ‘If this is the spirit which animates Liam Lynch then I am sure your body will agree that it is very little good endeavouring to talk about terms.’3In this letter Collins referred to the duties of the government and to the fact chat the time for face-saving had passed. ‘The choice is definitely between the return of the British and the irregulars sending in their arms to the People’s Government to be held in trust for the people.’4These were certainly strong words from a former friend and comrade.
On the same day, Arthur Griffith replying to two specific points, stated that the actions of the anti-treatyites were incorrectly described as being defensive and could therefore not be tolerated. He also stated that the functions of a second Dáil came to an end on 30 June 1922. In the letter Griffith insisted that the military action undertaken by the government was necessary to enforce obedience to parliament, which action would cease only when there was the surrender of arms, the restoration of seized property, and the restoration of bridges and roads which had been mined or made otherwise impassable.
The tone of these two letters indicate that the Provisional Government’s intention to end the conflict was only through the absolute defeat and destruction of the anti-treaty forces. It should be noted that the Republican forces were, at this point, in a stronger position to negotiate than at any subsequent period. Though many favoured peace at almost any price, a large section of opinion disliked the fact that the Dáil had not continued to assemble, and they did not like the stand taken by the Provisional Government.
The situation, which Lynch envisaged, was an ideal one. He did not, however, take into account that the large majority of the people in Ireland wanted an end to the warfare. On 19 August 1922 he had directed, ‘our troops will now be formed in ASU’s [Active Service Units] and operate in the open’.5He stated that ‘the strength of columns should not exceed thirty-five all ranks and that where a number of columns were operating in the same locality they should co-ordinate their security measures, afford each other mutual protection and act in combination when necessary.’6
During these months of the early part of the Civil War, Lynch had kept the progress of the conflict under review at frequent staff meetings: it could be said that the complete control of the Republican forces rested with him in so far as it was possible for any one man to exercise authority in the face of such a conflict. Lynch’s optimistic nature was now strongly tinged with sadness. In a letter to his brother Tom on 16 September he wrote:
The disaster of this war is sinking into my very bones, when I count the loss of Irish manhood and the general havoc of Civil War. Who could have dreamt that all our hopes could have been so blighted.
However, he had set out on a course and he was determined to see it through. He felt that nobody on the Republican side had any responsibility for carrying on the war except the Executive. De Valera expressed a desire to meet members of the army Executive, but Lynch was reluctant to hold an Executive meeting, unless ‘the military situation improved considerably ... I would, however, be only too pleased to have your views, at any time on the general situation, and matters arising out of it, and they will receive my earnest consideration.’7
From the outset De Valera disagreed with the army split on the treaty. Therefore, he was anxious that the members of the Executive would consider seriously the view that a military victory was not only impossible but virtually improbable. During the months from July to September, De Valera urged the leaders to try to end the conflict. This view was not now shared by Lynch.
On his way to meet Liam Deasy in West Cork, De Valera called to Lynch at Fermoy. As soon as Dev left, Lynch sent a dispatch to Deasy: ‘Dev’s mission was to try to bring the war to an end. Give him no encouragement.’
On the evening of 22 August 1922, Michael Collins, commander-in-chief of the army, who had been on an inspection tour of military barracks in West Cork, was returning to the city when he was shot dead at Beal-na-mBláth. Republican officers had gathered in the area for a meeting to determine future strategy. Collins was in a military convoy that passed through the locality that morning. He was recognised. As
this was an enemy convoy passing through Republican held territory, they decided to set up an ambush. The following day Liam Deasy sent a dispatch to Liam Lynch giving just an outline account of what happened. Lynch acknowledged Deasy’s correspondence as follows:
Irish Republic Army,
Field General Headquarters,
Department C/S,
C/O 1st Southern Division
22 August 1922
A Chara,
1. Yours of the 24th inst. reporting attack on the enemy at Beal-na-mBláth to hand yesterday.
2. Considering the very small number of men engaged this was a most successful operation, and they are to be complimented on the fight made under such heavy fire, and against such odds.
3. Considering you were aware of the fact that the convoy contained an armoured car, it is surprising you had not mines laid to get this.
4. Nothing could bring home more forcibly the awful unfortunate national situation at present than the fact that it has become necessary for Irishmen and former comrades to shoot such men as M. Collins who rendered such splendid service to the Republic in the late war against England. It is to be hoped our present enemies will realise the folly in trying to crush the Republic before it is too late.
