Having lost nearly a third of his knights the previous autumn, with the survivors too exhausted to pursue the enemy, Baldwin had to face a new invasion the following May. As Fulcher put it, they had been sent to destroy the Christians completely. This time the king, apparently overconfident after the victory the previous year, rushed into battle with only 200 knights and little infantry support. In Fulcher's view, this was an act of great recklessness, since the Egyptian army was much larger than he realised. Arpin of Bourges, chastened by recent experiences in Asia Minor, had tried to persuade Baldwin to wait for reinforcements, but the king scornfully told him that if he were frightened, he should flee back to Bourges. The resulting carnage claimed the lives of ‘the greater part’ of his knights, as well as those of Stephen of Blois and Stephen, count of Burgundy, also survivors of the crusade of 1101, who had been waiting at Jaffa for a favourable wind to return home. Arpin was taken prisoner and held in Cairo until his release was obtained by Alexius Comnenus, the Byzantine emperor.27
Baldwin himself escaped first to Ramla and then, after spending an anxious night hiding in the mountains, reached Arsuf. This brief disappearance was sufficient to fuel a rumour that the king had been killed, which was quite likely in the circumstances and, like the panic in Jaffa the previous year, indicative of the state of nerves prevailing among the early settlers. Once safe, Baldwin sailed to Jaffa, where he gathered what forces he could find, perhaps amounting to 170 knights plus foot soldiers, and counterattacked to such effect that the Egyptians were once more put to flight. In Fulcher's account the role of the foot soldiers, not present at the initial encounter, was crucial. Even so, it is evident that Fulcher thought that this near-disaster, spread over ten days between 17 and 27 May, was largely of the king's own making, a criticism to be taken seriously in view of Fulcher's admiration for Baldwin.28
Unsurprisingly, the Egyptians were not able to muster an immediate response, but the danger of a crushing defeat, which, as Fulcher of Chartres shows, could change everything in a single day, remained for the next three years. In August 1105, al-Afdal sent a combined force of Arab cavalry and Ethiopian foot soldiers, intended to act in combination with 1,000 Turkish archers from Damascus, supplied by its ruler, Tughtigin. This was the first time that the Franks had been faced by an alliance between Sunni and Shi'ite, and it resulted in the biggest battle since the victory of the first crusaders in August 1099. Baldwin's army was larger than on any previous occasion since he had become king. There were about 500 knights and 2,000 foot soldiers, as well as an unspecified number of mounted warriors ‘who were not counted as knights’, which suggests that, perhaps for the first time, the Franks were enlarging their armies with contingents of local Christians and baptised Turks – the turcopoles, as they were later called.29 The battle was fought on 27 August and, after another fierce encounter, the Muslims retreated to Ascalon, losing Jamal al-Mulk, one of their leading emirs, in the process.30
Contemporaries were well aware that the four victories over the Egyptians were extraordinary achievements and, thus, like the capture of Jerusalem, should be attributed to divine intervention. The latter was manifested in the form of wood from the True Cross, which, according to Raymond of Aguilers, had been found thanks to the efforts of Arnulf of Chocques during his brief period as patriarch-elect.31 Albert of Aachen presents Godfrey as explaining to ‘the prefect of Ramla’ that it was ‘a spiritual shield against all the enemy's missiles’. This was why the Christians had such belief in their battles with the Egyptians, for ‘we have been redeemed by this wood of the Holy Cross from the hand of death and hell, and by angelic power from harm, and we have been cleansed in the blood of Lord Jesus, son of the living God, from all the filth of former error, and we have confidence in eternal life’.32 Fulcher of Chartres stresses that the True Cross was carried before the army by leading clerics in all the battles with the Egyptians, the only exception being Baldwin's reckless attack of May 1102, when he had neither waited for reinforcements, nor sent for the True Cross, which of course proved Fulcher's point: ‘If indeed this benevolent Cross had been carried with the king in the previous battle, it cannot be doubted that the Lord would have favored His people.’33 Baldwin fully absorbed the lessons, both military and spiritual. Before the battle with the Egyptians in August 1105, he did not engage until he was ready, making sure that the patriarch, Evremar, had brought the True Cross to the army and apparently engineering the confrontation for a Sunday when, in the eyes of the soldiers, the relic may have been thought most efficacious.34
