In the normal course of events the duties of a fighter pilot are far removed from the tasks the men of this highly skilled team were called upon to carry out. They therefore had to undergo a special course of training. This was done in Scotland and lasted only a fortnight. The pilots had to learn the principles of gunnery and of spotting as well as perfecting their aerial navigation. They also had to learn how to recognise ships and types of army vehicles, distinguishing our own and the Americans’ from those of the enemy. They also had to study methods of camouflage adopted by the enemy for various purposes in order to be able to penetrate its disguises, and they had to know a good deal about British and American army organisation so that they could tell by the formation and disposition of troops and vehicles whether they were friend or foe. Map-reading from various heights, too, was an important subject.
After this intensive course, the pilots moved to Lee-on-the-Solent, whence they operated during the invasion.
It had been found by experience that the best height at which to observe a bombardment and to spot the fall of shot is between 4,000 and 6,000 feet, and that, in clear weather, a pilot could observe efficiently from a position as much as five miles from the target. The best method of observing a bombardment is either to circle the target or to fly in a wide “figure of eight” over it. Pilots on spotting or searching duties went into the air with a squared large-scale map of the district and aerial photographs of the target to be bombarded or the area to be searched. They also had binoculars. It can be imagined that the pilot of a fast fighter would have his hands full in more senses than one, and could hardly be expected to keep a sharp look-out for enemy aircraft which might be manoeuvring to attack him. For this reason, every spotting aircraft had a partner called a “weaver.” The “weaver” was another fighter, flown by a member of the specially trained team so that he should realise and appreciate what the “spotter” was trying to do, and his duty was to weave to and fro over the tail of the “spotter,” keeping a sharp look-out for enemy aircraft and remaining in the best possible position to prevent an enemy from getting on the tail of the “spotter.”
“Spotter” and “weaver” were partners who often flew together, taking it in turns to do the two duties, but they were not trained or regarded as partners. To have done so would have impaired efficiency in the event of casualties.
During the planning of the naval gunfire support to be given during “Neptune” it was early realised that the expenditure of ammunition would be so heavy that a special system of supply would have to be set up to ensure that no time was lost in re-ammunitioning ships, and that ships with full magazines and shell rooms were always ready at a moment’s notice to take the place off the beach-head of ships which had to leave the assault area to replenish with ammunition. This would have been a comparatively easy task if numbers of ships could have been held in reserve, but such were the naval requirements of “Neptune” that practically every warship allocated to that great operation was urgently and constantly needed “at the front.” Here again was a problem in which careful and detailed organisation could save time.
The system of ammunition supply evolved for “Neptune” was to keep at all likely ports lighters loaded with full “outfits” of ammunition for the types of ships likely to use those ports for re-ammunitioning. Thus, when a ship ran short of ammunition the naval commander informed the port that HMS —— was returning for ammunition and would arrive at such and such a time. As HMS —— entered harbour, with hatches open, derricks rigged and whips rove, there was immediately placed alongside her a lighter containing exactly the ammunition she required, in calibre, type and quantity. As HMS —— sailed, having re-ammunitioned, the lighter returned to the ammunition wharf and was replenished in readiness for the next call. As ammunition was loaded from the wharves into the lighters, the former were replenished from “dumps” inland, so that there was in effect a steady flow of shells and charges from inland “dumps” in England on to the German positions in Normandy.
The system and organisation were good, but to have lighters loaded with the ammunition requirements of different types of ship proved to be beyond the capabilities of the lighterage of the Naval Armament Supply Department. Additional lighters had, therefore, to be borrowed from the military.
The scale of naval support gunfire envisaged raised another problem. When the “fire plan” was examined it was clear that ships would wear out their guns during the operation, so arrangements had to be made for worn guns to be replaced without delay. New guns of the smaller and medium calibres were assembled in south coast ports, but replacements for the heavy guns were held in readiness in the north because to move a 15-inch gun weighing a hundred tons across England would have been more difficult than sending battleships and monitors to northern ports to change their guns.
The question of replacement of guns raised the problem of keeping berths under the big cranes free of other ships—and this at a time when berths would be at a premium, in the north as well as in the south.
While naval officers and technicians were grappling with the manifold problems arising out of the naval needs of “Neptune,” the Ministry of War Transport was engaged on plans for the participation of the Merchant Navy. It was obvious that a very large number of merchant ships would be required for the invasion. For the manning of these merchant vessels for invasion purposes the Ministry of War Transport launched, in the late autumn of 1943, a volunteer scheme which was aptly named the “V Scheme.” This invited officers and men of the Merchant Navy to sign on for invasion duties—which would be likely to subject them to even greater hazards than those to which they were accustomed.
It was characteristic of the unquestioning devotion to duty of the British merchant seaman and of his readiness to accept any risk while doing his job that more than 90 per cent of British merchant seamen who returned to this country after the inauguration of the “V Scheme” unhesitatingly signed the articles prescribed. Nearly all those who did not sign were deterred solely by reasons of age, health or special family responsibilities.
