According to official public opinion surveys, the “love of the German people for the führer had increased more than ever, and also the attitude to the war had become still more positive among many as a result of the attempted assassination.”7 The Socialist underground reports agreed that regardless of who planted the bomb, it was “the Nazis who reaped the success.” Some thought Hitler’s death would only have benefited the enemy. The Socialists concluded that “according to our general observations,” the attempt to kill Hitler led “to a strengthening” of national “determination” to go forward with the war, and “we recognize by that fact once more that there is only one possibility” of getting rid of Hitler, and that was “the convincing military defeat of the Reich.”8
A popularly supported leader, one who had recently chalked up an easy victory in Poland, proved to be too much for would-be opponents in the military. Although they worried about the spread of war, they could not agree on what should be done. The western offensive did not go ahead immediately, but there were repeated delays caused by poor weather.
Halder, when pressed by Hitler’s opponents, kept saying that it was “impractical” for the army to attempt a coup. Foreign powers would give no assurances what they would do if Hitler were toppled. Perhaps even worse, “opinion among the population and the younger officers (major and below) was not ‘ripe,’” which is to say, would not tolerate an overthrow of the government. This was clearly what Halder meant by the “unfavourable” public opinion of the moment. Like the Socialists, he recognized Germans were behind Hitler, and they would only begin to change their minds, if at all, when the country faced military defeat.9
For the moment Hitler had the show of support he relished when facing division and dissent in the ranks. He decided to take on the doubters in the military in one fell swoop, not as Stalin would have done, by ordering their mass execution, but by bringing them in for a talk. On November 23, he ordered all the principal leaders (about two hundred in all) to come to the Reich chancellery for a special conference.
They were treated to the well-worn narrative of Hitler’s rise from 1919 and how he had proven every naysayer wrong. He reminded them of his successes since taking over in 1933, most of them military victories, and he laid before them what they all saw as a stark fact, namely that Germany’s rising population needed greater lebensraum. The alternative was either to take the “cowardly way” of killing children (abortion) or to fight to expand the room available. “No calculated cleverness is of any help here, solution only with the sword. A people unable to produce the strength to fight must withdraw. Struggles have become different from those of a hundred years ago. Today we can speak of a racial struggle. Today we fight for oil fields, rubber,” and so on.
He said with pride that no one had predicted the quick victory over Poland, but the issue was not settled; the stronger foe remained in the west, where there was neither peace nor war, a situation that could not last for long. For Hitler, the moment to strike could not be better: if Germany attacked, this time they would have no enemy in the east. How long could the USSR be expected to live up to its treaty obligations, he asked? At a certain point it was bound to make a move. Thus, Hitler’s rationale for dealing with the west as soon as possible was to free up the military for the east. He felt the Soviet military was weak and would remain so for a year or two. In his view, even a delay of six months would see the whole situation change.
Hitler intended to attack in the west “at the earliest and most favorable moment. Breach of the neutrality of Belgium and Holland is of no importance. No one will question that when we have won.” That was his old refrain, as was his observation that there were no guarantees of success. Essential to victory in his mind—and presumably that was why he had gathered all these officers around him—was that “the leadership must give from above an example of fanatical unity. There would not be any failures if the leaders of the people always had the courage a rifleman must have.” There was only one way to stop the war, and that was to attack and win. There was going to be no repeat of 1918—another of Hitler’s favorite themes—because this time Germany had numerical superiority.
He ended with the usual all-or-nothing note: “If we come through this struggle victoriously—and we shall come through it—our time will go down in the history of our people. I shall stand or fall in this struggle. I shall never survive the defeat of my people. No capitulation to the outside, no revolution from within.”10
He played up his popularity with the nation against the theoretical objections of some of the higher officer corps. These men could not stand up to him. Ian Kershaw correctly observes that “Hitler enjoyed a level of popularity exceeded by no other political leader of the time.”11
What was involved, however, was not simply a popularity contest, because the great majority identified with Hitler’s ideas and savored his triumphs as their own.
On January 16, 1940, after many cancellations of the attack on the west, Hitler finally postponed it until the spring. This development meant the armed forces had more time and their chances of success improved. The military leadership was in any case not so much opposed in principle to a west offensive; it had worried more about its lack of preparation.12
OPENING THE WAR IN THE WEST
In early 1940 the situation faced by Germany and the Allies was brought to a head. Winston Churchill, who was then the first lord of the admiralty, decided—at almost the same moment as Grand Admiral Erich Raeder—that the strategic position of Norway and Denmark was such that those countries could not be left open to the enemy. As both sides saw, if Norway was taken by the British, Germany’s imports would be vulnerable. Raeder put the case to Hitler, who on March 1 issued a directive for the attack—code-named Weserübung (Weser Exercise)—for April 9. Again there was a coincidence with the British who on April 7 began to embark troops for the occupation of Norway and the next day began mining the waters around Narvik. The German invasion of Norway and Denmark went ahead as scheduled, catching the latter completely by surprise. In Norway they encountered far more resistance. Nevertheless, by June 10 the Norwegians sued for peace. The Allied forces in Norway had been withdrawn earlier to help meet the even bigger crisis of the German invasion of Western Europe.
