Add these 150 vessels for minesweeping duties to the 467 other warships required, and one can scarcely wonder that the Admiralty were somewhat shocked at Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay’s needs.
It is only right, however, to record that the Admiralty appreciated that these requirements had been worked out as a preliminary assessment which might well have to be increased. This realisation tended to add to the horror of the Admiralty when confronted with these figures.
In dealing with the Admiralty’s reception of these demands one must take into consideration the fact that, in the Admiralty’s view, the invasion of Normandy was but one operation among many for which ships had to be found. Everybody in the Admiralty appreciated that “Neptune” would be the most important naval operation of the whole war, but this in no degree blinded them to the fact that they were responsible for the conduct of naval affairs in all the seven seas. There was no desire to curtail the resources for the invasion, and certainly no tendency towards obstruction on the ground that one commander might have more ships under his control than the Admiralty themselves.
On the other hand, there was a very definite doubt in the Admiralty whether the other essential naval commitments could be adequately discharged if the demands for invasion were met in full. It has been said that, from the production point of view, the United States were at that time leaving the shadow of “too little” and entering the light of “plenty”; but this increased production was not leading at that time to an increase in British naval strength sufficient, to enable the Admiralty to view with equanimity its worldwide commitments and at the same time earmark a great fleet to be immediately available for a gigantic combined operation.
In the circumstances it was not surprising that the Admiralty did not accept Admiral Ramsay’s requirements without question. They examined them in the light of the world naval situation and concluded that to allocate a total of 232 ships capable of working as convoy escorts and anti-U-boat vessels to “Operation Neptune” would be likely to impose an intolerable strain upon such vessels as remained available for these duties outside the invasion area, and might therefore lead to disastrous setbacks in other theatres.
The Admiralty also appreciated that, if Admiral Ramsay’s requirements in minesweepers were to be met, there would be few minesweeping flotillas left to deal with the day-to-day requirements all round our coasts—and who was to say that the enemy might not at any moment embark upon another sudden and concentrated mining offensive such as that which had cost us so dear in the autumn of 1939?
The outcome was that the Admiralty asked Admiral Ramsay to reduce his requirements in naval vessels, particularly in ships suited to act as convoy escorts and in minesweepers.
So strongly did the Admiralty feel on the subject of convoy escorts that Admiral Ramsay was invited to reduce his requirements in these types of ship by as much as 40 per cent. This was not a flat request. The Admiralty suggested that it might be possible to reduce the convoy escort requirements by this amount if Admiral Ramsay could see his way to substitute for his plan of escorting all convoys a system of patrols on each flank of the convoy route between Britain and the Normandy beaches.
This Admiral Ramsay found himself unable to do. The working out of the detailed plan had made it clear that, in addition to the vast number of ships of all types which would have to be at sea on D-day, the minimum “build-up” requirements would be for the daily passage of at least 8 ship-convoys and 10 or 12 landing craft groups—which would have to be continued day in and day out for a minimum of five or six weeks. Tactical surprise might, if it could be achieved, prove a great factor for the safety of the shipping on D-day, but it was only to be expected that the enemy would subsequently bring all possible weapons into action in an attempt to cut our vital sea lines of communication with the armies in Normandy.
Admiral Ramsay and his staff could only assess the probable strength of the enemy’s counter-attacks against this sea-lane in the light of the latest intelligence of the German forces available or likely to be available. Nor could he ignore the fact that the landings and the initial “build-up” of our invasion troops in the Bay of the Seine would have to be conducted along a sea route with a major German naval base close on either flank—Le Havre to the east and Cherbourg to the west.
It was known that the Germans had in the west at that time five destroyers of the powerful “Narvik” class, and about nine of the smaller destroyers of the “Elbing” class. This force, it was estimated, might be reinforced rapidly by six more big German destroyers from the Baltic, the Heligoland Bight or Norwegian waters. Such reinforcement of the German destroyer strength in the west would, however, leave no destroyers in the north-west to act as screens for the German heavy ships and would therefore indicate that the German High Command did not propose to use the heavy ships in an attempt to interfere with our invasion of France. On the other hand, it would in no way indicate that the German heavy ships were to be kept inactive. The great British naval responsibility of preventing them from breaking out on to the Atlantic convoy routes would continue and be of added rather than diminished importance, for destroyer screens would be only an encumbrance in an attempted break out for a raiding expedition in the Atlantic.
Between fifty and sixty E-boats might be expected in the English Channel, and about the same number of R-boats, in addition to between 25 and 30 minesweepers and some 60 other small craft of various types.
The minesweepers and the other small craft might easily and quickly be fitted to adopt an offensive role; but it was the E-boats and R-boats which caused the greatest anxiety. They would almost certainly be operating from bases close to the flanks of the cross-Channel convoy routes and close to the conglomeration of shipping which would be inevitable off our Normandy beachheads.
Then there was the U-boat menace. In the light of all the information available in Allied hands it was calculated that, even if tactical surprise were effected with the initial assault, about 130 U-boats might reach the invasion area from the Biscay ports and the Eastern Atlantic within forty-eight hours of a general alarm being broadcast by the German High Command. Nor was this all. There was a possibility of this U-boat force being reinforced by a further 70 vessels within a fortnight of D-day—and Admiral Ramsay had to think in terms of several fortnights. There was also the possibility that up to 25 short-range U-boats might be available to operate off the British east coast during the invasion operations.