Baldwin's military achievements effectively marginalised Daibert; indeed, apart from the brief mention of the appointment of an archbishop to the see of Caesarea in May 1101, Fulcher of Chartres makes no reference to ecclesiastical affairs until the autumn of 1104, when Daibert, ‘who had been Patriarch of Jerusalem’, decided to depart for Rome to present his case to the pope and make known the injury done to him by the king. Although he must have known much more, Fulcher offers only the laconic statement that in Rome Daibert ‘gained what he sought, but he did not come back for he died on the way’.35 William of Tyre, dependent on his sources for his facts if not for his opinions, offers little more, claiming that, in 1103, Daibert was driven out of the kingdom by the intrigues of Arnulf of Chocques, who had revived the conflict with the king as well as stirring up the clergy against him. Daibert left for Antioch where he was well received by Bohemond, his old ally, who endowed him with the church of St George, which had considerable estates and revenues. Arnulf then used his influence with the king to promote to the patriarchate ‘a simple-minded priest of deeply religious character, named Ebremar’, who came from his home village and had been a companion on the crusade.36 Having successfully appealed to the pope, Daibert then set out for the East, armed with an apostolic letter, but died on 15 June 1105 while waiting for a ship at Messina.37
Albert of Aachen offers a much fuller account in which the nub of the conflict seems to be money, although his hostility to the patriarch might suggest that he overplays Daibert's role as villain. Baldwin needed paid soldiers to defend the kingdom and therefore had no intention of leaving control of the resources of the Church in the hands of an ambitious prelate whom he did not trust. In early March 1101, the new legate, Maurice of Porto, arrived in Jerusalem, having overwintered in Latakia.38 The king seems to have taken this as an opportunity once again to voice his allegations against Daibert and, at a council convened in Jerusalem, the patriarch was suspended, pending his answer. Pushed into a corner, Daibert secretly handed over 300 besants to the king, who then interceded with Maurice to restore him.39 However, the money did not last long. Faced with the Egyptian invasion of September 1101, and under pressure from soldiers who had not been paid, Baldwin demanded more money from Daibert in a confrontation so furious that Maurice of Porto could do no more than stand on the sidelines, vainly trying to calm the protagonists. According to Albert, Baldwin was so angry that he said he would ‘devour not only the offerings of the faithful and distribute them to our soldiers’, but that he would ‘even rip out the gold from the Lord's Sepulchre and altar in order to sustain the soldiers’. Daibert finally gave in when an envoy from Roger Borsa, Bohemond's half-brother, revealed that he had brought 1,000 besants to the patriarchate for distribution in three parts, to the canons of the Holy Sepulchre, the hospitaller brothers, and the king for maintaining soldiers, but that all this had disappeared into the patriarch's coffers. Albert says that, because of ‘this enormous fraud and treachery’, Daibert was deposed and forced to withdraw to Jaffa. The following spring he sailed for Antioch.40
Daibert made one more effort to regain his position, returning to Jaffa in May 1102 with the forces of Tancred and Baldwin of Bourcq, who had come south in response to Baldwin's appeal for help against the Egyptian invasion of that year. The king, still angry, was reluctant to accept him, but did agree to a council at Jerusalem, presided over by the new legate, Cardinal Robert of St Eusebio, the replacement for Maurice of Porto, who had
died the previous winter. As Albert saw it, the patriarch's perfidy was clearly proved and he was again deposed, leaving him with no option but to return to Antioch with Tancred, to be replaced by Evremar, ‘a man and cleric of good character, an excellent and cheerful distributor of alms’.41
Fulcher's reticence about these matters is hardly surprising. He knew very well that Baldwin's determination to dominate the Church was not compatible with papal attempts to shake ecclesiastical life free from the tentacles of secular power, but he had seen enough fighting to realise that the survival of the kingdom of Jerusalem depended upon its soldiers, led by a king who expected unquestioning spiritual and material support from the patriarch. Evremar was a more pliant instrument than Daibert, but it soon became evident that Baldwin had a low opinion of his abilities; according to Albert of Aachen, accusations were made against him by Baldwin and Arnulf and, in 1107, he too travelled to Rome to absolve himself.42 Fulcher of Chartres presents this as an attempt to ‘inquire from the Apostolic See whether he would remain patriarch’ in view of Daibert's death.43
