Once again, decolonisation was at the forefront of the international agenda. Seats taken up by newly independent countries entirely changed the profile of the United Nations. The Bandung conference of 1955, dramatising the presence of the Third World, pressed for UN membership for countries such as Libya, Ceylon, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. Thirteen new members joined that year and twenty-three more by 1961. On 14 December 1960 a Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People in the General Assembly of the United Nations was voted by eighty-nine countries, with none against, but with Britain, France, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, the United States, South Africa and Australia abstaining. Fears that Pan-Asianism and Pan-Africanism, exploited by the USSR, might take over the United Nations put pressure on Britain and France to offer independence to their African colonies, on the understanding that they would continue to vote with them and with the Western bloc in the United Nations.3
There were, nevertheless, two major obstacles in the way of rapid and effective decolonisation. The first was the position of the European settler colonists, especially in French North Africa and British Central and Southern Africa. They considered themselves not as outsiders but as pioneers who had ‘made’ the colonies what they were over generations and were ‘at home’, with as much claim as those indigenous populations who were demanding independence and self-government. Their actions and their pressure had guaranteed the support of metropolitan governments and they were prepared to keep up the pressure to preserve the status quo; anything else was betrayal.
The second factor was the concern of metropolitan governments themselves to secure their strategic and economic interests. These remained as important as ever; the only question was how they might be secured. Clearly the territorial governance that had been imposed since the ‘scramble for Africa’ in the 1880s was no longer viable. The alternative was to revert to the model of ‘informal empire’ under which those interests were guaranteed by local rulers, who were kept in line by a combination of financial and military dependency. Although formally independent they looked to the former colonial power to secure their power against rivals by money and arms. This would be a new edition of the ‘armed trade’ which had served the European powers so well in the eighteenth and for most of the nineteenth centuries. In 1965 Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana called this new order ‘neo-colonialism: the last stage of imperialism’.4 Such an informal empire generally worked well for the Western powers until the oil crisis of 1973. The crisis shifted the balance of power from Europe and the United States to many former colonial countries, and required the more resolute elaboration of a global financial empire along the lines of Adam Smith’s ‘great mercantile republic’ or Cain and Hopkins’ ‘gentlemanly capitalism’.
Losing Algeria, Gaining Françafrique
What the metropolitan governments learned in short order was that the settler communities were not going to give up easily the ascendancy over colonial peoples they had so painstakingly built. In the French case it was particularly painful because they took the view that their actions with the French Army on 13 May 1958 had brought de Gaulle to power precisely in order to save French Algeria. On 4 June 1958, invested as the last prime minister of the Fourth Republic, the General stood in front of a vast crowd at the Place du Forum of Algiers, raised his arms above his head and declared, ‘Je vous ai compris’ (I understand you). While the European settlers wanted him to shout ‘Vive l’Algérie française’, he concluded with ‘Vive la République! Vive la France!’5 De Gaulle now founded the Fifth Republic, of which he became president, and had plans nurtured during twelve years in the political wilderness to make France great again. Vast oil resources had been discovered in the Algerian Sahara in 1956 and it was in the Algerian Sahara that in February 1960 the French first tested their nuclear weapon. De Gaulle came to Constantine on 3 October 1958 to launch a plan to develop Algeria through industrial and infrastructural development, rural land reform and education. On the military front three million rural inhabitants were herded into settlement camps under military supervision, to prevent them supporting rebels, while General Challe undertook a combing of the maquis from west to east to flush the rebels out.6
The problem for the new Fifth Republic was that the international situation was changing. The UN General Assembly was due to call for Algerian independence on 15 September 1959. The United States feared that France would find itself in a war with the whole of North Africa, whose nationalists would be supported by the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower flew to Paris for talks with de Gaulle on 3 September 1959.7 Two weeks later de Gaulle made his speech offering a referendum on the self-determination of Algeria. However, he had another plan up his sleeve in order to protect France’s interests in Africa, a model that was subsequently dubbed Françafrique.
