In view of the great strength to which the Allied invasion armies had already been brought, and the loss or decimation of valuable German military formations in Western Europe, the main German hope of delaying the Allied progress lay in the U-boats. It is true that the U-boats had suffered a serious defeat two years before, and that since then their own losses had been greater than those which they had been able to inflict upon the shipping of the United Nations. Nevertheless, they had remained a menace, and with the “schnorkel” device—which enabled them to avoid coming to the surface and so to operate in inshore waters instead of being driven even farther away from the focal points of the trade routes as had previously been the case—the menace had greatly increased.
The capture of Brest would rob the U-boats of a base close to the greatest concentration of Allied shipping, and one fitted with virtually indestructible concrete U-boat pens (it is true that one or two Allied bombs had made holes in the roof of these pens but they had obviously expended their energy in so doing, for the glass windows within the pens were not broken.) Brest in Allied hands would not only deprive the U-boats of a great strategic advantage, but would also provide our patrols of small craft with a sheltered harbour north-west of the remaining U-boat bases of Lorient, St Nazaire and Bordeaux. It would thus place these patrols in a strategic position to “blanket” those Atlantic ports which remained in German hands.
The devastation at Brest.
So the fortress of Brest was attacked with overwhelming weight of air bombing, artillery and men. Even so, it proved to be a very tough nut to crack. The German garrison held on with the grimness of desperation even after they had been forced out of Brest itself and were confined on the Crozon Peninsula on the opposite side of the harbour.
In the assault on Brest the navies played their part, even the battleship HMS Warspite coming close inshore to bombard with her 15-inch guns. It seems probable that it was the bombardment from the sea which forced the German garrison to abandon Brest itself and cross the harbour to the Crozon Peninsula.
A U-boat pen at Brest showing the damage done by a ‘tallboy’ bomb dropped from a Lancaster.
The two great strongholds of the Germans in Brest were the vicinity of the famous École Navale and the tunnelled warehouses off the Quai de la Douane, and both of these were virtually immune to artillery fire from the land to the north of Brest, for they faced south with high ground immediately to the northward of them. In the central quadrangle of the great stone building of the École Navale the Germans had built big concrete “bunkers” with their greater part under ground level, while close to the east of the main building was an even larger bomb-proof “bunker” used as a hospital. The majority of these works, being on the southern slope of the ground, were in “dead ground” to guns firing from the northward. Even more immune to fire from the northward were the U-boat pens, which contained not only shelter for the submarines, but a complete protected dockyard in miniature and comfortable living quarters for the crews of the U-boats and the administrative staff of the flotilla. These pens and their attendant structures of very strong reinforced concrete faced roughly south-south-east and nestled under the cliffs on the top of which stands the École Navale.
The dry dock at Brest after the siege.
On the eastern side of the Penfeld River lies the commercial port with the Quai de la Douane running along its southern side. Immediately to the north of the flat reclaimed surface carrying road and railway rises the cliff upon the top of which is built the ancient fortress town. Running into this cliff from the port level are a number of tunnels which are both railway sidings and underground warehouses. These the Germans had turned into comfortable living quarters and in them they had stored sufficient food and ammunition to last six months. These tunnels and their entrances, which were closed by great steel doors, were quite immune from any artillery fire from the northward. Bombardment from the sea, however, could be directed at their entrances, which were the only places where they were at all vulnerable.
By the time Brest fell to the Allies there was practically nothing but rubble and gutted buildings in the town and more rubble and twisted steel in the dockyard. The jetties of the commercial port had been destroyed, great craters being blown so that half the crater was under water and the tide was adding daily to the damage. The commercial port and the entrance to the Penfeld River, on which the dockyard lies, were blocked by a tangle of sunken ships, while the latter was also blocked by the wreckage of the high swing bridge. As a port, it was useless to the Allies, and it was fortunate that the relentless progress of Allied strategy had placed other and more suitable ports in our hands.
No sooner was the last German resistance in Brest crushed than the roads leading away from it were choked with convoys leaving the neighbourhood of the devastated city. The whole army which had reduced Brest was hastening, with all its equipment, to get back into the fight, which had been carried many hundreds of miles farther east.
Much of the equipment of that army went east by road, but its heavy guns and tanks rumbled across the peninsula of Brest to the little port of Brignogan on the north coast, where Tank Landing Craft and Tank Landing Ships were waiting to take them east. The English Channel was providing an invaluable lateral line of communication of which full use was being made.
CHAPTER II
CLEARING THE CHANNEL PORTS
Importance of Le Havre—Successful actions by our patrols stop German attempts to reinforce—German attempts at evacuation have to be abandoned—Fall of Le Havre—Port clearance organisation—Dieppe—Boulogne—Ostend—Antwerp.
On the eastern flank of the Assault Area the German hold on Le Havre was still the main preoccupation. The capture of Le Havre was very desirable, not so much because it was required as a port for the landing of supplies as because it gave the enemy a strategic advantage on the left flank of the Assault Area and the convoy routes. This the Germans were continually trying to exploit in some new way.