The pope's version, set out in a letter to Baldwin of 4 December 1107, was that Evremar arrived in Rome seeking confirmation as patriarch, having heard news of Daibert's death, but that he was closely followed by Arnulf bringing letters from the king and the canons of the Holy Sepulchre asking that Evremar be removed from office on the grounds that he was ‘completely useless’.44 Paschal's answer was to send a new legate, Gibelin, archbishop of Arles, to sort out the problems and, in a council held in Jerusalem in 1108, Gibelin decided that Evremar could not be lawful patriarch as he had assumed office when the incumbent was both still alive and in communion with the Church.45 Evremar was then translated to the see of Caesarea, while Gibelin himself reluctantly accepted the patriarchate, which he held concurrently with the post of legate. William of Tyre, whose hostility to Arnulf of Chocques is unshakeable, thinks he discerns the real reason for this: ‘It is claimed that this choice also was brought about by the subtle plotting of Arnulf, who thought that Gibelin, being old and decrepit, would not survive long in the patriarchal office.’46 Albert of Aachen does not blame Arnulf so overtly, but makes no secret of his view that the whole business was quite contrary to the principles of papal reform: ‘Although it was wrong that this dispute should take place, unless one of them had been condemned by decree and sentence of canon law, yet because the Jerusalem Church was still unformed and fragile the pope allowed it to happen, and so by the king's gift and the assent of all the faithful, each of them was elevated to office.’47
When Baldwin left Edessa for Jerusalem on 2 October 1100, almost three years had passed since he had abandoned the main body of the crusade on the road to Antioch and headed east.48 Fulcher of Chartres, who was the only chronicler who went with him, says that they were only three days north of Antioch at this point, but he offers no explanation for the diversion, nor does he record the opinions of the other leaders. The foray into Cilicia the previous month, undertaken apparently in conjunction with Tancred, may have been part of a wider plan intended to make contact with the Armenians and to open up a supply route for the coming siege of Antioch. If so, Baldwin may have convinced the leaders that the establishment of a redoubt east of Antioch would similarly bring strategic advantage.49 Albert of Aachen says that Baldwin sent gold, silver, horses and arms to the leaders during the siege of Antioch and, as the situation outside the city grew more dire, ceded the revenues of Turbessel to Godfrey in the form of corn, barley, wine and oil, together with an annual income of 50,000 besants.50 There is some evidence of forward planning. The Franks had not only informed Constantine, the Roupenid prince of Cilician Armenia, about their arrival, as might be expected, but also Thoros, the Armenian governor of Edessa appointed by the Greeks, but now largely cut off by Turkish expansion.51 Moreover, as early as the spring of 1097, when the crusaders were still in Nicaea, Baldwin had made contact with an Armenian soldier called Pakrad (or Bagrat), the brother of another local Armenian lord, Kogh Vasil, who held castles east of Marash.52
However, if strategy and provisioning were the sole reasons for the expedition, then it was an extremely risky enterprise, since Fulcher of Chartres says that when Baldwin crossed the Euphrates in February 1098, he had only eighty knights.53 The more likely driving force was Baldwin himself, evident both from his subsequent actions and what is known of his character. The death of Godehilde, his wife, in mid-October, which weakened any claim he had on part of the Tosny inheritance in Normandy, may have convinced him that he needed to concentrate on gaining land in the East.54 Even before this, he had done little to hide his ambitions in Cilicia, where his quarrels with Tancred over the possession of Tarsus and Mamistra had culminated in a violent fight between their followers, resulting in several deaths. Even Albert of Aachen, whose pro-Lotharingian sympathies are never far from the surface, could find no credit in this: the next day, ‘they recalled that both sides had done wrong in the Lord's sight, and their devotion to the most sacred way of Jerusalem had been violated’.55 As their bad relations at the time of Baldwin's accession to the kingship of Jerusalem show, this reconciliation was mere form, for the rivalry remained.