Even before the battle for Norway was over, on May 10, the German offensive against the main enemies in the west began. The delays in the attack had given Hitler and his military leaders time to work out more innovative approaches. They found the plan put forward by the Army High Command, which envisioned a sweeping attack from the northwest, to be unimaginative and predictable. Instinctively, Hitler felt uncomfortable with the initial Case Yellow, as did Generals Erich von Manstein and Gerd von Rundstedt and the tank specialist Heinz Guderian.
The final version of Case Yellow was to begin (more or less as the Allies expected) with surprise strikes, led by General Fedor von Bock, to the north, through Holland and Belgium. The aim was to mislead the British and French into thinking these attacks were the main invasion. In fact the nasty surprise was in the south, where Manstein and Rundstedt had concentrated armored and motorized forces. Their attack would not sweep toward Paris, as would be anticipated, but instead drive through the Ardennes to Sedan and across the river Meuse. Then, again contrary to what would be expected, it would not head south to Paris but turn west and north, driving at full speed for the coast at Calais. That movement, later likened to a sickle cut, would isolate the Allied forces rushing northward to repel Bock’s attack and cut them off from their armies in the south. The Germans would catch the Allies from behind and in front, leaving them little choice but to retreat to the coast in hopes of avoiding capture.13
The German attack, much of it inspired by Hitler’s strategic thinking, with sound advice from Manstein, was a spectacular success. Within ten days, German troops were on the Channel coast. The Allied debacle was partly the fault of their own mistakes, perhaps above all their failure to work out a command structure and to integrate their
forces with the Belgians and the Dutch. As one account sums up what happened, “A poorly led and badly coordinated Allied force was pierced at a critical point by concentrated German armor and was never able to regain even its balance, to say nothing of the initiative.”14
The Allies realized they could not link up with their troops to the south; the British Expeditionary Force began its own march to the Channel with the aim of evacuating as many as possible near Dunkirk. Hitler let himself be persuaded by Rundstedt to stop the advance on May 24, mostly because Rundstedt thought the terrain in Flanders was too soggy for tanks, which in any case needed refurbishing. Generals Halder and Brauchitsch strongly favored chasing down the retreating forces but were overruled. Halder observed sarcastically in his war diary that his troops were stopped with no opposition in sight and on Hitler’s direct orders.15 As it was, the Wehrmacht was but fifteen miles from capturing or killing a substantial proportion of the Allied armies, and that might have had an important effect on the British decision to continue the war.
Many explanations have been given for the mistake of letting escape 220,000 British and 120,000 French soldiers. The myth of Hitler’s magnanimity is completely without foundation; he was persuaded to stop the advance by Rundstedt on technical grounds. Göring also led him to believe the air force could finish the job, but his boast was mistaken. It was also true that Hitler wanted to redeploy, first to the south, where some fighting continued. He changed his mind when he saw so many get away at Dunkirk and within forty-eight hours commenced the attack again. Rundstedt turned his forces to the south and headed toward Paris. The German passion was to win as quickly as possible. The attack opened on June 5 and was over in less than three weeks.16
In Hitler’s view, the escape of the Allied troops seemed of little consequence compared with the overwhelming victory. German units rolled forward almost without stop, entering Paris on June 14. A week later Hitler demanded that the French government agree to an armistice near Compiègne. He also insisted on getting the same railway car and signing the documents in the same place where the Germans had been forced to sign an armistice in 1918. That event was seared into Hitler’s consciousness as the day of the ultimate national humiliation. The repetition of the same event, with a different outcome, ended part of Hitler’s trauma about the last war.
His vision went far beyond undoing the “shame of 1918” and recouping the territorial losses. He strove for more. In a matter of months he had been able to beat France, Germany’s traditional foe, and push the British off the continent. Germany controlled all of Western Europe and, in the east, most of Poland, all of Czechoslovakia, and Austria. The economic potential of this vast area was greater than the dreams of the most voracious imperialist.
All of that meant little in itself to Hitler. He was still fixated on crushing what he called the “Judeo-Bolshevik” threat. In fact, his explanation for the attack on the west was connected to his military plans against the Bolsheviks. He wanted to make sure that “early in the year [1940] he would have his own army free again for a great operation in the east against Russia.”17
It was in the autumn of 1939, even before the victory over Western Europe, that his adjutant first heard Hitler mention Russia in this way. By late May and early June 1940, Hitler had realized France was on the verge of defeat and Britain might soon have to sue for peace. He promptly began talking with his generals about settling accounts with Bolshevism.
Hitler must have smiled wryly on receiving Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov’s “warmest congratulations” when German troops entered Paris. French Communists might have had a difficult time explaining those hearty salutations to their people deeply saddened at what was commonly regarded as a great national tragedy.18 Molotov’s sugar-coated words were completely lost on Hitler and did not give him a moment’s pause in his determination to invade the USSR.
