by Meda Ryan
I am to inform you officially, on behalf of the Government and Army Command, that the proposal contained in your circular letter of 30 January, and the enclosure, cannot be considered.
Comrades say that because he lived in Dublin during this period, his appreciation of the true situation was far more optimistic than the facts warranted. Maurice Twomey, general headquarters staff, gives a picture of Liam at that time:
He could not or would not face the thought of defeat and collapse of Republican resistance to the imposition of the Treaty. The farthest he would allow himself to think in such a direction was that the Free State authorities would be compelled to negotiate with Republicans. Abandonment of the struggle in the field he would not countenance, and I believe this would have continued to be his attitude if he had not been killed. I feel that in no circumstances would he himself surrender, and that he would never order those under his command to do so.4
Ernie O’Malley, who was in jail at this time, got a letter out to Liam Lynch with his criticism of Deasy’s activity. ‘Prisoners are casualties and must not be considered ...’ He further expressed his opinion that the public would swing to which ever side they felt would win. ‘The chaplain came to me with a paper yesterday and hinted that I should follow Deasy’s example and also that of the Limerick prisoners; I’m glad I managed to contain myself when he was in my cell, but when he left I went up in smoke.’5
The following day O’Malley got another letter out to Lynch which indicated that the deputy governor had been attempting to persuade the Mountjoy men to sign the unconditional surrender; but he advised Lynch to have courage as the ‘... enemy government will realise that even if the leaders go, the rank and file will carry on ...’6This type of encouragement gave Lynch renewed vigour.
De Valera, in a letter to McGarrity, regarded Deasy’s surrender statement as ‘the biggest blow we have got since we started’.7Liam Lynch told McGarrity that Deasy was ‘in a despondent mood’ and his attitude was that ‘there can be no going back on our demands. It is clear the enemy will carry out many executions, but even though this terrible sacrifice has to take place we must put up with the consequences.’8
It was Lynch’s intention towards the last day of January to visit the south ‘in a few weeks’;9however the many activities which crowded his days meant he had to postpone the visit. He made an appeal to his forces to make an all-out effort to compel the Free State authorities into the position of negotiation.
From the outset of the Civil War he endeavoured to conduct the conflict on recognised warfare lines, and in an ‘Order’ dated 27 September 1922 he had prohibited retaliation despite the fact that ‘some cruel and cold blooded murders’ had been committed against ‘our troops’ but ‘similar reprisals for these murders cannot under any circumstances be tolerated.’10
In the same order he prohibited the shooting of unarmed Free State soldiers and the use of explosive ammunition; wounded enemy personnel should receive proper medical attention; the hoisting of the white flag denoting surrender should be accepted. In the Mulcahy papers there are copies of alleged ‘captured documents’ one issued to ‘O/Cs all battalions’ dated 23 November 1922 and a further document which is entitled ‘Enemy Murder Bill’ and dated 30 November 1922 in which it is stated that, ‘All members of the Provisional “Parliament” who, were present and voted for the Murder Bill will be shot at sight ... Houses of members of Murder Bill, active supporters of P.G. who are known to support Murder Bill will be destroyed ... Free State army officers who approve of Murder Bill will be shot at sight; also all ex-British army officers and men who joined the Free State army since 6 December 1921.’11The order was ‘to be duplicated and transmitted to O/C all units.’ This alleged document came to light when an inquest was being held on the death of Hugh Houghton, Dublin. According to the Irish Independent 15 March 1923 report, ‘a Colonel in the national army identified the signature on a captured document produced as that of Liam Lynch, chief-of-staff in the Irregular army.’12But without investigation could it be identified categorically and stated with certainty that a signature was that of a particular person?