De Gaulle’s promise of a referendum sent a shock wave through the French settlers and the French Army in Algeria. ‘That day’, recalled Jean-Marie Le Pen, then a young right-wing deputy, ‘the partisans of French Algeria began their movement of refusal and resistance’.8 Right-wing settlers’ leaders worked closely with the French Army of Africa, which was commanded mainly by generals such as Salan, Jouhaud, Challe and Zeller, who had remained loyal to Vichy against de Gaulle in 1940, and remained suspicious of him, but also by generals like Massu, who had joined the Free French but were hardened by years of war against the FLN. On 24 January 1960, when Massu was recalled to Paris for criticising de Gaulle’s policy in a German newspaper, the settlers threw up barricades in the streets of Algiers and fought pitched battles with the authorities for a week.9
The question of the principle of self-determination in Algeria was put to the voters of both France and Algeria on 8 January 1961. In metropolitan France, 75 per cent of voters approved of self-determination, while the Algerians were divided 70 per cent for and 30 per cent against. The settler population obviously voted against and looked to their allies in the Army of Africa to resolve the question by force. Generals Salan, Jouhaud, Challe and Zeller organised a putsch in Algiers on 22 April 1961. Unlike in 1958, their aim was not to bring in de Gaulle but to overthrow him. De Gaulle appeared on television in his general’s uniform, asserting his role as commander-in-chief, denouncing the ‘handful of generals’ who had launched this ‘pronunciamiento’ and calling on the military not to follow them. The putsch collapsed after only a few days, but opposition to the French strategy of abandonment was continued by the Organisation de l’Armée Secrète (OAS), for which Salan and Jouhaud provided military leadership.10 The OAS had wide support among the pieds noirs population, which it called out for saucepan-banging rallies, cars honking ‘Al-gé-rie fran-çaise’ and strike action.11
In its last pulsating phases the Algerian War was fought not only in Algeria but on the streets of French cities, especially Paris. The OAS launched bomb attacks both in Algeria and on the French mainland to provoke civil war and force the French Army to intervene to defend French Algeria, killing 2,400 people in the process. In Paris students demonstrated against the ‘fascist’ OAS and clashed with police. The French state used lethal force both against those protesting for peace and an Algerian Algeria and those in revolt for a French Algeria. In Paris, the most brutal force of a colonial nature was used against Algerian immigrants who marched to the city centre on 17 October 1961 at the call of the French Federation of the FLN. They were stopped by the Paris police under Maurice Papon, a former Vichy official who had deported Jews in 1942 and in 1956–8 was regional prefect in Algeria, where he had fought the FLN. Now, in Paris, up to 300 Algerians were beaten to death and their bodies thrown into the Seine (Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1 Colonial violence in Paris: racist reaction to the Algerian demonstration of 17 October 1961.
Getty Images / Keystone-France / Gamma-Keystone / 107421806
This was all concealed; at the time much more attention was given to a left-wing demonstration in Paris on 8 February 1962 that was attacked by police by the Charonne Metro station, killing e
ight communists, and to the mass protest and general strike that followed on 13 February.
Peace between the warring parties was finalised in the spa town of Evian on 19 March 1962. Pieds noirs who continued to claim betrayal were no longer supported by the French Army which now turned on its own citizens. In the rue d’Isly in Algiers on 26 March 80 settlers were killed and 200 injured. They became martyrs to a lost cause which gouged a trench of hatred between the pieds noirs and de Gaulle.12 Generals Jouhaud and Salan were arrested and court-martialled; Salan was given a life sentence and Jouhaud was sentenced to death. Pieds noirs women gathered in church to pray for his pardon and his death sentence was in fact commuted.13 A final flourish came with an attempt to assassinate General de Gaulle on 22 August 1962. Its perpetrator, 35-year-old lieutenant-colonel Jean Bastien-Thiry, was not pardoned by de Gaulle for this treason and was executed by firing squad on 11 March 1963.