Hitler took little more than a perfunctory tour of Paris, hardly long enough to relish the spoils. He told Albert Speer, who was with him: “I am not in the mood for a victory parade. We aren’t at the end yet.” He asked Speer to “draw up a decree in my name ordering full-scale resumption of work on the Berlin buildings.” He had given some thought to destroying Paris but opted not to, because “when we are finished in Berlin, Paris will be only a shadow.” Speer visited Hitler later and vividly recalled overhearing a conversation he was having with the military leaders Alfred Jodl and Wilhelm Keitel. “Now we have shown what we are capable of,” Hitler was saying as Speer approached. “Believe me, Keitel,” Hitler continued, “a campaign against Russia would be like a child’s game in a sandbox by comparison.”19 He was still mulling over options when he returned to Berlin, where he was welcomed like a conquering hero.
At that moment, as numerous contemporary records make clear, Hitler reached a new pinnacle of popularity. The majority considered him without question the greatest leader in Germany’s long history. The drive from the railway station to the Reich chancellery was a massive lovefest. The crowds could not throw enough flowers or shout their support loudly enough.
Even as a staunch enemy of the regime admitted, Hitler’s latest victories had magnified his popularity, and he was now generally regarded by ordinary Germans as “invincible.” The people were certain of his victory over the British and the destruction of London and awaited peace in a matter of weeks. They were only puzzled that the landing of German troops was taking longer than expected.20
Within days the public began to notice troop transports heading east and tried to figure out the significance of these moves.21 On July 31, Hitler informed military leaders that the earliest possible date for the invasion of England was September 15. He observed at the same time that Churchill was hanging on because he thought the Soviets would get involved in the war. “With Russia crushed, Britain’s last hope would be shattered. Germany would emerge the master of Europe and the Balkans. Decision: Russia’s destruction must therefore be a part of the struggle. Spring 1941.” These were the cryptic notes taken by Halder on the occasion.22
Hitler was determined to take on Stalin before or as part of defeating the British, even though such an attack went against one of the axioms of his thought—namely the need to avoid a two-front war. He was convinced the British were staying in the war in the belief that the Soviets and perhaps the United States would come in on their side.
The German attack would not only crush the home of “Judeo-Bolshevism,” as Hitler long had hoped, but hasten peace with Britain. Defeating Stalin would also relieve Japanese worries about Soviet encroachments, and that would free up Japan to explore options elsewhere, making it likely the United States would have to become involved to check the Japanese. That would draw the attention of the United States away from Europe and continue to give Hitler a free hand there.
All in all, by mid-1940 Hitler had come to believe he had every reason to see a rosy future. He was already so powerful as to be considered by most experts, including many in America, unstoppable. The consensus was that a German attack on the Soviet Union would succeed in three weeks or even less.
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THE SOVIET RESPONSE
Stalin was by no means idle while Hitler pursued the war against Poland and Western Europe. He boasted to Nikita Khrushchev that the Nazi-Soviet Pact of August 1939 gave the Communists a free hand not only in eastern Poland but in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bessarabia, and Finland. He said, “Hitler wants to trick us, but I think we’ve gotten the better of him.” The boast was that the Soviets also had turned the tables on Britain and France, who had wanted to see the dictators at war with each other. Khrushchev had reservations and after the fact recalled them:
We had a chance to get our head out from in front of our enemy’s rifle, a choice we were pushed into by Western powers. That was our justification for the pact. That is still the way I see it today. However, it was a very difficult step to take at the time. For us Communists, antifascists, a people who stood on philosophical and political ground diametrically
opposed to Hitler, to suddenly join forces in this war—how could we? Certainly the average citizen saw it that way. It was even difficult for us to fathom and to digest. But we were forced into it, and we were getting something out of the deal too.1
What they got was a chance to run roughshod over their neighbors and to transform those societies into mirror images of the Soviet Union.
THE SOVIET ATTACK ON POLAND
Stalin ordered the attack on Poland on September 17. According to Molotov’s brutally frank note to the Polish ambassador, that country had ceased to exist, and the USSR could not “remain indifferent when its blood brothers” there were left to their fate. The Red Army was thus ordered “to cross the frontier and to take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western White Russia.” Molotov said they would also “take every step to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and give them an opportunity to live a peaceful life.” That is to say, they would impose Communism.2 On September 28, the Soviets signed a “friendship and frontier treaty” with Germany that recognized a mutual frontier between them running the length of the former Polish state. Both sides then did what they wanted with their spoils.3
Poland had not reckoned with this turn of events and maintained only the small Frontier Defense Corps (KOP, with around eleven thousand troops) on the border with the Soviet Union. Before his escape over the border, the supreme commander of the Polish forces ordered cessation of resistance to the Red Army. Communications were in chaos, and some Polish units, including the KOP, opened fire anyway. The result was a disaster. The war against their former Soviet allies cost the Polish armed forces at least 50,000 lives, and an unknown number were wounded or missing in action. Molotov admitted at the time that the losses of the Soviet forces were 737 killed and 1,862 wounded.4
Lenin, Stalin, and Hitler Page 43