In a ‘Proclamation’ of 1 February, Lynch as chief-of-staff expressed his revulsion at the unethical practices of the Free State government ‘who have resorted to the infamous practice of shooting Republican soldiers taken by them as prisoners of war, and have already put to death fifty-three officers and men in this manner, “and having violated with impunity” the “international usages of war” this “Junta” have announced “that Punitive Action” will be taken against other prisoners in their power if hostages which we have been compelled to take are not set at liberty. Now We Hereby Give Notice that we shall not give up our hostages, and if threatened action be taken, we shall hold every member of the said Junta and its so-called Parliament, Senate and other House, and all their Executives responsible, and shall certainly visit them with the punishment they shall deserve’.13
A further ‘Captured Document’ order issued to ‘O/C battalion III’ states:
The following will be shot at sight ... (a) all members who voted for Enemy Murder Bill; (b) officials of all rank; (c) members of senate in list A; (d) members of Murder Gang; (e) officials – civilians who order prisoners to be fired on; (f) those who torture prisoners ...
The order goes on to list a number of targets such as ‘high court, county and district judges and state solicitors ... editors and leader-writers of hostile press in Ireland in cases where these are known to be hostile ...’ It also lists the residences belonging to certain owners which ‘shall be destroyed.14
The documents published in the Freeman’s Journal 16 March 1923 are similar but not identical to those found in the Mulcahy papers – those published in the newspaper appear on the surface at least to go beyond Lynch’s dictum of having ‘honourably stood by the rules of War’, because the alleged ‘Captured Documents’ in the newspaper states that ‘aggressive civilian supporters of the Free State government policy of executions of prisoners of war [and] ... officials (civilian or military) employed at the headquarters of the different enemy Ministries’, as ‘enemies of the Republic will be shot at sight ...’15
On 4 December 1922, which was four days after the alleged captured documents were issued, a document under the heading ‘General Activities’ was signed by Liam Lynch, which is among the alleged ‘Captured Documents’ in the Mulcahy Papers. In this, document he again talks about the rules of war:
... We have met the enemy in noble warfare, putting our weak arm against his strong one ... We have not adopted against him the same tactics adopted against the British ... While our prisoners have been murdered and tortured ... all efforts will be concentrated on making the enemy realise that no matter what the cost may be, no government but that of the Republic will ever function in Ireland. The maintenance of discipline is the first duty of officers and they will take special care to see that no matter what tactics the enemy descends to, the honour of the IRA will be preserved inviolate.16
According to Florence O’Donoghue, ‘even in the face of persistent Free State policy of executing prisoners of war, he [Lynch] continued steadily to resist any departure from the letter or spirit of the order, beyond the taking and holding of hostages.’17On 1 February 1923, Lynch issued a strongly-worded proclamation denouncing the ‘Government of the Irish Free State’.18
Lynch was keenly aware of adverse propaganda. The War News issued by the Free State government carried stories, which were often exaggerated, and these were often reprinted in the daily newspapers.19
On 10 February, he sent a formal letter of protest to Richard Mulcahy setting out in detail the breaches of ‘civilised warfare’ ethics such as the ‘shooting of prisoners’ without trial; prisoners taken from lorries and murdered by the roadside; the wounded deprived of proper medical attention. In this document he outlined full details of the breaches with names and dates. He was convinced that military
resistance to the treaty should continue as long as the treaty included partition and enforced inclusion in the British empire.
In a letter to Con Moloney he stated that ‘were it not for recent events we would have forced them to accept our terms within a few weeks’.20It seems likely that he was referring to Liam Deasy’s order of unconditional surrender. Lynch remained adamant and would not entertain any suggestion of seeking terms, because according to Liam Deasy:
Being an idealist, his highest principles were his guide. It was not in his nature to surrender or to compromise. It is my opinion that the promise he made to support the Four Courts garrison, if they were attacked remained a sacred trust, and the two broken treaties which he had signed in Limerick with Donnacha O’Hannigan and Michael Brennan confirmed his determination that this would be a fight to the finish.
Deasy maintained that De Valera had no illusions and had stated that a military victory was not possible. ‘Once De Valera saw that Lynch and his men had to burn Fermoy barracks and abandon the vast territory he told me that he could not see any hope of a military victory.’