The number of merchant seamen becoming available under the “V Scheme” for duties in connection with the invasion enabled the Ministry of War Transport to work out a system of “reserve pools” of merchant seamen in the vicinity of the operational ports, ready to replace casualties or provide relief crews if necessary.
The part which the Merchant Navy would have to play in carrying out the operational plan for the invasion of North-west Europe was very closely studied in every detail by officials of the Ministry of War Transport, who worked in the closest collaboration at the highest level with the Service Planning Staff, the United States Army Transportation Corps authorities, and officials of the American War Shipping Administration.
The fact that the planning staffs and the outline plan had grown on the foundation of a great deal of exploratory and preparatory work proved of immense value. Among other things, this process of evolution had led to the collection on the staffs of men who were absolute experts in their various tasks.
A good story is told of an incident which arose from this fact. It happened at one of the many hundreds of meetings which had to be held to consider the loading and use of certain ships. As was inevitable, the Service representatives at the meeting asked that a quart should be put into a pint pot. The Ministry of War Transport officials said that it could not be done, but the naval officer present said that he thought the requirements of the military might be very largely met by making some adjustments to the method of loading. Argument developed along these lines, but showed no signs of getting anywhere when the naval officer was more than a little startled by one of the Ministry of Transport officials turning to a Brigadier in khaki and asking:
“Well, as a practical sailor, what do you say, Tom?”
The Brigadier was, in private life, the Marine Superintendent of the line to which the ship under discussion belonged!
A cartoon from the Daily Mirror, 2 May 1944.
/> CHAPTER VI
TO KEEP SHIPS GOING AND THE ENEMY GUESSING
The repair organisation—The tug organisation—Repair ships and repair parties—Surveying the French coast—Final planning— Beach names—Misleading the enemy.
In the very early days of considering the invasion of Northern France it had been realised that an offensive operation of such a nature would place a very heavy strain on the maintenance and repair resources, particularly those in the south of England.
The strain on the repair resources would not be caused solely by enemy action. It was to be expected that many landing craft would sustain damage by stress of weather, accidents, or faulty handling on and off the beaches. Landing craft are, by their very nature and the use to which they are put, certain to be damaged in considerable numbers during any landing operation. There is a risk which is inherent in running even specially designed vessels ashore in good weather—and the invasion weather could not be guaranteed. In even the slightest surf there is a marked tendency for any vessel, having taken the ground forward, to “broach to”—that is, be swung broadside on to the beach and to the sea. It is obvious that a vessel “broached to” is far more susceptible to damage than one which remains end-on to beach and sea. Not only does a vessel “broached to” offer a far greater area to the sea, by which she will almost certainly be bumped on the beach, but the sides of a vessel are very weak compared to the bows.
Even if landing craft do not “broach to,” there is risk of their flat bottoms being damaged on the beach, where, apart from explosions and obstructions placed by the enemy, there may at certain states of the tide be boulders or outcrops of rock. The virtual certainty of damage if a landing craft “touches down” on an outcrop of rock or a boulder is increased by the rapid redistribution of weight in the vessel caused by the disembarkation of heavy vehicles, and even a very small boulder can do considerable damage when the bottom of a vessel “works” over it.
Another source of damage for which allowance had to be made was damage to screws and shafts through fouling wreckage. The nature of their tasks dictates that the screws of landing craft shall not be very deep, and it was to be expected that in a great invasion operation there would be much wreckage in the water off the beaches.
These hazards are normal and inescapable in what may be termed “amphibious navigation,” and they are apart altogether from the hazards produced by enemy action or obstructions laid by the enemy, mined or otherwise, for the express purpose of destroying or damaging landing craft.
In order that every possible means of repairing, as well as maintaining, the landing craft and other vessels to be used in the invasion, the Admiralty set up Committees in the Home Commands. In the first instance these were set up at the Nore, Portsmouth and Plymouth, but later similar Committees were set up at the Western Approaches Command and at Rosyth.
The function of these Committees was the Co-ordination of Repairs, and their task became known as COREP from the initial letters of these words. The main committee in each of the Home Commands was composed of the Engineer Rear-Admiral representing the Commander-in-Chief of the Command, and representatives of the Director of Dockyards, the Director of Merchant Ship Repairs, and of other naval maintenance and repair bases.
These committees were known as “Command COREP Committees.” At each of the outlying ports within a command there was set up a “COREP Committee” of somewhat similar constitution, the work of each one of which was closely co-ordinated by the “Command COREP Committee.”
These Committees were charged with the preparation—and the operation during the invasion—of an organisation which would make the fullest possible use of all available repair and maintenance facilities within their areas. They were responsible that every dock, slipway, repair berth and workshop within their area—whether naval or belonging to a private firm—would be fully and properly used and that there would be no overlapping. The maintenance and repair of the invasion fleet was to take priority over all other work.