Mise le Meas
Liam Lynch C/S.8
It was Paddy O’Brien’s belief that, ‘when Collins, the one man on the other side prepared to negotiate, was gone, Liam became more determined. He knew the others were not prepared to compromise, therefore it became a fight to the finish.’9
Liam Deasy was convinced that the tragedy of the Civil War was that the anti-treatyites’ protests did not end with the fall of the Four Courts. (It is, of course, easy to accept this view with hindsight, but the inter-action of that time did not lend itself to such an idealistic situation.) Deasy was, at this juncture in August, pulled between De Valera’s call for peace, and Lynch’s ‘faith that somehow the Staters would have to surrender.’10
On 30 August Very Rev. Monsignor O’Hagan, Rector of the Irish College in Rome who was in Ireland, wrote to Richard Mulcahy requesting a meeting between Liam Mellows, Rory O’Connor, Oscar Traynor and Tom Barry, then in jail. Richard Mulcahy agreed to the meeting in Mountjoy Jail. O’Connor and Mellows, having received a copy of the letter, jointly wrote stating that they welcomed ‘any efforts promising to end this new and unnatural attack on the independence of the country’. Copies of both letters were sent to Lynch who was still in the south.
Monsignor O’Hagan met Ernie O’Malley in Dublin and some proposals were put forward. Lynch’s comment was ‘that they were not worth much consideration by us’.
In the period following Collins’ death Emmet Dalton in Cork worked in association with Tom Ennis to find a peace formula.11Deasy told Liam Lynch about this, stating ‘that intermediaries were trying to make contact.’ Lynch’s response was ‘that these men were undoubtedly acting on Government orders, and he asked why didn’t they contact him directly.’
‘Is anyone foolish enough to believe that either of them [Ennis or Dalton] would negotiate without orders of Government? Then why not direct negotiations?’12
Is this the key that would have opened the door to peace? Did Lynch feel slighted because he was not approached directly? After all, a meeting was arranged and held near Crookstown on 13 October between Tom Ennis and Charlie Russell on the Provisional Government side and Liam Deasy and Tom Barry on the Republican side. (Dalton had dropped out of the negotiations.)
It was confirmed that General Dalton was acting on definite instructions from the minister for defence (Mulcahy) and was anxious ‘to make an effort towards ending the present needless strife on the basis of an unconditional surrender’.13It was Ernest Bythe’s belief that ‘Lynch was totally uncompromising. He was determined to fight it to the end; but so were we.’14
Prior to the Civil War, Todd Andrews found Liam Mellows rather critical of ‘Liam Lynch for placing too much trust in Collins and Mulcahy’s good intentions. Frank Aiken pleaded with both Mulcahy and Lynch to resist from hostilities, as he himself was determined that there was not going to be a Civil War – at least not in his division …’
Andrews was aware that ‘from as early as August, De Valera was convinced of the impossibility of winning the war and wanted to call it off, but Liam Lynch made it clear to him that any public action to this end would be repudiated by the Executive and the fighting would continue.’ Emmet Dalton wanted the Civil War to end, especially following Collins’ death. ‘I was really sick of it all when as the months progressed and I saw the turn events were taking.’
But why didn’t he make contact with Liam Lynch? ‘My efforts even with Tom Barry and Deasy did not get very far,’ responded Dalton. Wasn’t Dalton’s demand ‘an unconditional surrender’? ‘This was, after all, the superior military stage which we had reached. The discussions with Liam Lynch could follow if there was some platform of agreement.’15
By September 1922 De Valera was extremely anxious to bring both sides together and to pursue his aim through political means. According to Mulcahy, De Valera explained to him that he [De Valera] was not responsible for what the leaders of his side believed, nor was he able to get them to understand his point of view. He was endeavouring to find a basis for peace and wondered if there was any method in which the treaty decisions could be revised. But Mulcahy, who met Dev, informed him that the treaty was not negotiable. By this time, it was quite clear that the control of the anti-treatyites was totally outside De Valera’s influence, and as time progressed Liam Lynch was the man in command, so De Valera was compelled to do as Lynch suggested.
Rev. Fr Wall, Broadford, wrote to Lynch on 13 October pointing out that Mulcahy’s response to Monsignor O’Hagan was that he and his army were carrying on ‘a defensive war’ which would cease if the anti-treatyites ceased firing on his men. Lynch took a cold look at Mulcahy’s ‘defensive attitude’ which he stated ‘is only quibbling with the situation. What a defensive action to first attack our GHQ and other positions all over the country! When he ceases to attack us in our efforts to maintain the Republic, then there will be peace.’