Algeria had been lost after eight bloody years of war. French forces killed about 150,000 rebels and lost 24,000 men, including harkis or Muslim auxiliaries. The FLN killed 2,800 Europeans and 16,400 Muslims. Between 75,000 and 100,000 harkis were massacred as traitors in Algeria. This did not mean that France was going to let go of her African Empire. On the contrary, she was going to fight to preserve it and by foul means if necessary.
Meanwhile the new framework for the French Empire – the French Community – came into force. French colonies were consulted by referendum on 28 September 1958 about whether they wished to be members. The only country to vote ‘no’ and claim full independence was Guinea, whose nationalist leader Sékou Touré, had told de Gaulle when he had visited Conakry a month earlier, ‘We would rather have freedom in poverty than richness in slavery.’14 De Gaulle reacted badly and threatened to starve them of trade and credit, so that they would not become an example. In the event, even those countries who voted ‘yes’, such as Madagascar and French Sudan, now Mali, gained independence within the Community in 1960 and the Community faded like the Cheshire cat’s smile.
Behind that smile, however, the French were busy developing Françafrique as they wanted it. The system was organised not by the Ministry of ‘Cooperation’, which replaced the Colonial Ministry, nor by the Quai d’Orsay, but by the Secretary-General of African and Malagasy Affairs, Jacques Foccart, who had an office in the Élysée Palace and met daily with General de Gaulle. Nicknamed ‘Monsieur Afrique’, he recalled that when he was offered the post de Gaulle had said, ‘France has lost Indochina and that is that. Our situation in Algeria has been ruined by too many mistakes, too much blood and suffering. There remains Black Africa where decolonisation is in train but must be a success, maintaining friendship and guiding the people in those countries. That will be your job.’15 He understood too that Africa was a pillar of de Gaulle’s policy of grandeur and must be defended from the incursions of other countries. According to Jean-Marie Soutou, who was in charge of African affairs at the Quai d’Orsay, Foccart played on ‘the enduring effect of the Fashoda syndrome, which determined reactions to the British and a sort of paranoia about Anglo-Saxons in Africa’.16
Foccart ran his own network of spies, agents and hit men. His people were in all the right places, whether missions to African countries, embassies or oil companies. Former colonial officials ‘advised’ government departments in the new states. The French oil company Elf-Aquitaine was a strong arm of Françafrique. Foccart had close personal relations with all African leaders in the French sphere, and operated through cronyism, bribery and bullying. Leaders who supported French interests were rewarded and their families likewise. Those who were seen as unreliable were denounced as ‘communist’ or ‘terrorist’, removed in short order and replaced by someone more pliable. More than one attempt was made by Foccart’s agents to kill Sékou Touré in 1960.17
A prime example of how the Foccart system operated was in French Cameroon. A Union of Cameroon Populations (UPC) had been set up in 1948, based on trade unions, farmers’ associations and village communities, led by a low-grade civil servant Ruben Um Nyobé. When it demanded independence in 1955 it was immediately banned by the French government. A Cameroon National Liberation Army (AFLK) was formed which launched a guerrilla war on the French. In response the French sent in forces under Lieutenant-Colonel Jean-Marie Lamberton, who deported villagers to internment camps, tortured rebels and threw them over waterfalls. Ruben Um Nyobé was murdered on 13 September 1958. This opened the way to independence under Ahmadou Ahidjo, dubbed the ‘African Pétain’, who was prepared to accept independence under the terms demanded by the French – control of foreign policy, defence, police and justice, finances and economic resources. AFLK rebels continued the fight but the French replied savagely, not least with bombing raids, leaving 20,000 dead. Because there were no conscripts from France who could write home, as in Algeria, the news blackout on the atrocities perpetrated was total. UPC leader Félix Moumié fled abroad but was assassinated by a French agent in Geneva on 13 October 1960. A month later the ‘cooperation agreement’ which gave France full powers of tutelage was signed in the Cameroon capital, Yaoundé.18
Leaving Southern Africa, Recovering Informal Empire