Fulcher of Chartres should be the major witness for the establishment of what became the county of Edessa, but his sparse and minimal narrative conceals as much as it tells. As Baldwin moved east, the local Armenians submitted to him, most importantly the town of Turbessel. He then received an offer of an alliance from Thoros, which included the inheritance of Edessa should Thoros die without direct heirs. As Thoros was childless, this drew Baldwin across the Euphrates, a highly dangerous move, since Edessa was about 160 miles from Antioch and there was little chance of any aid from the main Latin armies. Indeed, Baldwin's force was obliged to beat off an attack by Turks based in Samosata on the Euphrates to the north. Around 20 February 1098, they reached Edessa, where they were received ‘with rejoicing’ and the promises made by Thoros were fulfilled. However, within a fortnight Thoros had been overthrown and killed, and replaced by Baldwin. Fulcher says that this was an entirely internal affair, arising from local hatred of Thoros. ‘Baldwin and his men were much grieved because they were not able to obtain mercy for him.’56
In Albert of Aachen's more detailed version, which appears to be soundly based on both oral and written sources, Baldwin also took Ravendel, which he entrusted to Pakrad, before crossing the Euphrates at the second attempt, having first been deterred by Turkish forces.57 At Edessa he was adopted as a son by Thoros in a ceremony that involved ‘binding him to his naked chest’, but he was then unable to prevent the overthrow of his new ‘father’, who was killed in the uprising. Albert makes clear that Baldwin knew what was happening, although, in contrast to Matthew of Edessa, he does not accuse him of collusion. Once in control, Baldwin set about extending his power, buying the support of Balduk, emir of Samosata, when he found he did not have the necessary forces to take the town, probably with resources obtained from the treasury of the late Thoros, and forcing out Balak ibn Bahram, the Artuqid ruler of Saruj, south-west of Edessa, a capture that opened up the route between Antioch and Edessa.58
By the spring of 1098, while the main body of crusaders was still struggling to bring down Antioch, Baldwin and his small force had created the basis of a viable lordship, stretching from Ravendel in the west to Edessa in the east, and dominating the previously Turkish-controlled towns of Samosata and Saruj to the north-west and south-west of Edessa respectively. It was defined in the north by the Anti-Taurus mountains and in the west by the Jaihan (Pyramus) and Afrin Rivers, although its southern limits are more difficult to identify. Edessa itself was an ancient and well-fortified site, claiming apostolic conversion to Christianity and containing a great cathedral, richly decorated with mosaics. In 1032, the Byzantines had retaken it from the Turks, but it had been lost again after the battle of Manzikert in 1071, vicissitudes that emphasise its position on the frontier between the powers of the region, making it difficult for its rulers t
o use it as the nucleus of a state.59
Ravendel had been granted to Pakrad, but he was soon tortured into giving up control because of what Albert of Aachen calls treachery, although there is no way of knowing whether Baldwin had always intended to be rid of him once his value had evaporated.60 Nor did Balduk long survive his association with Baldwin who, in the summer of 1098, had him beheaded on the pretext that he had not provided the hostages he had promised to guarantee his good behaviour.61 Moreover, once news of Baldwin's success began to reach the main army, the numbers of Franks started to increase; Albert of Aachen mentions frequent journeys in the summer of 1098 after the victory over Kerbogha. Some took service in Edessa, while the others became temporary residents in their efforts to escape the spread of disease around Antioch, including Godfrey of Bouillon, who lived for a period in Turbessel and Ravendel.62
Of course, Baldwin had left the main army shortly after the march from Marash had begun, which meant he had been unable to take any further direct role in the crusade. This must have provoked criticism, for when Bohemond and Baldwin eventually completed their pilgrimage to Jerusalem at Christmas 1099, Fulcher felt the need to stress the importance of the protection provided by guarding cities that acted as a barrier against the Turks, ‘now driven back as far as Persia’, something that had been achieved through the many battles fought by Baldwin in Mesopotamia.63 Most dramatically, when Kerbogha brought his huge army of perhaps 35,000 men west from Mosul, he spent three fruitless weeks besieging Edessa, between 4 and 25 May, before giving up and continuing to Antioch. William of Tyre, always keen to find evidence of God's favour, thought that the delay had saved the crusaders, who only broke into Antioch on 3 June.64
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