Even if they believed our statements, the conservative Cuban American National Foundation (CANF) and the Cuban Liberty Council lobbies would not be satisfied. They would use Guantanamo Bay as a club to beat the administration of President George W. Bush into switching from the moderate policies of recent years to a hostile policy that denounced Castro and tightened the embargo. I hoped that the two events, Powell’s testimony to Congress and my press conference in Havana, would obviate the need for the new assistant secretary Reich, who was fiercely anti-Castro, to add his voice to an already volatile situation. Reich’s remarks, which would likely be antagonistic, would please the diaspora but could lead to a verbal confrontation with the Cuban hierarchy, which was ever vigilant for any sign of disrespect toward its government.
Filled with anticipation, the international press arrived early. I knew and liked the representatives of ABC, CNN, MSNBC, and Reuters. I trusted them to get the story right because they followed US-Cuba relations closely and understood the various nuances and intricacies. It was more challenging to deal with the media from France and Spain, which were generally dumbfounded by the influence wielded by the Cuban diaspora and the acquiescence of the US government to its demands. All the reporters were hoping to get a rare scoop within the closed Cuban environment, where it was hard to find a good story. Not knowing what to expect, they must have imagined that Castro had declared me persona non grata; if he had not, then surely I would explain what was going on with the seeming détente between the United States and Cuba. It wasn’t odd that these predictions were contradictory, because our relations were not only contradictory but riddled with misunderstanding and mistrust. Now the media was attempting to figure out the latest twist in our relations. Castro had brushed aside the incarceration of enemy combatants at Gitmo almost as if the issue was too insignificant to be brought to his attention. For some inexplicable reason Fidel had failed to seize the opportunity to denounce the United States both for the war in Iraq and what Cuba viewed as our “illegal” occupation of Guantanamo Bay.
The risks were substantial for me. If CANF decided that my remarks were favorable to Castro, it would strongly suggest that the Bush administration replace me, as after all I had been appointed by Clinton. If Castro disapproved of what I said, he might demand that I leave the country. Still, I was pleased to have an opportunity to defend our current approach to Cuba, which—while certainly not friendly to the regime—was in my opinion reasonable and moderate. There had not been a crisis between the United States and Cuba during the past year, and relations were definitely improving with an increasing number of American visitors and the first- in-decades sales of American corn, chicken, and other agricultural products.
I began by telling the press that the US government wasn’t fooled by Castro’s charm offensive, which I explained was simply his strategy to convince American visitors and our Congress to lift the embargo. Fortunately, leading with the charm offensive provided a lead for most of the reporters’ articles. It was only the Spanish government press, Agencia EFE, that led with the issue of terrorism and Guantanamo Bay. I explained that Castro’s more accommodating approach was simply because he didn’t want to appear to be on the side of the terrorists who had carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. In describing the charm offensive, I explained, “You cannot say there is a change because Cuba wants to say there is one. There has to be a fundamental change here, and there has not been one.” Seeing this as an opportunity to advocate on the part of the dissidents, I added, “Cuba must take steps toward becoming a more open society before the United States will consider changes in its policy.”
In addition to asking about the Guantanamo Bay issue, the media wanted to know if the influx of American visitors, especially the VIPs, and the recent $34 million in sales of American agricultural products meant that the Bush administration was intentionally allowing relations to improve. I didn’t have a good answer, because these activities were in and of themselves a sign of better relations. But the purpose of the press conference was to reassure the diaspora, so I pointed out that Castro had made the agricultural purchases to speed Cuba’s recovery from Hurricane Michelle, a Category 4 storm that had devastated western Cuba. It took only two days for agricultural products from the United States to arrive in Havana as opposed to two weeks for products from China and Europe; moreover, the goods were 20 percent cheaper. I added that while Castro might be intent on convincing the US Congress to lift the embargo, he was unlikely to succeed. Republicans who supported the embargo held a majority in the House of Representatives, and President Bush could veto any Cuba legislation he didn’t like. In any case, history illustrated that US and Cuban interests seldom intertwined. President Bill Clinton had twice attempted an opening and twice failed. Now, having won the battle for Elián González, Castro was ready to engage, but President Bush was not.
One reporter asked if the increased travel of Americans to Cuba was a sign that we were a willing partner in what seemed to be a détente. I explained that American people-to-people visits were important because they helped build grassroots democracy, providing an opportunity for dissidents to meet with our political leaders. In addition, visiting Americans brought fresh ideas and information to Cubans whose access to news was strictly limited by their government. My personal opinion, which I didn’t share with the journalists, was that Fidel was more interested in enjoying the company of America’s cultural and political leaders than in actually ending the embargo, which provided a convenient scapegoat for Cuba’s political oppression and economic depression.