Just as de Gaulle’s speech of 16 September 1959 had set the cat among the French settlers and the military in Algeria, so Macmillan’s ‘wind of change’ challenged the South African Prime Minister Hendrik Verwoerd and the Afrikaners. Verwoerd declared that South Africa was a bulwark against international communism and that the Afrikaner mission was grounded in Christianity. He also declared that they were Europeans only in the sense that they were white. ‘We call ourselves Europeans. But actually, we represent the white men of Africa. They are the people, not only in the Union, but throughout major portions of Africa, who brought civilization here […] And particularly we, in this Southern-most portion of Africa, have such a stake here that this is our only motherland. We have nowhere else to go.’19
The apartheid regime was prepared to defend itself by force. Six weeks later, on 21 March 1960, the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), as if responding to recognition of the legitimacy of African nationalism, decided that the time was ripe to overwhelm apartheid by a campaign of massive non-collaboration. They marched without passes on police stations in Sharpeville, a township outside Johannesburg, and invited arrest, with the aim of triggering further protest. They were met by police gunfire and sixty-nine protesters were killed (Figure 4.2). Further protest marches and strikes took place from Cape Town to Durban. The South African government declared a state of emergency, banned the ANC and PAC, and arrested 2,000 African political leaders.20
Figure 4.2 The brutality of colonial supremacy: the Sharpeville massacre, 21 March 1960.
Getty Images / Universal History Archive /UIG / 513686235
There was an international outcry. United Nations Security Council resolution 134 on 1 April 1960 condemned the killings and called upon South Africa to abolish apartheid. On 14 December 1960 the UN General Assembly resolved that ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination’ and that ‘all armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease’. In Britain a movement to boycott South African goods that developed in 1959, as a direct result of Sharpeville, became the anti-apartheid movement. On 27 March 1960 a rally of 15,000 people in Trafalgar Square wearing black sashes and badges marched on South Africa House, demanding its expulsion from the Commonwealth.21 In the face of international opprobrium, and to shut down pressure for majority rule, the Pretoria government held a referendum on 5 October 1960 ‘to unite and keep South Africa white’ by declaring a republic, which was carried by 52 per cent.
A crisis point was reached for Britannic nationalism. Pretoria was still keen to remain in the Commonwealth but a meeting of the Commonwealth nations in London in March 1961 was dominated by the newly independent Asian and African countries, whose representatives threatened to walk out if South Africa was not expelled. Whether the Commonwealth remained a club of the white dom
inions or a multiracial forum was at stake. Australia and New Zealand supported South Africa. Australian Prime Minister Menzies declared himself ‘very unhappy’ when South Africa was asked to withdraw and later wrote to Macmillan, ‘I ask myself what benefit we of the Crown Commonwealth derive from having a somewhat tenuous association with a cluster of republics, some of which like Ghana are more spiritually akin to Moscow than to London.’22 On the other hand Canada’s John Diefenbaker broke rank and sided with the Asian and African countries.
Out of the Commonwealth, the South African regime no longer had a brake on its policy of repression. It inaugurated what has been called ‘high apartheid’ or ‘second wave apartheid’.23 Between 1960 and 1982, 3.5 million Africans were tractored off white farms or driven out of townships and dumped in camps in the Bantu homelands in what may only be described as ethnic cleansing.24 ‘In the second richest country in Africa we are reproducing the living conditions of nineteenth-century famine victims allowed to labour under sufferance in a another country’, wrote Nadine Gordimer, ‘we […] have created encampments of people living like the homeless refugees of Palestine, Biafra and Vietnam’.25 The days of non-violent opposition were over and the banned ANC and PAC switched to armed struggle through secret organisations respectively called the Spear of the Nation and Poqo. Nelson Mandela visited FLN bases in Morocco in order to learn guerrilla fighting techniques.26 The South African authorities fought back against what it called communism and terrorism. Mandela was arrested in August 1962 and most of the rest of the ANC underground leadership was caught at Rivonia farm outside Johannesburg in July 1963. At the so-called Rivonia trial in 1964 they were in danger of hanging, but the regime was not prepared to make martyrs of them and the accused were sent to Robben Island for life.
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