The batteries of Le Havre with their heavy guns were always apt to become a nuisance and demand the use of heavy ships to silence them anew. The E-boats continued to use Le Havre as a main advanced base and were only prevented from causing loss and damage to the Allies by the endurance, vigilance and courage of the men who manned the British motor torpedo boats and motor gunboats and American PT boats which blockaded them and brought them to frequent action. Le Havre, moreover, covered the coastline between the Seine and the Orne, and it was from insignificant points along this coast that the Germans launched their “one-man torpedoes” and explosive motor boats. These were short-range weapons of which the convoy route and the anchorages off the Normandy beaches would be freed from the moment that that coastline was wrested from the enemy, but the capture of Le Havre was a necessary prerequisite to the seizure of the whole of the Seine-Orne coast.
The capture of Le Havre in its turn depended upon other factors. There could be no direct assault on that strongly fortified port. It would have to be taken from the landward side, and this was contingent upon the break-out from the Caen area, the rapid advance to the eastward, and the crossing of the Seine. The latter was complicated by the success with which the Allied air forces had attacked all the bridges in order to isolate north-western France for the initial stages of the invasion.
By the end of the third week in August the Armies had surmounted all these difficulties and were beginning to close in on Le Havre from the east.
At the same time it became clear that there was an abnormal amount of German maritime activity close in to the French shore between Le Havre and St Valéry-en-Caux. It was, of course, to be expected that the Germans would try to evacuate certain instruments and important personnel from Le Havre as soon as they perceived that the capture of their stronghold could not be long delayed. The German naval activity, however, was not by any means all concerned with attempted evacuation from Le Havre. There was also a considerable movement on foot to reinforce the garrison of Le Havre and so prolong its siege.
The first of this series of encounters directly concerned with the situation at Le Havre took place soon after midnight on 23 August, when two German coasters escorted by eight R-boats were encountered west of Fécamp. The action which followed was inconclusive although the destroyer Talybont was able to engage for a minute or two at a range of about 4,000 yards. The British motor torpedo-boats tried hard to reach a favourable position from which to attack the German convoy, but they were illuminated by star shell and so heavily engaged by the guns of the shore batteries that they were forced to withdraw.
An hour later this patrol encountered another group of German ships off Cap d’Antifer, but again the motor torpedo-boats were forced out by shell fire from the coastal batteries, and HMS Talybont was only able to fire a few shells at a range of about 3 miles. Another of our patrols in approximately the same area had better luck that night. In this case three motor torpedo-boats succeeded in working round inshore of the German convoy and attacked from that direction, hitting a coaster with a torpedo. The destroyer HMS Melbreak, which was working with these motor torpedo-boats, engaged the German convoy from seaward at the same time and sank a second coaster by gunfire and also seriously damaged an armed trawler which formed part of the convoy’s escort.
That night’s work illustrates the great difficulties under which our patrols had to work, since the Germans always kept very close in to the coast and well under the shelter of the coastal batteries. The next night—that of 24-25 August—proved even more eventful. The first clashes with the enemy occurred at about 10.40 p.m., when a patrol of American PT boats (the equivalent to the British motor torpedo-boat) twice engaged a group of enemy ships about six miles north-west of Cap d’Antifer. Both these engagements were very brief and fought at high speed, so that it was hardly surprising that results were not observed and that they were therefore considered to be inconclusive.
After these early clashes nothing happened until about 1 a.m., although our patrols were, of course, searching for the enemy. At about that time, however, a group of our motor torpedo-boats encountered some enemy ships which appeared to consist of a fairly large convoy escorted by armed trawlers and E-boats. The motor torpedo-boats at once attacked, and their attack was followed by a heavy explosion. It was considered that one of the motor torpedo-boats had scored a hit with a torpedo, probably on an armed trawler, and that this vessel had probably been sunk.
Three minutes later the PT boats again made contact with the enemy and they succeeded in inflicting severe damage on an E-boat. Rather less than twenty minutes elapsed after this clash before the destroyers HMS Talybont and HMS Retalick made contact with the enemy and engaged by gunfire. These destroyers set two of the German vessels on fire, one of which was seen to blow up shortly afterwards, and probably destroyed a third German craft.
Up to this time it had seemed that there was only one German convoy involved in these actions, but it then appeared that the convoy had split into two halves, probably as a result of the last attack by destroyers, and in an attempt to get at least some ships through unharmed.
The next incident of the night was when a group of three British motor torpedo-boats discovered two coasters very close inshore off Cap d’Antifer. They at once moved to the attack, and succeeded in getting within 900 yards of their quarries, but then they were suddenly illuminated by star shells and engaged by the heavy guns of the shore batteries at extremely short range. The motor torpedo-boats were forced to disengage, but while doing so and making an offing they encountered two R-boats, which had presumably been acting as escorts or as a covering force for the coasters. These the motor torpedo-boats promptly attacked by gunfire at a range of 500 yards, leaving one on fire and the other silenced.
Meanwhile a group of two other motor torpedo-boats had been ordered to attack another group of German vessels discovered close inshore off Fécamp. This they tried to do, but found themselves illuminated and heavily shelled by the coastal batteries and were forced to withdraw. A few minutes later this pair of motor torpedo-boats again tried to attack, this time under cover of a diversion caused by the destroyer HMS Talybont, but this attack also proved abortive as a result of the interference of the shore batteries.