Deasy also maintained that Seán Hyde was extremely enthusiastic about the position of the anti-treaty forces and could not understand the meaning of the word defeat and it was his belief that Hyde’s enthusiastic reports to Liam Lynch ‘did much to encourage and strengthen Liam in his determination to carry on the fight. This, despite the fact, that the edifice seemed to be crumbling around us.’ (Hyde was in the south – Lynch was in Dublin at that time.) 21
Lynch resisted all demands for a meeting of the Executive. In a letter of 22 January to the members of the Army Council he stated: ‘It was impossible for the Executives to meet’ as he was convinced it would be dangerous if they were all together in one place. In this letter he asked that the council would continue to report on any developments, and freely express their views.
Tom Barry and Tom Crofts went to Dublin and on 6 February requested that an Executive meeting should be called and they stressed the importance of Lynch’s attendance. P. J. Ruttledge was also convinced of the need for an Executive meeting. He wrote to De Valera saying, ‘It is absolutely essential that the Army Executive meet to review the situation and decide, when conversant with all circumstances and conditions, as to the prosecution of the war or otherwise.’22Barry and Crofts returned to the First Southern Division headquarters near Ballyvourney on 9 February 1923, and held a division council meeting at Cronin’s in Gougane Barra on 10 February. The following day they drafted a letter to Lynch and repeated their request for a meeting of the Executive. In this they were supported by Humphrey Murphy and Seán McSwiney. Lynch had intended leaving Dublin for the south on 9 February, but replying to correspondence delayed him until the thirteenth.
In the early days of 1923 Lynch sent for Todd Andrews. ‘I’m going to pull the south together,’ he said, and suggested taking Andrews with him as his adjutant. Following some questions by Lynch, Andrews told him that the situation throughout the country was anything but hopeful. However, Lynch discounted his pessimism and was cheered by Andrew’s account of conditions in south Wexford which in general were rather hopeful. Though Lynch was disappointed at Deasy’s surrender appeal he told Andrews that he felt sure he could restore the situation from a base in the south. ‘I pointed out, rather timidly, that we didn’t seem to have any coherent plan of action either at local, brigade or divisional level.’ Todd Andrews said that in February, De Valera brought back Document No. 2 and this angered Lynch who responded:
Your publicity as to sponsoring Document No. 2 has had a very bad effect on the army and should have been avoided. Generally they do not understand such documents. We can arrange a peace without referring to past documents.23
De Valera responded in a long letter making no apologies for his opinions: ‘Many good men have come to the conclusion that we have long ago passed the point at which we should have regarded ourselves as beaten so far as actually securing our objective is concerned ...’24Lynch was now going to meet the men ‘on the ground’ and was confident he would prove De Valera wrong.
Before leaving Dublin Liam said goodbye to Madge Clifford. It was as if he might have had a premonition of his death. His parting words were, ‘You may never see me again!’ He had a great family grievance to bear. His brother, Jack (Seán) had been arrested and was in Maryboro jail, listed with so many others, for execution.
Commandant Paddy Brennan, O/C South Dublin brigade, arranged transport and protection for Dr Con Lucy and Lynch to Templeogue and on to Ballymore Eustace and then to Borris where they were joined by Todd Andrews and John Dowling. Travelling mainly at night, very often with the car lights switched off, they occasionally changed to a pony and trap and continued on their journey southwards. It was a slow, tedious nerve-wrecking journey to Kilkenny where they met Martin McGrath, then on to Foskins in Mooncoin where they stayed for a few days.
During this journey Andrews got to know Lynch well and at night-time the two discussed the country’s position. According to Andrews, Lynch often spoke of his former comrades and it was with ‘a countenance more in sorrow than in anger’. He found it inexplicable, Andrews said, how Collins, of all people, could have started the Civil War which would bring the nation ‘under the sovereignty of the British Crown or how he could have accepted partition’. Requests had often been put to Lynch to allow Free State soldiers armed or unarmed to be shot as reprisals for the executions which the Free State government was continuing to pursue, but this was something Lynch refused to countenance. ‘Liam thought that shooting prisoners was immoral; he wondered how as Christians the Free Staters justified such to their own consciences.’ According to Andrews, ‘Lynch was a simple, uncomplicated man, believing deeply in God, the Blessed Virgin and the Saints, and in loving Ireland as he did he had dedicated his life to her under God.’ Throughout it all he felt no bitterness towards his opponents in the Provisional Government, nor the Free State army, only sadness that they had dishonoured Ireland. ‘To the end he believed that had Collins taken the lead events would have followed a different course.’25
1 Ernest Blythe told me that they would continue until the last man was executed, if such became necessary, 8/1/1974.
2 Copy of original from Liam Deasy personal documents.
3 First, four prisoners were executed, then following Erskine Childers’ arrest, 10 November and found in possession of a small revolver given to him as a gesture of friendship by Michael Collins; he was tried by court-martial (emergency powers) and executed by firing squad 16 November 1922.