All these committees worked in very close co-operation with the Turn Round Control Organisation and with the United States naval authorities.
The initial data at the disposal of the “COREP Committees” concerned, of course, the facilities for repair and maintenance of ships and vessels of all types in their own areas. It was not long, however, before they received other data. The Combined Planning Staff were preparing an estimate of commitments; composition of assault forces; training and assembly; loading ports and schedules of sailings; and also an estimate of loss and damage likely to be sustained over a period of about three months after D-day. Thus the “COREP Committees” soon had before them lists of the vessels of each type which would be using their areas, and an estimate of the loss and damage to be expected over a considerable period. They could then begin to make fairly detailed plans.
As the details of the repair and maintenance problem began to be filled in it became apparent that some co-ordination of the work of the “Command COREP Committees” was necessary, particularly in order to ensure the most effective and economical distribution of work between the various commands. In order to achieve this a “COREP Control” was set up under the Deputy Controller at the Admiralty, with representatives of every Technical Department and Ministry concerned.
The whole of this complex organisation of “COREP Control,” “Command COREP Committees” and “COREP Committees” had scarcely been completed before casualties caused during training exercises and preliminary moves called for its services. The actual invasion followed rapidly upon these training exercises and preliminary moves. Never before had there been repair and maintenance problems of such magnitude, and the whole of the “COREP” Organisation was without precedence, yet it achieved mightily.
It was, of course, appreciated that the work of the “COREP” Organisation would be to some extent dependent upon the recovery of damaged vessels. So far as repairs on the British shore were concerned, this would obviously depend upon the availability and the work of tugs.
The recovery of damaged ships was not, however, the greatest towing commitment of the invasion. It was realised that this would be the transit to the French coast of the many components of the great artificial “Mulberry” harbours, and that if the tug fleet could carry out this feat it would be quite adequate for the work of recovery of damaged ships after the first few days of the invasion. In the first few days, of course, the two towing requirements would overlap, but there was no possible means of avoiding this contingency and it had to be accepted.
From the moment that approval had been given by the Combined Chiefs of Staff during the Quebec Conference for the construction of the great artificial harbours it had been appreciated that the provision of a sufficient number of tugs would be a matter of extreme difficulty.
The “Mulberry” harbours alone consisted of 400 components, amounting to about a million and a half tons. This meant, that if the plan was to be carried out to schedule, there would have to be 35 heavy tows every day from D-day to D plus 18, which was the planned completion date for the artificial harbours. There were also lighter tows, so that nearly 1,000 tows in all would be required. Even so it was appreciated that, in order to economise in tugs, the tows would have to be made as big as the tugs could possibly handle—the pier roadways, for instance, were made up into lengths of 480 feet to be towed across to France.
A census of all the tugs in the United Kingdom showed that there were not enough tugs to carry out the programme, even if tugs which had been built only for harbour work took to the open sea—as a great many did. It had been worked out that at least 160 tugs would be required, but it was soon realised that it would be impossible to provide so many. An emergency tug-building programme was put into effect on both sides of the Atlantic, but even so, there were available by D-day only 132 tugs, varying from large 1,500 horse-power ocean-going tugs to small 600 horse-power vessels usually employed only on harbour or river work. Nevertheless the plans went forward
. The number of tows was cut down to the absolute minimum and it had to be accepted that the synthetic harbours, although they would provide shelter and considerable unloading facilities by D plus 18, would not be complete in every detail by that date.
The tug problem was such that a special organisation had to be set up to deal with it. This was called the Tug Control Organisation, with the short title COTUG. It had to deal not only with the provision of the tugs themselves, but with arrangements for their crews. The latter were complicated. Some tugs wore the White Ensign, some wore the Red Ensign, others belonged to various Dock and Harbour Boards and Salvage Companies—and the conditions of service and rates of pay of the crews of the various tugs varied accordingly. COTUG grappled with these manifold problems and brought to the south coast of England just before D-day a tug fleet which was extremely heterogeneous in the character and capability of the vessels and in the experience of their crews, but in which all worked together tirelessly and skilfully to the common aim.
The very varied characteristics and capabilities of the tugs called for much work on the part of COTUG, for the principle of economy of effort had to be rigidly observed in order that the best possible use should be made of every available tug—if possible on its homeward as well as its outward journey. A powerful tug would always have to have a heavy tow and a small tug a light tow, and steps would have to be taken to ensure that all the available tugs of one type did not accumulate, after D-day, on one side of the Channel—no easy matter with the heavy outward towing commitments imposed by the “Mulberry” components, the delivery of which to the French coast would have to be carried out against time.
The tugs which were mustered by COTUG, and which did such great work during the invasion of Normandy were not all British. Some of the biggest and most powerful were Dutch tugs which had for years distinguished themselves on rescue work in the Battle of the Atlantic and had saved a great many ships after they had been damaged by torpedo. There were also American and French tugs.
Operation Neptune Page 12