Although the problem of dealing with enemy air attack by day could be safely left to our undoubted air superiority, there was the possibility of night air attack. Although night air attack on the convoys at sea might not assume serious proportions, there was no denying that the mass of shipping which would necessarily be collected off our Normandy beachheads would provide the Luftwaffe with a tempting and perhaps a profitable target. Night fighter patrols were organised and the anti-aircraft armament of nearly every ship taking part in the invasion was increased, but still it was necessary to allow a margin for ships which might be sunk or damaged.
A margin to cover ships lost or damaged had also to be allowed in respect of other means whereby the enemy might seek to attack our convoys or our shipping off the beachheads. The Naval Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force had to be prepared to meet the unknown. There had been much talk of German “secret weapons.” This certainly could not be taken at its face value, but there was, nevertheless, no denying the ingenuity of the Germans in weapon production. They had produced the glider-bomb, the acoustic torpedo and the magnetic and acoustic mines, all of which had inflicted losses upon us at sea, and it would have been quite unjustifiable to plan the invasion on the assumption that Germany had nothing new for use against our invasion forces. In the event, the Germans produced no less than four so-called “secret weapons” for use against our ships during the invasion of France. All were dangerous and difficult to counter, and only one of them had previously put in an appearance.
In addition to the margins ne
cessary to guard against and to cover losses which might be incurred by methods of direct enemy attack, allowances had to be made in respect of probable losses due to mines and to stress of weather, breakdowns, and accidents such as collisions. The invasion of Normandy and the cracking of Hitler’s “West Wall” was certainly not an operation which could be contemplated without an adequate “factor of safety.”
When one considers the magnitude and variety of the threats to the convoy routes and anchorages—upon the safety of which would hang the success of the entire invasion—it is not surprising that Admiral Ramsay could not see his way to adopt the Admiralty’s suggestion of a reduction of 40 per cent in his requirements of escort ships.
Nor could he accept a reduction in his requirements in minesweepers. It was already known that the Germans had been laying an anti-invasion barrage of moored mines off the French coast for nearly the whole length of the English Channel, and there was every possibility that the German defensive mining would greatly increase before D-day. Moreover, there was no knowing what might be encountered on the French side of the German anti-invasion mine barrage. It was to be expected that the approaches to all possible beaches would be heavily mined. Moreover, Admiral Ramsay considered that one of the German reactions to our invasion would be a great increase in their mining activities in the invasion area, and particularly off the beachheads, where the sinking of a ship might not only lead to the loss of that ship, but cause a wreck in such a position that it might seriously interfere with other movements to and from the beaches. Events were to prove that Admiral Ramsay was right in his assessment of the probable German reactions to our invasion, and it was providential that there were available a sufficient number of minesweepers to deal with a situation which at one time became very serious, with the minesweeping resources strained to the very utmost.
There was yet another factor which made the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief determined to accept no reduction in the naval requirements as presented to the Admiralty at this stage. This was the outcome of his experience in the planning and conduct of invasion operations. As a result of this he was convinced that as the Combined Planning progressed the naval commitments would increase, and that this would entail an expansion, rather than any contraction, in the demands for warships which he would have to make to the Admiralty. It would obviously have been unfair and would have been likely to cause confusion if he had accepted a reduction in his initial requirements and then, at a later stage, had found it essential not only to go back upon agreed reductions but also to increase the total naval requirements above those initially presented to the Admiralty.
It must be emphasised that there was no disagreement between the Admiralty and Admiral Ramsay over these naval requirements. It was a perfectly normal procedure. The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief asked for certain ships to be made available to him. The Admiralty, finding these requirements large in relation to their other naval commitments, asked the Commander-in-Chief whether it would not be possible to reduce his requirements, possibly by some modification of his plan. The Commander-in-Chief reconsidered the matter and found himself unable to accept a reduction in the number of warships which he felt to be the minimum necessary to ensure the success of the operation. The Admiralty then accepted the position and set about the task of finding the necessary ships.
As events were to show, it was as well that Admiral Ramsay did not accept any reduction in his initial naval requirements; for he was right in expecting the naval commitments to be increased as the planning progressed. It is doubtful, however, if even he had expected as great an increase as actually took place in the naval commitments for which he was responsible.
On Christmas Day, 1943, General Sir Bernard Montgomery was appointed to take over the command of No. 21 Army Group—the Army group which was to form the British military component of the invasion. General Montgomery arrived in London on 3 January 1944, and then saw for the first time the outline plan for the invasion. This, it will be remembered, was the “COSSAC Plan” which had received the approval of the combined British and American Chiefs of Staff at the Quebec Conference. This plan provided for an assault of the Normandy beaches on a three-divisional front, with an immediate follow-up of two divisions. It had been on this basis that all the planning had so far been done, and the requirements for the invasion worked out.