He continued by insisting on more definite proposals. ‘The fight must go on until there is no question of forcing Ireland into the British Empire, by the enemy, foreign or domestic.’16
Towards the end of September 1922 casualties had mounted to over 300 killed or wounded and there were over 6,000 Republican prisoners either in jails or internment camps. The arms’ position was by this time reasonably satisfactory and guerrilla warfare seemed to be working fairly well.
The Provisional Government issued a proclamation giving effect to a decision to set up military courts with powers to inflict the death penalty; the decision had been carried by eighty votes to eighteen in the Provisional parliament on 27 September.17A Free State document, 7 October 1922 stated:
If prisoners are taken they must not be released until they are incapable of further harm. If executions are necessary they must be carried out with no fear of the chimera of popular reaction.
The Irish hierarchy met on the same day at Maynooth and stated that armed resistance was ‘morally only a system of murder and assassination of the national forces’.
The Provisional Government casualties up to the middle of September were 185 killed and 674 wounded. A tragic feature of the entire operation was that men who had fought bravely together against the British, now died on opposite sides of the camp – men like Cathal Brugha, Harry Boland, Michael Collins and Arthur Griffith (who died in Dublin on 12 August, due to exhaustion). Republican prisoners were now in over-crowded jails and internment camps. Lynch had forbidden hunger strikes where political treatment was granted. On the Republican side, all prisoners taken were released unharmed once their arms and ammunition were taken from them, mainly because they did not have accommodation for them. It was an absurd situation.
Éamon de Valera wanted a public dec
laration by the army Executive of the actual existing situation. ‘The Army Executive must publicly accept responsibility ... There must be no doubt in the minds of anybody in this matter. This pretence from the pro-treaty party that we are inciting the army must be ended by the declaration from the army itself that this is not so.’18It was therefore necessary to call the Executive together though doing so involved risk. Liam Lynch issued instructions to have the meeting called.
When the men on the army Executive met in Nugents, Ballybacon on 16 October 1922, Liam Lynch presided. It was decided to co-opt four members to replace those imprisoned, substitutes were named and ratified by the entire body. A day of negotiations was devoted to a review of events since the outbreak of hostilities and to the consideration of certain peace proposals. Lynch stated that it was decided, at the Clarence Hotel meeting after the attack on the Four Courts, that each division would operate on its own and that there would be no headquarters outside the Four Courts. However, he must have become convinced soon afterwards that this would not give the best results as he subsequently created three commands, Northern and Eastern to be commanded by Ernie O’Malley, Western under the control of Michael Kilroy and Southern commanded by Liam Deasy.
The meeting continued the following day (17 October) with eleven members of the army Executive present. Two important points were discussed:
First – whether the forces should continue to wage war under the authority of the Executive only or whether the Executive itself should sanction and co-operate in the formation of a Republican government – this would control the Republican forces and continue in armed resistance against the Provisional Government. Second – a policy decision on what minimum terms of peace would be acceptable. 19
De Valera had sent Liam Lynch a memorandum which Lynch read to the meeting. This memorandum suggested that if a decision was taken to continue the fight, then the possibility of setting up a Republican government which would co-ordinate efforts and prevent a Free State government from establishing itself, should be considered; it would also mean laying claims to any funds or resources of the Republic. He stated that the only public policy necessary was to maintain the Republic and the sovereign independence of the nation: also he suggested that there should be a frank exchange of views and a definite understanding between the army and the government.20Following lengthy discussions at this meeting, the members of the Executive realising that the problem was not solely a military one, expressed an almost unanimous feeling in favour of the establishment of a Republican government. A resolution was passed which called on ‘the former president of Dáil Éireann to form a Government which will preserve the continuity of the Republic’. The Executive pledged wholehearted support provided ‘arrangement does not bring the country into the British Empire. Final decision on this question to be submitted for ratification to the Executive’. On 25 October the available Republican deputies met secretly in Dublin, constituted themselves as the Republican government, and appointed De Valera as president with a twelve-member council of state. A proclamation was issued by the army Executive on 28 October and it was arranged that documents from the defence department would be signed both by De Valera, as president, and Liam Lynch, chief-of-staff. While De Valera recognised the views of Lynch and the Executive he made his position clear in a letter to Joe McGarrity: ‘If the Army thinks I am too moderate, well, let them try to get a better President and go ahead.’21