4 Liam Deasy private papers.
5 Ernie O’Malley, On Another Man’s Wound, p. 299.
6 Ibid.
7 Seán Cronin, The McGarrity Papers, p. 133.
8 Lynch to McGarrity – Seán Cronin, The McGarrity Papers, p. 134.
9 Letter to Con Moloney, 26 January 1922.
10 General Order No. 9, 27 September 1922.
11 Captured documents, File P7/A/82. Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives.
12 Captured documents, File P7/A/83. Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Memo, No. 7, dated 4 December, 1922, P7/A/85, Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives.
15 Freeman’s Journal, 16 March 1923; also quoted P. S. O’Hegarty, The Victory of Sinn Féin, pp. 205–9.
16 Letter to ‘Comrade’ 9 February 1923. Mulcahy papers, University College, Dublin, Archives, P7/A/84 also P7/A/85.
17 Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 291.
18 See Appendix III.
19 See also letter, 9 February 1923, Florence O’Donoghue, No Other Law, p. 293.
20 Lynch private family papers.
21 Liam Deasy, author interview, 5/12/1972.
22 P. J. Ruttledge to De Valera, 7 February 1923.
23 Todd Andrews. author interview, 4/11/1983; Liam Lynch to De Valera, Longford and O’Neill, Éamon d
e Valera, p. 215.
24 Longford and O’Neill, Éamon de Valera, p. 216.
25 Todd Andrews, author interview, 4/11/1983.
25. With Executive members
It was cold and continuously wet during the ten days of their journey south. Lynch, Con Lucy and Andrews had been travelling mainly by night. In a pony and trap they forded the Tar River and were lucky to escape drowning as the pony stumbled several times. While in Araglin (22 February) they met David Kent, brother of the Kent boys who had resisted the British in 1916. (This incident had given Liam Lynch his first inspiration to join the volunteers.)
The men now had to travel mainly on foot and because Lynch had been confined so long at Tower House, Dublin, his physical fitness had deteriorated somewhat so he rested at Araglin, his old brigade area for only a short period. On receipt of a dispatch from West Cork stating that there was a move towards peace, Lynch could wait no longer. Determined to put an end to the peace talks, he gave Todd Andrews a dispatch telling him to go to Con Moloney and inform him of his (Lynch’s) decision – that he wished to add new life to his forces.
Andrews cautiously crossed the Galtee Mountains to discover that Con Moloney had been arrested, but he met Dan Breen who informed him that the situation in the south appeared to be deteriorating. Andrews felt it was imperative to get back immediately with the news to Lynch.
Following a meeting of Cork No. 2 brigade council, Lynch had resumed his hazardous journey to the First Southern Division headquarters near Ballyvourney. With Con Lucy, Lynch crossed the Blackwater at Killavullen and continued through Donoghmore and on towards Lehanes of Ballingeary where they arrived on 26 February 1923. The First Southern Division council meeting was reconvened at James Moynihans, in Coolea, on 26 February and lasted for almost three days – eighteen officers attended, and only three were absent. Four members who were present – Tom Barry, Tom Crofts, Humphrey Murphy and Seán McSwiney demanded that a meeting of the army Executive be held which had been endorsed by the general council (at its meeting on the tenth.) The proposal was put forward again at this meeting and Lynch said that he ‘alone was responsible for not calling it.’ He felt that there was no point in calling a meeting as the present Executive had no power to make peace or war because the imprisoned members would have to be released in order to produce a comprehensive decision. ‘If he thought he could not carry on successfully he would not allow the war to continue for a moment longer and would put the matter to the [Republican] government.’1