General Montgomery examined the outline plan, in conjunction with all the available intelligence of German defences and military strength in the west, and in the light of his experience in the invasion of Sicily, in which he had been the British Military Force Commander. He came to the conclusion that the assault, as contemplated, would be on too narrow a front. Moreover, he felt that it would be essential to have a greater number of troops in the first wave of the assault.
General Montgomery accordingly demanded that the plan should be re-drafted to provide for an initial assault on a five-divisional front instead of a three-divisional front. He was content that the immediate follow-up should remain at two divisions.
Thus the strength of the first wave of the assault was to be nearly doubled. The extent to which this increased the commitments of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief was enormous. It affected not only the initial assault, but the immediate “build-up” requirements, in order that two more divisions could be supplied and sustained during the early stages. Thus the increased commitments were concerned not only with naval vessels and the ships and landing craft to take part in the assault, but with the merchant ships and craft which were to bear the brunt of the “build-up.”
The assault on a three-divisional front had been worked out on the basis that this would absorb practically all the ships and craft which were likely to be available at the time when the invasion had been planned to take place. The extension of the scope of the assault to a five-divisional front could only, therefore, be accepted if certain adjustments and compromises were made.
In the first place it was found to be essential to postpone the “target date” for the invasion by one month, in order that the necessary ships and craft for the two extra divisions of the assault should become available and the necessary training of these two extra divisions be undertaken. The invasion had been planned for the first week in May, but it had to be put back to the first week in June. It could not possibly have been undertaken any earlier on the new five-divisional front basis, and even as it was the two extra divisions had not—by early June—achieved such a high degree of training in amphibious assault warfare as the three divisions originally allocated for the initial landings.
It was realised that even by June there would not be available a sufficient number of ships and craft to convey to France with the initial assault as many vehicles per division as had been envisaged in the three-divisional front plan.
In all great amphibious operations it is the sea transport of the army’s land transport which presents the greatest difficulties to those in charge of the maritime side of the expedition. The laden vehicles form a clumsy and cumbersome cargo. They take up far more space than men or stores, and are far more difficult and slower to load or unload except from Tank Landing Craft and Tank Landing Ships, from which they can be driven ashore. In the case of ordinary ships, special slings and often special derricks have to be provided for handling them.
These factors made it necessary to ask General Montgomery to accept a reduction in the number of vehicles to be landed with the assault divisions, and he agreed to a reduction in the number of vehicles from 3,200 to 2,500 per division. It was also necessary for General Montgomery to accept some reduction in the number of gun-support craft allocated to each division along the front of the assault. The craft allocated to give gunfire support to the troops ashore did not mean only the naval bombardment ships and the destroyers, which would provide a good proportion of the gunfire at fairly short rage in the initial stages. They included vessels being specially designed and built for the purpose, notably types of landing craft on which were mounted batteries of
guns or batteries for the launching of rocket projectiles.
The increase in the scope of the initial assault was naturally accompanied by a great increase in the responsibilities of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. Up to this stage in the planning of the invasion it had been accepted that Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief-would not only have charge of all vessels engaged, but would also assume active command at sea.
With the great increase in the scope of “Operation Neptune” it became apparent that it would not be humanly possible for the Commander-in-Chief to conduct the whole operation and also to command at sea in charge of the tactical handling of ships and squadrons, with duties as widely different as bombarding in support of the army and convoy protection and seaward offensive patrols against the German destroyers and U-boats which were likely to try to interfere.
It was therefore decided that, while the Commander-in-Chief should conduct the operation and have general control of all ships in the invasion area, it would be necessary to appoint a Flag Officer to take command at sea of the British Task Force.
Admiral of the Fleet Sir Philip Louis Vian, RN, (1894-1968). Admiral Halsey and Vice Admiral Vian aboard USS Missouri, c. May-Aug 1945; the other officers were Commander William Kitchell and Captain Joel Boone.
Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian was selected for the command. Rear-Admiral Vian had proved himself time and again as a dashing but not reckless sea commander; one who was willing to take enormous risks if they were in his view justified by the circumstances and the situation, and with the power to size up a situation very rapidly and seize the initiative. It had been he who had rescued 300 British merchant seamen who were being taken to Germany in the tanker Altmark and had earned a message from Winston Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty: “The force under your orders is to be congratulated on having in a single day achieved a double rescue, Britons from captivity and Germans from drowning.” (The latter because he had rescued the crew of the German ship Baldur which they had scuttled). Rear-Admiral Vian had successfully accomplished other missions in the Arctic, notably the expedition to Spitzbergen and the action in which the German cruiser Bremse and other ships were sunk. The great battleship Bismarck had been held in a “box” made by Rear-Admiral Vian’s destroyers throughout the wild night before the German battleship was sunk. Later, in the Mediterranean, he had commanded a force of light cruisers and destroyers with which he successfully fought off Italian battleships and heavy cruisers from a Malta convoy, in what has been described as “one of the most brilliant actions against greatly superior forces ever successfully brought off.” Rear-Admiral Vian had, moreover, first-hand experience of invasion, for he had commanded one of the British Assault Forces during the invasion of Sicily, an appointment in which he had served under Admiral Ramsay, who had been in command of the British Task Force.
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