This group of German vessels, however, were not allowed to escape. Three more motor torpedo boats were ordered to the attack while the Germans were still close off Fécamp. This group succeeded in carrying out their attack on what they were able to identify as a group of five German Tank Landing Craft. One of these was hit by a torpedo and was considered to have been destroyed.
So ended a night in which there had been no less than eight actions between our patrols and the German traffic to and from Le Havre.
On the following night-that of 25-26 August—there was one sustained action and heavy loss was inflicted upon the enemy. It was 1.50 a.m. when a group of three British motor torpedo-boats found a convoy of German coasters escorted by E-boats. These were hugging the French coast even more closely than usual, and were only about 400 yards from shore when the motor torpedo-boats attacked. The motor torpedo-boats were illuminated by star shell and heavily engaged by the shore batteries at this very close range, but they persisted in their attacks and set one coaster on fire and severely damaged one of the escorting E-boats. The motor torpedo-boats then withdrew and allowed the destroyers which were in the offing to “have a go.” HMS Thornborough most successfully diverted the attention of the gunners in the German shore batteries while the Fighting French Destroyer La Combattante closed into a range of 3,000 yards. The French ship then opened a devastating fire, which quickly sank two of the German coasters and one E-boat, while another of the coasters was seen to have been driven ashore to save her from sinking. It had been a highly successful action.
The policy of delivering a rapid succession of attacks by different arms was further exploited on the following night when a convoy of Tank Landing Craft taking supplies and reinforcements to Le Havre was decimated. This convoy consisted of eight LCT’s. Despite the very active efforts of the coastal batteries four or five of these LCT’s were sunk and another was driven ashore in a badly damaged condition, while the remainder were certainly damaged.
The action was begun by a group of British motor torpedo-boats which succeeded in pressing home their attack despite the interference of the shore batteries and sank two of the LCT’s. One of these had clearly been carrying ammunition to the beleaguered garrison at Le Havre, for she blew up with a terrific explosion.
No sooner had the motor torpedo-boats completed their work than the destroyer HMS Middleton “took over,” attacking by gunfire and scoring many hits on the LCT’s. As a result of her fire one LCT was seen to have been driven ashore in a seriously damaged condition. It is safe to say that she would not have been beached in this way had she not been in danger of sinking.
Next it was the turn of a group of American PT boats. These pressed home their attack to a range of under a mile and scored one torpedo hit, sinking yet another of the German craft.
As the PT boats withdrew from their attack, another group of British motor torpedo-boats dashed in. These also attacked with torpedoes and two very large explosions told that they had scored hits and sank two more of the LCT’s which had both probably been carrying ammunition.
The Germans had had enough. The losses which they were suffering in their efforts to supply and reinforce the Le Havre garrison were on such a scale that they could no longer continue with their project. So the Le Havre garrison had to be left to its fate without help from outside. After the action on the night of 26-27 August no further attempt
was made by the Germans to send ships or craft to Le Havre.
The Germans did not, however, at once abandon their attempt to extricate certain key personnel, instruments and secret material from Le Havre.
It was an evacuation convoy from Le Havre which was intercepted by our patrols shortly before midnight on 27 August. This convoy consisted of two coasters, three armed trawlers and a considerable number of R-boats. They were found close off Cap d’Antifer and the Fighting French destroyer La Combattante again distinguished herself. She engaged the enemy by gunfire and illuminated them with star shell as three of our motor torpedo-boats sped in to the attack. Both the coasters were sunk by torpedoes fired by these motor torpedo-boats. The La Combattante continued to engage the enemy by gunfire while the motor torpedo-boats disengaged under fire, and she set one armed trawler on fire and damaged another.
Vertical photographic-reconnaissance taken over Le Havre, France after daylight raids by aircraft of Bomber Command on 5, 6 and 8 September 1944. A large area of devastation can be seen in the city centre west of the Bassin de Commerce, over which smoke from burning buildings is drifting. Further attacks on and around Le Havre were carried out on the three following days in an effort to reduce the German garrison still holding out in the city.
After this, even the attempts at evacuation from Le Havre were abandoned by the enemy. As the Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth stated in his official report to the Board of Admiralty: “This night’s operations concluded the operations off Fécamp and Cap d’Antifer. Our offensive patrols had maintained their stations night after night in this area in face of air attack and shore battery fire for nine weeks.”
Although the garrison at Le Havre received no further succour and was in a hopeless situation, it held out until 12 September. When the Allies entered Le Havre they found it in an appalling state. There were no less than 165 wrecks and obstructions in the port, while the approaches to the port and a large part of the lower town had been destroyed as a result of Allied shell fire and heavy bombing attacks. Even as they went down to defeat, the Germans in Le Havre indulged in propaganda of the Goebbels type. They spread the canard among the unfortunate inhabitants of Le Havre that the final heavy bombing attack delivered by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force had been carried out, not in order to achieve any military object, but simply in order to ensure that Le Havre would never again be able to compete with Southampton as a port for the big trans-Atlantic liner traffic.
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