The toughest issue I had to address was the administration’s decision to use Guantanamo base for the incarceration of the unlawful enemy combatants. To reassure the Cuban American community, I told the press that we appreciated Havana’s stance on Guantanamo but “the problem for us is that nothing has fundamentally changed in Cuba.” To be removed from the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism Castro would have to return Americans wanted for various crimes—such as Joanne Chesimard, who had been given refuge in Cuba—and stop harboring Basque and Puerto Rican separatists. I personally hoped that by mentioning the actual reasons why Cuba remained on the terrorist list might subtly demonstrate that Cuba did not deserve to be associated with Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria. I believed that Cuba should have been removed from the terrorist list when it ended its support for international insurgencies in the 1990s. Cuban American legislators knew as well as I did that Fidel Castro wasn’t sponsoring terrorism. But they and the conservative Cuban American lobby would attack any effort to remove Cuba from the list because doing so would eliminate a powerful rationale for continuing the embargo. In any event, Cuba would remain on the list no matter what I said.
I thought the press conference had gone well. I had focused the media’s attention on Castro’s actions, underscoring that there had been no change in US policy. By mentioning that Cuba would remain on the terrorist list, I had preempted Florida’s Cuban American congressional representatives, Republicans Ileana Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln Díaz-Balart, who, having been shocked and concerned by the unexpected arrival of enemy combatants at Guantanamo, would now focus on ensuring that Castro would not benefit in any way from Cuba’s cooperation. This meant that despite having assisted in the War on Terror, Cuba would remain on the State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. As the reporters filed out, the US Interest Section’s public affairs officer Gonzalo Gallegos, who was a first-class diplomat, assured me that it had gone exceedingly well. But we had not counted on Spain’s Agencia EFE writing an article that misquoted me.
The next day, Cuba’s new head of North American affairs, Raphael Dausa, summoned me to the Foreign Ministry. This meant that I was in serious trouble, but I could think of only one remark that would have given offense, and it was off the record. Determined to defend myself, I arrived at the ministry with my deputy chief of mission, Lou Nigro, because I thought it prudent to have a witn
ess who could confirm what was said. As usual, we were ushered into one of the small rooms reserved for meetings with diplomats. It was adorned with large plastic plants, which likely conceal cameras and listening devices. The room also had a two-way mirror, behind which would likely be additional observers. I wished that the congenial Dagoberto Rodríguez Barrera, the former head of North American affairs, had not been posted to lead the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC. Dausa was a harder man, more dogmatic and unlikely to give much credence to my explanation. Lou and I stood and shook hands with Dausa and two other officials, but they barely touched our hands, coolly looking us over as if we were a particularly odious species of capitalist.
There were no pleasantries. Dausa immediately asked if I was speaking for the State Department or myself. If I did not have the State Department’s backing, Castro could demand that I leave the country and be done with the entire affair. I assured Dausa that I had the full support of the State Department. I had my fingers crossed. I had not submitted my remarks in advance for the department’s approval because I did not want Reich to make them harsher, and I was confident that I could handle the press conference. Dausa’s next salvo revealed the crux of the matter. How dare I claim that the Cubans were not cooperating with the United States on Guantanamo? I was stunned.
“I didn’t say that!” I exclaimed. Then Dausa accused me of saying that Cuba “debe hacer mas” (ought to do more) in the fight against terrorism. With that I knew that my message had been misinterpreted. I replied that they should read a transcript, which they could get from any of the reporters who had attended the press conference or presumably through their own clandestine recording.
I explained that I had not denigrated Cuba’s cooperation on terrorism; rather, I had said, “Cuba has reacted in a positive manner to bringing the illegal combatants to the base.” I had added that to be removed from the terrorist list, Cuba would have to stop harboring Basque and Puerto Rican separatists and American criminals. But that was quite different from saying Cuba should do more to cooperate with the US against terrorism.
As we left the meeting I turned to Lou, who had also been the political officer when I was chargé d’affaires in Haiti. I trusted Lou completely and knew that he would tell me the truth. He squeezed my arm and said he thought that I had probably dodged a bullet. I agreed, but only because Castro and his staff would review the recording of the press conference. In doing so they would discover that Agencia EFE had misinterpreted my remarks. I had not denigrated Fidel’s decision to cooperate with us on Guantanamo Bay. And I knew that the rest of my press conference was not sufficiently irritating to result in Castro expelling me from Cuba. But I would need the State Department to support me. At the daily press conference the department spokesman announced, “We back what Huddleston said one hundred percent.” I was relieved because I knew that Reich didn’t fully supported me. He appreciated and applauded my stand on behalf of the dissidents, but he opposed my advocacy of a cooperative relationship between the United States and Cuba.
The challenge for me in my job as the chief American diplomat was that no one was ever satisfied. In the case of the press conference, Castro was unhappy because I had not given him sufficient recognition for his cooperation; but if I had done so, my boss, Otto Reich, and other conservatives would reproach me for being too gracious toward Cuba. The same dynamic prevailed with those who advocated better relations with Cuba, many of whom now criticized me for too aggressively championing human rights. Most of the time I enjoyed seeing just how far I could push both sides without stepping over the boundaries. It was hard to succeed in Cuba, but it was never boring.
With the State Department firmly behind me, all I had to worry about was Castro’s reaction. Fidel wouldn’t like my quip that “Castro is a man of the past, not the future.” It wouldn’t get me thrown out of the country, but it also wouldn’t further the détente I was trying to promote. At the beginning of the press conference I had told the reporters that they could quote me, but I asked that they not repeat my unflattering remark about Castro. But if Fidel reviewed the tapes he would hear what I had said and he would find a way to pay me back.
Castro pronounced his verdict by belittling me. He said, “There is not a country in the world where diplomats don’t meddle,” adding “Here, where [the United States] doesn’t have an ambassador, there is an Interests Section and they have tried applying the same style.” I was relieved, because he had attacked me before in much harsher terms. With respect to my comments regarding Cuba’s inclusion on the terrorist list, he was bitter, complaining, “They cannot imagine how much we do not care one bit whether they exclude us or not.” But I imagine that he cared a great deal, and with good reason. Castro’s refusal to condemn our actions at Guantanamo Bay had reassured many left-leaning governments, and his cooperation with our military had improved base security. He must have expected something in return, such as Cuba’s removal from the terrorism list, but such reciprocity was not forthcoming.
The Cuban Foreign Ministry spokesman, Roberto de Armas, did a good job of explaining the commotion, claiming, “In Miami, there’s extraordinary confusion—a state of alarm.” The diaspora suspected that “an under-the-table deal” had been made to soften the travel ban and Armas added that they were “trying to ensure that Jeb doesn’t lose a single vote.” He was referring to the fact the Jeb Bush, who throughout his political career had been supported by Cuban Americans, would soon be running for a second term as governor of Florida.
American domestic politics was progressively encroaching on the relatively good, or at least benign, relations between our two countries, which during the past year had allowed a Cuban Spring to emerge—the most open period on the island since the Cuban Revolution. Even the toxic issue of political prisoners, which was historically used as a cudgel by the Cuban American community to maintain a harsh policy, had lost some of its potency. According to Elizardo Sánchez, the head of the Cuban Commission on Human Rights, there were 210 political prisoners in February 2002, a drop of 15 percent from six months earlier. But these advances did not distract the Cuban American lobby from continuing to advocate for a harsher policy. More worrisome to me was that it appeared President Bush might accommodate the lobby. He had given Reich—a hard-liner’s hard-liner—an interim appointment and was reported to have responded to Uruguay’s president Jorge Batlle’s suggestion that he lift the US embargo by defending our policy against that “tyrant” Castro. It seemed that for American presidents it was simpler to lead the diaspora in punishing their old enemy than to assume the more difficult and risky role of convincing them that a moderate policy would improve the lives of Cubans and benefit their own country.
Knowing that at some point the president would have to make a decision about whether to continue the current policy, I traveled to Washington, DC to make the case for détente—a word I never used in public because it would have sparked great indignation among the Cuban diaspora. I invited Peter Corsell, my Special Assistant, to accompany me.
We began by seeking the approval of the secretary of the Department of Housing and Human Services, Cuban American Mel Martinez, who was President Bush’s principal Cuba adviser. Martinez was a thoughtful and cordial man who listened to our arguments with an open mind. Peter successfully argued, as he had done with many groups in the Cuban American community, that our outreach activities over time could undermine the Cuban government. I didn’t like that argument, but it was effective. I preferred to emphasize that a more moderate approach had been critical in producing the Cuban Spring. If the president curtailed people-to-people travel, Castro would no longer have an incentive to refrain from crushing dissent because he would have lost his American audience and the possibility of convincing the Congress to end the embargo. Martinez was impressed and commended the outreach program. He described our efforts as a quintessential carrot-and-stick approach in which we permitted American travel so long as Castro was demonstrating good behavior. The meeting ended
with Secretary Martinez asking me if I would extend my tour in Havana for a fourth year. This was clearly a strong endorsement of our approach. I responded that I would be delighted, but that would ultimately depend on Secretary Powell and the State Department.
The next day I met with Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who was both my and Assistant Secretary Reich’s boss. I explained to Armitage that a détente of sorts had developed between the United States and Cuba that I hoped to nurture. Armitage, an outspoken and confident diplomat, wished me luck, which to some degree was a warning that our policy could change at any moment. After that I met with Assistant Secretary Reich. I didn’t mention my views on détente to Reich, who would have been appalled. I focused on the details and success of our outreach program. Reich opposed cooperation of any kind with the Cuban government, but he supported empowering the dissidents. Unfortunately, as Reich and his conservative following would eventually discover, the latter was dependent on the former. Regardless, I would not be able to convince him to moderate his desire to punish Cuba.
Our Woman in Havana Page 18